



International Relations and World Politics since 1919

S N DHAR





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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND
WORLD POLITICS
SINCE 1919

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS SINCE 1919

SAILENDRA NATH DHAR



KALYANI PUBLISHERS
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PREFACE

(4th Edition)

IT IS a matter of satisfaction that within a short time all, or nearly all, copies of the previous edition have been sold out and a new edition is called for. I thank my publishers for the nice get-up and printing of the book as also for fixing a moderate price for it. I heartily congratulate them on their achievement.

In this (fourth) edition, so far as the author is concerned, the 'book' has received a thorough revision. Sundry mistakes (mostly of a typographic nature) have also been corrected. Some important additions to the text have been made—those in particular which relate to possible developments in international relations in the near or the not too distant future. To mention only a few, the triumph of the method of non-violent non-cooperation in Poland under the leadership of Lech Walesa and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to him together with its significance, the recent *pourparlers* between the high dignitaries of China and the Soviet Union, the Ziang visit to America, the exchange of visits of the dignitaries of other states, all of which indicate the desire for peace among the nations of the world, have been dealt within the book. The unsettled conditions in the Middle East due largely to the *debacle* of the P.L.O., the Iraq-Iran War, etc. have been dealt with. Altogether, the book has been made as up-to-date as possible.

It is expected that the same warm reception that was accorded to the previous edition by all concerned would be given to the present edition.

Calcutta
1986

S.N. DHAR

PREFACE

(1st Edition)

THIS book is designed primarily to meet the needs of students offering International Relations and World Politics as a subject or subjects for various University and Public Service examinations. I hope, however, that it will be found useful also to others—and specially to the politically conscious sections of the general public who, having little time to spare for scholarly volumes, are yet keen on keeping themselves abreast of the main developments in world affairs of the times and their correlations.

I hope, also, that the book will help those who want to go in for higher and/or specialized studies on the subject, and specially for their use I have appended, under the caption "Reading References", a list of books, magazine articles, etc. which, along with many others, were consulted by me in preparing this work, and many of which, I trust, are readily available. I acknowledge my special indebtedness to the works mentioned in the list.

I would like to mention that I began to write the book a few years back, and continued to make additions and alterations till practically the pages were printed, with a view to making the treatment up-to-date. The order of the chapters, as originally planned, was also changed, so that what are now earlier chapters were in some cases actually written later than some others which are at present later ones, and *vice versa*.

Calcutta

27 January 1965

S.N. DHAR

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
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PART ONE

1919—1941



CHAPTER I

THE PEACE SETTLEMENT, 1919-23

PEACE PRELIMINARIES

GERMANY having sued for peace (6 October 1918) and the Allies consented to grant it to her (5 November 1918), the Armistice Agreement was concluded between the two sides (11 November 1918), and the Allies summoned a conference at Paris with a view to settling the final terms of peace. The conditions on which Germany asked for peace and on which the Allies consented to grant it were embodied in the Armistice Agreement, which thus provided the legal basis for the final settlement. Briefly, they were the American President's address to Congress on 8 January 1918 (containing the so-called Fourteen Points), subject to some reservations made thereon by the Allies, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses—the Principles Speech (11 February 1918), the Four Ends Speech (4 July 1918) and the Five Particulars Speech (29 September 1918). The Fourteen Points were, briefly, as follows :

- (1) Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at ;
- (2) Freedom of the seas ;
- (3) Free international trade ;
- (4) Reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety ;
- (5) A just colonial policy ;
- (6) Evacuation of Russian territory and leaving Russia free to determine her political development ;
- (7) Evacuation and restoration of Belgium without attempting to limit her sovereignty ;
- (8) Evacuation of invaded French territory and cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France ;
- (9) Readjustment of the frontiers of Italy along clearly recognizable lines of nationality ;
- (10) Autonomous development of the peoples of Austria-Hungary ;

(11) Evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro; Serbia being accorded free access to the sea ;

(12) Autonomous development for the nationalities in the Turkish Empire, the Turkish provinces being assured a secure sovereignty ;

(13) An independent Poland with a free and secure access to the sea ;

(14) A general association of nations under specific covenants affording guarantee to all states.

The Paris Conference differed from the Vienna Congress of 1815 in that it was controlled by the "delegates of free peoples freely elected" instead of by autocratic rulers of states. But, as after the fall of Napoleon, so after the First World War, a new order was devised not in open conference and by free deliberations of the assembled delegates, but by compromises arrived at in secret conclaves among a few heads of Great Powers—Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, the last-named often finding that he was not of much importance. So far as at least outward appearances went, the American President occupied a position of special importance in the Conference : it was American arms that had turned the scale in the late war and it was the American President's noble utterances of war and peace aims that had captured the imagination of the world, and had even, by their corrosive effects on the morale of the enemy—they had held out the promise of a peace based on justice, "without cession and without indemnity"—weakened the German "home front" and compelled the military leaders to sue for an armistice.

The President is generally considered as having committed a mistake in deciding to head the American delegation in person, instead of deputing Secretary of State Lansing for the task. He should have been stronger, it has been thought, sitting tight on his chair at the White House and guiding by written instructions the American delegation at the Conference. Face to face with his astute European colleagues, and seeking to counter their realistic arguments with words of idealism, he often felt unhappy—and once even decided to withdraw altogether from the Conference. On other thoughts, however, he stayed on ; he accepted compromises, one after another, on many points at issue ; ultimately, it seems, he pinned himself on one article of faith—the establishment of the League of Nations, which was to rectify all

the blunders of the peace-making, and to be the saviour of the world. In any case, even before he came to Paris, he had accepted, at the behest of his European allies, two important modifications of his Fourteen Points. First, the latter had reserved to themselves complete freedom on the subject of the freedom of the seas, neither his own country nor Great Britain having observed the principle in their blockade of Germany and the latter never having accepted the principle as applicable in war; and secondly, with regard to his declaration that compensation should be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies by her aggression by land and sea and from the air.

The framing of peace treaties in any case was found to be no easy task at Paris. The peace-makers' hands were tied by (i) wartime declarations, such as the famous statement of Mr. Lloyd George that they were not fighting to deprive Turkey of any part of her Asiatic possessions, and (ii) the Secret Treaties by which the Allies had apportioned enemy territories to one other—sometimes the very same territories to a number of themselves, and in utter violation of their professed principles and open declarations, many of which—promises and allocations—were impossible of implementation. To give one example, by a pact signed in London (25 April 1915), they had purchased Italy's adhesion by promising her the cession of not only Trentino and Trieste, which were genuinely Italian, but Southern Tirol, which was German, and most of the eastern coast of the Adriatic, which was predominantly South Slav as well as imperialistic compensations in Africa and the Ottoman Empire. President Wilson, who at least officially was unaware of these Secret Treaties (which the world knew about by the Russian Bolsheviks finding them in the Tsarist archives and publishing them forthwith), naturally refused to be bound by them. In particular, he objected to the cessions promised to Italy, many of which conflicted with the claims of Slav nationalism. This led to ugly scenes at the Paris Conference, such as Orlando's temporary withdrawal from the confabulations, the fall of his cabinet, and ultimately the rise of Mussolini to power.

Again, before the Conference could assemble in Paris, and in advance of territorial settlements which were expected to be made by it, and, in some cases, in defiance of what it was be-

lieved to be intending to do, territories were seized by governments and peoples who were the beneficiaries of the war. The whole of Central and Eastern Europe, indeed, was convulsed by a number of revolutions, while the peace-makers talked on at Paris, and many important territorial changes were thereby effected. In most of these cases the Conference leaders found that they had no other option left to them but to accept the *fait-accompli*. Finally, though they worked hard and for long at reconciling conflicting claims and devising some equitable settlement, they had to bow to the mounting clamour in all the Allied capitals, and most of all in Paris, in the press and on the platform, in favour of the strictest terms being granted to the enemy. By and large, Georges Clemenceau, the French Premier—aptly nicknamed the Tiger—was the most dominating figure at the Conference and stood forth as the very embodiment of the prevalent spirit of revenge, basing it at the same time on the solid argument of French security.

Though the principal heads of the states represented at the Conference had arrived at Paris by the middle of December 1918, the first formal meeting of the body did not open till 18 January 1919, presumably because the date was made to synchronize with the day on which, forty-eight years ago, the German Empire had been proclaimed by an army of invasion in the Chateaux at Versailles. This delay and the long time taken to prepare draft treaty which was presented to the Germans on 7 May 1919, were strongly criticized by the latter, who alleged that they caused the deaths of "hundreds of thousands" of German non-combatants, the Allies having kept up a strict blockade of the German coasts during the period. The delay, which amounted to about six months, may not appear to be too long a one to us of the present generation, who have yet to hear of a peace treaty being concluded with Germany nearly twenty years after the Second World War had terminated. On the other hand, on the Allied side, there were critics who complained that the Big Four "rattled through the business at high speed" with the result that there was much scamped work which had to be done over again.

Another point on which a comparison may be drawn between the two World Wars relates to the military position of the vanquished nations at their termination. The end of the Second World War witnessed a complete disintegration of the *Reich*


with the principal cities of Germany smashed to smithereens by years of aerial bombing and the whole country under thorough military occupation. At the end of the First World War, the military debacle was not so complete, and, on the showing of the technical experts, Germany could possibly have continued the war for another six months. Again, in 1918, though the threat of an Allied occupation of Berlin was uttered many times, there was no actual invasion of the country—with the result that the Nazis could invent the “stab-in-the-back” theory and penalize the Jewish community for betraying Germany to the enemy.

In a broad view of the peace-making at the conclusion of the First World War it includes, besides the treaties with the principal enemy powers, a number of agreements which arose out of them and were left over when the Conference broke up. The last of the peace treaties, viz. the Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey was signed on 23 July 1923. The Peace Settlement, understood in this sense, includes the following: (1) the Armistice Agreement, which formed the judicial basis of the entire settlement; (2) the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, the most important of, and the model for, all the treaties (20 June 1919); (3) the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria (10 September 1919); (4) the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria (27 November 1919); (5) the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary (4 June 1920); (6) the Minority Treaties, agreements as to the distribution of the Mandated Territories, agreements as to the distribution of reparations among the Allied Powers themselves, (7) early modifications of, or additions to, the original peace treaties, such as the Rapallo Agreement temporarily settling the Italo-Yugoslav issue; (8) the territorial changes brought about by the early plebiscites, such as those in Schleswig, Klagenfurt, Allenstein, Marienwerder, and Upper Silesia; and (9) the original decisions of the Reparation Commission, fixing the amount of the German bill for reparations.

The bases of the territorial redistribution effected under the treaties, broadly labelled as the Treaties of Peace, 1919-20, may be reduced to three:

(1) Compensation for damage done to Allied territory in the course of the war;

(2) Restitution of territories formerly appropriated by force against the wishes of the population;



(3) Recognition of ethnological claims.

Under the first, the rarest cause, the Saar basin was ceded to France on certain conditions as an act of retribution for wilful destruction of French coal mines by the German armies during the war; and Moresnet and its woods were incorporated into Belgium for the destruction by the enemy of Belgian forests. The most important example of the second cause was to be seen in the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, which also came under the eighth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Under the same heading also fell the restoration of Poland, but in this case the racial factor entered. It had formed the thirteenth among the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. Certain territories which were not Polish at the time of her partition were included in her new frontiers, or were to be subjected to a plebiscite of the inhabitants on the score that their population was predominantly Polish. Thus Upper Silesia, pending a plebiscite, was incorporated in Poland. In the third case—that is, adjustments which were made solely on ethnic grounds—there were three important examples: (1) the formation of an independent state, Czechoslovakia, consisting of those districts, including the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, in which the Czech race predominated; (2) the union with Serbia of the Southern Slav elements which predominated in the Southern and Adriatic provinces of the old Austrian empire, under the name of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia); and (3) the addition to Rumania of Transylvania and the Bukovina districts in which the Rumanian elements have been in perpetual conflict with their Magyar rulers since the eleventh century.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

At no stage of the framing of the treaty during the six months of confabulations at the Paris Conference were the Germans ever asked to have a share or part of the proceedings. On 7 May 1919, the draft treaty was presented to the German delegation headed by the Foreign Minister, Count Rantzau, and they were given three weeks during which to give any written objections, if any. With only one change, viz. the decision to have a plebiscite in Upper Silesia, the Germans were asked either to accept

or reject the treaty on pain of a march to Berlin. All German objections being found unavailing, the National Assembly of the German Republic decided to accept the treaty, after a few stormy sessions, during which Scheidemann, the Minister-President, declared: "Let the hand wither that signs it." On 28 June the Germans appended their signatures to it, and, on the following day, the National Assembly, by 208 votes to 115, approved the act. The nation thereafter held that the treaty was imposed on them by brute force, and, as *Versailles Dictat*, was not morally binding on them.

The principal territorial changes effected under the treaty (in Europe) were the following: (1) France recovered Alsace and that part of Lorraine that she had lost in 1871. (2) Belgium got back Eupen and Malmedy; she also got Moresnet in partial compensation for the destruction of her forests by the Germans. (3) Denmark received the northern part of Schleswig. (This was as the result of the plebiscite held under the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, in which the northern part voted for union with Denmark and the southern part for union with Germany.) (4) Germany also lost her Polish-speaking districts, most of Posen and West Prussia, the district of the Kashubes and that part of Upper Silesia which, after and in spite of the result of the plebiscite taken in 1921, was awarded by the Council of the League of Nations to Poland (see below). (5) The Saar valley was formed into an area under the control of an international commission and the League. Its coal mines were ceded to France. It was decided that at the end of fifteen years a plebiscite would be held in order to ascertain whether the inhabitants wanted (a) to return to Germany, (b) to unite with France, or (c) to remain under the existing arrangements. (6) Memel was ceded to the Principal Allies and was handed over to Lithuania in 1924. (7) A small bit of Upper Silesia was ceded to Czechoslovakia. (8) Under Article 80 of the treaty Germany acknowledged and undertook strictly to respect the independence of Austria, and agreed that the independence shall be inalienable except with the assent of the League Council. On 22 September 1919, the Allies compelled Germany to sign a declaration nullifying Article 61 of the Weimar Constitution which provided for consultative participation of Austria in the German Parliament preceding Austria's "juncture with the German *Reich*", thus

conflicting with the treaty.

As regards the cessions of territory by Germany to Poland, it may be noted that, in obedience to the thirteenth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, Danzig, whose population was almost wholly German, was set up as a Free City under the League of Nations, to be used by Poland as a port, and, in order that the latter might so use it, most of Posen and West Prussia were ceded to her. This territory, which was seized by Frederick the Great in 1772 as his share of the first partition of Poland, now formed the Corridor—260 miles in length and ranging up to 80 miles in depth—and cut Germany in two. It was predominantly Polish in population and claimed by the Poles as national territory, and besides giving the new Poland facility for access to the sea, had great strategic value. Frederick the Great had said: "Whoever holds the course of the Vistula is more fully the master of that country (Poland) than the king who rules over it." As regards the cession of a part of Upper Silesia to Poland, Dr. W. H. Dawson wrote as follows:

"The French Commissioner assisted the Poles in organization of two brutal and bloody insurrections—one before the voting, in order to terrorize the German inhabitants, and the other, after it, in order to terrorize the Allied Powers. . . . The second had the effect desired, since, though three-fifths of the electorate declared for German sovereignty, the Powers in Paris gave to Poland the best part of the province, including five-sixth of the industrial area and three-quarters of the mines and metallurgical industries." (*Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1936).

Outside Europe, Germany lost all her colonies which virtually went to the Allies in the guise of mandates. These totalled 1,027,000 square miles, and included possessions known as German New Guinea, German Samoa, and lesser areas. The loss was accompanied by a blow to German national pride and sentiment since the sequestration of the colonies was sought to be justified by the Allies by the assertion that Germany's treatment of the native population in her colonies had been cruel and arbitrary. Germany also had to relinquish certain rights and claims she had in China, Siam, Morocco and other countries.

Germany was subjected to certain indignities, which also imposed limitations on her sovereignty. She consented to demilitarize the whole of the left bank of the Rhine and the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 Km. to the east of the Rhine. While retaining her sovereignty over Heligoland, she had to demolish the fortification and to demilitarize it. All fortifications and war materials within Germany were made clean sweep of. The German army was limited to 100,000 men, and the navy to six battleships, six light cruisers, and twelve torpedo boats; in short, virtually to a flotilla for coast defence. The air clauses were the most drastic of all, for they absolutely forbade naval or military air forces. There were to be corresponding reductions in personnel and equipment of all arms. Germany consented to abolish conscription and the General Staff. The Treaty of Versailles further provided for international control of rivers which flow through more than one country. International commissions were set up to control the Rhine, the Oder, the Niemen, the Elbe and the Danube. The Kiel canal was internationalized, though left, subject to this condition, under German administration. Access to the sea was provided for Czechoslovakia by giving her free zones in the harbours of Hamburg and Stettin. Finally, the Rhineland was to be kept under the military occupation of the Allies, but the three zones into which the area was divided were to be evacuated in three successive stages at intervals of five years. It deserves to be specially mentioned that the Allies sought to justify the disarmament of Germany on the express ground that "the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations" might be thereby facilitated—a hope or a promise that never received anything like fulfilment.

The worst blow dealt to the Germans was the compulsory admission of sole responsibility for the war and the consequent liability for payment of reparations, as contained in Article 231 of the treaty, which ran as follows: "The Allied and Associated Powers affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed on them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." It has been argued that this clause was an "assumption of liability" rather than an

ethical, or legal, or historical verdict. That may be so, but the Germans with good reason construed it as a compulsion for admission of sole war guilt, since this theory, which few historians at the present day endorse, was supported by other clauses in the treaty, and by the decision to exclude the Germans from a share of the mandated territories. The Preamble to the Treaty of Versailles stated that the war "originated in the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on July 18, 1914, against Serbia, the declaration of war against Russia on August 1, 1914, and against France on August 2, 1914 and in the invasion of Belgium". The charge was also levelled against Germany clearly in the rejoinder made by the Allies to the note of the German delegation.

Article 237 of the treaty arraigned the former German Emperor "for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties", and provided for his trial as a war criminal by an international tribunal. This clause remained a dead letter, because the Netherlands Government, in whose territory the ex-Kaiser had taken refuge, refused to surrender him in accordance with Allied request. Article 228-30 provided for trial before military tribunals of other "war criminals", and a list of one hundred such persons was drawn up, but, except a very few minor such persons, none could be tried, as extradition could not be secured without fighting. In 1923, Field-marshal Hindenburg, a topmost-ranking "war criminal", was elected President of the German Republic without formal Allied protest.

As we have seen above, the Treaty of Versailles made Germany responsible for loss and damage to the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals "as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies". (Article 231.) The Allied Governments recognized that the resources of Germany were inadequate for a complete restoration of all damages done. They, therefore, limited their demands to compensation being made for all damages done to the civilian population and to their property during the war. The treaty did not fix the total amount of German liability, which was left to be determined by a Reparation Commission to be appointed under its terms, but it fixed the categories of damages to be charged. These were ten in number, and included military pensions and the allowances paid by the Allied

Governments to the families of persons mobilized or serving at the front, thus vastly enlarging German liability. President Wilson's surrender on this point to his French colleagues at the Conference was a surprise to his admirers. On being informed that not a single lawyer in the American delegation could give an opinion in favour of including pensions, all the logic being against it, the President exclaimed: "Logic, Logic! I don't care a damn for logic. I am going to include pensions." (Keynes, quoted by Max Sering, *Germany under the Dawes Plan*.) Further, as a punishment for violating the Treaty of 1839, Germany was asked to reimburse all sums, which Belgium had borrowed from the Allies up to 11 November 1918, together with interest on all these sums at the rate of 5 per cent per annum.

The total amount of reparations to be fixed by the Reparation Commission was to be paid by Germany within a period of thirty years from 1 May 1921. She was, in the meanwhile, directed to pay the equivalent of £1,000,000,000, and forthwith, to make certain deliveries in kind as specified in the treaty.

(i) The right of the Allies was recognized "to the replacement, ton for ton and class for class, of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to war". Germany was, therefore, asked to surrender all her merchant-vessels of 1,600 or more gross tons, one-half of her ships, by tonnage, of 1,000 to 1,600 tons gross; and one-fourth, by tonnage, of her steam trawlers and fishing boats. (ii) For the physical reconstruction of the devastated areas, Germany was to furnish machinery, equipment, tools, and building materials (such as stones, bricks, tiles, wood, window-glass, steel, lime, cement, etc.). (iii) During the three months following the coming into force of the treaty she was to deliver to the French and Belgian Governments livestock (stallions, fillies and mares, bulls, milch cows, rams, sheep, goats) as specified in the treaty. (iv) During the next ten years, she was to find annually 1,000,000 tons of coal for France, 8,000,000 tons for Belgium, and to Italy deliveries amounting on the average to 8,000,000 tons per annum. (v) During each of the three years following the coming into force of the treaty, she was to supply 35,000 tons of benzol, 50,000 tons of coal tar, and 30,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia to France. From all such payments, the expenses of the army of occupation, and certain specified things

were to be met, and the balance, if any, was to be credited to her reparations account.

Germany was to restore within six months of the coming into force of the treaty the trophies, archives, historical souvenirs, or works of art carried away by her forces from France during the Franco-German War or the last war, and, particularly, the French flags and political papers taken away during the former. Similarly, she was to deliver to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz the original Qoran of the Caliph Othman, which was removed from Medina by the Turkish authorities and was presented to the ex-Kaiser William II. She was also required to hand over to His Britannic Majesty the skull of the Sultan Mkwawa which was removed from the Protectorate of German East Africa and taken to Germany (Articles 245 and 246). Germany also undertook to furnish to the University of Louvain manuscripts, books, etc. corresponding in number and value to those destroyed by the burning of the University by Germany. She also undertook to hand over to Belgium two paintings which were at the time in Germany (Article 247).

The total area lost by Germany by her various cessions of territory was about 28,000 sq. miles with a total population of a little more than seven million souls. The economic losses incidental to these territorial cessions were heavy. Most of her iron ore went with the cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France. Lead, zinc, and coal mines were lost through the division of Upper Silesia, and 15 per cent of her agricultural products went to Poland. The cession of the Saar coal mines to France cost the *Reich* one-quarter of her coal supply. Rubber, copra, and other products went with the colonies. The German merchant marine was in large part handed over to Great Britain in compensation for ships sunk by U boats.

THE TREATY OF ST. GERMAIN

The Allies rejected the contention of the Austrian delegation at the Peace Conference that the republic of "German-Austria" which had been created on 12 November 1918 should be treated not as the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but as a successor state like Czechoslovakia or Poland. They insisted on considering "Austria" as having replaced the old monarchy, and made

her responsible for loss and damage caused to the Allies by the latter. They virtually forbade the union of Austria and Germany—the *Anschluss* as it was called—which both countries desired, by providing that it could not be done without a unanimous vote of the League Council, (where France was sure to turn it down).

The Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, which was signed by the Austrian delegation on 10 September 1919, followed closely the Treaty of Versailles. Part I contained the Covenant of the League of Nations. Part II detailed the borders of the new Austrian State. The Allies had decided at an early stage that President Wilson's Fourteen Points and other pronouncements were not to apply to Austro-Hungary. President Wilson had himself intimated to the Austro-Hungarian Government that Article 10 of his Fourteen Points providing for autonomous development of their subject peoples no longer applied and that the latter must be left free to determine their own fates. Hungary had already been recognized as a separate state. The newly formed state of Czechoslovakia was also recognized. The Tirol south of the Brenner pass, inhabited by a quarter-million Germans, was ceded to Italy. Bohemia, Moravia, part of Lower Austria, and most of Austrian Silesia went to constitute Czechoslovakia, along with some three million Germans who were strengthened in their national consciousness by compact settlement in a region called Sudetanland, which bordered immediately on Germany. The industrialized Teschen district was eventually divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia, who both laid claim to it. Rumania received Bukovina. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Dalmatian coast and islands went to Yugoslavia. The net result was that, whereas the Austro-Hungarian empire, prior to the First World War, with an area of 240,456 sq. miles was the largest of the European States excepting Russia, the new Austria was a tiny, land-locked state with about 31,756 sq. miles only, hardly bigger than the Serbia which Austria-Hungary in 1914 had attempted to destroy.

THE TREATY OF NEUILLY

The Treaty of Neuilly, signed on 27 November 1919, took away from Bulgaria the Southern Dobruja, which was transferred to

Rumania; Caribod and Strumica, which were given to Yugoslavia; her recent gains in Macedonia to Greece, and her Aegean coastline, which was transferred to Greece. Thus Bulgaria's transit to the sea, like German transit to East Prussia, was to proceed through alien and unfriendly territory. Bulgaria, moreover, was condemned to pay a heavy indemnity, and she was disarmed so thoroughly that it became difficult to maintain internal order. Her total loss in population was 300,000 souls.

THE TREATY OF TRIANON

Hungary was brought to justice by the Treaty of Trianon, signed on 4 June 1920. The new state was allowed to take the name "Hungary" rather than "the Hungarian Republic", but the Allies warned that a Hapsburg restoration would not be allowed. Hungary lost Transylvania and two-thirds of the Banat of Temesvar, including some one and half million Magyars to Rumania, Croatia-Slavonia, along with half a million Magyars to Czechoslovakia, which also acquired some territory and some half a million Ruthenian inhabitants along with it, to the south and east of the Carpathian mountains, Burgenland or West Hungary to Austria, while the port of Fiume, after being erected into a Free City, eventually went to Italy (1924). The treaty contained armament, reparation and financial and economic clauses after the manner of the Treaty of Versailles. In all it took away from Hungary two-thirds of territory and population.

THE TREATIES OF SEVRES AND LAUSANNE

Like the Hapsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire in Asia collapsed as a result of the First World War. The Arab subjects of the empire, among whom a national feeling was growing for long, had been induced by Allied promises of independence to revolt against their masters. At the end of the war, however, Arab hopes were dashed to the ground, and Iraq and the eastern Mediterranean territories of the empire were placed under mandate to Britain and France. Britain supported a ring of smaller independent Arab sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf, Red sea and Indian Ocean, while Ibn Saud, the ruler of Nejd, by a successful

policy of conquests, succeeded in making a large kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Allies took advantage of Turkey's difficulties to impose upon the Sultan the Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920), which was modelled on Versailles, and was bitterly opposed by Mustapha Kemal, later known as Atatürk, and his nationalist supporters. The latter accepted the loss of the Arabian provinces, but rejected the Allied plans to partition the old province of Anatolia. Meanwhile, Venizelos, the Greek Premier, encouraged by the Allies, had landed troops in Smyrna, who inaugurated the campaign with a massacre, which was committed in full view of the Allied troops (15 May 1919).

These happenings enabled Kemal to stir nationalist feeling in Anatolia, and acting officially as the inspector of the army in Anatolia, he began a heroic struggle, in defiance both of the Allies and of the Sultan, that completely transformed the situation. The Allies, now lukewarm in their support of Greece on account of the accession to the throne of that country of the pro-German ex-king, Constantine, and the fall of Venizelos from power, were wise enough to avoid a clash with nationalist Turkey. The terms of a settlement were thrashed out at a conference held in neutral territory, at Lausanne, and on 24 July 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne—the last of the post-war agreements—was signed between the two parties. It practically guaranteed to the Turks all their national demands. The former Arab territories, which were mandated to France and Britain, were not restored, but otherwise Turkey recovered everything that she had possessed in 1914, particularly Smyrna, Constantinople and Eastern Thrace. The clauses of the Sèvres Treaty regarding penalties, reparations and disarmament disappeared. The capitulations were abolished. Within a year, Turkey became a republic, with Kemal as its president, and the office of the Caliph was abolished (see below, Chapter 5).

CHAPTER II

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE GENESIS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE last of the Fourteen Points of President Wilson and the one which, in the midst of the wreck of nearly all his idealistic plans at the Paris Conference, he clung to with single-minded interest and to which he did succeed in giving a concrete shape, was the scheme of the League of Nations. The idea did not originate with him, and some of his contemporaries—among them a few who were his colleagues at the conference—had their own plans for a League of Nations. The adoption by the Peace Conference of the idea of establishing a League of Nations may, however, be counted as a triumph of his diplomacy, although the actual shape the League received as it emerged out of the discussions at the conference bears the impress of more than one mind.

The plan of the League of Nations was embodied in a Covenant, which was prefixed to the Treaty of Versailles and the other major treaties of the Paris peace settlement. Running through the whole document there is Wilson's master mind assisted by the cognate spirit of Lord Robert Cecil, and the two, it would seem, were confronted by and forced to compromise with, the imperialist minds of General Smuts of South Africa and Leon Bourgeois of France. President Wilson, as his fourteenth Point indicated, wanted the League to be an instrument through which peace could be permanently guaranteed by the concerted power and will of the member states. Lord Robert Cecil, hesitant about the notion of enforcement, wanted the League to provide an agency through which conflicts among nations could be forestalled by compelling them to resort to a peaceful procedure of conference, delay and discussion in restraint of war. This was a typically British idea and was reminiscent of the desperate attempts made by Sir Edward Grey in 1914 to induce Austria to agree to refer her dispute with

Serbia to an international conference.

General Smuts closely followed the views of Cecil, but desired that the League should "occupy a much greater position and perform many other functions besides those ordinarily assigned to it". The League, according to him, was to be "the reversionary, in the broadest sense", of the peoples and territories set free by the debacle of the Central Empires and to shoulder the burdens of government of such among them as were unable to rule themselves. To General Smuts is also attributed the suggestion of the setting up of an international secretariat, which was accepted and provided for in Articles 2 and 6 of the Covenant. The French statesman thought of the League as an instrument which was "either to serve as a sword to hasten on the day of victory or as a shield to protect its fruits".

The Wilsonian idea is expressed in the famous Article 10 of the Covenant, without which, said he, the League "would be hardly more than an influential debating society" and on which hinged the main provisions for "sanctions" as laid down in Articles 16 and 17. The notion of Lord Cecil is reflected in Articles 12 (which includes provision for a "cooling off period"—a favourite idea of his), 13 and 14. The idea of Smuts, much changed, is crystallized in the Mandates System of the League, and the allocation to it of a number of administrative duties. The influence of Bourgeois, though slight, made the League-membership confined to allied and neutral nations alone. The League, as finally established, was thus, in reality, three leagues rolled into one—one to execute the peace treaties, another to promote international cooperation, and the third to outlaw war. (W. E. Rappard, *The League of Nations as an Historical Fact*.)

In a sense the League of Nations was the revival and elaboration, or, as Prof. Toynbee thinks, an "institutional replacement" of the idea of a Concert of Europe which had been sought to be set up by Tsar Alexander I and Metternich after the downfall of Napoleon, or of the intangible, but, within limits, fairly effective, "solidarity" among a group of Great Powers, which continued to exist after the fall of the Holy Alliance, and was based on aristocratic and monarchical fellow-feeling. While, however, the old Concert was confined to Europe and was more or less amorphous in composition, the new institution was a world organization, it had a definite membership, and the mem-

bers owed solemn allegiance to a Covenant, under which every member accepted certain duties and responsibilities. The kernel of the obligation of membership of the League was contained in a novel principle, collective security, which implies that every member must seek a peaceful solution of every dispute in which it found itself involved, and also that it must have some share of responsibility for defending every other signatory against aggression. That the members accepted such sweeping obligations was due to one very compelling fact and one rosy hope. The fact was the awful carnage and devastation that the war had involved and the realization that future warfare was going to be increasingly more devastating. The hope was that the war having made the world safe for democracy—imperial crowns were rolling in the dust and the day for the common man was dawning—there would be no more wars or at least no Second World War.

AIMS AND OBJECTS—OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP

The aims and objects of the League were stated in the Preamble to the Covenant in clear and unambiguous language, as follows, "to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security". In pursuance whereof the signatories, each for itself and towards the others, accepted the following obligations :

"Not to exceed, without the concurrence of the Council, the limits once agreed upon for the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations (Article 8, para. 1).

"To interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes, and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes (Article 8, para. 6).

"To respect and preserve as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League (Article 10).

"To submit either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council any dispute likely to lead to a



rupture (Articles 12 and 13).

"To carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered and not to resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith (Article 13).

"To communicate to the League every treaty or international agreement entered into by them, for registration and publication by the Secretariat (Article 18).

"To render to the Council an annual report in reference to the mandated territories committed to their charge (Article 22).

"To endeavour to secure fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children (Article 23/a).

"To secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control (Article 23/b).

"To entrust the League with general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs, and the trade in arms and ammunition (Article 23/c and d).

"To make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communication and transit, and to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of diseases." (Article 23/e and f).

ORGANIZATION

The number of members, when the League started functioning on 10 January 1920, was 24, rising to 41 by the end of the year, to 50 in 1924, to 60 in 1934, and was 43 in 1946, the last year of its life. Germany was not admitted till 1926, nor the Soviet Union till 1934, after Japan and Germany had withdrawn from it that very year. There was no moment in its history when more than five of the Great Powers belonged to it, or when at least two of the Great Powers did not belong to it. The U.S.A. was never a member. In December 1939, Russia was pronounced an "aggressor" for declaring war on Finland, and expelled from membership of the League.

The organization of the League was outlined in the Covenant by which three bodies were definitely constituted: (1) the Assembly, (2) the Council, and (3) the Secretariat, the last being supplemented by certain technical and advisory bodies. Associated with the League were two other essential and autonomous

organizations : (1) the Permanent Court of International Justice and (2) the International Labour Organization.

The Assembly, which consisted of the representatives of the members of the League, each member having one vote and not more than three delegates, met annually at Geneva on the first Monday in September. It would deal with "any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world". The representatives were the delegates of their respective governments, and had no standing except in this capacity. Nevertheless, the general publicity challenged them to present full statements of their case for open discussion and the Assembly under the circumstances acquired the character of an open forum for the expression of the public opinion of the world. The duties of the Assembly included : (1) admission of new members, (2) annual election of the non-permanent members of the Council, (3) approval of addition of members to the Council, (4) approval of the Council's nomination of a Secretary-General, and (5) joint election with the Council of the Judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Except for decisions about procedure and the admission of new members complete unanimity of all members was required.

The Council consisted partly of permanent members, five in number, viz., representatives of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Germany (after 1926), and partly of non-permanent members (the number increased from four to six in 1922, to nine in 1926, to ten in 1933, and to eleven in 1936), annually elected by the Assembly, each member having equally one vote. The chief function of the Council was to hear and consider disputes referred to it, and to report and give advice about what the Assembly should do. It had no power of independent action. It met every September, and also on the appeal of any nation, or when an emergency arose. Among the special powers and functions of the Council, there were the duties of preparing a plan for the reduction of armaments, and supervising the administration of the mandates, which were entrusted to it under the Covenant, and certain tasks assigned to it by the Treaties of Peace, e.g. as trustee for the government of the Saar to appoint the members of the Administrative Commission and receiving a report from it every three months, to appoint the High Commissioner for the Free City of Danzig, which was a protectorate of

the League, and to watch over the protection of the minorities.

The Secretariat of the League consisted of about 600 officials of various grades, and of all nationalities under the authority of the Secretary-General. Incidentally, it was a minor influence for peace, since it was a loyal *corps* of internationally-minded men and women with professional pride in promoting good international relations. The League had a number of auxiliary organizations : (1) technical organizations such as those dealing with the world problems of health, narcotics, white slave traffic, communications and transport, and finance and (2) special organizations, such as dealing with such problems as refugees (the Nansen International Office), research on leprosy (at Rio de Janeiro), and intellectual co-operation (in Paris). The constructive work carried on by these bodies, though not spectacular in their influence, was very valuable, as it fostered co-operation and brotherly feeling among the nations of the world. They took and carried on the work already being performed by existing institutions, but they co-ordinated all such work and did it on a broader and vaster scale.

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

The same idealism which gave birth to the League of Nations was also responsible for the creation of two important auxiliary organizations, viz., the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The Court was duly set up at the Hague in 1922, and, unlike the Hague Tribunal established by the Peace Conference in 1897, was a permanent institution. It dealt only with specifically legal disputes between states, such as those arising from alleged breaches of treaties or different interpretations of international law. Like the League in all its aspects, it depended on the will of the adherents to use it and on their good faith to implement its findings. The U.S.A. did not join it. The constitution of the ILO was appended to the peace treaties like the Covenant of the League. It had its separate annual general conference to which each member state sent four delegates—two representing the government, a third the employers' organizations and a fourth the workers' organizations. The ILO also had its own

Secretariat, which was located in Geneva, and national offices in the major countries. Its budget was part of the League budget. It worked by getting states to ratify agreed codes of labour conditions and relations. Its own decisions were not binding except in so far as governments legislated or acted on them. It did useful work and has survived the Second World War.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The main object with which the League of Nations was created was the prevention of war and, so that this might be brought about, to provide for ways and means for the amicable settlement of disputes among nations and for averting a threat of war. Naturally, a number of provisions were made in the League Covenant for the attainment of this end and effectively to put into operation the various methods suggested therein for ensuring the maintenance of peace in the world. The chief idea on which the whole arrangement provided in the League Covenant for world peace hinged was the principle of Collective Security. This was clearly expressed in Article 10 of the Covenant, which may be described as the core of the League's peace programme. Under this the members undertook "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League". Article 11 further stated that "any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not" was to be considered as "a matter of concern to the whole League" and that the League "shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations".

Should there be a threat of war, or should war actually break out, how was the League to act? In reply to this question it may be stated that, first, all members of the League undertook, under Article 12 of the Covenant, in case a dispute arose between any two or more of them that might lead to a rupture, "that they will submit it either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council"; and consequently the parties themselves were in the first instance to exhaust all methods of settlement of their disputes before the League could take cognizance of them. Under Article 11, it was "declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of

the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations" which threatened peace anywhere in the world. In any case of a threat of war or of a war having actually broken out, that is in all cases in which the members of the League might be called upon to carry out their obligations under Article 10, under the same Article, a special responsibility vested in the Council, "which shall advise upon the means by which the obligation shall be fulfilled".

In any case of an emergency of this nature, Article 11 required the Secretary-General "on the request of any member of the League forthwith to summon a meeting of the Council". The case could then be submitted to arbitration or judicial decision, and, as an added inducement to such forms of settlement, the members undertook, under Article 13, "to carry out in good faith any award or decision that may be rendered", and not to go to "war against a member who complies therewith". The arbitral and judicial methods are described in Articles 13 and 14 respectively. All cases of disputes not submitted to arbitration or to judicial decision must, under Article 15, be submitted to the Council and all relevant facts and papers pertaining to such cases must be submitted to the Secretary-General "who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof" (Article 15).

Article 15 laid down the procedure to be followed by the Council in all cases, that is those which were not submitted to arbitration or to judicial settlement. (1) Disputes could be brought to the attention of the Council by one or more of the states parties to the dispute or by a disinterested member of the League. (2) The jurisdiction of the League did not extend to matters solely of domestic concern. (3) Parties were to be heard on a footing of equality, their representatives sitting as members of the League Council at any meeting during which the matters affecting them were considered. (4) The representatives of the states parties to the dispute, even if they were members of the Council, had no vote in deciding the dispute. (5) If the decision of the Council was unanimous, members agreed "that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the Council". (6) If the Council could not take a unanimous decision, members "reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary

for the maintenance of right and justice". However, as under Article 12, members agreed "in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the report of the Council". Three months could be considered as a "cooling off" time, during which tempers might improve and a frame of mind favourable to peaceful consideration of the problems might come into being.

The League mechanism for the preservation of world peace was provided with "teeth" under Article 16 which outlined "Sanctions of Pacific Settlement". Under the provisions of this Article, in the first place, an attack upon a nation abiding by the decision either of the Assembly or of the Council was declared to be an act of war against all the members of the League. The aggressor was to be subjected to immediate "severance of all trade or financial relations", and the losses which League members might undergo by imposing a boycott were sought to be minimized by their undertaking the obligation of giving each other mutual support in carrying out the measures. If economic sanctions failed to have the desired result the Council might "recommend" to the governments concerned "what effective military, naval or air forces the members of the League shall severally contribute to be used to protect the covenants of the League". Members obligated themselves to "mutually support one another" in these respects, and "to afford passage through their territory to the force of any of the members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League". The obligation to use sanctions, or for that matter all obligations under the League Covenant that the Council might decide upon, were, however, subject to the provisions of Article 5 of the Covenant which imposed the unanimity rule on the decisions of the Council in all such cases. No member of the Council could, therefore, be required to impose any kind of sanctions, including going to war, to carry out its obligations under the Covenant.

The framers of the Covenant did not want that the League should confine itself to a merely negative role of prohibiting war and recommending "sanctions" against nations engaged in it by violating its provisions. They wanted the League positively and constructively to uproot the causes that underlay war and to organize peace. The central agencies of the League—Secre-

tariat, Council and Assembly—were designed for this long-range purpose of preventing war, and so was the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was founded in 1922 in accordance with the terms of the Covenant. As, further, it was believed that in the past secret treaties had contributed to war, the framers of the Covenant sought to prohibit them by various ways. First, it was laid down that treaties should be published and that none should be binding unless registered with the Secretariat (Article 18). In the second place, all League members had to pledge that they should abrogate all existing “obligations or understandings” inconsistent with the obligations of the Covenant and would not enter into new ones (Article 20), though exception was made—at American insistence—in case of “regional understandings such as the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace” (Article 21). The Covenant also recognized that, in a changing world, it was dangerous to insist too rigidly on a *status quo* consecrated by treaties that had become obsolete. It expressly enabled the Assembly to “advise the reconsideration, by members of the League, of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world” (Article 19).

Furthermore, the Covenant aimed at doing away with big competitive armaments, which were generally regarded as a major cause of past war. It therefore obliged the members of the League to recognize that “the maintenance of peace required the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety” (Article 8) and also that “the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections”, and it instructed the Council to formulate plans alike for the limitation of armaments and for the prevention of “the evil effects” attendant on their private manufacture (Article 8).

THE “GAPS” IN THE COVENANT—THE CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE

The framers of the League Covenant did not accept the pacifist position of the immorality of all war, and war was not absolutely forbidden by the Covenant. Armed rebellion and civil war were

plainly excluded from the League's jurisdiction by a stipulation in Article 15. League members might be required to wage war against a state or states declared to have committed an act of aggression in violation of the Covenant. Even international war might legally be waged if the parties to it had previously submitted their dispute to mediation and the Council had failed to reach a unanimous decision. "This was the notorious 'fissure' in the Covenant, perhaps its weakest spot." Even to prevent "illegal" wars, the League, having no armed forces of its own or at its ready command, could rely only upon "the moral obligation" which its members had assumed under the Covenant. Imperialist outrages on the liberties of subjugated peoples were covered under the "domestic jurisdiction" formula accepted in the League Covenant and the acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine might condone possible American sins in Latin America.

Apart from the moral objections to the League's attitude to war, there were certain "gaps" or "flaws" in the Covenant which rendered it an inefficient instrument for carrying out even the limited objective it had set before itself under the terms of the Covenant. As events showed, the provisions of the Covenant for dealing with threats to war or terminating one which had broken out did not deter at least a strong nation that was bent on carrying out its will, from an act of aggression and could not check its aggressive course, and, far less, compel it to repair the wrongs it had committed or to disgorge its unlawful gains. Since the Covenant only forbade war (under certain circumstances), and not the use of force, Japan could carry on extensive military operations in the Chinese outlying province of Manchuria or even in Mainland China itself and virtually annex Manchuria (adding to it the Chinese province of Jehol) without waging war and, thus, without violating the Covenant and being named an aggressor by the League. Whatever may have been the original idea in the minds of the founders of the League, it was converted into simply an agency for fostering international amity by arbitration and conciliation instead of becoming a powerful body for enforcing peace. There were, indeed, two ideas of the functions of the League, viz. the Anglo-American conception of the League as a body using persuasion and the French one of maintaining peace (primarily the Peace Settlement of Paris) by force. The failure of the United States to become a member of

the League of Nations virtually knocked out the second conception. Further, such was the war-weariness in Great Britain in the post-war years and so loud the demand voiced by the Liberal and Labour Opposition for disarmament and against rearmament that it was impossible for her to support any action proposed in the League which might land her in war. The failure of the League to resist aggression and prevent war ought therefore to be ascribed to the inability or the unwillingness of the principal members of the League, and notably Great Britain and France, to use it properly, rather than to "gaps" or "flaws" in the Covenant, which, as we have seen, existed.

THE SYSTEM OF MANDATES

The disposal of the German colonies and of the non-Turkish provinces of the Ottoman Empire was an embarrassing problem for the Peace Conference. The victors did not want to return them to their former possessors, nor was it decent for them to annex them outright to their own empires. As a compromise between war-time principles and old-world facts, the so-called Mandates System was devised. Article 22 of the League Covenant stated that the former German and Turkish possessions, "which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" were entrusted to "advanced nations" acting as the mandatories of the League. The "well-being and development" of such peoples was to "form a sacred trust of civilization" and the mandatory powers were not to derive any benefits from them.

The allocation of the mandated territories was made by the Allied Supreme Council in May-August 1919. Their disposal depended on a number of factors, such as the development of the mandated peoples, the geographical situation of the territories, their economic condition, etc. They were accordingly divided into three classes, A, B, and C. Class A comprised the former Turkish vilayets of Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, whose independence could "be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance until they are able to stand alone". Class B included the ex-German Central African colonies—Togoland, the Cameroons, Tanganyika and Ruanda—with respect to which the mandatory was responsible for the

administration and undertook to promote the moral and material welfare of the people. Tanganyika and a small part of the Cameroons and Togo fell to Great Britain, the larger portion of the two latter being assigned to France, while Belgium got Ruanda. Class C mandates were those which could "be best administered under the laws of the mandatory as portions of its territory, subject to the safe-guards" mentioned in the case of Class B. They were South-West Africa, Western Samoa, former German Pacific Islands south of the Equator, and they were mandated respectively to South Africa, New Zealand, Australia and Japan.

In accordance with the provision of the League Covenant, a Permanent Mandates Commission was duly set up and approved by the Council on 1 December 1920. It consisted of ten, later eleven, members, the majority of whom were nationals of the mandatory powers. They could not hold office in direct dependence on their governments, but could be such persons as university professors. The Commission received annual reports from the mandatories through the latter's authorized representatives, examined them in their presence, but determined its conclusions in their absence though under obligation to communicate its observations to them and to include the replies received in the report which it sent to the League Council. Inhabitants of mandated territories were allowed to send petitions to the Commission, but they were to be through the mandatories, who made comments on them as they liked. The Commission circulated them among the members of the League, but as both the Commission and the League lacked authority over the mandatories, and were little more than publicizing agents, the ultimate authority to which the stewardship of the mandatories was submitted was world public opinion, whatever that meant.

THE PROTECTION OF THE MINORITIES

In spite of the attempt made at the Peace Conference to apply the principle of self-determination to all territorial changes made in the treaties of peace, large minorities were still left under, or transferred to alien rule, e.g. Germans under Poles, Czechs, and Italians, Magyars under Rumanians, and so on. It was mostly unavoidable, but it raised formidable difficulties. In many of

these cases, the minorities were ex-enemy nationals passing under the rule of peoples who were their erstwhile subjects, and suffered from the psychological effects of change of place. To give them any special protection against unjust treatment at the hands of their new masters might offend the latter's sovereign rights and hurt their national pride. Under the circumstances the peace-makers devised the plan of asking the states concerned, viz. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Greece, to sign special minorities treaties. The principles of minorities protection embodied in these treaties were later embodied in other documents, viz. the Peace Treaties with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, and also extended, through the instrument of the League, to some other states, e.g. Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, etc. Most of the minorities agreements provided that infraction of the accepted obligations might be called to the attention of the Council by any member of that body.

There was nothing about the minorities in the Covenant of the League, which had no means of interfering in the case of the minorities other than those dealt with under the minorities treaties. The Great Powers did not sign any such documents, and, in spite of protests of international organizations interested in the subject and others, nothing was done to universalize the principles for minorities protection. This discrimination between the Great Powers and the small fry caused considerable heart-burn among the latter, and as late as 13 September 1935, Col. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, declared that, pending the enactment of a general and uniform system, Poland refused to accept League supervision of her minorities. Minorities treaties could not whitewash imperialism.

The machinery set up by the League to secure the execution of the minorities obligations consisted of five distinct parts : the Secretariat, the Committee of Three, the Council, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the Assembly. The Minorities Section of the Secretariat was entrusted with the duty of receiving petitions from or on behalf of the minorities, and unless they were anonymous, irrelevant, or unduly violent in tone, they were to send them to the members of the Council with such comments as the governments concerned would think fit to make on them. The President of the Council, with two of his colleagues, formed the Committee of Three to examine, and, if they

found it to be necessary, to forward them to the Council at its plenary session. The Council could ask the Permanent Court of International Justice to give its decision or advisory opinion on questions of law or fact arising out of the minorities treaties themselves. Finally, the Assembly, in reviewing the work of the Council or of the Secretariat at its annual session, could express its satisfaction or regret as to what was done or omitted in the past, as well as its hopes or apprehensions for the future.

The procedure was not satisfactory, as delays occurred at every stage of the transit of a petition to the Council and the minority committees worked in secret—which, however, had some compensating advantages, since the government concerned could make concessions without loss of prestige. The most serious defect in the system was the fact that in no stages were the minorities or the petitioners heard and the committees never undertook investigations on the spot. The Council of the League, not a judicial but a political organ, was ill-suited to the task and it resorted to only measures of conciliation and compromise. No wonder the dissatisfaction of the minorities mounted everywhere; it was bitter complaints of the German minorities in Czechoslovakia, Memel, Danzig, and Poland which created the situation that led to the Second World War.

After Germany's admission to the Council in 1926, the minorities found a vigorous champion of their cause, and it was as the result of strong criticisms of the League's handling of the minorities by the German and Canadian representations at the Council session of 25 December 1928, that, at its following session at Madrid on 13 June 1929, a few notable changes were introduced. They included the following: (1) Petitioners were henceforth to be informed when their petition was judged unacceptable. (2) In case a Minority Committee, after investigating a case, merely submitted a report, and did not ask for its inclusion in the agenda of the Council, it was to inform the members of the Council about its findings by letter. (3) A Minority Committee could publish its results if the interested state agreed to it. (4) In order that the general public might have some means of knowing how the League acquitted itself in its task of minorities protection, the Secretary-General must publish in the official journal once a year statistics showing, (a) the number of petitions received by the Secretariat in the course of the year,

(b) the number of petitions declared unacceptable, (c) the number of petitions accepted, (d) the number of committees and the number of committee meetings, and (e) the number of petitions the examination of which was concluded in the course of the year.

The position did not seem to improve very much, or radically, and Germany herself did not take much interest in minorities of other nations than her own, and she could not sit in most of the Minority Committees that were set up, since, in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Council on 10 June 1925, the representative of the state to which the persons belonging to the minority in question were subjects and the representative of a state, a majority of whose population belonged, from the ethnic point of view, to the same people as the minority in question, could not sit on such committees.

CHAPTER III

A CRITIQUE OF THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT

CRITICISM of the Peace Treaties is as old as the Peace Conference itself. Though the chief authors of the settlement, while speaking in public, stoutly defended their own handiwork, they often, in indirect ways, expressed their qualms about it, and, in particular, admitted that it needed to be revised. On the day the decision was taken at the Conference that the League Covenant should be incorporated in the Peace Treaties, President Wilson remarked as follows: "I can easily conceive that many of these settlements will need subsequent reconsideration; that many of the decisions we shall make will need subsequent alteration in some degree." Article 19 of the Covenant actually provided for peaceful revision of treaties that might become inapplicable. It is well known that one of the principal reasons why President Wilson insisted on the establishment of the League of Nations was his consciousness of his failure to have the ideal settlement that he had desired and his expectation that it would be realized gradually through the League.

Mr. Lloyd George generally supported Mr. Wilson, and even at the eleventh hour of the signature of the treaties attempted to have some of the provisions altered in favour of Germany. His efforts to have what he considered as harsh terms mitigated were not usually successful, as M. Clemenceau supported the decisions. He reaped as he had sown; he had won a general election at home on the slogan, "Hang the Kaiser!", and at one time Lord Northcliffe had confronted him with a mandatory telegram from two hundred M.P.s, rebuking him for supposed leniency to Germany. Another eminent statesman, General Smuts, Premier of South Africa, was equally convinced of the injustice of some of the terms. On the very day that he put his signature to the Treaty of Versailles, he issued a statement in which he spoke of "territorial settlements that will need revision", and of "indemnities stipulated which cannot be exacted without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe".

GERMAN OBJECTIONS TO THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The German delegation at the Peace Conference, though given barely three weeks' time within which to present their objections, if any, to the terms offered to them virtually at the point of the bayonet, managed within that brief time to prepare an able document, subjecting the treaty to a thorough examination from their point of view. In spite of their polemical character, their counterproposals contained many effective arguments, both against the treaty as a whole and against most of its terms. They laboured to show that the treaty was not only a contradiction of its legal basis, viz. the Armistice Agreement, but was harsh and vindictive. Above all, they took their stand on fundamental human rights :

"As there are innate rights of man, so there are innate rights of nations. The inalienable fundamental right of every state is the right of self-preservation and self-determination. With this fundamental right the demand here made upon Germany is incompatible. Germany must promise to pay an indemnity, the amount of which at present is not even stated. The German rivers are to be placed under the control of an international body upon which Germany's delegates are always to be but the smallest minority. Canals and rail roads are to be built on German territory at the discretion of foreign authority. . . ."

The Germans contended that, as the indemnity which was demanded was indefinite, its payment would condemn Germany to a state of slavery. Said they :

"If they impose upon Germany a debt which robs her of every possibility of a future ; if as a consequence of every improvement of Germany's condition, which the German people might achieve by tireless diligence and Spartan thrift, would simply lead to this, that even greater payment would be imposed on us, then . . . the German people would feel themselves condemned to slavery, because anything that they accomplished would benefit neither themselves nor even their children, but merely strangers."

In their formal and official reply to the German note, the Allies emphatically and categorically rejected each and every argument advanced by the Germans against the treaty, and, as regards the contention that the principle of self-determination had been ignored, asserted as follows: "The Allied and Associated Powers emphatically reject the suggestion that there has been any 'bartering about' of peoples and provinces. Every territorial settlement of the treaty of peace has been determined upon after most careful and laboured consideration of all the religious, racial, and linguistic factors in each particular country." They, however, failed to convince the German delegation—and the German nation as a whole—that they were inspired by nothing but a sense of justice and fair play in framing the treaty. The general impression of the treaty on the mind of the common folk in countries outside the Allied ranks, and notably in America, was unfavourable. Even in the Allied countries, after war passions died down, the injustice of many of the provisions of the treaty came to be officially acknowledged and this change of opinion supplied to the later-day "appeasers" like Mr. Neville Chamberlain, their basic *raison d'être*.

THE FOURTEEN POINTS AND THE TREATIES

The German plea that the treaty was an "obvious contradiction" of all the assurances that they had received from President Wilson in his speeches—notably the one containing the Fourteen Points—has raised a good deal of controversy. The point was more than an academic one, since it was an accusation of bad faith on the part of the Allies, and by giving the treaty the character of an imposition on a helpless people by brute force—the *Versailles Diktat*, as the Germans always styled it, insinuated that it could be altered by superior force. The Nazis certainly considered the argument as a complete ethical solvent for all their unilateral violations of the treaty. Along with this argument, and in some cases, deduced from it, were the further objections raised against the treaty—that it was harsh and vindictive—a Carthaginian peace—that it was impossible of fulfilment (particularly so far as the economic provisions were concerned), and, finally, that it sowed the seeds of another war.

The question whether the Treaty of Versailles conformed to President Wilson's Fourteen Points, which both the Allies and the Germans had accepted as the basis of a settlement, has received answers covering a wide range from wholesale acceptance to complete repudiation. A sentimental element has been introduced into the advocacy of the treaty because of the imputation of bad faith. An English writer, Mr. Gathorne-Hardy, has gone so far in the defence of the treaty with respect to this particular point that he has remarked that "the Treaties, broadly considered, were in fact permeated by Wilsonian principles", and that in so far as they may be considered as causing "grave and lasting injuries to international understanding", the mischief was caused not by any departures from the principles but exactly by "those decisions which most faithfully implemented the Fourteen Points". He attributes to sedulous propaganda emanating from the vanquished powers, and specially from Germany, the growth of the "myth" or the "legend" that "the settlement as a whole, and the Treaty of Versailles in particular" was a "vindictive and fraudulent departure from the principles on the faith of which Germany laid down her arms". "On the contrary," says Mr. Gathorne-Hardy, "there has surely never been constructed a peace of so idealist a character."

Mr. Gathorne-Hardy discusses the Fourteen Points of President Wilson point by point, and finds that of these only four, viz. Points 5, 7, 8, and 13 were of substantial interest to Germany, Points 9 to 12 being of interest to Austria-Hungary and Turkey, Point 6 to Russia, and the rest (Points 1 to 4 and Point 14) being general provisions relating to a new world order. The Fourteen Points, however, were intended by the President to lay the foundations of a new European or world order and contained the outlines of territorial rearrangements and an enunciation of principles, which interested all nations and more or less affected them all. In particular, it may be pointed out, the settlement effected in the territories which belonged to the late Austro-Hungarian empire vitally affected Germany, politically and economically. Point 2 (relating to the freedom of the seas) was a German slogan before the First World War and was partly responsible for the creation of a state of Anglo-German tension in the naval field that contributed to the outbreak of the war.

So far as Points 5, 7, 8, and 13 were concerned, Mr. Gathorne-Hardy thinks that the treatment meted out to Germany was "what Germany might expect from surrender on this basis"—the loss of the colonies from Point 5, the evacuation of the occupied territories of France and Belgium and the cession of Alsace-Lorraine from Points 7 and 8, the creation of a Polish state with access to the sea from Point 13, the payment of reparations from the stipulations added by the Allies and accepted by herself, drastic disarmament both from Point 4 and the first of the "Four Ends" speech and so on. He even defends the War Guilt clause, and remarks that "many impartial persons" are convinced that the imputation is substantially correct. The cession of Alsace-Lorraine righted a historic wrong, and was not challenged even by the Germans. But the cession of the colonies cannot be considered as anything other than "the price" paid by Germany for her defeat. It was made needlessly offensive to national pride by the accusation on which it was sought to be justified, that Germany's treatment of her colonial peoples had been cruel. Germany had accepted her liability to pay reparations, but the enormity of the demand and the way it was sought to be extorted were indefensible. The accusation of sole responsibility of Germany for the war is historically questionable, to say the least. The principle of self-determination necessitated the creation of a Polish state with access to the sea, but in the actual delimitation of the German-Polish boundary, political considerations were allowed to override the claims of nationalism, as for example by the division of Upper Silesia. It would be wrong to suppose that everything was plain and above board on this score at the Peace Conference at Paris.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The point needs careful consideration and the verdict cannot rest on dogmatic grounds alone. Both before and during America's participation in the war, President Wilson spoke a lot on the principle of self-determination, which once in never-to-be-forgotten words he described as an "imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril". He certainly championed it to the best of his ability at the Peace Conference, and notable victories for the cause were with-

out doubt gained there. Poland, which even Napoleon had not dared fully or truly to restore, having left the task to be accomplished by the Almighty, was resurrected. Like the Poles, the Czechs and the Slovaks—after centuries of servitude—once again breathed the air of freedom. The praise which goes to the peace-makers for these achievements is, however, subject to certain qualifications. When Wilson and other Allied statesmen were speaking of the applicability of the principle of self-determination to the subject-peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires they knew that in their mouths the phrase was a battle-cry, an incitement to them to revolt against their masters. It cannot be denied that, after their purpose was served, they in many cases forgot the promises that had been very freely made. In defence of the Allies, it has, however, been argued that the claims of nationalism are not absolute, and that they have to be—in an imperfect world—considered in the context of economical, geographical and historical realities. It has been also argued that the choice in politics is not always a straight one—between a wrong and a right—and that it has to be quite often a choice between one right and another right. The restoration of Poland was a fundamental fact; to ensure it a safe strategic and economic existence, the Allies allotted to it a few enclaves of German territory, such as Bromberg. On the same ground, the so-called corridor was provided to Poland. Then, again, in Central and Eastern Europe, there is such a mosaic of nationalities that absolute justice could not be done to the claim of one of them without some sacrifice of the claim of another. In such adjustments of conflicting claims, however, almost invariably, gains of territory fell to the share of the victor nations, or their proteges, and it was the lot of the vanquished to suffer losses. If there was any consistent principle that the peace-makers followed, it was "*Vae Victis*" (woe to the vanquished) as the Gaulish chief had expressed it.

The most notable exceptions to the right of self-determination were the creation of the Free City of Danzig (stemming from Wilson's promise to give the Poles access to the sea), the prohibition of the union of Germany and Austria, the provisional separation of the Saar basin from Germany for the purpose of reparations, and the transfer to the newly created state of Czechoslovakia of nearly three million Germans (*Sudetendeutsche*)

so that it might have a strategic frontier. Yet, it has been estimated that there were fewer minorities left under alien rule in 1919 than there were in 1914. Before the First World War, there were twenty-eight million subject people under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy alone. In the same region, in 1919, there were left less than fourteen million. Again, if from these we deduct those minorities who were left under the same alien rule and those who merely changed their masters and were not much worse off for the change, viz. the non-Germans and the non-Magyars who were left in Austria and Hungary respectively, the Yugoslavs who passed from Austria-Hungary to Italy, and the Ruthenians who went to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania, we get a figure of eight million for what we may call new minorities. In other words, in the area covered by the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, there were twice as many persons living under alien rule in 1914 as those who were still doing so after the Peace Treaties, and, of these latter, again, nearly half were not much worse off than they were before. We must also remember that these minorities were put under some form of international protection, as the countries under which they passed had to sign the so-called minorities treaties—ineffective as these latter mostly turned out to be in their actual working.

An American writer, Dr. W. C. Langsam, has commented on the Peace Treaties as follows: "They were replete with unstable compromises. They reflected materialism tinged only here and there with idealism. They contained the seeds of future conflict . . . (They) created new wounds in the process of healing old ones." The Fourteen Points, says he, did not fare well in the final peace settlement—five were put into effect, an equal number disregarded, and four carried out in a manner which benefited the Allies but not the defeated states. Speaking in general terms, those among the points that related to the undoing of historic wrongs—the cession of Alsace-Lorraine (Point 8) and restoration of Poland (Point 13), and freeing of territories in enemy occupation, viz. French (Point 8), Belgian (Point 7), Russian (Point 6), Rumanian, Serbian, Montenegrin (Point 11), were carried out; (with regard to Point 6, it must, however, be mentioned that the Allies made Germany evacuate Russian territory, but, without declaring war, sent troops into Russia with a view to overthrowing the Soviet Government);

those that related to "making States more perfect nation-states"—autonomous development of the peoples of Austria-Hungary (Point 10) and readjustment of the frontiers of Italy on clearly recognizable national lines (Point 9)—were carried out, though many Austrians and Magyars were in turn subjected to foreign control and, according to the Allies' promise in their Secret Treaty with Italy, which conflicted with Wilsonian principles, several thousands of Austrians and Southslavs passed under foreign (Italian) rule, while only lip-deep regard was paid to the doctrine of nationality with respect to the nationalities in the Turkish empire (Point 12), which were mandated out to the two foremost imperialist powers among the Allies; and, finally, those (Points 1 to 5) that laid down principles for the establishment of a new world order by seeking to remove conditions which according to Wilson's theory—implicitly stated—were responsible for the war, namely, secret treaties (Point 1), naval jealousies (Point 2), tariffs (Point 3), race in armaments (Point 4), and colonialism (Point 5) were disregarded or perverted.

The doctrine of the freedom of the seas, which had been violated both by America and Britain during the war by imposing their blockade of the German coasts, could not, of course, be pressed, and even before he came to Paris, Wilson had accepted the Allied disclaimer on the subject. Point 5 was utilized for depriving the Germans of all their colonies, and, with this done, forgotten. In the needs of post-war rehabilitation, every country in Europe insisted on raising a tariff wall, the total length of which was now much greater than in pre-war Europe, because the number of independent states was larger (Point 3). Point 4 was utilized for drastically disarming Germany, but in spite of the pledge given that it should lead to a general disarmament, nothing was done beyond framing schemes and plans and calling disarmament conferences to no purpose. President Wilson's last point, which related to the creation of a League of Nations, was carried out.

The accusation that the Treaty of Versailles was imposed upon a vanquished nation under threats of a much worse fate cannot be denied, but various arguments have been used by the apologists to explain this away. It has been pointed out that Germany also violated treaties which were not imposed on her, e.g. the Treaties of Locarno—an argument which involves what

is called the Fallacy of the Consequent. An American critic, Mr. J. T. Shotwell, tries to explain it away by reference to what he calls "an elusive page in the history of procedure", which also explains, in his opinion, the failure of the authors to appreciate that the provisions, in their collective application, were severe. Says he :

"Once launched upon the study of detail, it was unreasonable to expect that all this labour would be spent upon a preliminary document, embodying only the tentative views of the Allied and Associated Powers, to be presented to the Germans, when the time came, as mere basis for further negotiations. . . . As the draft treaty grew into a completed document, it became not only harder and harder to change but it reached so deeply into the economic and social, as well as political life of Europe, that only those who knew the conditions in the countries across the Rhine could adequately judge of the effect that the treaty was bound to have on the public opinion of succeeding years. In short, the shift from a purely preliminary peace to the detailed document called for a collaboration from the ex-enemy Governments if the treaty was to register a lasting peace." (*International Conciliation*, Pamphlet No. 369, p. 175.)

It has also been argued that the Treaty of Versailles was drawn up in sections—political, economic, financial, military, and naval ; and that this prevented the cumulative effect of the obligations upon Germany from being recognized. The worst part of the treaty, undoubtedly, was what related to the demand for reparations, which, though reasonable for the Allies to expect—in view of the incalculable losses that they had suffered at the hands of the enemy, the savage method of the conduct of the war by the Germans, e.g. their initial use of the prohibited poison gas, as also because the Germans accepted the liability—became such that it was impossible of fulfilment. The Germans contended that it was calculated to reduce them to a state of permanent slavery, and that as such it was repugnant to fundamental human rights. Mr. (later Lord) Keynes, who was, till 10 June 1919, the chief financial expert of the British delegation at the Paris Conference, argued, in his famous book, *The*

Economic Consequences of the Peace (published in November 1919), that the financial demands made on Germany were far beyond her capacity to pay. He correctly predicted that the reparations would not continue to be paid for more than a few years. The effect of the payments that were made was a steady drain of the world's supply of gold into American vaults where it was locked up for fear that it would produce inflation in America. This was specially unfortunate because at this time many of the world's currencies, including that of Great Britain, were being put back on to the gold standard. Experts are of opinion that there is a direct line of continuity between these developments and the financial depression of 1929.

Certain critics have argued that even if the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were milder, the Germans would have resented it nonetheless and that they would have violated it and/or prepared themselves for a war of *ravanche* all the more easily. Mr. David Thomson argues that the treaty was "harsh in wrong places and lenient in the wrong ways". He points out that the military, diplomatic and international guarantees of the Peace Settlement were allowed to collapse. This happened, says he, not because there was "a breakdown of machinery or lack of adequate organization" but because there was a failure of will to implement the principles that had been adopted in 1919. Critics of a like way of thinking are of opinion that if force had been used when the earliest attempts were made to violate the League Covenant the principle of collective security would have triumphed and would-be disturbers of peace might have been forestalled. Others have held that the injustices committed against Germany (and British and American criticisms of the Peace Settlement) supplied Hitler and his Nazis with sufficient ammunition which they used both against the Republican Government at home and against Germany's enemies. The Treaty of Versailles was no peace but only a twenty years' truce, Marshal Foch is said to have remarked. The war, however, came not when the Germans were suffering the most from the injustices committed against them by the treaty but when the shackles were falling off one by one and Germany had regained her old status as a great European power. Many critics, accordingly, are of opinion that if the Treaty of Versailles was a cause

of the Second World War, it was not a direct or a primary cause but a subsidiary one.

The settlement made in 1919 was certainly not an inspiring one, and, with hindsight, many mistakes of omission and commission could be discovered in it. It is reasonable to think that with the horrors of the greatest war in history fresh in their minds, the longing for peace and the determination to uphold it were stronger in November 1918, when the guns ceased to roar and the boys came back home than at any other time in men's memory. It is sad to think that mankind missed the bus, which could possibly take them along the new road to peace and life that seemed to stretch ahead of them. One criticism of those who had the supreme responsibility at that very critical moment in human history is perhaps justified—that they failed to distinguish the essentials from the non-essentials in that they paid their greatest attention to such things as the payment of reparations by their late enemies rather than to vital questions like disarmament and the creation of a really workable international machinery, which promised to introduce a new and vivifying principle into a war-torn world.

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY TILL THE RISE OF HITLER

THE GERMAN REPUBLIC

FEW countries in the world's history had to face a situation so baffling as Germany did at the signing of the Armistice. Almost overnight the nation passed from dreams of a triumphant German State surrounded by subject and tributary nations to the realities of surrender to implacable foes and a domestic revolution which well nigh threatened a complete collapse of their accustomed social and economic order. Yet in military defeat and political revolution, the marvellous discipline of the German nation prevailed and enabled them to form a stable state from baffling confusions. There was something heroic, even sublime, in the conduct of the prostrate nation, which extorts admiration.

On the flight of the Kaiser to Holland, Prince Max, the Imperial Chancellor, handed over the charge of his office to Ebert, the leader of the Majority Socialists, 9 November 1918. But in the meanwhile the poison gas of Marxism which the German military authorities had, as the story goes, despatched to Petrograd in a sealed train carrying Lenin, had, after the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, been wafted back to Germany. The extreme Socialists, called the Spartacists, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, had succeeded in creating country-wide disorder. During December there were frequent clashes between the Spartacists and soldiers. In January 1919 there was a general strike and an attempted Communist revolution in Berlin. The Social Democrats (Majority Socialists) co-operated with the army to crush it, and both Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were killed. The Social Democrats, who had not wanted a revolution, took up its leadership when it came, though this involved an alliance with the military leaders, which portended dangers for the new Republic, which it was now their task to set up.

A National Assembly, elected on universal suffrage, met at

Weimar, a significant choice, since in the popular mind, the place was associated with the liberal-humanist tradition of Goethe and Schiller. The Majority Socialists, who were the single largest party in the body, made a coalition government with the bourgeois parties, the Democrats and the Centre Party, and with one of their own leaders, Philipp Scheidemann, as the Chancellor. Their first task was to sign the terms of peace offered to them by the Allies. Scheidemann refused to sign so humiliating a document, saying, "Let the hand that signs it wither". His successor, Bauer, had to do it under duress (28 June 1920), and on the following day, the National Assembly ratified the signatures. This was followed almost immediately by the adoption (in July 1920) of a constitution with ultra-democratic features, such as the referendum, initiative and recall, proportional and proportionate representation, and a guarantee of fundamental rights. Herr Ebert, the leader of the Majority Socialists, was chosen as the President.

Of its troubled life of thirteen years (1920-33) the first few years were perhaps the worst. With the stigma of acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles and the accusation of being delivered to the nation in the baggage-train of the victors, the government had to face the most calamitous situation that any German government had ever to encounter in the country's long and chequered history. Branded as a criminal nation; on that accusation also stripped of her colonies and saddled with the payment of reparations, which none knew how heavy they were to be or how long they were to continue; with the Rhineland already under the military occupation of the enemy; with her industries thoroughly disorganized; and with a population decimated by war and facing unknown privations, Germany was in a sorry plight indeed.

THE REPARATIONS ISSUE

But before the nation could even think of applying itself to the task of its own reconstruction, it had first to meet the demands that its creditors had decided to make upon it on the score of reparations. We have seen that the Peace Conference had not named the sum, but left it to be determined by a Reparation Commission. While the latter slept over it, the task was sought

to be done by Allied statesmen in various conferences among themselves. One such took place in July 1920 at Spa, and in it for the first time the German Government was represented and their representatives allowed to sit round a table with the Allied representatives on equal terms. The only outcome of the Conference was the allocation, as among the Allies themselves, of the payments that Germany was to make. (According to this agreement, France was to have 52 per cent, Great Britain 22 per cent, Italy 10 per cent, Belgium 8 per cent, and the others 8 per cent.) In 1921 the Allied statesmen met at Paris to settle the question of allowing Germany to pay a "lump sum" in settlement of the entire liability. The Germans made a counter-proposal which was unacceptable to the Allies, whereupon the latter occupied three German towns, viz. Duisberg, Ruhrort, and Dusseldorf.

THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF THE RUHR

Almost at the eleventh hour the Reparation Commission asserted itself, and on 27 April 1921, announced that they had assessed the German liability which was 132 billion gold marks (equivalent to thirty-two billion dollars, or £6,600,000,000)—an amount which, incidentally, was over thirty times as great as the French indemnity in 1871. By this time serious divergences of opinion had grown up between the British and the French representatives on the Commission, where, with the refusal of the U.S.A. to accept the Treaty of Versailles, the only possible moderating influence had been eliminated. In December 1922, Germany having meanwhile failed by a small margin to fulfil her commitment of deliveries in kind, the Commission, against the vote of its British member, declared Germany to be in "voluntary default". The French now carried out their long-cherished plan of securing from Germany "productive guarantees", and, along with the Belgians, poured their troops into Germany's highly industrialized district of the Ruhr (January 1923).

The Ruhr venture proved to be disastrous for all concerned. The Germans, unable to oppose it by force of arms, were welded together in patriotic fervour and in stubborn determination to resist the French demand to pursue a policy of passive resistance, even if such a policy meant the complete economic ruin of the nation. As ordered by the Government, all workers, starting

with the railwaymen, gradually withdrew from such productive and distributive processes as might help the army of occupation. The Government undertook to feed the entire population affected by unemployment consequent on this policy. The strain thus put upon their finances led to the complete collapse of the mark, which had begun to shrink in value even as far back as the outbreak of the war and was continuing on the downward path since the peace. Valued at the equivalence of 20 marks to the pound before the war, it had fallen to the pound-equivalence of 770 marks in December 1921, nearly 3,000 marks in August 1922, and over 34,000 marks in December 1922. At the end of 1923 the pound purchased the incredible figure of nineteen billion marks.

With all the arts of **oppression** practised upon the German inhabitants of the Ruhr, the French discovered that the venture cost them more than it yielded. So far as the Germans were concerned, the nadir of their suffering and humiliation had been reached. By September 1923 the German Government had to yield and give up the passive resistance struggle. But the suffering had not been in vain. New ministries had been formed in France and Germany headed by Herriot and Stresemann respectively who were prepared to co-operate with each other, and presently a new era was introduced in the relations between the two nations. The first step was to recognize that reparations must be lifted out of politics and negotiated on business lines. Now the American Government, interested in the question because of its bearing on the question of the Inter-Allied Debts, joined hands with the British, French, Italian and Belgian Governments in appointing a Committee of Experts, under the chairmanship of an American, General Charles G. Dawes. The plan which the latter evolved, commonly known as the Dawes Plan, was accepted by all the countries concerned.

THE DAWES PLAN

Under the Dawes Plan, France agreed to withdraw from the Ruhr, and Germany received an international loan to re-establish her currency on a gold basis. A new reparation programme was drawn up by which Germany's annual payments were appreciably reduced. The annuities, further, were made to vary with

reference to Germany's economic condition, while in order to prevent upsetting the currency the amount transferred abroad was not to exceed the surplus which she obtained from her foreign trade. (The annuities were to begin at a relatively low figure till the standard annuity of 2,500 million gold marks was reached in the fifth year.) The payments were to be made by Germany in marks, and transferred into foreign currencies by the Allied Governments. The payments were to be made in accordance with the following schedule :

(in millions of gold marks)

	<i>First Year</i>	<i>Second Year</i>	<i>Third Year</i>	<i>Fourth Year</i>	<i>Fifth Year</i>
From railways	200	595	550	660	660
From reparation loan	800				
From transport tax		250	290	290	290
From industries		125	250	300	300
From sale of preference shares of the railway company		250			
From ordinary budget resources			110	500	1250
Supplementary budget contribu- tions			300		
	1000	1220	1500	1750	2500

The Plan, however, had some grave defects. The total amount of Germany's liability remained yet to be finally fixed, nor was it settled how long the annuities were to run. The operation was simple : it was like that of a tank which was being filled and emptied, the filling being the payment by Germany and the emptying the receipt of payments by the Allies. It was just a method whereby Germany could pay and her creditors receive annuities without hitch, and was little beside that. Germany's essential objections, such as the imputation of war-guilt, were not looked into by the Committee, being presumably outside its competence. As the standard annuity of 2,500 millions did not cover more than merely the interest of a portion of the liability fixed by the Reparation Commission, it was evident that "never, even in thousands of years, will Germany be able

to pay off her debts". Then, again, for the execution of the Plan, a number of foreign controls were set up, which were derogatory to national sovereignty, and inflamed nationalist feeling.

THE YOUNG PLAN

The Dawes Plan worked smoothly, and it was claimed that it benefited Germany also, because her industries, under the stimulus of the international loan and currency stabilization, had a boom. But it was obviously an emergency measure and Germany's objections to it had to be considered. In 1929, accordingly, another committee, presided once again by a neutral American, Owen D. Young, was appointed, and on 7 June their plan was submitted to the governments concerned. Though America had always refused to own the interdependence of the reparation payments which Germany owed to the Allies and the loans which the latter owed to America, the Young Plan definitely recognized the interconnectedness. Under the plan, Germany's total liability was cut down to \$8,000,000,000, that is about one-fourth of the original figure, and her annual payments were to be about \$500,000,000 for a period of fifty-nine years. All the foreign controls that had been set up under the Dawes Plan were abolished, and the responsibility for transferring the sums was shouldered by the German Government. Germany's lingering objections to the acceptance of the plan were withdrawn by the French offer of evacuation of the Rhineland, and, after a twelve-year foreign occupation, Germany was freed of the presence of foreign soldiers on her soil.

THE INTER-ALLIED DEBTS

When America declared war on Germany (6 April 1917), she was in no position to send her armies to Europe, and her first contributions to the common cause were in the shape of loans to her "gallant associates". This was the origin of the loans, which in subsequent years came to be known as the Inter-Allied Debts, and which continued to be advanced by America to her allies all through the war period and even a little beyond it. It may be mentioned that under the term were included some credits

which America had given to European nations fighting Germany even before America entered the war, they being advanced from private sources, as also the debts which some of the Allies, notably France and Italy, owed to England and those which, though small, a very few of them owed to France.

The bulk of these loans, roughly amounting to ten billion dollars, was owed by her European allies to America—three of them (England, France, and Italy) owing some 90 per cent of the total. Not a cent of these huge sums had been actually sent to Europe, the entire amount having been spent by the debtors in America for the purchase of war materials, on account of which American business men made huge profits. The transaction created such a prodigious European indebtedness, says Prof. Seligman, that it changed the United States from the chief debtor nation of the world to the chief creditor nation. Again, as Prof. Taussig points out, since the repayment by the debtors had to be made in goods, the prices at the time of repaying having gone down to two-thirds of what they were when the loans had been incurred, they had to despatch 50 per cent more of goods than they had received, that is, one-half as much again. These considerations, however, could not obscure the fact that the sums advanced were not gifts but loans, which were individual to each debtor and had no relation to other debtors or other debts or liabilities. They were contractual obligations, and were made at the earnest request of the debtors and under their solemn assurances of repayment. That is to say, the legal position was quite clear.

When, in 1922, America asked Great Britain to fund her debt to herself—after Congress had decided that all the loans should be repaid within twenty-five years and reduced the interest from 5 per cent to $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent—Great Britain sent a note (the celebrated Balfour Note, August 1922) to her own debtors including France, asking them to arrange for repayment. She declared that though she was owed more than she owed, she did not desire to make any profits and favoured a policy of “surrendering her share of German reparations, and writing off, through one great transaction, the whole body of inter-allied indebtedness”. The Note had a quite contrary effect, for while the Americans considered it as an “over-clever attempt” to expose the U.S.A. as the Uncle-Shylock-in-common of the whole of Europe, there came a

stinging note from France (September 1922) conveying her point-blank refusal to "consider any settlement whatsoever of the debts she contracted during the war as long as the sums she advanced and will have to advance for reconstruction of her devastated regions have not been covered by Germany". (The texts of the two notes are found in *International Conciliation*, Pamphlet No. 181, December 1922.)

As a "proud debtor" England immediately sent a debt-funding commission to Washington, who, after protracted negotiations, arrived at an agreement by which America still further scaled down her demands. Following England, the other debtors, except Soviet Russia, which had repudiated all the Tsarist loans, concluded debt-funding arrangements with America. Thus, while insisting on the payments being made, Uncle Shylock, by substantially reducing the rates of interest, did cancel a good portion of the sums which his borrowers owed him, agreeing to realize only double the principal he had lent. "They hired the money; didn't they?" asked President Coolidge. In spite of their insistence on getting back their money, however, they were destined to be disappointed; for at the very moment when the governments concerned were sending their ratifications of the Young Plan, the world economic depression, which began with a panic in Wall Street, was spreading like a blizzard over Europe, business withered everywhere and governments found it impossible to honour their commitments. German economy, which depended on foreign loans alone, collapsed, because American investors refused to advance loans any more, after the existing ones, mostly short-term, were gathered back. President Hoover declared a year's moratorium from 1 July 1931 but Germany's economic condition continued to deteriorate, and in January 1932, Chancellor Brüning declared that Germany neither could nor would ever resume payment of reparations.

THE END OF REPARATIONS AND INTER-ALLIED DEBTS

On 16 June 1932, an international conference was held at Lausanne which recognized that the whole reparations structure had been erected on a prospective world prosperity, which had vanished. The representatives of England, France, Germany,

Italy, Japan and Belgium offered to reduce the remaining German liability to an almost invisible figure, and also to cancel their war debts to each other provided the U.S.A. agreed to a cancellation of all debts owed to her. This was not philanthropy but a desperate attempt to save their own countries from economic ruin. The U.S.A. refused to cancel the war debts, and so, technically, the decisions of the Lausanne Conference were nullified. Nevertheless, as Germany had refused to pay anything and as it was impossible to make her pay, the reparations payments came to an end; and on the same grounds, convincing at least to themselves, most of America's debtors refused to make anything but "token payments"; only Finland kept on paying her instalments in full. On 15 July 1934, those who were making "token payments" ceased paying anything; but till the outbreak of the Second World War Finland kept on paying.

THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE INTER-ALLIED PAYMENTS

By refusing to accede to Britain's request for a mutual cancellation of reparations and war debts payments, America incurred unpopularity, but a creditor is seldom popular and a debtor is rarely willing to pay for a dead horse. The controversy is of little more than an academic interest at the present day but it is worth a brief presentation. Though the American Government made it perfectly clear to the Allies that the sums advanced to them were not gifts but loans, the contention of the latter that they represented what America paid in money for what the European allies were giving in blood, at least during the period which intervened between 6 April 1917, when America declared war and the time when she sent her troops to Europe, is reinforced by a number of economic and political arguments. It has been contended that America declared war on Germany at her own time and to safeguard her own interests, and even that she did so only when the trend of events was pointing to a German victory, which might imperil her own safety. If it is conceded that America did not fight only to make the world safe for democracy but also, or principally, to safeguard her own economic and political interests, it follows that till the time at least when she sent her army to fight the enemy, the Allies were

fighting America's battles as well as their own with *their* blood if also with American money, which was a substitute for American soldiers.

It has been argued on this ground that the loans should be divided into two categories, viz. pre-armistice and post-armistice loans, and that the former, which amounted to nine-tenths of the total indebtedness should be immediately treated as cancelled. As the post-armistice loans—on the admission of the American Secretary of the Treasury—were advanced to safeguard American business, they also were not much different and deserved to be cancelled. In any case, it has been argued that America had reaped enough profits out of other peoples' miseries and had become the richest nation on earth. Already she held two-fifths of the world's entire stock of gold; she produced 54 per cent of its cotton, 45 per cent of its grain, 60 per cent of its copper, and more than half of its iron and steel. The Europeans were America's best customers, and, if they were impoverished further by being required to pay back the loans, American business would suffer, and, conversely, if the debts were cancelled, economic stability would be restored in Europe and American trade would be stimulated. Moreover, as Prof. Taussig calculated, the annual debt payments came to only about one quarter of one per cent of America's national income, which was quite negligible for America, but a considerable sum for the European nations, and a big factor in their economy.

On the other side is the forceful argument that an honest debt has to be paid by the debtor, and should not be transferred to the shoulders of the creditor, in this case the American taxpayers. The United States, it was pointed out, had already been generous in cancelling a large part of the debts and adjusting them in accordance with the capacity of the debtors to pay. A complete cancellation would endanger the basis of international credit, and make difficult any form of international contracts in future. Then also, it was urged, the Allies were receiving regular reparations payments from Germany under the Dawes Plan, and their ability to pay the loans was proved by the fact that they were all spending huge sums on armaments. The case against cancellation was clinched by the argument that the European Governments would then spend more sums on armament, and endanger the world's peace.

Under the Truman Aid and the European Recovery Programme and other plans, America has spent freely, since 1949, billions of dollars, the total amount expressible only in astronomical figures. A critic of the present day may wonder why America did not seek to restore a war-shattered Europe in 1919 to its normal economic health, which it could have done by cancelling the war debts at the cost of but a small fraction of the enormous sums she is spending for the same purpose today. That would have meant an end to the ugly fight for reparations, and probably the beginning of better international relations. "America failed the world!"—President Wilson's saintly daughter¹ told the present writer, when he happened to meet her at Sri Aurobindo's Ashram at Pondicherry, in the course of a conversation on post-1919 American policy. Who can but feel that the comment is all too just?

THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC, 1919-32

The question of the payment of reparations (with which the problem of Inter-Allied Debts was closely associated) was one of life and death for the German Republic. When a solution had been found for it and the nation had got rid of the payments, the life of the Republic also had reached its end. In the concluding pages of this chapter we shall give a brief outline of the story of the German Republic and indicate the causes of its downfall. We have seen that the first ministry was formed by a coalition of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats who together commanded a large majority of the German electorate and hence

¹ The daughter of President Wilson referred to above was Miss Margaret Woodrow Wilson. She was the oldest of the President's three children, all daughters, her two sisters being Jessie (Mrs. Sayer) and Eleanor (Mrs. MacAdoo). As regards her stay at the Ashram, it is learned on enquiry from Sri Nolinikanto Gupta, the Secretary of the Ashram, that she became attracted to Sri Aurobindo's Teaching by reading his book, *Essays on the Gita*, in a library in America. She lived in the Ashram for a few years, being called "Nishtha" there, and died there after a brief illness in 1944, during which her relations pressed her to return home and she refused to leave the Ashram. "We have all pleasant memories of her, her devotion to Sri Aurobindo, the spirit of service and dedication", writes Sri Gupta in a letter to the author dated 20 May 1964. The author met her on 22 and 23 December 1942.

of the Reichstag. Their opponents were the Nationalists of the extreme right and the Communists of the extreme left, but though ministries were very unstable and chancellors came and went, there was a certain measure of governmental stability on account of the continued co-operation of these three parties, whom we may designate as the Centre Parties. From 1923 moreover, the French occupation of the Ruhr having called forth a united national resistance, the People's Party (the moderate section of the right-wing National Liberals) gave up its opposition to the Republican Government. Herr Stresemann, the leader of this party, a wealthy industrialist, became Chancellor and Foreign Minister in August 1923, and remained Foreign Minister under successive Chancellors till his death in 1929. Since foreign relations played a predominant part in German politics during these years, they justly became known as the "era of Stresemann". Acting in close co-operation with Aristide Briand and Austen Chamberlain, Stresemann succeeded in bringing about a considerable improvement in the position of Germany at home and abroad. During this period Germany got a new currency replacing the old and useless mark and an international loan which gave her the necessary security; she accepted the Dawes Plan of reparations payments and was admitted into the League of Nations with a permanent seat in the Council like the other Great Powers, who were members of the League. Stresemann was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1927.

During these years the forces supporting the Republic gained perceptively in strength, even though its enemies, the Nationalists, won one great victory in the presidential election of 1925. In that year, the first President of the Republic, Friedrich Ebert, a Majority Socialist, died, and in his place the seventy-eight-year-old war veteran, Field-marshal Hindenburg, the nominee of the Nationalists, was elected President. It was generally expected that, as a man of conservative sympathies, Hindenburg would work to bring about the overthrow of the Republic. Hindenburg, however, was a true soldier, and having taken the oath of the constitution, observed it, and sought to play the role of a good President according to his lights. The fact that he was President assured stability in times when there was little stability in German party politics, and to him, no less than to Stresemann

is due the credit for the improvement in the condition of Germany at this time. Unfortunately, however, Stresemann died in 1929, and what was worse, the German economy, as we have already seen, went down on account of the world economic depression which began in that year.

THE RISE OF THE NAZIS—ADOLF HITLER

The economic crisis had serious political consequences, since the Republic lost the credit which its not inconsiderable successes in the past few years had won. The voters drifted in steadily increasing numbers into one or the other of the irreconcilable oppositions. It was not, however, the Communists or the Nationalists who could turn the deteriorating situation to their best advantage, but a new-risen body of nationalists, the so-called National Socialists, led by a yet unknown or little known figure, one Adolf Hitler, who did so. This man, who was not even a German but was an Austrian, in personal appearance a militant edition of Charlie Chaplin, had begun life as a house-painter, and had first come into limelight as the chief figure in a political burlesque—the inglorious *Beer Hall Putsch*—an attempted rising at Munich in 1923 in which Ludendorf had taken part and which had been easily crushed by the government. Arrested by the government and sent to prison and confined at the fortress of Landsberg to serve his prison sentence which was for five years but was reduced to one year only, he spent his time in jail writing an autobiography, called *Mein Kampf* (My Battle), in which he frankly expounded his personal and party creed and future programme, and which became famous in his days of power as the Nazi Bible.

The Nazis combined a fervent nationalism with a social programme alluring alike to the impoverished small bourgeoisie and to the harassed, starving workers. It was for this double programme that they called themselves National Socialists, abbreviated into Nazi. The Führer (leader) of the party, Adolf Hitler, had an undoubted personal magnetism and rare oratorical ability, which drew thousands to him and his party. In his orations, which were frequently broken by his sobs, because he was definitely lachrymose, he was at his best when describing the shame and humiliation of the *Versailles Diktat* and recounting

the woes of his people. It was his passionate conviction that the defeat of Germany in the late war was not due to military failure but to "treason" at home, to the "stab in the back" by the Jews, because he was also an anti-Semite fanatic. Be that as it may, his party swelled slowly but steadily in spite of the economic recovery which began in 1924, though not alarmingly for the authorities till after 1929 when the economic crisis came to be acutely felt. Then even landed aristocrats of the conservative Nationalistic Party, though regarding Hitler as a vulgar upstart and a demagogue, began to contribute votes and funds to him, as they considered him as the greatest bulwark against Communism, which was thriving on the miseries of the people. The mass mind in Germany turned to Nazism as it had favoured Fascism in Italy as an escape from Communism.

THE FALL OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC

In 1930-32, the Republicans made a last stand. Brüning, a Centrist and one of the ablest men in the Reichstag, became Chancellor in 1930. He succeeded in bringing about a belated revision of the reparation arrangements and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Rhineland. He expected that, if he secured a few substantial concessions from the Allies, the "prestige" thus acquired would strengthen his government in particular and the Republic in general so as to enable them to withstand their enemies at home. His analysis of the situation was probably correct, but the Allied response was poor and as he was conscientiously opposed to adopting violent counter-measures against Nazi acts of violence, the latter went on unchecked. Nevertheless, in the presidential elections of 1932, held because the seven-year term of the office occupied by Marshal Hindenburg had expired, he and the Republican leaders stood for the re-election for another term of the old and trusted Hindenburg as against Hitler, the Nazi nominee and Thalman, the Communist Party candidate. Hindenburg was re-elected, but the expectation of the Republicans that he would continue to co-operate with them as he had done so long was not realized. Within a month of his re-election, Hindenburg had dismissed Brüning, and, after experimenting hesitantly and unsuccessfully with two upperclass Chancellors,

took, in January 1933, the fateful step of conferring the chancellorship on Hitler, whose party had emerged from the elections of 1932, held in the midst of countrywide violence organized by the Nazis, the largest single party in the Reichstag.

The handing over of the Republic by President Hindenburg to its sworn enemies, the Nazis, has been variously interpreted. According to some, it was his crowning act of treachery to the Republic; he was devoid of any sympathy for republicanism, and was always looking out for an opportunity of destroying it, these critics said. A more charitable explanation is that it was not a rational act: it was sheer senility; he was eighty-five. A plausible explanation is that the President was sick of having on his hands a succession of coalition governments, who were always asking for presidential decrees and that he conferred the chancellorship on Hitler because his party was the single largest one in the Reichstag and could be expected to have an absolute majority at his back in the near future. A bid for this was made by Hitler himself who, in March 1933, called for fresh elections. The Nazis conducted a campaign of frenzied activity, with violence; and a timely act of senseless incendiarism—the burning of the Reichstag building—popularly believed to have been committed by themselves but blamed on the Communists was utilized by them both to justify strong measures against them and to terrorize the electorate. In spite of all this, the majority which the Nazis secured was small, even with the votes of their Nationalist allies included in it. Nevertheless, within one brief but decisive week (5 March to 12 March 1933) the transfer of power was effected and in the next few weeks (12 March to 7 April), the leaders, parties, and institutions of Republican Germany were put to rout or ruined. On 22 March, by a vote of 441 to 94, the Reichstag passed, at Hitler's behest, the Enabling Act, by which it practically signed away the Weimar Constitution and then adjourned indefinitely. The break with the past was now complete; it was not only a break with 1919 and the Weimar Republic; it was a break with the liberal-democratic traditions of the Frankfurt Assembly; and even with the conservative traditions of the Bismarckian Empire. Hitler gave his state a new name—the Third *Reich*, the other two preceding *Reichs* being the Holy Roman Empire and the Bismarckian Empire.

CAUSES OF THE DOWNFALL OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

The surrender of power by the leaders of the Republic to the Nazis was astonishingly tame: the Nazis indeed boasted of their bloodless victory. It is rather difficult to explain why the former did not exert themselves to nip the Nazi movement in the bud. Their desire to avoid bloodshed was genuine, but however much one may sympathize with the idea, the policy of non-violence, followed when one's opponents are violent, may lead to disasters. It has been said against the Republican leaders that they were men without faith, who could not inspire or organize. They were theorists, elderly armchair doctrinaires, who allowed power to slip from their hands, it has been said. Germany under them has been described as a republic without republicans. One wonders indeed why, with all the instruments of popular propaganda in their hands, viz., the radio, the press, the platform, they did not make use of them to educate their people to have a faith in democracy. One wonders, too, what happened to the German workers, who were highly disciplined and organized and enquires why they did not use their weapon of a General Strike, which had proved its efficacy against Dr. Wolfgang Kapp, a nationalist leader, who with the assistance of General Von Luttwitz, had effected a *coup d'etat* at Berlin in 1920 and compelled the Republican Government to flee the city.

From the very start, however, the Republic worked under many handicaps. As we have seen, by the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty, which was forced on a defeated nation by the sheer weight of arms, the Republican leaders had incurred the odium of being the "authors" of the national humiliation and had lost all popular respect and sympathy. Then again the Allies, whose correct policy, based on their own self-interest, should have been to see that the Republican experiment in Germany succeeded, not only failed to do so, but did exactly the opposite. By their policy of relentless severity towards Germany—by their exactions and many acts such as the occupation of the Ruhr, which humiliated the Germans—they made the German Republican Government appear in the eyes of the masses as totally unworthy of being vested with ruling power.

The Nazis fully exploited the situation to their own advantage, they endorsed the popular thesis condemning the Republican Government, and promised everything to everybody. They had the best spell-binders, including Hitler, and used all the symbols of mass appeal—the Swastika badge, the uniform of the brown and the black shirts, the acclamation (*Heil Hitler*) and the salute, which a people long used to the pomp and circumstance of imperial government had a craving for in their heart of hearts and were missing during the Republican regime. Their campaign of violence and terrorism had been regarded with secret sympathy by millions of people, because theirs was the only programme which seemed to offer a solution for the manifold ills from which the nation was suffering. You may not be able to fool all people for all time, but you can fool them sufficiently long to worm yourself into their favour and entrench yourself in power, perhaps for all time.

The big landowners and capitalists who had helped to swell the party's funds were not scared by the socialistic leanings of Hitler, because they did not think much of them. The middle classes on the whole ranged themselves behind the Swastika banner because the inflation and the slump had threatened to, and to a great extent did actually, proletarianize them. The Germans worship power and authority as such, and were ready to be regimented or ruled over by a party or government who seemed to be able to undo the cruel wrongs inflicted on them by their enemies, and improve the intolerable living conditions which the Republican Government seemed to be totally powerless to remedy. Then again democracy in Germany was a feeble plant, placed in an unfavourable soil and exposed to all the inclemencies of wind and weather from its very birth. The Germans, in all their history, had never had an experience of popular government. The constitution, which contained ultra-democratic features, was run by old-world civilians, who were authoritarian in spirit, and owed only lip-deep loyalty to the Republic.

As regards the organized workers of Germany, their failure to take action, e.g. a General Strike, against the Nazis, has been ascribed to a fatal split in their ranks for which Moscow was responsible. The German Communist Party undermined the solidarity of the working classes, seducing younger members

and sowing dissensions between the leaders and their following. Very often, it is said, when one German Communist leader realized the needs of the situation in Germany, Stalin replaced him by another who was more orthodox in Communist theories.

CHAPTER V

THE SUCCESSION STATES, THE BALKAN NATIONS AND THE ARAB WORLD AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

THE SUCCESSION STATES

THE dissolution at the close of the First World War of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires led to the creation of a few new states, which are sometimes spoken of as the Succession States. Among them are included five states on Russia's western borders, viz. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which may be called the Russian Succession States, and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, which may be called the Austrian Succession States. In the Peace Treaties, which were concerned with the disposal of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, the name, "Succession States", was given to four states only, viz. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania, which, as such, were not treated as ex-enemy states, and were distinguished from Austria and Hungary, which were treated as old Austria-Hungary and made to pay reparations. All these states were new creations only so far as their name and state-form were concerned, and owed their origin more or less to the creative energy of nationalism, which, recognized by President Wilson as self-determination, was responsible for vast changes in the map of Europe, as we have already seen. Naturally enough, these states adopted very liberal, and even democratic constitutions, and most of them proudly called themselves republics, but, with the exception of only two among them, viz. Finland and Czechoslovakia, they failed to govern themselves democratically, and fell under actual or veiled dictatorships.

FINLAND

We may begin our review of the so-called Succession States with

Finland, which though a tiny state and always living under the threatening shadow of the vast mass of Soviet Russia, managed to keep up its democratic constitution and attain a high measure of political and economic stability in the post-war years. It suppressed a rising fascist party in 1933.

ESTONIA AND LATVIA


They recognized that, if they were to live at all, they must co-operate with each other, and so they did, both economically and politically. Harassed continually by opposing fascist and communist agitators, both of them were, however, compelled to suspend their democratic constitutions and submit to one-man rule in 1934.

LITHUANIA

Confronted with the same problems—limited resources and extremist agitations—as the three above considered, and having an additional worry, viz. boundary quarrels with her neighbours, Lithuania also fell under a dictatorship, even sooner than they. When, in 1920, Poland seized the disputed territory of Vilna, Lithuania appealed to the League of Nations, which gave her little help in the matter. As if to compensate herself, Lithuania seized Memel, an ancient German city, which the Allies had severed from Germany. The Allies acquiesced in the spoilation, only asking that the predominantly German population of the city be given local autonomy (1923). This stirred a violent agitation in Germany, which Lithuania could for the moment ignore, but which became a very serious affair after the Nazis seized power in Germany.

POLAND

The setting up of an independent Poland, as we have seen, was one of the most satisfactory features of the work of the Peace Conference. The restored Poland, however, failed either to have political stability at home, or to be a source of strength to the new order in post-war Europe. When the war ended, constitutional leadership was divided between the anti-Russian



Pilsudski and the anti-German Dmowski. The Poles, however, were united sufficiently by the famous Polish pianist, Paderewski, to agree that Pilsudski should be the Chief of State of the new Republic. A Constituent Assembly set up in 1919 framed a democratic constitution modelled closely on the Third French Republic. Suffering from unstable government and a weak executive power for a number of years, the Poles passed under the dictatorship of Pilsudski, who changed the constitution drastically in 1926.

With their relations with Germany none too satisfactory because of the territorial adjustments effected as the result of the Treaty of Versailles, the Poles exhibited, in all their relations with their great neighbour, an unhelpful superiority complex—cherishing the memory of the battle of Grünewald (1410) in which they, along with the Lithuanians, had defeated the Germans, and claiming to be a great power and resenting that they were not recognized as such by the world.

Boundary disputes also led to a disastrous war with the Russians, who were within an inch of capturing Warsaw, the capital, but the Poles, helped in organizing their defence by France, who sent to their help one of her most distinguished soldiers, General Weygand, for the task, came out successful. The disputes were settled by a treaty signed at Riga, by which the Poles acquired a not inconsiderable belt of territory inhabited by White Russians and Little Russians (Ukrainians).

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia, as created towards the end of the First World War, roughly corresponded to the kingdom of Great Moravia of the Middle Ages, and was thus not an entirely new political entity. The Czechs or the Bohemians, who together with the Slovaks formed the bulk of the population of the modern state, finally came under the Austrian yoke after the Thirty Years' War. The Slovaks, who about the same time passed under Hungarian rule, and were thus separated from them, were a fellow-Slav people. Though it became a fashion for Czechoslovak statesmen after the First World War to describe themselves as an "oppressed nationality", they really had made great progress under Austrian rule. It is a fact, how-

ever, that when the war broke out all their sympathies were with the Slav powers, Russia and Serbia, rather than with their masters, and it was in the latter's defeat alone that they felt that their national salvation could come. While prominent political leaders, Prof. Masaryk and Dr. Benesh, fled from the country, Czech soldiers in the Austrian army deserted their ranks and out of them Czech legions were formed in Russia, Italy and France. The Czechoslovaks first received official Allied recognition as an Allied nation in an announcement of the British Government on 9 August 1918. The Austrian Government, in their cable to President Wilson (27 October 1918) recognized the right of the Czechoslovaks to self-determination. The new state was proclaimed, 16 November 1918, at a National Assembly at Prague. Prof. Masaryk, who was still abroad, was elected the first President, Dr. Kramar, who had been sentenced to death and pardoned by the Austrian Government during the war, Premier, and Dr. Benesh Foreign Secretary. Thus after three centuries of foreign rule, all the Czechoslovak territories, viz. Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia, were formed into a single state. Unfortunately, as we have seen, it included also a large minority population (3 million out of a total population of 14 million) consisting of Germans, and also some Magyars, Urakainians, and Poles. Until at least the advent of Hitler, the treatment of these minorities by the Czechoslovak Government, though perhaps not unexceptionable, was acknowledged to be the best in the whole of Europe.

Czechoslovakia had a stable democratic government and a balanced economy. It was composed of the most populous and wealthy provinces of the late Hapsburg monarchy—Bohemia, with three-quarters of the industrial plant of old Austria, being joined with agricultural Slovakia and Ruthenia. Herself self-sufficient in the matter of food, Czechoslovakia was sufficiently industrialized with the help of her coal and iron resources to be able to exchange her machine-goods for such agricultural resources as she lacked and which grew abundantly in the neighbouring states in the east and the south-east.

Czechoslovakia was linked with Yugoslavia and Rumania, the two other Austrian Succession States in a political combination, known as the Little Entente, in the formation of which

Dr. Benesh played the leading part (see below). The three states had a common interest in preservng their gains from the Peace Treaties and specially against Hungary. As France had an equally strong interest in the preservation of the *status quo*, the Little Entente states, individually though not collectively or as members of the alliance, were linked to France. Czechoslovakia was a great favourite of the West, because she was the strongest bastion of democracy in Eastern Europe, and her relations with the Soviet rulers were also very cordial, on account of the personal friendships contracted by her leaders with Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders during the days of their political exile in the war period.

YUGOSLAVIA

The origins of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, or the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (which was the name which the state assumed at its start) may be traced to the agitation which began in the early years of the present century among the Yugo, i.e. the southern Slav subjects of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which aimed at bringing about unity of action among themselves as a means of enhancing their weight in the empire. In the beginning it had little to do with Serbia, but after the extinction of the Obrenovic and the establishment of the Karageorgevic dynasty, Serbia came to be recognized as "the Piedmont" of the national aspirations of all the Slavonic peoples of the South. An Austrian historian, Dr. Friedjung, accused the leaders of the Yugoslav movement of working as paid hirelings of the Serbian Government. At a trial for a libel action, brought on by Dr. Trumbic, Supilo and other leaders whose honour he had impugned, it was revealed that he had relied on forgeries concocted by minor officials of the Austro-Hungarian delegation at Belgrade with the concurrence of the minister.

This triumphant vindication of the Yugoslav leaders gave a powerful incentive to the movement, which now aimed at uniting all the Slavonic peoples, inhabiting the southern provinces of Austria as well as Serbia and the Balkan peninsula generally, and was encouraged by Russia. A succession of events—the victories of the Balkan League over Turkey, Serbia's successful defence of herself against Bulgaria's treacherous attack—further

strengthened the movement and the position of its leadership claimed by Serbia. According to many historians, the crime of Serajevo was an episode of this phase of the Panslavonic movement and served as a pretext for Austria-Hungary, the champion of Pan-Germanism, to attempt to crush both that movement and its leader, Serbia.

During the war, Dr. Trumbic and Supilo, who had fled the country, formed the Yugoslav Committee, and, with the Tsar's special permission, enrolled prisoners of war on the Russian front into the so-called Yugoslav Legions. The Yugoslav cause was, however, handicapped by a recrudescence of internal strife among the three branches of the South Slavs, viz. the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Pashich, the Premier of Serbia, favoured a Greater Serbia as distinct from a Yugoslav programme espoused by Dr. Trumbic. At this moment, another formidable difficulty in the way of the realization of the Yugoslav national aspirations presented itself. The Allies had promised the Italians, by the Secret Treaty of London (27 April 1915), a number of districts in Dalmatia, Istria, etc. inhabited by over 700,000 Yugoslavs. Thus, while, at the termination of the war, the Yugoslavs themselves, for internecine quarrels, failed to press their claims at the Peace Conference, the Italians, though opposed by President Wilson, pressed hard for the implementation of the Treaty of London, and actually invaded Slovenia. Dr. Trumbic, thereupon, hastily patched up a compromise, and they issued the Declaration of Corfu, "the birth-certificate of the future Yugoslavia".

Under the compact, the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes were to form one state under the Karageorgevic dynasty, and the equality of all citizens under the law was proclaimed. "What should have been a considered entry into union with fundamental agreement on the main principles was transformed into a stampede of Croats and Slovenes into the protective custody of their Serb brethren." The state began to function with the very important question of the terms of union of its component racial units unsettled, and the problem continued to haunt the state always. However, on 23 November 1918, the Yugoslav National Council, which had moved from Ljubljana to Zagreb, invited the Prince Regent of Serbia to assume the regency of

the new state. Three days later, a hurriedly convoked National Assembly at Podgoritsa decreed the deposition of King Nicholas of Montenegro and his dynasty and the incorporation of Montenegro into Yugoslavia. On 1 December Prince Alexander of Serbia formally proclaimed the union of the Yugoslav peoples and repeated their cry: "Long live free and united Yugoslavia!"

The two difficulties we have spoken of above, Italian claims and internecine quarrels among the Yugoslavs, continued. The eclipse of President Wilson facilitated a solution of the territorial question, which was settled by the Treaty of Rapallo (12 November 1920), signed by Premier Giolitti with Yugoslavia, and by an agreement signed between fascist Italy and Yugoslavia on 27 January 1924 (see below). The breach between the protagonists of the Greater Serbia and the Yugoslav ideals continued to widen, however, with the result that it was not till the end of 1920 that a Constituent Assembly, as the Declaration of Corfu had envisaged, could be elected. The Slovenes did not present a formidable problem, but the differences between the Serbs and the Croats seemed to be irreconcilable. Belonging to the same racial stock, these two peoples differed in language, religion and political tradition. The Serb alphabet is Greek and they belong to the Orthodox Church, while the Croats are Roman Catholic. The Serbs, who were conquered by the Turks and absorbed into their empire, had, in the course of their long and bitter struggle with their hated masters imbibed an uncompromising spirit, which made them unwilling to share power—when it came to them at long last—with others. The Croats, who had been absorbed in Hungary, and later in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, had known no long struggle for independence, and had, even as subjects, enjoyed their autonomy and ancient privileges. They had, however, developed the spirit of a minority, and were highly conscious of their rights and resolutely determined to resist centralization and co-ordination.

In the early days of her history, Yugoslavia possessed two great leaders—Pashich, the Premier of old Serbia and the first Premier of the new kingdom, who followed a Pan-Serbian policy and Stephan Radich, the Croat peasant leader, who wanted a federal state. In 1921, Radich refused to co-operate and the Constitution was voted without Croat consent. He adopted the policy

of non-violence, and with his past record of sacrifice and a number of prison sentences and because of his stern simplicity in life and fight against corruption, became a prophet for millions. He went abroad, but returned in 1924, suffered another term of imprisonment, then had a change of heart, and for a few brief months sent his Croats to Belgrade and co-operated with the ministry. But he accused the Premier's son of corruption, and old Pashich resigned. A Belgrade newspaper accused Radich of being a communist, an atheist and a traitor, and declared that he should be murdered. A savage Montenegrin deputy shot him and a few others in the parliamentary sitting of June 1928. King Alexander, who had a great respect for him, rushed to his bedside and offered him the Premiership. Radich died—as Mahatma Gandhi, of whom he was a great admirer, was to die later—vainly striving to assuage communal passions and to bring honesty into politics, by an assassin's bullet. Six months later King Alexander established his dictatorship, after he had dissolved the Parliament with the help of the army. In 1931, he promulgated a new constitution, under which his dictatorial powers were by no means curtailed. His ministry was solidly Serbian with no Croatian representation. In 1934, he was assassinated by a Croat fanatic soon after he had landed at Marseilles on a visit to France.

Under the treaties, Yugoslavia had received some Magyar, German and Rumanian minority populations, but they were not such a source of worry to her as were the Macedonians, a fellow-Slav people, who had passed under her rule along with territory ceded by Bulgaria. These Macedonians were in a constant state of rebellion against the Yugoslav Government, because the latter attempted by force to make them good Serbs. That they could continue to do so was due to the terroristic activities of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), who operated from Bulgaria allegedly with the sympathy of that state. This affair produced ill-will between Bulgaria on the one hand and Yugoslavia and Greece on the other, both of whom had received slices of Macedonia at the expense of the former.

Foreign Policy

Grave as the internal situation continued to be, graver

still were some issues of foreign policy, specially Yugoslavia' quarrel with Italy, which was one of the major sources of danger to the peace of Europe as a whole. The question arose because, as we have seen, the Allies, by the Secret Treaties of London, had promised Italy some Adriatic territories, which on the ground of self-determination, President Wilson thought should pass to Yugoslavia. Taking a leaf out of the Wilsonian book, Italy claimed Fiume which she coveted for commercial and strategic reasons but which the Allies had not promised to Italy. President Wilson objected to this on the ground that it was a natural port for Yugoslavia. (In Fiume itself, the Italians were in a majority, but if the suburb of Sussak were included in it, Italians and Yugoslavs would be about equal to each other.) President Wilson contended that the Italians could not have both Fiume and the Adriatic territories: it would be inconsistent to claim the former on the strength of self-determination and the Adriatic territories by violating it, he said. But President Wilson himself was inconsistent in opposing Italian claims to the Adriatic territories on the ground of self-determination, while he had consented to award German-inhabited South Tirol to Italy in violation of that principle.

While the unseemly controversy was going on at the Peace Conference between President Wilson and the Italian delegates, public opinion was roused to frenzy in Italy on the question of Fiume, which became the very symbol of Italianity, when the poet D'Annunzio flew to the city with his followers, garbed in cloaks, crested with eagle's feathers, and armed with daggers! It was with considerable difficulty that the Italian Government could drive him out of the city and hand it over to the Inter-Allied authorities, who decided to make it a "free city". The question was not finally settled till 27 January 1924, when an agreement was signed in Rome between the Fascist Government of Italy and Yugoslavia, together with a "Pact of Friendship and Cordial Collaboration" between the parties, which was executed simultaneously. By this arrangement, the original solution creating Fiume as a "free city" was abandoned, and the greater part of the disputed territory was incorporated in Italy, leaving Yugoslavia in possession of the adjacent Port Baros and provided with satisfactory economic facilities in the main harbour. A few months before this settlement with Italy,

Yugoslavia had composed her quarrel with Greece by signing with her a convention (May 1923), whereby she had acquired a "free zone" in the port of Salonika; in 1925 she obtained actual possession of it.

Albania and Italo-Yugoslav Relations

The two Governments found a fresh bone of contention in the Albanian question. "The fate of Albania was a miniature parody of Balkan politics." Set up in 1912 as an "independent" state by Austria-Hungary and Italy in order to block Serbian expansion, it was, after passing under various controls, in 1920 once again recognized as independent and admitted as a member of the League of Nations. As a matter of fact, as the result of a number of successive agreements concluded with Italy, it was becoming virtually an Italian protectorate. The fear that Italy might thereby control the Strait of Otranto and endanger her access to the Mediterranean troubled Yugoslavia. The signature of an Italo-Albanian Treaty at Tirana on 27 November 1926, made Albania virtually an Italian protectorate and seriously alarmed Yugoslavia with the result that her foreign policy henceforth received a new orientation, and, in 1927, out of a dispute between Yugoslavia and Albania arising from the arrest of an employee of the Yugoslav delegation by the latter, war seemed to be imminent between the Yugoslavs and the Albanians, backed by the Italians. The matter was settled without recourse to arms but Yugoslavia now turned to France for an alliance. Meanwhile, out of the chaos in Albania had emerged the conspicuous figure of a young Muslim chieftain, Ahmed Zogu, who after many vicissitudes of fortune, was proclaimed king as Zog I in 1928. He attempted vainly to lessen Italian influence. On Good Friday of 1939, Italy invaded and annexed Albania, and Zog fled from the country with his wife and their two-day-old son.¹

¹ On the departure of the Italian troops in 1943 and of the German troops a little later, Albania fell exhausted under the influence of Yugoslavia, and underwent a Communist revolution. The Yugoslavs did little to develop the country, whose inhabitants, mostly Muslim peasants, were the poorest in the whole of Europe. The expulsion of Yugoslavia by Stalin from the Communist group in 1948 gave the Albanian Communist

The foreign policy of Yugoslavia took concrete shape when she joined the Little Entente and also made an alliance with France. This just meant that she was determined at all costs to preserve her gains from the Peace Treaties. Apart from the ever-present necessity to guard herself against the possible irredentism of Hungary and Bulgaria, she had the old problem of finding a secure position on the Adriatic coast which had continually vexed old Serbia with the difference that Italy instead of Austria-Hungary was now her Public Enemy No. 1. (Further developments in Italo-Yugoslav relations are traced in Chapter 8.)

RUMANIA

Rumania emerged from the First World War more than doubled in size, taking rank among the middle-sized states of Europe, immediately after Spain and Poland. Her aggrandizement had been effected not only at the expense of enemy peoples, viz.

leadership under Enver Hoxha the opportunity to find a supporter farther afield, in the Soviet Union. Separated by three frontiers from her new benefactor, Albania, for the first time in her history, had a taste of real independence, specially after Stalin's death. The spirit grew, much to the annoyance of Khrushchev, who, angry because the Albanian leaders expressed their opposition to his policies of de-Stalinization, liberalization, and peaceful co-existence,—threw Albania to the winds—after the latter had been nurtured with money, materials and loans for thirteen years (1948-61). The Chinese, whose ideological difference with the Russians had by now reached a critical stage, immediately rushed in to fill the vacuum.

The break from their Russian benefactors seemed to be a heavy blow for the Albanian people, but their government, who were orthodox in their Communist faith and opposed to Khrushchevian "revisionism" and de-Stalinization, were happy to find what they wanted most, another "sugar daddy", who was even farther from their home than the Russians. On their side, the Chinese, though greatly taxed to provide loans to the Albanians for their five-year plans, found in Albania, a European country which was orthodox in the matter of Communist ideology, poor and militarily weak, and so a trustworthy friend, a bridgehead for the spread of their brand of Communism in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and a ready weapon for use in their duel with the Russians. The Chinese have provided valuable training in the cultivation of rice which the climate of Albania makes possible. The Albanian leaders have been mouthpieces for the Chinese point of view in every controversy that has divided the two Communist giants, Russia and China.

Bulgaria, whom her treachery in 1913 despoiled of the Dobruja, Hungary from whom she acquired Transylvania, and Austria, who ceded to her Bukovina, but also an ex-ally, Russia, whom she had wronged by seizing, on the strength of an old historical claim, the huge territory of Bessarabia. Facing a bad conscience on three sides, Rumania linked herself to the Little Entente against Hungary, and for protection against a possible attack by the Soviet Union, who refused to recognize her seizure of Bessarabia, concluded defensive alliances with Poland (1921) and France (1926). Not until her signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1933 was the war danger in Bessarabia made remote rather than imminent (see below, Chapter 11).

After the First World War, Rumania carried out successfully a vast land reform, involving the expropriation of 13,000 landlords and the partition of their combined estates of fourteen and a half million acres among a million peasants. Nevertheless, the agencies of democratic government—elections, Parliament and ministries—continued to be dominated by cliques of professional politicians, some of whom were notoriously corrupt. In 1930, Carol, the father of the infant-king, Michael, who had been debarred from the succession and banished on account of his infatuation with a woman of unsavoury character, staged a comeback, and proclaimed himself king as Carol II. At this time, there arose in the country a virulently fascist, anti-Semitic party, calling itself the Iron Guard, which was pro-German, and which the king, who was allied with France and attached to the Little Entente, tried to crush, but without success. The fight between him and the fascist elements went on right up to the outbreak of the Second World War, during which the king, the constitution and the country were lost in the flood of the Nazi invasion.

AUSTRIA

In the hectic month preceding the conclusion of an armistice (4 November 1918), the nationalities composing the Austro-Hungarian empire, including the dominating people, the Germans, were responding to President Wilson's battle-cry of self-determination, and attempting to form themselves into nation states. An independent Polish State was proclaimed on 5 Octo-

ber, and a Czech Government on 14 October. The efforts of the young and well-meaning Emperor, Charles I, to save the empire by proclaiming its reorganization as a federal state (16 October) were unavailing, and, bowing to the inevitable, he abdicated on 11 November.

The Germans of the Austro-Hungarian empire, militarist and imperialist to the core, had also been seized by the desire to form their own republic, and formed a Provisional National Assembly (21 October). They were angered by the Emperor's last-minute attempt to appease the nationalities, and also lured by the hope of securing better terms from the enemy by a disavowal of the discredited empire. The strongest impulse at the moment, however, was gnawing and unceasing fear. On the wreck of the empire the Germans of Austria found themselves left over—marooned in a foggy sea—while their former fellow-subjects were forming themselves into separate states and, with the blessings of the enemy, seizing lands which the Austrians considered to be properly German. The Italians had already occupied South Tirol, and, in accordance with the Armistice terms, were laying hands upon the railways and other means of communication. Above all, Communism was raising its head and threatening to convulse government and society in the throes of a bloody revolution.

The day following the Emperor's abdication Austria was declared to be "a democratic republic" which was to be "a constituent part of the German Republic" (12 November). The Constituent National Assembly met at Vienna on 4 March 1919 and formed a provisional government in which the Social Democrats held all the important offices, though they had only a "relative" majority with 69 out of 156 seats. The first problem before them and before the people as a whole was the *Anschluss* or union with Germany. The Social Democrats and their allies, the Christian Socialists, desired it because they thought that this "would link them up to a great German Socialist Republic and thus strengthen them against the bourgeoisie nationalist governments of the Succession States". But the bulk of the bourgeoisie population of Austria was opposed to it, because they were afraid that it would involve the state in the payment of reparations, which they knew the Allies would impose upon Germany, and also that it would swamp Austria with cheap German goods.

As we know, the *Anschluss* was forbidden by the Allies, who were probably encouraged to do so by the attitude of the Austrian bourgeoisie to the idea. (Otto Bauer, *The Austrian Revolution*, p. 115.)

The once mighty monarchy of the Hapsburgs had now shrunk to a tiny Austrian Republic, which was little more than the imperial city of Vienna and some Alpine provinces, somewhat as the Delhi Sultanate had been reduced to Delhi and the surrounding country after the invasion of Tamerlane. It was not a viable state, since its economy was unbalanced—highly industrialized Vienna being now unable to draw the foodstuffs it needed from the poor Alpine provinces, and the latter being too poor to buy the Viennese manufactures. The divergence of economic interests between Vienna and the provinces had its effect on politics also, since the former with its large working class population lent strength to the Social Democratic party, which controlled the municipal government of the metropolis and the provinces were dominated by the Christian Socialists. As for the federal government at the centre, which, as we have seen, was dominated by the Social Democrats in the early days of the Republic, it tended more and more to pass under the control of the Christian Socialists, who waxed stronger as the Catholic peasants developed an aversion for the radical workers of the capital. From 1922 to 1924, and again from 1926 to 1929, Ignatius Seipel, the Christian Socialist leader, was the Chancellor of the Republic. After his retirement from politics, on account of ill health (1930), his place was taken by Engelbert Dollfuss, who, anxious to suppress the Social Democrats and also to fight the growing Nazi menace, set up his own dictatorship. About the tragic story of his murder, we shall say later (Chapter 12).

HUNGARY

In the midst of military collapse, revolution broke out simultaneously in Austria and Hungary, the two partners of the Dual Monarchy. In Hungary, a People's Republic was declared, under Count Karolyi, who, having been a strong critic of the Triple Alliance, was expected to get tolerable terms from the Allies. His first act was to order the withdrawal of the troops from the front and to dissolve the army. The result of this pacifist policy

was that the Serb, Croat, and Rumanian forces, though weak, were able to penetrate deep into the country. Karolyi resigned power into the hands of Bela Kun, a former insurance agent, who had recently returned to Hungary after receiving training in Bolshevik theory and practice in a Russian prison. Bela Kun declared "a dictatorship of the proletariat", and a reign of terror ensued. The measures of the new government included the enlisting of a Red Army, quartering of communists on middle class families, the arrest of "hostages"—some 400 distinguished citizens, some of whom were murdered with every circumstance of calculated brutality, and the organization of special "terror troops", "Lenin's ruffians", as they were called, who arrested, tortured, and murdered people on their own authority.

To stem the tide of Czech and Rumanian invasion, Bela Kun attacked the Czechs and drove them out of the regions occupied by them. On Clemenceau's protest, however, he withdrew the troops and on 13 June actually recognized the cession of northern Hungary. The demoralized Red Army was unable to stem the tide of the Rumanian invasion, at which Bela Kun lost heart and fled to Vienna. On 4 August, the Rumanians occupied Budapest and most of Hungary. With no government worth the name existing in the city, they plundered Budapest with a thoroughness which a Tamerlane or a Nadir Shah might have envied. They took grain, fodder, cattle, 1,151 locomotives, 40,950 railway carriages, motor cars, 4,000 telephone installations, typewriting machines from offices and schools, beds and bed-linen from hotels and prisons, machinery from factories and scientific apparatus from the schools. It was not until a final ultimatum was given by Clemenceau, as representing the Supreme Council, that they at last withdrew from Budapest.

Thereupon a counter-revolution, which in the days of the Communist power was being organized in Szeged under the former Vice-Admiral, Nicholas Horthy, set in. A White Terror began and communists were lynched wherever found. Admiral Horthy was elected regent on 1 March 1920, and he set up a decent administration. Meanwhile, a National Assembly had been elected on 25 January. Hungary was proclaimed to be still a kingdom, though it was without a king. It had to accept the Treaty of Trianon, which, like the Treaty of Versailles, was

imposed on the signatories without the latter being given an opportunity to discuss its terms. As we have seen, the treaty deprived Hungary of nearly two-thirds of her former territory and three-fifths of her population. Hungary was also saddled with the burden of reparations. Politically as well as economically, Hungary was the most wretched of all the countries stricken by the First World War.

Hungary adopted an attitude of perfect intransigence towards the Treaty of Trianon. The government published the treaty in their official gazette with black borders around every page, ordered flags at half staff, and printed and sent round to every school a dismembered picture of pre-war Hungary with the slogan, "Nem, Nem, Soha" (No, No, Never). The children were ordered to stand at salute before that map twice a day and recite a credo beginning with "I believe in the justice of God", and ending with "I believe in the resurrection of Hungary". "Resurrection", of course, threatened Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia with the loss of the extensions of territory since the war at Hungarian expense.

Another development in Hungary which filled her neighbours with alarm was the possibility of and continued preparation for the restoration of the Hapsburg monarchy in that country. This new pose of loyalty to the Hapsburg dynasty, which is belied by history—the Magyars having many times revolted against them and decreed their deposition—was simply a round-about way of clinching their demand for a revision of the Treaty of Trianon. Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia attempted to defend themselves by forming the so-called Little Entente. Hungary approached Italy, which, though a victorious power, was dissatisfied with the Peace Settlement, and an Italo-Austro-Hungarian combination was the result, as we shall see later.

The Little Entente

Hungary's intransigent attitude towards the Treaty of Trianon, specially as manifested in the movement for a restoration of the House of Hapsburg, induced her neighbours—Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia—to form an alliance with each other which came to be spoken of as the Little Entente. The latter were apprehensive about the gains they had made at the

expense of Hungary—Slovakia, Transylvania and Croatia respectively, whose peasant inhabitants, moreover, were supposed to have a lingering affection for the Hapsburg dynasty. Apart from their common fear of Hungary, the grounds for this alliance were not very firm; nor was this fear equally intense in the cases of all these three states. Rumania, for example, was apprehensive about Transylvania, which she had acquired at the expense of Hungary—a reason why she should like to join an anti-Hungarian combination. But she was even more apprehensive on the score of Bessarabia, which she had seized from Russia, and the other two Succession States saw no reason why they should be in the bad graces of the U.S.S.R. by doing anything which might be construed by the latter as giving their approval to the Rumanian seizure of Bessarabia. Rumania had a bad conscience also about the Dobruja, which, on ethnological grounds, properly belonged to Bulgaria, whom she had despoiled of this territory since the days of the Balkan Wars. Enmity to Bulgaria provided a ground for an alliance with Yugoslavia, whose relations with that country were strained on account of the Comitadji raids (see below—Bulgaria). It was, however, no special reason for an alliance with Czechoslovakia, who had little quarrel of her own with Bulgaria. Similarly, for Yugoslavia too Hungary was not “the first concern”; the portion of Hungarian territory she had acquired was smaller than the portions acquired by Rumania or by Czechoslovakia; and her chief worry was Italy’s ambition to play a dominant role in the Adriatic region. Even for Czechoslovakia, who took the lead in negotiating the alliance, Germany posed a greater danger than Hungary.

Nevertheless, in the years immediately following the Peace Settlement, due to the fears which haunted the three states, which as events also showed, were quite real, and thanks to the initiative and also drive of M. Edouard Benesh, the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, the alliances were actually formed. Benesh did not look upon the union of the three states as merely an anti-Hungarian alliance; he considered it, constructively, as an organization for the economic co-operation of peoples, who, before the war, were parts of one economic entity. “The ultimate and wider aim” of his move for bringing about an agreement for common action among these states was, as he interpreted it,

to prevent them from being tied to the tails of the Great Powers and thus provide in the broad sense a firm foundation for the maintenance of peace in Europe.

Be that as it may, on 14 August 1920, soon after the Kapp *Putsch* in Germany had roused fears about a possible restoration of the old order in that country (see above, Chapter 4), Mr. Benesh paid a visit to Belgrade, and arranged for the conclusion of a treaty between his own country and Yugoslavia. This required the two signatory states to assist each other "in the case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary" in accordance with the terms of a military convention to be drawn up later, this being actually done a year later. He then proceeded to Bucharest and laid out before the Rumanian Government his plan for an alliance similar to the one just concluded by him with Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the ex-emperor Charles, who was ex-King Charles IV of Hungary, and had already once attempted to get himself restored to the throne, suddenly appearing in Hungary on 27 March 1921, and had been foiled then and compelled to leave Hungary on 5 April, was getting ready to make another attempt to regain the lost throne. The Rumanian Government, which was hesitating to accept the overtures of Mr. Benesh, was at long last induced by the Hapsburg threat to accept them, and signed a treaty, which was supplemented by a military convention, later on, with Czechoslovakia. The Little Entente was completed on 2 July 1921, when Mr. Benesh's diplomacy succeeded in bringing to an end the hitch between Rumania and Yugoslavia as to their respective boundaries, and a defensive agreement was concluded between the two states. This last convention was for the purpose of maintaining not only the Treaty of Trianon but the Treaty of Neuilly (the peace settlement with Bulgaria).


The Little Entente scored its first success when Charles suddenly reappeared in Hungary by a plane in October 1922 and, on its vigorous protest, backed by the Allies, he was compelled to leave, was interned at Madeiras, where he died soon afterwards. The Hungarian Government was compelled to pass a Dethronization law, which, though excluding the Hapsburgs from the succession, still declared Hungary to be a monarchy. The Little Entente states still remained so apprehensive that they concluded treaties with France, supplemented

by formal or informal military understandings relating to the supply of military missions and war material to themselves. They thus became French satellites, pledged to assist France to enforce the Treaty of Versailles in which their own interest was negligible.

BULGARIA

Defeated in the Second Balkan War and the First World War, Bulgaria had to cede territories to her neighbours—Serbia (Yugoslavia), Greece, and Rumania, which, on ethnological grounds she thought were properly hers, and she naturally had a grudge against each of them. The most important of these territories was Macedonia, some 200,000 of whose inhabitants migrated across the border, after the First World War, away from Yugoslavia and into Bulgaria, where, as we have seen, they formed terrorist bands (called *comitadjis*) under an organization called IMRO. Their raids on the territories of Greece and Yugoslavia drew angry protests from the aggrieved governments, but Bulgaria pleaded her inability to control them on the ground that the reduction of her army to only 33,000 men by the Treaty of Neuilly made it difficult for her even to maintain internal order. The terrorists themselves were understood to justify their action on the ground of inhuman treatment of the Bulgarian minorities in Yugoslavia and as the only course left to them whereby they could ventilate their grievances before the world.

In 1922, the Yugoslav, Greek and Rumanian Governments addressed a joint note to Bulgaria on the subject of these incursions, and the latter, interpreting it as a threat to herself, appealed to the League of Nations. The matter was soon settled, but the fundamental difficulties were not removed, and in 1925, as the result of a frontier incident, in which a Greek soldier was killed and the Greek commandant of the frontier post shot dead in an endeavour to mediate under cover of a white flag, the Greeks began a serious invasion of Bulgarian territory. War was stopped only by the intervention of the League of Nations, whose supporters claimed the episode as a great victory in the cause of peace achieved by the application of League methods. A Commission of Inquiry appointed by the



League recommended the payment of reparations by Greece to Bulgaria to the tune of £45,000, which Greece actually paid in full by the beginning of the following March (1926). Greece resented the treatment she received from the League, which she considered as a penalty for being a small power.

On the defeat of Bulgaria in 1918, her king abdicated in favour of his son, Boris, who, though young, proved to be a successful ruler. In the early years of his reign, the government was headed by Alexander Stambolisky, who was the leader of a powerful peasant party, the peasants forming the bulk of the population in the state. In 1930, a combination of middle-class merchants and shop-keepers supported by the professional intelligentsia brought about his overthrow, followed shortly afterwards by his murder. These warring factions, calling their respective opponents fascists and communists, discredited themselves, and in 1934 both were put out of the way by the army officers who set up a dictatorship. In the following year the king got rid of the army officers and set up a dictatorship of his own.

GREECE

We have seen how Greece had landed troops in Smyrna at the end of the First World War when M. Venizelos was Premier, being encouraged to do so by the Allies, who withdrew their support when Venizelos fell from power and ex-king Constantine came back to the throne. In this adventure in Asia Minor Greece had in fact been used as their cat's paw by England, France, and Italy, who had their plans for the partition of Turkey. We have also seen that the victory of Kemal Ataturk had produced a new situation in Turkey, which compelled the Allies to give up some of their most unsavoury schemes in the Middle East, and to conclude a new treaty with Turkey at Lausanne (1923) which replaced the Treaty of Sèvres. Once bitten twice shy, Greece abandoned the lure of colonial gains and turned to her domestic problems, which were formidable enough. Soon after the Smyrna defeat, Constantine was deposed and a republic proclaimed (1924), which, however, failed to work, being usually dominated either by a military junta or an individual military usurper. Greece was also greatly troubled

by raids on her territory by *comitadji* bands operating from Bulgaria, as we have seen, and the problem of rehabilitating some 1,400,000 refugees from Turkey, Russia, and Bulgaria. In 1922, George II, the son of Constantine, was set up on the throne as the result of a plebiscite. In 1923, following a frontier dispute between Greece and Albania, Italy as protector of the latter sent warships to bombard Corfu. It was Mussolini's first defiance of the League. Although he had to withdraw troops from Corfu, Greece had to pay Italy an indemnity. In 1926, as we have seen above, Greece's quarrel with Bulgaria came to a head, and, though war was avoided, at Bulgaria's complaint, the League appointed an Inquiry Commission, as the result of whose findings, Greece had to pay Bulgaria a large amount for reparations. In spite of her troubled domestic history, Greece on the whole followed a pacific foreign policy and even attempted, as we shall see later, to create a healthier atmosphere in the Balkan Peninsula.

The Balkan Tinder Box

Apart from the conflicts which stemmed from the Peace Treaties and kept the states we have dealt with in this chapter mutually suspicious and in a state of commotion for many years, there were some which were rooted in geographical, strategic or economic conditions, and stood in the way of the establishment of genuine or permanent peace among them. In the Balkan Peninsula in particular there are some deep-rooted causes of discord among the states, which have kept the nations inhabiting it in a state of continual tension. They have produced wars among themselves, which have sometimes caused wider conflagration.

Nature seems to have vied with man in perversity to make the Balkan Peninsula the strain-centre of Europe, says a modern writer. There is no real separation in the north between the peninsula and mainland, as there is in Italy by the Alps, or in Spain by the Pyrenees. The width of the Balkan Peninsula at the point of its contact with the continent is 750 miles—the corresponding width of the Iberian Peninsula being only 250 miles—the result being that a wide enough door is left for foreign intrusion. Both the mountain and the river systems

are whimsical. The mountain starts nowhere in particular and similarly ends nowhere in particular. The rivers pursue strange courses. The Danube, for instance, after a prolonged, regular, west-to-east course from Belgrade to beyond Silistria makes a sudden tilt due north as far as Galatz before it empties itself into the Black Sea. "Its only purpose seems to be the purely malicious one of involving Rumania and Bulgaria in disputes over the unattractive marshes of the Dobruja." Again, some rivers, such as the Maritza, which should have flown into the Black Sea or the Sea of Marmora, drop down into the Aegean, and thus, flowing through Macedonia, make that province the bone of contention among the rival states of the Peninsula.

Scientists find little difficulty in explaining the apparent whimsicality of nature in the Balkan Peninsula. The courses of the rivers, for example, are due to the phenomenon known as "river-capture"—in the case of the Balkan Peninsula the sinking of the land below what is now the surface of the Aegean Sea and the consequent increase in the velocity and erosive power of the rivers. But the course of politics in the Balkan Peninsula is indeed strange and many of its problems defy solution. Says Mr. David Mitrany, who made a thorough study of the problems of the Balkan States with a view to finding out if the principles underlying the Locarno Treaties could be applied to them :


"Such is the complex nature of Balkan relations and of the various problems that it seems impossible for any two countries to conclude a separate treaty without making it appear to be directed against a third. A Greek-Yugoslav treaty would appear to be directed against Bulgaria, with whom the two countries have a common quarrel over the minorities; a Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty would seem to threaten Greece, with whom the two countries have a contest over Aegean out-lets; and so on. . . . In short every one, so to speak, has a quarrel with everybody else, and the compounding of one quarrel is promptly taken to mean that the two parties want a free hand, for handling more forbiddingly their quarrels with a third party."

Nevertheless, as the same writer says, there is no smoke without a fire, and it is extraneous interests (in plain English, the intrusion of Great Power politics into the internal affairs of

these small Balkan States), which in the past has been mostly responsible for the prolongation of their mutual conflicts. Another writer, Mr. Newbiggin, is of opinion that the fact that they are interdependent in the matter of railway communications may strengthen their sense of common interests. "The Belgrade-Constantinople railway passes through the territories of Yugoslavia, of Bulgaria, of Greece and of Turkey; the Belgrade-Salonika one, prolonged from Salonika to Athens, is divided between Yugoslavia and Greece; the potential Durazzo-Constantinople one crosses territory belonging to Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. . . ." That Yugoslavia has a free zone at the port of Salonika, and that Greece is linked to the rest of Europe only by a line which passes through Yugoslav territory are notable facts; they proclaim that the well-being of each state is bound up with that of the others.

THE NEW TURKEY—KEMAL ATATURK

We have seen (Chapter I) how after the collapse of the Ottoman empire a new nationalist Turkey was created by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The new state was nearly identical with Anatolia, for long claimed by the Turks as their homeland, and though it retained the Straits, viz. the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and the city of Constantinople, its centre of gravity had shifted to Asia, and its capital was transferred to Ankara in the heart of Anatolia. It renounced all claims not only to its former Christian dependencies in the Balkan Peninsula but to the Arab lands over which the Sultans had ruled. Turkey still continued to have considerable international status on account of her crucial European possessions (Constantinople and the Straits), and the Allies imposed on her a special regime for this area, and, by a supplementary enactment, called the Convention of the Straits, forbade her to have her armed forces or build fortifications in a narrow strip of coast on either side of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and obliged her to allow free passage through them to ships of all nations. The demilitarization did not last long, and, by the Convention of Montreaux, it was cancelled and Turkey allowed to fortify the area (1936) (see below, Chapter 13—the Shifting Balance of Power—the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis).



Mustafa Kemal, or Kemal Ataturk, "the father of the Turks", his later name by which he is best known, remade his Turkey in the image of the West. He transformed it into a republic with a constitution providing for an elected legislature, the Grand National Assembly, a responsible Cabinet, and a President—an office he filled from 1923 to 1938. He, however, had little faith in the ability of his people to practise constitutional government, and his government was, like that of Nasser in Egypt, a national dictatorship, in which only a simple political grouping, his own Republican People's party, is allowed. It was saved from being a full-fledged totalitarian rule by reason of the fact that the National Assembly developed into a lively parliamentary forum.

Ataturk was most revolutionary in his religious and social reforms. He abolished the Caliphate and replaced sacred Muslim law with codes based on Italian, Swiss, and German models. He established state schools and closed Muslim ones; he forbade the use of Arabic, the sacred language of the Muslims; he instituted the western calendar with Sunday, not Friday, as the day of rest. He did everything but forbid the actual practice of Islamic worship. He outlawed traditional forms of dress, like baggy trousers and the fez, as tokens of a reactionary past. More important, he abolished polygamy, and introduced civil marriage, gave women full legal equality and granted them the vote. In line with this advance they were encouraged to adopt western dress and throw away the veil. Finally, Ataturk imposed a brand new Latin alphabet on the Turkish language and toured the country with a blackboard to instruct the people in the new writing. He died in 1938, worn out by his herculean labours and dissipations. His historic reputation as the great man of modern Turkey is unchallenged, but it could be expected that such revolutionary and all-pervading reforms as his could not penetrate to the grass roots.

THE ARAB WORLD

EGYPT

By the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey renounced not only her

claims on her former possessions in the Balkan Peninsula and the Arab lands but on Egypt, shadowy as they had become since the rise of Mohamet Ali and the forcible seizure of the land by Great Britain in 1882. At the end of the First World War, Great Britain was in a position to do whatever she pleased in that ancient land and she did so for a time by shell and bomb and thus silencing that clamour for national independence which her own rule there and the war had created. Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the leader of the Wafd, or the nationalist party, who was the soul of the Egyptian movement, was deported to Malta (March 1919) and an army of 60,000 men commanded by General Allenby crushed the risings. Then Britain made a gesture of "conciliation" by sending Lord Milner to Egypt, who was to effect an agreement with the Egyptian Government, headed by Fuad, who had, on the abolition of the Caliphate, adopted the title of King of Egypt (instead of Khedive). A treaty was signed between the two countries by which Egypt was granted "independence", though the king was still subjected to the control of a British High Commissioner, and Great Britain was given a preferred position, more particularly in regard to the Suez Canal. The treaty was rejected by the nationalist followers of Zaghlul and disorders continued, which were suppressed by military action, and it was ultimately put into force in 1922 by a simple declaration by the British Government.

The Wafd, who dominated in the Parliament which was created by a constitution issued in 1923, and was headed by Zaghlul, presently recalled from exile, forced Great Britain to open fresh negotiations in 1927. In August of the same year Zaghlul died, and his successor, Nahas Pasha, rejected the British proposals, chiefly because they included an agreement for the retention of the British army in Egypt. In 1930, the British made fresh proposals, which were also rejected by Nahas Pasha, who had now become the Prime Minister of Egypt, the stumbling block this time being the British insistence on the continuance of the *status quo* in the Sudan, i.e. an Anglo-Egyptian condominium over that territory. The deadlock in the negotiations for a settlement between the two countries might have gone on indefinitely but for the Italo-Abyssinian conflict of 1936, which profoundly influenced Anglo-Egyptian relations. Egypt, though not a member of the League of Nations, adopted

the sanctionary measures against Italy, out of her sympathy for the Abyssinians. Afraid of Italian retaliatory measures, she now considered the presence of British forces on her soil as rather necessary for her protection and the ground was thus prepared for an improvement in Anglo-Egyptian relations. In August, 1936, negotiations were resumed, and a new treaty was concluded, which named Great Britain as an "ally" instead of "protector", abolished the office of the High Commissioner, and contained a stipulation for the withdrawal by the British of all troops except a guard for the Suez Canal. In 1937, Egypt was admitted to membership of the League of Nations (now, however, reduced to little more than a name), and, by the Montreux Convention, the powers agreed to abolish foreign law-courts and other "extra-territorial rights" in Egypt.

THE ARAB LANDS—SAUDI ARABIA

During the war, the Arabs freed themselves from their Turkish masters, chiefly by their own action and also by the help given them by the British and the French, who had incited them to revolt on promise of grant of independence after the war. Under the Peace Treaties, however, only one region was made independent, viz. the Arabian coastal area of the Hejaz, which contained the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and over which the Sheriff of Mecca, Emir Hussein, hated by all the Arabs as nothing but a British stooge, was placed as ruler with the title of King. In 1925, Hussein was driven out of the Hejaz by his rival, the Wahabi chief, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, a valiant warrior, who succeeded in the course of a few years in making himself master of nearly the whole of the Arabian peninsula. The Arab lands which did not achieve independence were Syria and Mesopotamia, and which were given over to France and Great Britain respectively as mandates. The latter region, renamed as Iraq, was given by the mandatory power, Great Britain, a considerable measure of independence. France divided Syria into a larger dependency called Syria and a smaller one, called Lebanon. Southern Syria, however, was handed over to Britain, who split it into two zones, a coastal zone more or less identical with ancient Palestine and a desert zone beyond the Jordan river called Transjordan. There were thus four, or, if we

take Syria and Lebanon separately, five Arab States which were placed under the control of Great Britain and France. The outstanding feature of the life of these Arab peoples during these years was the growth of nationalism.

IRAQ AND TRANSJORDAN

Shortly after acquiring the mandate, Great Britain set up Faisal, a son of Hussein, King of the Hejaz, as king of Mesopotamia (now named Iraq), and Abdullah, another son, as ruler of Transjordan with the title of Emir. Presently the mandatory power was compelled to grant a measure of independence to the region with reservations similar to those imposed upon Egypt by the treaty of 1922. In 1930, after prolonged negotiations, a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Iraq, by which Great Britain recognized the independence of Iraq, promised to sponsor her application for membership of the League of Nations, and agreed when Iraq became a member of the League to renounce the mandate and within five years more to withdraw her troops. In accordance with this agreement, Iraq became a member of the League in 1932, and the last British troops were withdrawn in 1935. Britain retained some defensive rights and also some economic privileges. Faisal died in 1933 and was succeeded by Ghazi, who in turn was succeeded by his son, Faisal II in 1939.

Transjordan, which is essentially a desert area, where nationalism made but little headway, was under tighter British control, but in 1928 Great Britain conceded a limited autonomy to the area, reserving to herself the right to send her armed forces into it, while acts of the Emir could be disallowed by a resident agent of the British High Commissioner of Palestine.

SYRIA

Syria is culturally the most advanced area of the whole Arab land and her leaders were most eager for national independence. The French, to whom the land was given over as mandate, cut off from it the land around Beirut, which is predominantly Christian, and constituted it into the autonomous "Republic

of Lebanon". Their game of "divide and rule" alienated the Arabs, and there were occasional riots in Damascus, the Syrian capital. In 1925, disturbances occurred all over Syria, which coincided with a revolt of the Druses, a warlike hill tribe. The French High Commissioner, General Serrail, had recourse to worst acts of barbarity and treachery in his effort to quell the risings, and destroyed a considerable part of Damascus by artillery and bombing from the air. The Mandates Commission of the League of Nations criticized French policy and the French at long last gave way. In 1936 they signed a treaty with Syria, promising the gradual withdrawal of troops and the eventual admission of Syria, as an independent state, to membership of the League of Nations. The Syrians, however, continued to agitate for complete independence.

PALESTINE

Even more than the French in their section of Syria the British experienced difficulties in the section of Syria assigned to them and identical with historical Palestine. The troubles stemmed principally from the British Premier Balfour's declaration issued in a particularly critical moment during the War in 1917 promising a "national home" for the Jews in Palestine (see below, Chapter 28). A year later, on 7 November 1918, after Palestine and Syria had been conquered from the Turks, a joint Anglo-French declaration was issued promising to the peoples liberated from the Turks "national governments", which encouraged the Arabs to expect Arab predominance in Palestine. After the war was over, however, Great Britain proceeded to make good her promises to the Jews and favour Jewish immigration into Palestine. Jewish companies bought lands from the Arabs and immigrants settled on them in a manner that alarmed the native Arabs. In 1929, the first countrywide flare-up of Arab violence against the Jews began. Britain tried to pacify the Arabs by limiting immigration and at times stopping it altogether. But disturbances continued, and in 1936 a British Parliamentary Commission was sent to Palestine to investigate into the situation. Acting on their report, the British brought forward a proposal for the partition of Palestine, which was rejected by both sides, and was withdrawn and substituted by another,

more moderate scheme. The outbreak of the Second World War prevented action being taken on the second scheme and the issue remained in cold storage during the war (further details are given in Chapter 28).

CHAPTER VI

FRANCE AND THE QUEST FOR SECURITY

FRENCH POLITICS AFTER THE WAR

It was a terribly battered and in many ways substantially transformed France that emerged, sullen yet confident, out of the ordeal of the First World War. It was a coalition government of centre and rightist parties, called the National Bloc, that had successfully carried the nation from the military reverses of the early war period to final victory. In the elections of November 1919, the people reiterated their faith in their government, though, early in the following year, Georges Clemenceau, the outstanding leader of the nation all through the war years and the Peace Conference period, was defeated in his candidature for the presidency, and a less controversial figure, Mr. Paul Deschanel, known as the "best dressed man in Paris", was elected President. The new National Bloc ministry applied itself heroically to the task of rebuilding France, taking in hand as the most urgent necessity the reconstruction of the departments of the north and north-east which had borne the brunt of the war and had been cruelly devastated by the enemy. It floated loans on a huge scale, and so great was the energy displayed by government and people that, in the next few years, the whole comprehensive programme of rehabilitation was gone through, the work being carried on with the same 'zeal even after the National Bloc ministry gave place to other party alignments.

France's hope that her immense outlay incurred by the programme would presently be made good by reparations payments was, however, largely unrealized. She had to think anew of her security after the American Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, throwing overboard at the same time the guarantee which President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George had accorded to her frontiers and also, by declining membership of the League of Nations, weakened the League's collective security system. What was the worst hit of all, England began to show the same

sympathy and consideration to defeated Germany as she had extended to France herself after Waterloo, and the two nations began to differ widely in their attitude to the many problems of post-war settlement that arose frequently. It became all too evident that the fatality of French history would soon reappear : that France, abandoned by England, whose naval power was now secure—with the German navy lying at the bottom of the North Sea—and trade relations with Germany needed to be resumed, would have to try with her own resources her own conclusions with Germany.

Her first act when she was launched on this course was to invade the Ruhr with a view to collecting reparations from Germany, whom she accused—the British dissenting—of having wilfully defaulted in paying them. The adventure, as we have already seen, paid less than it cost and in the totality of its results at home and abroad so damaged French credit that it precipitated a disastrous decline in the value of the franc. The national reaction to it was the defeat of Poincaré and the National Bloc in the elections of 1924, and the setting up of a ministry headed by Edouard Herriot, the leader of a Left Cartel. The franc, however, went on depreciating still further till Poincaré, called back to power, restored the country's shattered credit, and also became the "saviour of the franc." He retired, full of years and honours, for reasons of health, in 1929, and the fiscal troubles reappeared and ministries were formed and fell, as in the French tradition, in the midst of noisy public demonstrations by reactionary leagues animated by royalist and fascist sentiments, such as the *Croix de Feu* (the Cross of Fire) which indicated that, if not democracy itself, parliamentary government, as it was practised in France, was in danger.

The French political stage seemed at this time to be fully set for the appearance of a dictator, and the histories of Germany and Italy seemed likely to be repeated. Such a development, however, was avoided because the French political parties, despite programmatic differences, were solidly devoted to the maintenance of free institutions. In the hour of danger, all the parties of the Left coalesced to form the so-called *Front Populaire*, which included even the communists (1935), and on Bastille Day (14 July) 1935, nearly 300,000 people joined in a huge demonstration against Fascism. In the following year, the

Front Populaire won a great victory at the polls, and for the first time a Socialist, Leon Blum, formed a cabinet, which included the party of the Radical Socialists, which, despite its label, was no socialist party but an old-fashioned liberal one, but not the communists, who were prepared to help elect anti-fascists to the Chamber but not to serve in the government at their side.

Leon Blum, a cultured and wealthy Jew, who, as the political dictator of the Socialist daily, *Le Populaire*, had won fame as a brilliant writer of polemics, won his spurs as Socialist Premier by holding a conference at the Matignon Hotel in Paris between the representatives of the employers and trade union leaders. In accordance with the agreement reached at the conference, Blum carried out a series of radical social reforms, which immediately resulted in the ending of the sit-down strikes, which were occurring frequently at this time and threatening to paralyse industry. The labourers got the forty-hour working week, holidays with pay, and collective bargaining, the civil servants a restoration of the recent cuts in salaries, and Frenchmen in general a more equitable share in the national income and the means to enjoy "a fuller life". The reforms, however, imposed a great burden on industry, and business recovery was retarded. To meet the problems, Blum asked for financial dictatorship until 31 July 1937, but the Senate refused to grant it, and he resigned. His successor was the Radical Socialist leader, Camille Chautemps, who had a certain amount of fiscal success, but his hostile attitude towards strikes led to his downfall, and, after he had formed a second ministry, composed almost entirely of Radical Socialists, and failed to carry on, he gave place to Blum, who formed a second ministry. The latter failed to reconcile the conflicting demands of the communists for proletarian legislation and of the Radical Socialists for a reduction of the labour legislation and a balanced budget. He resigned on 10 April 1938, and a new ministry was formed under Daladier, a leading Radical Socialist.

FRANCE'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE QUEST FOR SECURITY

As the above narration clearly indicates, with the exception of

a very few ministries, e.g. that of Poincaré for the second time, which lasted three years, French cabinets have been both unstable and weak. "The War Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George was the thirteenth government in England since 1875. The War Ministry of M. Clemenceau was the fifty-seventh in France." These facts make an appreciable difference in the conduct of foreign relations in the two countries. It is true that some foreign ministers, like Delcassé and Aristide Briand, were able to continue in office and pursue a continuous policy through a succession of ministries. Nevertheless, such instability of governments in France has had serious results on occasions of grave crisis. To give one example, the Chaumet Government resigned all on a sudden a few days before the Nazi march into Austria. While this march was in progress, France was without a government.

There is, however, one objective of foreign policy, which—of primary concern to every state—has a special place in the minds of the French people (and has thus dictated consistency in the governmental conduct of French foreign policy), viz. security. Britons, the political boundaries of whose country are unalterably fixed as well as safeguarded by nature, and are further insured by their naval supremacy, often fail to appreciate the anxiety which their fair cousins on the other side of the Channel have on the problem of security. Without having a natural frontier in the east and the north-east; and having Germans as their neighbours, with whom they had the most numerous and bitterest of fights that any two European nations had had in history; ever troubled with the thought that while they had a more or less stagnant population, the Germans had a much larger population that was multiplying rapidly; and having been invaded and despoiled twice within living memory, the French naturally thought more of the problems of their security than the British or other nations in Europe had to worry themselves about on the subject. The British sometimes felt that the French had themselves to thank for the tension on their common frontier with Germany, that it was the result of "imperialist" policies pursued in the past by French rulers and statesmen, who, with regard to the Germans, thought that aggression was the best defence, and they remarked that the French idea of security meant

insecurity for all nations save the French.

FRENCH SECURITY AND THE PARIS CONFERENCE

In any case, as we have seen, the French, at the close of the First World War, when the national enemy lay prostrate at their feet, were determined to deal with him in such a manner that he never again might have another chance to cross their borders, or even that he might not rise again. The peace-makers at Paris had to bow again and again to the French demand for security, powerfully voiced by Clemenceau (there are twenty million Germans too many! he once exclaimed); and French security was writ large over the entire Peace Settlement; it eclipsed every other consideration. Military experts in France were of opinion that so long as Germany possessed both banks of the Rhine, she had a spring-board for launching an army almost at will on to the French plains to the west. Deferring to this view, Clemenceau, at the Conference of Paris, demanded indefinite control of the Rhine bridge-heads as a "physical guarantee" of French security. Wilson and Lloyd George refused to agree to the indefinite separation of the Rhineland from Germany for fear of creating "a new Alsace-Lorraine in reverse". France got instead the demilitarization of the left bank of the Rhine and of a considerable part on the right, and Allied occupation of the Rhineland for fifteen years. She had also the satisfaction of getting written into the treaty numerous provisions designed to cripple Germany economically so that her war potential might be destroyed and she might never be able to wage another war against herself. Finally, after protracted negotiations, she received the pledge that England and America would immediately come to her assistance in case Germany made an unprovoked attack upon her. This diplomatic guarantee, which France reluctantly accepted as a bad second-best substitute for the "physical guarantee" demanded by her, however, fell through since the U.S.A. repudiated the Treaty of Versailles (which failed by six votes of getting the necessary two-thirds in the Senate), and Britain claimed this also invalidated her part of the bargain. France felt that she had been tricked into surrendering a vital element in her national security.

ANGLO-FRENCH TALKS ON FRENCH SECURITY

In the years immediately following the Peace Conference, France continued to press Great Britain for some additional guarantee of assistance against Germany. But the possibility that the two countries might come to some agreement as to the form that the guarantee was to assume was increasingly lessened on account of the widening divergence of opinion between them as to the attitude they should have towards Germany. As we have seen, England, feeling anxious about the declining economic condition of her chief customer, was disposed to be conciliatory to Germany, while France, looking at the problems of Germany from the sole point of view of her own security was quite unconcerned about, or opposed to German recovery. At the Conference at Cannes (January 1922) Mr. Lloyd George thought that he had enlisted the support of the French Premier, M. Aristide Briand, for the British view point, but the very suspicion that the latter had yielded to England ruined M. Briand's popularity at home. Hauled back to Paris, Briand had to meet an angry Chamber, and though not defeated, was replaced by M. Poincare. The new premier, who was an advocate of the policy of coercion rather than of conciliation, had his own ideas on the needs of French security, and, with respect to the negotiations going on with Britain for a guarantee pact, considerably augmented the demands of his country. Under the circumstances the curtain fell on the first act of France's search for security; and the pourparlers ended paradoxically, it being the British who were now offering and the French who were refusing a guarantee pact.

FRANCE BUILDS UP HER SECURITY SYSTEM

Meanwhile, the French were also exploring other avenues of security, and on 7 September 1920, concluded a military pact with Belgium, which provided that the two signatories should come to each other's aid in case either was attacked by Germany. A similar provision was contained in the Franco-Polish Treaty of 19 February 1921, by which the two countries undertook to consult each other on all international matters of mutual interest and to act in concert for the maintenance of all treaties

to which they were or might become parties. In September 1922, moreover, France and Poland concluded a military convention, which was renewed in 1932 for a further period of ten years. France also began to strengthen her army by enlisting coloured troops from North Africa. Forgetting her own loans to England, she began to pour money into Poland in order to arm the Poles and also furnished the latter with military instructors and war materials.

During M. Poincaré's first post-war ministry a trial was given to a scheme which showed the lengths to which the policy of encompassing the ruin of Germany might be carried, viz. an attempt to create an independent German State of the Rhineland. The French pretended to discover some Germans in the Rhineland anxious to secede from Germany and have their own state. The move developed serious proportions when, in the autumn of 1923, the local French representative of the High Commission actually recognized the "separatists" in the Palatinate as an independent government, and the latter, provided with arms by the French military authorities, expelled the German officials and took over the administration. In January 1924 the High Commission—the British representative dissenting—officially recognized the "autonomous government" of the Palatinate, which quickly received from the loyal inhabitants the nickname of "the Revolver Republic". Under the strong protests of the British Government, the French Government was compelled to disavow the act of its agents, whereupon the whole movement collapsed and no more was heard about a separatist movement in the Rhineland. About M. Poincaré's adventure in the Ruhr we have spoken already.

France's attempt to build up a security system of her own by alliances with states bordering Germany, which was a return to the pre-war diplomacy of encirclement, continued under Poincaré's successors, who extended it to include the Little Entente states. On 25 January 1924, a treaty was concluded with Czechoslovakia, by which the two states agreed to consult each other if Germany and Austria attempted to unite, or if Germany or Hungary attempted to restore monarchy, and to "concert upon" common measures whenever their security or the peace treaties were at stake. On 10 June 1926, France

concluded an agreement with Rumania, by which the two countries undertook never to attack each other, and to act together to forestall any attempt to change the *status quo* in Europe. A similar treaty was concluded between France and Yugoslavia on 11 November 1927. As in the case of Poland, these treaties were accompanied by military and financial assistance to Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Germany was enclosed in a veritable ring of steel!

These alliances served their purpose when they were contracted by giving France a sense of enhanced security though at a frightful cost, since France who refused to pay back her own loans to Great Britain and America, had to spend heavily for arming the Poles and her other allies. Needless to say, Germany viewed them with alarm and indignation, and as soon as Hitler came to power he sought to bring the nations of Eastern Europe back to the German orbit of influence, and so to weaken the security system which France had built up. These small nations of Eastern Europe, whose military strength was slight and who were unable, because of their conflicting interests, to act together, were fair-weather friends who were the least useful to France when she needed their support most, that is when she was threatened by Nazi Germany. Poland, who led the other allies in opposing the Four-Power Pact (see below, Chapter VIII), which, if sincerely adhered to, might have improved Franco-Italian relations, signed a pact of non-aggression with Germany in January 1934 (see below Chapter XII) mindful of only her own national interests and forgetting those of France. Another serious consequence of these alliances of France was that they angered Italy, who held that France had no business to intervene in Eastern Europe and that the fact that she did so was proof that it was her policy to obstruct the pursuit by Italy of national objectives in a region where she claimed to have special interests. France's support of Yugoslavia, whom Italy considered as her Public Enemy No. 1, was one of the principal reasons for the continuing tension in the relations between the two sister Latin nations, which in its turn paved the way for a *rapprochement* between Italy and Nazi Germany. Also, as a counter-measure Italy wooed Hungary, Bulgaria and Austria and encouraged them to hope for treaty revision—

throwing fresh seeds of trouble into the already complicated field of Balkan politics.

SEEKING SECURITY THROUGH LEAGUE MACHINERY

When the U.S.A. and Britain disavowed their promised Guarantee Pact (1920), France was left with only one extraneous guarantee of security, viz. that provided by the Covenant of the League of Nations. Realistically, France did not think much of the efficiency of this kind of security, since, in particular, the U.S.A. had dodged out of the League also. In an earlier chapter we have analysed the provisions under the Covenant for the maintenance of Collective Security, and discussed the question how far they sufficed to protect a League member from the possibility of aggression, or to help him in resisting an actual act of aggression. There is the celebrated story that on being asked by Napoleon why the gun had not been fired in salute to him when he visited the citadel, the commandant had replied: "There are a hundred reasons, Your Excellency, why the gun could not be fired from the citadel welcoming you; only one needs to be mentioned: there was no ammunition!" The complete answer to the question, "Why did the League fail to provide its members sufficient security against aggression?" may be given equally simply and convincingly as follows: There were a hundred reasons which were responsible for the inoperativeness of the security provisions of the League Covenant; it would be sufficient to mention only one, viz. Article 5." (This required that decisions in all such cases either in the Council or the Assembly must be unanimous.) This reply, which should have satisfied a Napoleon, did not satisfy the critics of the League in America, where there was a storm of controversy over Article 10, leading to—despite Wilson's explanation—the rejection of the League by the American Senate.

The security provisions under the Covenant came again under fire in the first meeting of the Assembly in 1920, when the Canadian representative proposed the elimination of Article 10. The proposal was rejected, but it was continued in the two following years. In 1923, an interpretative resolution was passed which declared that it was for each state to decide for itself how

far it was bound to employ its military forces in executing its obligation under the article. In 1921 the attack was extended to Article 16 and certain "rules of guidance" were adopted which had the effect of weakening its obligations. Critics of Article 16 also expressed the fear that in case an economic blockade was imposed on an aggressor state under its provisions there might be a clash between the League and the U.S.A., a non-member whose commercial interests might be affected by a blockade and whose policy of neutrality might lead to conflict. How far away, indeed, was the general trend of opinion from the French advocacy of strengthening Article 10 by the creation of an international army, rejected by the U.S.A. and Britain at the Peace Conference, was indicated by Mr. J. L. Garvin's remarks in *The Observer*, dated 5 April 1930: "Nothing stands more in need of revision than the cumbrous and obsolete provisions of Article 16, containing a series of 'sanctions, armed and economic'."

In spite of the fact, however, that the French considered the League as it had been shaped out by this time as but a broken reed to rely on for the purpose they intended it should serve, viz. safeguarding the Peace Settlement, they continued to co-operate with it, hoping thereby to check the "flight from sanctions" described above as also to utilize the League's annual session as a sounding-board for reaching and influencing world opinion. Even M. Poincare, the unbending nationalist and realist Premier, did not disdain to make use of the League in this way. His successor, Herriot, sent to Geneva as French delegate to the League, as Poincare had done before him, M. Aristide Briand, one of the most distinguished orators and statesmen that France produced in modern times. In 1924 Mr. Ramsay MacDonald personally attended the session of the Assembly at Geneva, being the first British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to do so, thereby immensely increasing the prestige of the League. Many other statesmen of eminence followed his lead. The French delegation was presided over by the Premier, M. Herriot. The example given by Britain and France was followed by other countries, so that for the next ten years the Assembly was a collection of the leading statesmen in Europe

THE DRAFT TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND THE GENEVA
PROTOCOL

The result of all this was that the League now had a boom and peace had a hearing. Article 8 of the Covenant expressly charged the League Council with preparing plans for the reduction of armaments, consistent with national safety, which were to be submitted to the governments for their decision. In 1921, the League had set up a new consultative body called the Temporary Mixed Commission to investigate the disarmament question. In view of the fact that the League was about to draft plans for disarmament, the French Government, for the first time in 1922, put forward their view that France could reduce her armaments only if her security were increased. In September 1922, the League of Nations flew its first kite of security by passing a celebrated resolution, which came to be known as Resolution XIV. It recognized that states could not disarm in the prevailing circumstances and asserted that as a precedent condition they must undertake to help a disarmed state in case of attack by any other state.

In the course of 1922 and 1923, many discussions took place as to the best means of giving shape to the problem thus formulated. Finally, in September 1923, a Treaty of Mutual Assistance was drafted, which was unanimously adopted by the Fourth Assembly (1923). It provided security by a pledge of the signatories to aid any one of their number who was the victim of attack. The basic principle was a combination of general and special guarantees. Within the cadre of a general treaty, groups of states would enter into detailed arrangements to support each other, if attacked, and, as a condition of this support, they would agree to proportional disarmament. Regarding armaments, it was stipulated that the Council should devise a scale of reductions to a "point consistent with national safety". In this way not only the whittling-away process which Article 16 had undergone in the Assembly was sought to be checked but by making sanctions automatic and obligatory, it strengthened it. On this very account, the Draft Treaty was supported by France and her allies, whose need for security was great, and was rejected by England, her Dominions, the Scandinavian states and Holland, who did not stand in equal need for security and were accord-

ingly unwilling to shoulder more burdens for it. The most emphatic rejection of the Draft Treaty came from Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, the British Premier, who thought that the scheme smacked of the pre-war system of alliances, that by setting up a machinery of defence the chances of peace might be destroyed, and that judicial methods, such as arbitration, appeared to be left on one side. Other objectors complained about the absence of an adequate definition of aggression, and also about the vagueness of the disarmament provision.

The proposed treaty was abandoned, and a new scheme, which came to be called the Geneva Protocol, was drafted and unanimously recommended to the governments by the Assembly. As there could be no arbitration and security without reduction of armaments, an international conference for the reduction of armaments was summoned to meet at Geneva on 25 June 1925. The protocol provided for compulsory arbitration in all cases—justiciable disputes were to be referred to the World Court and political disputes to the Council; even disputes about matters of domestic jurisdiction were to be submitted to the procedure of conciliation under Article 11. The protocol sought to improve on the Covenant by closing the "gaps" through which war might come, viz. by the Council failing to come to a unanimous decision as to disputes referred to it, and the Council being debarred from handling a dispute claimed by one of the parties to come under its domestic jurisdiction. Arbitration without force to back it was not likely to appeal to nations like France, but it did one thing. "It would provide a test as to which country was the aggressor, since it might be concluded that if arbitration were rejected by one of the disputants it was that one that meant to attack." (Viscount Cecil, *A Great Experiment*, p. 159.)

Macdonald and Herriot, who now headed the Governments of Britain and France respectively, appeared together at the Assembly session at Geneva in 1924, and their support of the protocol seemed to give a clear passage to its acceptance by other states. France's acceptance did signify that, under Herriot, she had departed to a great extent from the position she had so far held on the question of security. It was also due to the fact that the protocol provided a way of settlement of disputes only; a demand for revision of the Treaty Settlement not being a "dispute" did not come under its purview; and so the protocol was an instru-

ment for maintaining the *status quo*, which was in line with French policy. In England, and the Dominions, however, there was an outcry against the protocol—in the former by conservative elements who had been outraged by the establishment of a Labour Cabinet and were plotting for and, by the use of the controversial Zinoviev letter, did shortly succeed in bringing about its overthrow; in the latter because, having recently passed anti-Japanese Immigration Acts there was the apprehension that Japan, whose representatives were responsible for the inclusion of domestic jurisdiction disputes in the protocol, might submit the case to the Council. In any case the Labour Government being overthrown as the result of the general elections, the fate of the protocol was sealed, and the next Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, lost no time in informing Geneva that the Conservative Government would not honour the commitment of its predecessor (Labour) government.

THE TREATIES OF LOCARNO

The critics of Sir Austen Chamberlain pointed out that his objections to the protocol were virtually objections to the League Covenant itself. This contention seemed to be borne out by his own statement that he had no objection to a guarantee pact of regional application only, and, indeed, the League way of Collective Security being now left behind, there was no alternative but to go back to the old path of a Guarantee Pact. Surprisingly enough, this time the question was raised, not by a French demand upon England for a guarantee of her security against Germany but by Germany herself who offered to France a guarantee of their mutual frontier. The offer was not a new one, and had not been hastily made. It had been put forward by the German Chancellor, Dr. Cuno, in December 1922, and rejected by M. Poincaré as a "manoeuvre". It had been repeated by Herr Stresemann in a speech on 22 December 1923, but had evoked no response from the French who thought that it was inspired by German anxiety to secure the evacuation of the Ruhr. An objectionable feature (from the European point of view) of the Germans' offer was their desire that the proposed security pact should be placed under the trusteeship of the

U.S.A. The Ruhr invasion, however, had served as a lesson both for France and for Germany. Germany's cup of humiliation and misery had been filled to the brim, and France had gained little. Under Stresemann, Germany was adopting a new policy, that of 'fulfilment', in place of the one she had pursued up to this time, that of "resistance"; France also had a new ministry. The most decisive factor in the renewal of the offer by Germany seems to be the conviction that had come in the national mind that Germany had as much interest in the economic recovery of Europe as any other nation; that economic recovery was impossible without political appeasement; and that what Germany needed most was settled life behind permanent frontiers within which the nation could enjoy full sovereignty and independence.

It was thus that in the first week of February 1925, Herr Stresemann informed the British Government and afterwards the French that Germany was willing to enter into a mutual solemn obligation with the powers interested in the Rhine not to wage war against one another and in addition to sign a pact expressly guaranteeing the existing territorial status. In addition the Germans were prepared to enter into arbitration treaties with other states. The French at once insisted that Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland should be invited to take part in the negotiations on the subject. After a protracted and voluminous correspondence, in the course of which it was decided that Germany, enjoying the same rights but assuming the same obligations, should enter the League of Nations, the powers agreed that the foreign ministers of the interested governments should meet in Switzerland on 5 October to put their signatures to the proposed guarantee and arbitration treaties. Almost at the last moment, the German Government had informed the Western Powers that they had one lingering objection to signing such a pact, and accepting membership of the League. They were afraid, they said, that these commitments might require that, in case the League, at some future date, decided to apply military sanctions against the Soviet Union under Article 16 of the Covenant, they (the German Government) should participate in such action. They pointed out that, in such an eventuality, they would be placed in an anomalous position, since they had signed a treaty of friendship with the

Soviet Union, viz. the Treaty of Rapallo, 1922. The Western Powers met this objection of the German Government by writing a letter to them clarifying the issue: they declared that Germany being a disarmed power could not be called upon to apply military sanctions under the League Covenant. The Soviet Government, however, viewed the signing of the Locarno treaties with deep suspicion. (See below, Chapter 7.)

The historic conference which met at Locarno in Switzerland—by the calm waters of the famous lake—on 5 October 1925 lasted ten laborious days in the course of which seven treaties were initialled, the formal signatures to which were attached on 1 December in London. These comprised, in addition to the final protocol: (i) a treaty of mutual guarantee among Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium; (ii) four arbitration treaties between Germany as the party of the first, and Belgium, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia severally as parties of the second; and (iii) two treaties of guarantee between France and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia.

The immediate effect of the Locarno Treaties on international relations in Europe was decidedly favourable. Sir Austen Chamberlain claimed that it marked "the real dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace". It was recognized that even more than in what it actually accomplished, the Locarno Pact (as the treaties together came to be called) signified much more in what it promised to enable Europe to do in the near future. It became henceforth the custom to speak of the "Locarno spirit" (as in a later day, after the Summit Conference at Geneva, 1955, people spoke of the "Geneva spirit"), and it was expected to work wonders. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who was at first a bitter critic and denounced it as "a pigeon-holed agreement", ere long recognized its possibilities. "It has been," said he, "the most magnificent example of mass Coeicism that I have ever known."

Yet, its imperfections were obvious, and the hopes which were based on it were hardly realized. Some of the present-day comments on the pact may be quoted as follows: "The Locarno achievements were widely hailed as precursors of a new era in world history. But neither the pacts nor the spirit of Locarno were actual guarantees of peace." "Hailed as the beginning of a new era in the relations between France and Germany,

Locarno proved to be a mirage that dissolved almost as soon as it was glimpsed. Or, call it a hoax that Briand and his German counterpart, Stresemann, sprang on the world in their understandable longing to give a respite to hate." "They were the first successful attempt to recognize impartially the needs of both France and Germany. . . . Yet the implications of Locarno were sinister as well as reassuring." "Realism had been set aside and an atmosphere of illusion began to descend on international politics. The Agreement of Locarno was not useless, though it was shortsighted." "At the time of its adoption, at any rate, the Locarno Pact was a most effective and formidable-looking scarecrow."

It cannot be denied that the Agreement had some solid results; it gave France some security, and, consequently, some halt in her ever-active quest for it, which had had a disturbing effect on European politics; it restored Germany to her place among the Great Powers and as one of them to her place in the League of Nations. It introduced a new spirit of co-operation and optimism—the spirit of Locarno—and it may be held that, if some calamities, e.g. the financial panic of 1929 and the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, had not happened, it would have introduced a new era in Europe. Before the Locarno spirit evaporated, another encouraging development followed: almost all the nations of the world, including the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, which were still outside the League, signed the Pact of Paris, outlawing war.

Now to deal with the defects of the Locarno Pact, the first striking point is that while England guaranteed the Franco-German and Belgian-German frontiers, she refused to sign along with France the two treaties that the latter signed with Poland and Czechoslovakia, although she affirmed that she recognized the obligations of Article 10 of the Covenant towards Poland and Czechoslovakia. This had several bad results and implications, which may be called even "sinister". (i) In the first place; France, already saddled with too many responsibilities and obligations, overburdened herself further by assuming obligations in Eastern Europe without partnership with Britain. (ii) As regards Germany's frontiers, Britain had "graded" them, by recognizing that the western frontiers were more sacrosanct

and permanent, since she was prepared to defend them by arms, and the eastern frontiers were less so, since she was not prepared to defend them by arms though she owned her obligations in respect of them under the League of Nations Covenant. Two bad results flowed from this "grading" of frontiers by Britain : (a) it weakened the Versailles Settlement in general, because the Locarno Pact implied that certain parts of the former were more binding because Germany voluntarily agreed to them than others to which she did not accord such special recognition (though she was prepared to submit disputes relating to them to arbitration). As one critic succinctly puts it : "If the Versailles settlement lacked fully binding force unless it were voluntarily reinforced in this way, it was now more precarious as a whole." (b) England admitted that her bond differed as regards Covenant obligations and as regards the obligations of an ordinary treaty. This weakened the concept of Collective Security as laid down in the Covenant, and made its maintenance more problematic.

It has been pointed out that England's promises to defend France against Germany if the latter attacked her, and Germany against France if the latter attacked her were both "unreal and one-sided". For, if Germany attacked France, England's army, which was about only 80,000 strong, might be of some use to the latter because at this time the French also had a strong army. But if France attacked Germany—this eventuality being at the time more probable—England could be of little help to Germany, despite her fleet. As a matter of fact, however, England's guarantee, "unreal" as it was, was based upon a shrewd calculation that, with England promising her intervention in any Franco-German war against the aggressor, there was little likelihood of the "reality of the Pact" being put to the test. Mr. Churchill, who considers the Locarno Pact as "the high-water mark of Europe's restoration", thinks that the British pledge was "dangerous in theory only". For the time at any rate, the "scarecrow" served its purpose. With hindsight it appears that the real effectiveness of the pact depended on the issue of disarmament, for if there was an all-round reduction of armaments, England's forces, however small, would turn the scale in a Franco-German war.

THE PACT OF PARIS, 1928

The Locarno Pact allayed Germany's fears about a possible invasion of the type of the occupation of the Ruhr a few years ago or about such French activities as the attempt to set up an "independent" state of the Rhineland. But she was not relieved of any of the Versailles disabilities and the reparation problem, even after its revision under the Dawes Plan, hung like a black cloud over her head. France did nothing by way of adopting any positive steps which might stimulate the spirit of optimism released by the Locarno Pact. Supposing she had followed up her Locarno signatures by withdrawing her army of occupation from Germany the spirit of Locarno would have grown up further. France rather chilled enthusiasms by clinging to her continental alliances and insisting that security must precede disarmament. It was only the delegations of some small states at the League Assembly that continued to work in the Locarno spirit, and helped the adoption by that body of a Polish proposal, which declared that "all war is and remains prohibited : that all pacific means must be employed for the settlement of disputes, no matter of what nature, that may arise among the various states ; and that the members of the League are under obligation to conform to these principles" (24 September 1927).

The Assembly resolution bore the impress of a plan, originally mooted by a Chicago lawyer, Mr. Salmon O. Levinson, to "out-law" war, which was first introduced as a resolution into the American Senate by Mr. Borah in 1923, and was since then being reintroduced at each session. The plan rested on the conviction that the masses of men love peace, but in time of war feel bound to support their own country ; and that the remedy for this "dualism" lies in placing law on the side of conscience. As Prof. John Dewey said : "At present the lover of peace becomes the criminal, the outlaw, in time of war if he ventures to hold out for peace. Outlaw war, and the law is on the side of peace and moral conviction." The idea caught the imagination of many people, but it remained for the Government of the United States officially to take up a suitable plan for implementing it and offer it for acceptance by other governments of the world in the form of a multilateral treaty. That was what the Secretary

of State, Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, did in 1927. But it came about in a round-about manner.

The ball was set rolling by the French Foreign Minister, M. Aristide Briand, when in a public statement, on 6 April 1927, as marking the tenth anniversary of the entry of the U.S.A. into the First World War, he declared that France was ready to sign an agreement with the U.S.A. outlawing war as an instrument of national policy between the two states. He followed this up by sending on 20 June the draft of a pact of perpetual peace between the two countries. In advocating the outlawry idea M. Briand might have been influenced by an American, Prof. Shotwell, with whom he had a conversation some time ago. But a war between France and the U.S.A. not being even a remote possibility, M. Briand's motive did not seem to many people to be clear. It was thought by some that he might be attempting to secure American neutrality in the event of some ex-enemy nation, exasperated at the veto which France possessed and was sure of using against any proposal for a peaceful revision of the peace settlement, declaring war.

In any case, Mr. Kellogg took about six months to reply to a seemingly innocuous proposal, and it was not till 28 December that he sent two notes to M. Briand, the second of which suggested that the proposed treaty should be multilateral. M. Briand could not immediately agree to this, and he pointed out that it would stand in the way of France and other nations carrying out their obligations for the maintenance of peace under the League Covenant. In April, however, he agreed that the entire correspondence on the subject might be submitted to the Governments of Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, and on 13 April the German Government, who were the first to reply to the American note, approved the American proposals, remarking that they could "only strengthen the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Rhine Pact". The British Government, in their reply, made a reservation with regard to "certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety"—in plain English, their imperial interests, and, pointing out the beam in American eyes, stated that the U.S.A. also had comparable interests. France reserved her previous treaty obligations, and emphasized the right of self-defence, which

Mr. Kellogg had conceded. On 23 June, Mr. Kellogg issued a final note, containing the necessary clarifications, and addressed to fourteen governments, viz. besides France and the four Great Powers originally addressed, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, together with India and the five Dominions of the British Commonwealth (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Irish Free State).

The governments thus addressed having favourably responded to Mr. Kellogg's letter, representatives of the fifteen original contracting parties met at Paris on 27 August 1928, and signed the pact. An invitation was extended to every other state to accede to it. By 1930, sixty-five states, including the Soviet Union but excluding Argentina and Brazil, adhered to it. The pact declared, simply enough, that all signatories condemned "recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another", and that every signatory agreed that "the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature shall never be sought except by pacific means". It may be noted that, in the course of framing and endorsing the pact, the signatories had made certain reservations. Apart from self-defence, or obligations under previous treaties or under the League Covenant or the Locarno Pact, other interests had been recognized as objects for which war might be waged without violating the pact. Under reservations made by the U.S.A. and Britain, American imperialistic interests in Central and South America, and British imperialistic interests, which were worldwide, were not affected by the pact. Finally, the pact was but a pious declaration, and no machinery for enforcement was even contemplated. Its only tangible result was that henceforth the signatories felt "morally" compelled to wage war, when they chose to do so, without declaration of war. In 1931, Japan invaded and conquered Manchuria, carrying on in the course of the operations a raid on Shanghai in the heart of China without declaring war.

HARMONIZING THE PACT AND THE COVENANT

Meanwhile, there were some criticisms to the effect that the pact in some way derogated from the authority of the League, or

that there was some incompatibility between them, which placed the members of the League in an anomalous position. It was argued that the pact forbade any resort to war as "an instrument of national policy", but that the Covenant, owing to the existence of "gaps", allowed this in certain cases. Again, it was pointed out, the pact declared that the settlement of disputes should never be sought except by pacific means, but the Covenant did not absolutely ensure that every dispute should be settled in this way or even that it should be settled at all. If war, therefore, was not to be excluded, what, it was asked, was to be done about disputes which could not be settled peacefully? It was felt accordingly that either the pact and the Covenant should be combined, or some system of dispute-settlement independent of the League Covenant should be set up for implementing the pact. The former of the two methods would involve the closing of the "gaps" and thereby extending the sanctions to all war; the latter might perhaps have the additional merit of enabling non-members of the League to co-operate in the settlement of disputes.

In the Assembly of the League (September 1929), England and France proposed that Article 16 of the Covenant should also apply to violators of the Pact of Paris, and that the League Covenant be amended accordingly. The Anglo-French proposal, which was the handiwork of the Labour Government which had just come to power in Great Britain, was a well-conceived one. If it were accepted, it would have not only strengthened the Covenant by prohibiting all wars, but given new force to the pact by making violations of it, as between members of the League, punishable. If the proposal had been put to the vote in 1929, the chances were that it would have been accepted unanimously. But, unfortunately, the discussions were postponed till the next Assembly, and by the time that body met, the situation had completely changed. The world was in the throes of the financial crisis; the Labour Government was out of power, and Stresemann was dead. Strong opposition was voiced by the delegates of Japan and the Scandinavian countries; and ultimately the amendments were talked out.

Instead, the Assembly produced a plan for implementing the pact, without amending the Covenant, by a General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which provided for

Conciliatory Commissions set up by each of the parties with every other party, for legal disputes to be submitted to the Permanent Court and non-legal disputes to arbitration. The Act was widely accepted, though in many cases with extensive reservations, but it was completely ineffective. It was a retrograde step to substitute conciliatory commissions for the League Council, for the former could neither have the means of obtaining information on the facts and the law of the cases brought before them as the Council had nor could they consist of men of international reputation like the Council members. The passing of an Act of this type may broadly be considered as a sliding back rather than a march forward, as it indicated a way of settling national disputes outside the League. With the failure in 1930 to adopt the Anglo-French proposal the opportunity slipped for ever of the League being ever able to strengthen its position. The decline which had begun long ago now became accelerated.

CHAPTER VII

BOLSHEVIST RUSSIA AND HER POLICIES

THE BOLSHEVIST REVOLUTION—THE FIRST PHASE ("PURE COMMUNISM")

THE seizure by the Bolsheviks led by Lenin of supreme power in Russia by a *coup d'état* at Petrograd on 7 November 1917 not only signified the triumph of the revolutionary movement that was going on in that country for more than half a century but put a violent end to the entire order represented by the Tsarist autocracy. The new rulers of Russia, as ardent and even fanatical pupils of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, immediately inaugurated the reign of "pure communism" by a series of decrees which they enforced with ruthless severity. Their first measures included the expropriation of the landlords and nationalization of the land, with peasant communities in charge of its partition and formation into government institutions, the nationalization of the banks, the repudiation of the foreign obligations of the Tsarist Government, and the disfranchising of all "non-working" elements of the population—in short the "dictatorship of the proletariat". Against the protests of the Allies, they took Russia out of the war, and concluded a separate peace with the enemy by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (March 1918), harsh and severe though the terms were.

In the wake of the revolution came countrywide disorders, to which were added both a civil and a foreign war, since Russia's ex-allies, including the U.S.A. and Japan, outraged by her desertion of them in one of the most critical phases of the war against Germany, intervened in the civil war, by not only helping the counter-revolutionary movements that had sprung up in many parts of the country, but, with a view to supporting them, seizing such ports of entry as Murmansk and Archangel on the White Sea, Vladivostok in Asiatic waters, and Odessa and other points on the Black Sea. In reply, the Bolsheviks unleashed the Red Terror, which, involving almost wholesale liquidation of the land-owning or possessing classes,

gave the criminal elements of the population full scope to satisfy their natural instincts of lust and greed, even though, to their ever-lasting credit, the Red Guards did their best to mitigate the excesses.

This phase of the revolution, known as Militant Communism, lasted roughly three years. The "white" invaders were gradually expelled by the Red Army, by now constituted into a zealous, well-drilled force by Trotsky, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and with the trial and execution of Kolchak on 7 February 1920, the Civil War may be said to have come to an end. The economic measures of the Bolsheviks, however, had produced distress and disasters. They had been opposed by nearly the whole body of peasants, for though the latter had ardently desired the overthrow of the Tsarist Government and undergone many sacrifices in their fight against it, they had not bargained for the establishment of Communism. Revolts broke out, and a terrible famine visited the land. So great and widespread was the misery that the Soviet Government permitted an appeal through the writer, Maxim Gorki, to Herbert Hoover, then Chairman of the American Relief Administration, for assistance. Mr. Hoover agreed to help and in July 1922 was giving daily ration to ten million children and adults in Russia.

THE SECOND PHASE—NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

Thereupon Lenin, a stern realist, perceived that the pace of Communism must be slowed down, and in 1921 he inaugurated a new policy, which came to be called the New Economic Policy (NEP). While reserving the major industries and the public utilities for state operation, he modified the ruling theory sufficiently to permit a certain amount of private industry and private trade in the hope thereby of encouraging individual enterprises to re-stock the empty markets. Above all, since food was the prime demand of the hour, the peasants were allowed to sell their surplus foodstuffs for their private advantage, being also thereby encouraged to grow more food. Encouragement was given to foreign capitalists to establish industrial enterprises in Russia, and trade agreements were negotiated with Great Britain, Italy, Austria and Norway. Small dealers were allowed

to open independent shops instead of being relegated to the position of managers for the retail trade of an all-embracing state. At the end of 1921 an attempt was made to stabilize the inflated Russian currency, which had fallen in value to such an extent that one of the new roubles would exchange for 10,000 of the old roubles. The peasants were permitted to rent land, hire labour, and sell their grain to private traders, whose position was also ameliorated. This injected new life into the "kulaks" (literally meaning the "big fists"), or Nepmen, who now began to occupy a dominating position in agricultural production.

This more moderate policy was followed till the death of Lenin in January 1924 and was hailed in the capitalist world as the Prodigal's Return, or the swing back to capitalism. As a matter of fact NEP only represented a temporary retreat, or as Lenin said, the taking of one step backward to enable them to have two steps forward. In any case the policy was followed in other directions also. A treaty of friendship—signed at Rapallo—was concluded with Germany in 1922. In 1923, after a period of severe persecution during which many priests were executed, the Orthodox Church—the national church of Russia—was allowed to carry on its religious services under the direction of a regulated Church Congress. The Tsarist Empire, transformed in 1918 into the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was reorganized in 1923 as the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.)—seven distinct national groups (after a decade the number rising to 11) being recognized as settled on Russian soil and each forming a constituent soviet socialist republic, with the theoretical right of secession. A reaction set in against licentiousness, which had marked the advent of "communist freedom".

THE THIRD PHASE—STALIN *v.* TROTSKY—"BOLSHEVISM IN ONE COUNTRY"

Lenin's death, which came in 1924, and which, before it actually occurred, had been gleefully announced in the European press a number of times, was followed by a "war for the succession" among his associates and followers. The latter, though presenting a "monolithic" front to the world, were

divided into two groups—one consisting of the “western exiles” such as Trotsky, Radek, Kamenev and Zinoviev, who had spent most of the past ten years under the free skies of Switzerland, France and England and the others, like Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov, who, during these years, had continued to do underground work in Russia and many of whom had suffered arrest, imprisonment, deportation and execution. Briefly, though all communists were agreed on the goal of the World Revolution, Trotsky advocated an active policy of achieving it by spreading Communism in every country by propaganda, subversion and incitement to revolt, while Stalin, a realist, believed in the ideal of “Bolshevism in one country”, that is, making a success of it in their own land, which, he said, would be a greater propaganda for a World Revolution than conspiracies and intrigues carried on all over the world without a definite purpose.

Hitherto, Trotsky had enjoyed a position in the communist world next only to that of Lenin, and it was expected that the latter's mantle would fall on him. But for some inexplicable reason, he neglected to attend Lenin's funeral and also the Thirteenth Party Congress held after the leader's death in May 1924, staying away the while in Tiflis, while Stalin consolidated his own position, which was already strong enough as he was the Secretary-General of the Communist Party. Stalin got himself elected to Lenin's post of Chairman of the Polit-bureau, and directing his campaign against his rivals from this place of vantage, rendered them completely impotent by having them expelled from the Communist Party. When they, thereupon, tried to effect a come-back by conspiring against him, he rid himself of them altogether by a succession of bloody purges. By 1937 the original nucleus of revolutionaries who had gathered around Lenin and proudly called themselves Old Bolsheviks had ended their existence before Red firing-squads. Trotsky alone was saved from this fate by his flight from Russia in 1929. He was assassinated in Mexico in 1941 by alleged Russian hirelings.

THE FOURTH STAGE—STALINIST DICTATORSHIP

Stalin elevated rule by terror into a complex political system.

Using the power of the police, which he personally controlled through trusted henchmen, he put each individual citizen and the nation as a whole into a psychological "isolation cell", and thus prevented and destroyed all opposition to himself. To maintain his own freedom of action within Soviet politics, Stalin further headed up or controlled directly all the important agencies of power in the country—the army, the police, the state bureaucracy, and above all, the Communist Party. He played each off against the others, and for that matter, within every agency he played off factions and persons against each other—on the ancient principle of divide and rule. By frightening people to do what was wanted of them, he got all power concentrated in the hands of a few of the top rung, who were his own henchmen. Unfortunately, an integral aspect of the Stalinist system was, that it also seemed to require a more or less continual maintenance of tension with the outside world as well, since the justification for the use of terror was the presence of an external enemy.

FIVE-YEAR PLANS

While NEP served the purpose for which it had been inaugurated by Lenin, it was repulsive to communist ideology, and so even while it was in progress, preliminary studies were conducted to chalk out a programme that was more in conformity with that ideology. When it was ready it was cast in the comprehensive form of a Five-Year Plan and started on its career in October 1928. Containing detailed programmes for the development of every branch of national economy, as well as fields of social activity, such as education and housing, it was received in the West with scepticism and some alarm as an effort at dumping. Inside Russia it was criticized as a departure from strict communist theory, and without doubt, the one insistent and consistent stimulus to the workers was found to be the profit motive. The Stakhanovite movement (analogous to the "piece-work system"—the "speed-up principle") became a national policy. "The Plan was proclaimed in the name of Socialism, and Socialist it was, but the work was the work of the nation, done by Russians for Russia, and it is therefore possible to say that the Five-Year Plan was the first peace-time

expression and accomplishment of Russian nationalism—as opposed to Marxist internationalism—which became apparent and grew stronger in the succeeding years.”

COLLECTIVE FARMING

The most outstanding feature of the First Five-Year Plan was the effort to socialize agriculture by means of collective farms (or *kolkhoz*). A collective farm was created by uniting a variable number of peasant holdings and obliging the peasants to work the enlarged unit collectively. It was managed by general meetings of the members and by an executive board elected for one year. The government supplied it with tractors and agricultural machinery. In return each collective farm concluded a contract with the government, by which it agreed to deliver to the state all produce over and above the needs of its members and livestock. The starting of the collective farms was accompanied by a drive against the *kulaks*, for whom the government had no further use, and whom they wanted to exterminate. The *kulaks* had the option of either voluntarily joining, along with their poorer brethren, the collectives, or being deported to Siberia, or suffering a similar fate in other ways. The peasants, as a whole, and not only the *kulaks*, raised an outcry against the collectives, because the remuneration was very poor; and the government had to grant them concessions and they also tightened their control over the collectives by establishing political sections at the 2,500 machine-tractor stations which at the time existed in the country. After a tremendous effort, the Soviet Government succeeded in collectivizing agriculture and by the time the Second World War broke out, 90 per cent of the peasants were in the collectives. The policy was carried out with a ruthlessness possible under dictatorial systems alone. Nearly two to three million agricultural peasants perished through the process. (John E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, p. 251.)

INDUSTRIALIZATION OF RUSSIA

The first and, for that matter, successive Five-Year Plans gave an equal attention to the problem of industrializing the country. During the years 1914-22, industry had suffered heavily;

factories and mines had been destroyed and large numbers of experienced workers had been killed or were in the army. Output had sadly diminished; to give one instance, that of coal was 50,000 tons in 1922 in place of 30,000,000 tons in 1913. Not only had industry to be brought back to its pre-war level, but it was to be improved and expanded. New plants had to be built and new branches of industry to be created, e.g. plants for the manufacture of tractors and other machinery needed for agriculture, machines and machine-made tools for the building up of factories, automobiles, aircraft, chemicals, etc. Under the First Five-Year Plan, the greatest attention was paid to the development of heavy industries. Enormous tractor works at Kharkhov, automobile factories in Moscow and Gorki, tractor plants in Rostov and Stalingrad, steel furnaces in the Don basin, fertilizer works in the Urals, and enormous dams were created. The great Dnieper dam was taken in hand, and completed in 1935. Industry in the Ural mountains was increased five-fold. All this involved a huge expenditure, which, Soviet leaders point out, is met in capitalist countries out of funds from outside—the plunder of colonies, foreign loans, etc.—sources not available to them. They claim that they carried out the industrialization of the country by means of socialist accumulation of internal revenues and savings, which meant a tightening of belts for all classes of the population.

Industrialization in Russia was characterized by the usual advantages and shortcomings of state-directed work. It eliminated the costs inherent in a competitive system of production and did not altogether destroy individual initiative. On the other hand, it never reached a high standard of efficiency, and quality was often sacrificed for considerations of quantity. The emphasis on heavy industry and comparative neglect of consumer goods produced discontent among the masses, and the standard of living could not be sufficiently improved. The labour conditions in Russia have been criticized in respect of wages, which are described as "starvation wages". This is not quite fair, as expressions such as "sweated labour" apply in particular to capitalist economy where production is done under profit motive. The accusation that labour in the Soviet Union is also "forced" or that it is at least involuntary is hard to deny; it is indeed a part of communist theory that "he who

does not work shall not eat". That forced labour, similar to convict labour in England and America, exists is not denied. "Socially hostile" elements are often deported to Siberia and subjected to penal labour under OGPU (or Unified State Political Administration, which could inflict even summary death sentences), which is regarded by the authorities as "re-education". With everything said for or against the Soviet system the fact stands out that Russia, which was a poor agricultural country in 1914, had made enormous strides towards industrialization at the end of the First Five-Year Plan; had at the time of the Nazi invasion well-disciplined and well-equipped armies, and industries of all descriptions supporting them, so as to be able first to bring to a halt and then beat back and destroy the strongest war machine that had been built up on earth; and is at the present moment, in science and industries, a serious rival of the United States.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION

Criticism on the same lines is frequently made also against the government and administration of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet system is criticized not only because it had set up an all-powerful state, but because it is arbitrary and oppressive. It is admittedly a dictatorship of the proletariat, but it is pointed out that it is also a dictatorship *over* the proletariat, viz. of the Communist Party, which is even now a minority of the population, over the vast masses of the peasants and workers of Russia. Finally, it is alleged, even the Communist Party is under the strictest regimentation of a handful of leaders—the Kremlin bosses—who were simply the henchmen of Stalin.

Communist writers, following Marx, at one time used to speak of a Socialistic State as truly democratic as contrasted with the "sham democracies" of the West, which, they said, were plutocracies or oligarchies. Russian Communists, however, do not bother over-much about the charge that their government is undemocratic. In the past, they point out, the state was the instrument of the capitalistic class for the maintenance of a particular economic order. In the age of Communism, they hold, it must serve as the spearhead of a class, the proletariat, which is numerically the strongest in society,

and in its own interests. The immediate historical task of Communism, according to them, is "to destroy the whole machinery of the bourgeoisie and parliamentary institutions with it and create in its place a proletarian apparatus. . . The only form of proletarian dictatorship is a republic of the Soviets." They, similarly, frankly admit the use of force and coercion in the exercising of governmental authority, pointing out that force is always the major weapon with which a ruling class meets the challenges to its authority. Nevertheless, the communist leaders contend, the Russian proletariat, which alone wields power in the Soviet State, actually enjoys greater freedom than that of other countries, where workers were exploited by the propertied classes. Freedom of the press, or of opinion, or such other things, they say, offer cold comfort in western countries to millions of unemployed workers who merely desire the opportunity to seek a job. The Russian people, it is also pointed out, had no liberties in the western sense in Tsarist Russia, and are, in any case, unaware of the absence of liberties they never enjoyed. Democracy, according to the communist leaders, is a luxury of rich and powerful nations like the English only.

The highest political body of the U.S.S.R. is the Union Congress of Soviets; immediately below it are the Congresses of the constituent republics; below them the lesser regional soviets; and finally, below the last-named, the soviets of the towns and villages constituting the primary governing units. Since the Union Congress of Soviets is far too large and unwieldy a body to govern directly, it delegates its power to a Union Central Executive Committee, and this in turn entrusts the practical work of government to a small body of ministers called the Union Council of Commissars. Superficially, the government could be called a democracy, because all the above-mentioned bodies are elected, and the franchise is given to all except known enemies of the regime. Really, as is acknowledged freely, it is nothing of the kind, because only one party is allowed to exist, the Communist Party, which hardly numbers three million persons, or a bare 2 per cent of the population. The Communist Party is under the control of a supreme political committee of nine members, the famous Polit-bureau, which may be considered as the outstanding political agency of the state.

The continuance of a rule by bayonets long after the conclusion of the civil war and the termination of foreign intervention, and the continuance of the tactics of revolution by conspiracy, intrigue, and incitement to disorder in a world where conditions were stabilizing, were charges against which the Soviet leaders felt compelled to give some concrete reply. We shall presently discuss how this line of thinking influenced the foreign policy of the Soviet Government, and compelled them to establish normal trade and diplomatic relations with the capitalistic countries. After her admission to the League of Nations (1934), the U.S.S.R. sincerely co-operated with the West in the pursuit of collective security. In 1936, a new constitution embodying many of the principles of parliamentary democracy, including a bill of rights, rule of law, etc. was introduced. It did not, however, appreciably alter the existing system of government in Russia, and the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 prevented any constitutional development which might have taken place if conditions in the world had continued to be peaceful.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The decision of the Bolsheviks, soon after the seizure of supreme political power by them in Russia, to sue for a separate peace with the Central Powers, elicited protests from the Allies. But, though at the moment the latter's own position was extremely critical and hence the defection was fraught with dangerous consequences to themselves, that fact alone might not have brought about an irreparable breach between Russia and her quondam allies. So crushing had been the defeats which the Tsarist forces had received at the hands of the enemy and so unpopular was the war in Russia, as evidenced by numerous desertions from the ranks by the Tsarist troops and the general war-weariness, that, even if the Tsarist Government had continued to be in power, it was unlikely that they could have carried on the war much longer, and a separate peace, for which the Tsarina was secretly working, could not have been long delayed. These facts were more or less appreciated by the Allies, who resented the hard terms that the Germans imposed on their old ally, and, indeed, they insisted, under

one of the terms imposed by them on the Germans at the Armistice, that the advantages secured by them by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk should be renounced.

The Allies at this stage desired to stand by their comrades of the early phase of the war, but the conduct of those, who, after the Revolution, guided Russian policy made a continuance of this policy impossible. The Bolsheviks repudiated the debts which the Tsarist Government owed to other nations, and expropriated without compensation the properties of foreigners resident at the time of the revolution in Russia. The Allies, thereupon, withdrew their ambassadors and severed diplomatic relations with Russia. They further declared an economic boycott of Russia and lent their support to Russian leaders such as Kolchak, Yudenich and others, who were fighting the Bolsheviks with a view to bringing about a White Revolution, and occupied a number of strategic positions in the periphery of Russia. The Bolsheviks fought with their backs to the wall, and the Allies, already exhausted by their long struggle against Germany, had to withdraw from the scene, leaving the White Revolutionaries at the mercy of their foes who neither received nor gave quarter.

At soon as the Bolsheviks gained this relative security, they thought of their first successes against their enemies as the beginning of a World Revolution, which would stop only when capitalism had been destroyed in every country of the globe. With a view to accomplishing this, they assembled at Moscow in 1919, an international gathering of communists which organized itself as the Third International, called the Comintern for short, and which became their agency for worldwide propaganda and intrigue. The prospects for the arrival of the Communist Millennium seemed at first to be bright indeed. Hungary actually went red, a Bolshevik revolution was believed to be imminent in Italy, and every effort was made to bring Germany in line. At the same time Russian agents began their work in the normal areas of pre-war Russia's aggression, viz. the Balkans, Persia, Afghanistan, India, Mongolia, Manchuria, China and Japan.

After the first few successes had been scored, however, the onrush of Bolshevism was checked. In Russia, the situation was critical; the collapse of the old economic system led to chaos,

and a famine visited the land. We have seen that Lenin met the situation by crying a temporary halt in the pursuit of a purely communistic policy in the economic field and inaugurated the so-called New Economic Policy. After his death, Stalin went further, and adopted the policy of "Bolshevism in one country". A few years afterwards the First Five-Year Plan was adopted, and Russian energies were further diverted from active pursuit of the policy of the World Revolution to constructive work at home. All these necessitated a change in the relations of the Bolshevik Government with capitalistic countries, and the hatchet had to be buried on both sides. The all-compelling fact of the world's numerous integrations had to be recognized and gradually a theory of "co-existence" was developed. But it has always been more than doubtful whether the doctrine has been sincerely held by either party. The U.S.S.R. has entered into trade and diplomatic relations with capitalistic countries, and the latter have accorded her recognition. After the seizure of power by the Nazis in Germany the U.S.S.R. co-operated in a much greater degree with the Western democracies, being admitted to the League of Nations membership in 1934.

The ideal of the World Revolution, however, was never lost sight of, or abandoned by the communists. As Zinoviev said, in a speech at Moscow in 1925, it had assumed its "slow and heavy" phase, and that, "contrary to our early expectations, it may take years to ripen". The Soviet Government left the task to be performed by the Third International (the Comintern), and, insisting on the separateness and independence of the organization, claimed that they were not responsible for its activities. The world, however, was not deceived, in view of the fact that practically every revolution of radical import that broke out anywhere in the world was guided by Russian agents and financed by Russian funds. The Russian agents may well have been despatched not by the U.S.S.R. Government but by the Comintern, but this would not still have accounted for Russian funds. As the Comintern enjoyed no revenues, the funds could not possibly have been supplied anywhere save from the treasury of the U.S.S.R.

The new policy pursued by the communists towards the capitalist world was two-fold. The object was still world revo-

lution, but the means of attaining it had two distinct aspects. The first was the steady infiltration into all workers' organizations of the world, specially the trade unions, with the object of capturing them and guiding them along revolutionary lines. This was to be done by the so-called "cell" system, and the process was called "boring from within". A cell was a small group of communist comrades which entered every labour unit which would tolerate them. Their duty was to preach the Marxian gospel according to Lenin. Whenever their labour group had serious differences with their employers, these cells found fertile ground for their propaganda and with "gold from Moscow" they were sometimes able to create real trouble. Whether they succeeded or failed in winning any particular cause for the strikers made little difference to the communists. They were more interested in pursuing the "slow and heavy method" to the bitter end, in order that one day the sum of their exerted pressure might be brought to bear in a stupendous world crisis of their own making and in which they could not possibly fail.

The second policy may be termed "direct action". This was to foster political revolts, no matter by what party they were engineered, with the object of destroying government. There were hardly any limits to this phase of Bolshevist activity. It certainly included international as well as national wars, if Zinoviev is to be believed. He said: "The revolutionary movement in the Orient is a mighty river, which is ploughing its way through every obstruction. This is China, Japan, India. We have already scored some successes in China, and Canton reminds one very much of Moscow. Other important centres will probably follow." The logical pursuit of such aims could not avoid some form of international conflict. Nonetheless, a *rapprochement* between Russia and the capitalistic states took place, attended by intermittent flare-ups of angry accusation and counter-accusation.

FOUR PHASES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY (1917-25)

An examination of the foreign policy of Soviet Russia reveals the fact that, during 1917-25, it passed through four phases. The first phase, which began with the establishment of the

Bolshevik Government in November 1917 and went through the years of civil war and foreign intervention, ended with the Treaty of Tartu, 1920, which concluded the war which Estonia had been induced by the Allies to wage against the Soviet. The Treaty of Tartu was a definite turning point, and inaugurated the second phase which lasted till 18 March 1921, when the Treaty of Riga was concluded with Poland and the war with that country ended. During the brief space of a little more than a year covered by this phase, Russia had concluded treaties of peace and non-aggression with all her limitrophe neighbours, viz. Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland, besides Poland, as also with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. In the case of her European neighbours, Russia made cessions of territory which formed part of the Tsarist empire, acting thereby on the ideological principle that the reign of Communism was not over territory but over the mind. In any case, by concluding these treaties Russia succeeded in breaking the iron circle of her foes and in progressively isolating the powers or groups engaged in definite hostilities with herself.

The third period, which extended up to the conclusion of the Locarno Agreements, which Russia professed to regard as a drilling of capitalism and aimed at her own encirclement, witnessed a further consolidation of the Soviet security system. At home, it witnessed the conclusion of the Treaty of Union, 30 December 1922, whereby the constituent republics of the Soviet Union were unified under a federal constitution. This was something more than a constitutional arrangement; it was intended to signify the singleness of purpose and solidarity which the proletarian world, as contrasted with capitalism, enjoyed. By implication, it was a recognition of the fact that the two rival systems, capitalism and Communism, must co-exist and that Soviet foreign policy must envisage a condition of balance between them.

The necessity was made strikingly clear by the Genoa Conference during the spring of 1922. The Soviet indeed failed to arrive at a settlement with the Great Powers, but they achieved a notable success by concluding a treaty with Germany at Rapallo in April 1922. Finding that they were excluded from the inner counsels of the Conference, the representatives of the two pariah states secretly reached an understanding with each

other. Though a development of this type was quite a natural one and should have surprised none, it caused a "flutter in the dovecots" in the West, since at this moment the Versailles Settlement was already facing a crisis—the principal upholders of it being at odds as between themselves, the most serious of which was the growing animosity between France and Italy. The Treaty of Rapallo provided for *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government and the renunciation by each government of war claims and pre-war indebtedness.

Immediately after Locarno, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georges Tchitcherin (Chicherin), went to Paris, and then to Berlin, to spy out the land in the capitalist strongholds with a view to finding out if and how the integrating policies of the capitalist world (as evidenced by the signing of the Locarno agreements) might be effectively stalemated. Thus was inaugurated the fourth phase of the Soviet Union's efforts to build up its security system, the guiding principle this time being the establishment of an effective barrier of treaty law between itself and the capitalist world, a barrier across which no attack, from whatever quarter, could be launched against the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government sought to organize, no longer on a temporary but on a permanent basis, their relations with the outside world—to reinforce by new pacts the provisions of their earlier peace treaties (as described above) and supplementing them with new guarantees. Tchitcherin's first achievement in this direction was to conclude, while he was still in Paris, a treaty with Turkey, 17 December 1925, by which the two states pledged themselves to solve their difficulties by the machinery of diplomacy. They agreed upon a series of guarantees of non-aggression applicable at all times, and covenanted upon explicit, pre-determined neutrality toward each other in case either of them should be involved in hostilities with a third power. (See also below, Chapter 11.) More or less on the same lines, treaties were concluded also with Germany (24 April 1926), Afghanistan (31 August 1926), Lithuania (28 September 1926), Latvia (9 March 1927), and Persia (1 October 1927). The U.S.S.R.'s treaties with the last three states were supplemented by treaties among them *inter se*, viz. between Persia and Afghanistan in November 1927, Turkey and Afghanistan in 1928, and, finally, Persia and Turkey in June 1928.

THE QUESTION OF THE RECOGNITION OF THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT

It was during this period that the question of the *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government was often discussed by European Governments. As we have seen above, there were two difficulties in the way: (1) the activities of the Comintern, which the Soviet Government refused to own responsibility for; and (2) the foreign debts which they had repudiated. Nevertheless, the period began with the signing of a trade agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain's example in resuming trade relations was followed by Germany and Italy, who signed trade agreements with the Soviet Union in the course of the same year. The promise which the Soviet had given that they would refrain from anti-British propaganda, however, gave rise to difficulties, and in May 1923, Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary of the Conservative Government, issued an ultimatum. The crisis passed off in June, when the Soviet gave fresh promises and withdrew two notes which Lord Curzon had characterized as "studied affronts". The glib promises of the Soviet and the brilliant periods of Lord Curzon's despatches were, however, getting out of date in a world anxious to attain stabilization. This was recognized by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, the leader of the Labour Party, who on coming to power as Prime Minister of Britain's first Labour Government, lost no time in according official recognition to the Soviet Government. (February, 1924.)

Unfortunately, however, the question of the recognition of the Soviet Government had become a party issue in Great Britain, and, on the fall of the Labour Government and the coming into power of the Conservatives, the decision of Mr. Macdonald was reversed by his successor, Mr. Baldwin, on the old ground of Comintern propaganda in the British empire, a fresh evidence of which was alleged to be found in the controversial Zinoviev letter. (In the letter, whose authenticity was stoutly denied by the Soviet Government, Zinoviev, the President of the Comintern, had given instructions to the British communists for the conduct of communist propaganda in Britain. It came to light just five days before the general elections, and was used by the Conservatives to damage the

reputation of the Labour Party.) However, the recognition accorded by the Labour Government had been quickly followed by recognitions by other governments—the Soviet Government having promised specially favourable terms to the first power to concede it. Italy got the prize, being the first to recognize the Soviet Government as on 7 February. Similar action followed on the part of Norway (15 February), Austria (25 February), Sweden (15 March), Hejaz (30 March), China (31 May), Denmark (18 June), Mexico (4 August) and France (28 October). Mr. Baldwin, as we have seen, had refused to ratify his predecessor's commitment, but he retained the Trade Agreement of 1921. Though Britain thus refused to recognize the Soviet Government, and the U.S.A. still held out, the Soviet Government could compliment themselves on their success in this field, and they had no longer to fear a concerted move on the part of the capitalist states to destroy them.

On 3 March 1924, the German police made a sudden raid on the office of the Russian Trade Delegation at Berlin, and a crisis in the relations between the two countries arose. The Soviet Government vigorously protested against this action of the German police and boycotted the Leipzig Fur Auction and the Cologne Fair. The German Government paid compensation and the affair was regarded as closed, but Russia's suspicions were again roused when Germany signed the Locarno Agreements with the Western Powers. The Soviet now decided that Locarno was nothing but an anti-Russian move. "The object of British policy both in preparing Locarno and during the Locarno Conference," wrote the *Izvestia*, the official organ of the Soviet, "was the strategic surrounding of the U.S.S.R., which was to be carried out through the severance of relations between Germany and Russia through the absorption of Germany within the orbit of British diplomacy." The relations with Great Britain continued to deteriorate, and British public opinion (outside Labour Party circles) became hostile to the Soviet Union on account of the support they gave to the general strike in Britain in 1926. In the following year the British police raided the premises of the Soviet trade delegation, which was conjointly occupied by the Russian commercial organization known as Arcos Ltd. The object was to recover a confidential document which was alleged to have been stolen

and conveyed to these premises. The document in question was not found, but the police professed to have discovered some documents proving generally Soviet intrigues against the British empire. The British Government seized the discovery as their ground for cancelling the Trade Agreement of 1921. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored in 1929, and a new trade agreement signed in the following year, the latter being denounced after the Ottawa agreements had been concluded and again brought into force in 1934.

Though the Soviet Government had become critical of the West after Locarno, and, though all along they had expressed their antipathy to the League of Nations, which, according to them, had been forged by the western capitalist nations to destroy Communism, the logic of facts drove them to revise their conclusions. In 1929, they sent a representative to sit on the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, and, three years later, they actually took part in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Thus committed to an inclined plane, they caused no general surprise when, in 1934, they accepted membership of the League of Nations. Meanwhile, there had been a significant change of weather throughout Europe by the seizure of power by the Nazis (1933), and Soviet anxiety as to Hitler's unconcealed abhorrence of Communism and his resolve to go to war against Russia to dispoil her of some territory to be used for German colonization led to the signing of a treaty of mutual assistance with France in 1935.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE EAST

The attitude of the Soviet Union to the rest of the world has been coloured and influenced a good deal by the communist ideology. But a country's foreign policy does not depend on ideology alone; and geography, economic needs, and historical tradition enter into it. The foreign policy of the Soviet Government has been variously described as an enigma beyond the wit of the West to fathom; as aimed at world domination in furtherance of Marxist Communism; and as fundamentally pursuing Russian national interests and in line with Russian tradition. While there is some truth in all these various readings of Soviet foreign policy, the influence of Russian national inte-

rests and of historical or Tsarist tradition on Soviet foreign policy has been considered by some writers as the most pronounced and continuous feature. "The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is that of Tsarist Russia writ large", it has been said. This is specially applicable to the policy followed by the Bolsheviks towards the East from the earliest days of their history.

The main objectives of the foreign policy of the Tsarist Government may be summed up as follows : mastery of the Baltic coast, dominance of the Balkans, control of Constantinople, peaceful penetration of Mongolia, partition of Manchuria with Japan, a sphere of influence in Northern Persia, intrigue in Afghanistan and the threat of an invasion of India. In most cases, though not by the same methods, the Bolsheviks have pursued these objectives, which sum up at least the major part of their foreign policy.

"The question of Constantinople and the Straits," wrote Trotsky, "was one of those rare questions on which the Tsarist regime was not deceived." So, with regard to this, the Bolsheviks were frank imitators of the Tsars. On 16 March 1921, Russia and Turkey signed an offensive and defensive treaty, and thereafter Turkey consistently neglected Constantinople, which began to decline. Following the strained relations between Britain and Turkey over Mosul, Russia and Turkey, in December 1925, entered into a new military agreement with each other. Having thus come to an understanding with Turkey, the Soviet proceeded to spread their diplomacy southward with a view to sapping the Asiatic approaches to India and signed treaties with Afghanistan and Persia, while the Russo-Turkish treaty was followed by a Turkish-Afghan alliance (25 April 1921), a Turkish-Persian entente (October 1921) and a Persian-Afghan treaty (17 October 1921).

Long before the Great War, General Komaroff prophesied : "The East and its countries, as China, Baloochistan, and even India, are by the will of Providence destined for the Russian people." The arguments of the Bolsheviks were different, but their policy was the same. An open war with Britain for the conquest of India not being strategically and economically possible, as it had not been considered possible by the Tsars also, they, like them, adopted the policy of threats, active or implied ; only with them subversive propaganda has been the chief means

employed. Again, recognizing that Indians and, for that matter, other Asian peoples were not "ripe for the proletarian revolution and the collapse of capitalism", they have carried on propaganda on nationalist rather than on anti-capitalist lines, and more in the interests of traditional Russian policy than to spread Communism. The ultimate objective, however, was to use the Asian nations, thus roused, as levers against the capitalist strongholds of the West.

In China, the Bolsheviks won their greatest successes in foreign policy, though they were shortlived, and they had to wait for long till the Second World War again opened the country to communist influence. In the hope of converting the Kuomintang to their doctrines, they returned the concessions which Tsarist Russia had extorted from China, recognized Chinese courts, abandoned the special rights of the maritime powers, and treated China—being the only European power to do so—on a footing of equality. The Chinese, however, after they had reaped all the advantages they could derive from their flirtations with Communism, broke away from the Russians (see below, Chapter 9).

CHAPTER VIII

FASCIST ITALY AND THE BID FOR WORLD POWER

ITALY TURNS FASCIST

HAVING achieved her unification and independence about the middle of the last century and being admitted, though rather on sufferance, to the rank of a Great Power, Italy had striven to attain national greatness by pursuing policies at home and abroad which were modelled on those of the great nations of Western Europe, England and France. She had failed to score many successes in any field, for while her essays in democratic government had brought little credit to the political capacity of the Italian people, her imperialist adventures had brought her but poor returns; while they left specially bitter memories of one episode—the crushing defeat administered to Italian arms by Emperor Menelik of Abyssinia at Adowa in 1896.

When the Great War broke out in Europe in 1914, nearly all the belligerents could claim that they fought for some great cause; the Germans fought for *Deutschland*, the British for the sanctity of international agreements and the integrity of small states, the French to get back their lost lands, and even for *ravanche*, and when the Americans later joined it, they waged a war to end all wars, and to make the world safe for democracy. Alone among the Great Powers of Europe, Italy maintained her neutrality, and if her abandoning her friends of the Triple Alliance was anyhow justifiable, her joining in the fray at a later date was little better than selling herself to the highest bidder among the belligerents, at the moment fighting desperately for life. Enormous as were her sacrifices in the war—with 700,000 killed and 1,000,000 wounded, the costs of war being more than \$12,000,000,000 and of damages of various kinds amounting to another \$3,000,000,000, and having suffered a disastrous defeat at Caporetto—she was still considered by her allies as more or less a liability for themselves. With such a

record, her representatives at the Peace Conference could hardly make themselves heard; even when asking for nothing more than what the Allies had pledged themselves to give her by solemn engagements, the Premier of Italy had to whine and whimper at the Paris Conference where others growled and roared.

While the Germans were mortified at the fruits of defeat, the Italians were disappointed at the fruits of victory; in both countries the ground was prepared for the setting on foot of revolutionary movements led by ambitious politicians. Yet it is likely that these agitations, which fed on the widespread misery and suffering caused by the war's aftermath, would have died down had it not been for the appearance in both countries of such men of destiny as Hitler and Mussolini, whose many-sided qualities for leadership were matched by their passion for wielding power and dominance over others. About the origins of the fascist movement and the causes of its success in establishing a dictatorship that lasted nearly a quarter of a century, there is a wide divergence of opinion. It is the general belief that it represented a "Conservative reaction" against the rising tide of Socialism, which threatened to engulf all Italy at this time in an orgy of violence by means of strikes, lockouts, and riotous demonstrations. The fascists themselves claimed that they rescued Italy from the post-war anarchy that was providing a fertile ground to Bolshevism and not only replaced governmental ineptitude and corruption by efficient and orderly administration but reinvigorated national life by the infusion of worthy ideals.

Against these views it has been pointed out, first, that such dictators as Hitler and Mussolini came not from aristocratic, or even bourgeois classes but from circles associated with Socialism and the political left, and that the power that they wielded was derived by "coupling the force of Socialism with that of Nationalism". But whatever the social stratum from which the leaders, Hitler and Mussolini, sprang, it cannot be denied that their respective movements waxed in strength only as they were joined by the leaders of vested interests, such as the army and the industries, and that, by and large, it was these interests that both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany stood for and served. As regards the inclusion of some socialist planks in the structure of the two creeds, let us not forget that as early as Disraeli's

enunciation of "Tory Democracy" the profession of some kind of Socialism had been part of the tactics of Conservation. "We are all socialists now", Sir William Harcourt, a Liberal politician had said. As regards nationalism, with whose force Fascism had undeniably allied itself, and with which its connection always remained intimate, it has to be remembered that the latter repudiated many of its implications, such as popular sovereignty with its corollaries, the doctrine of natural rights, parliamentary government, etc. Fascism was a creed of totalitarianism, which Mussolini defined as: "All in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State."

With regard to the fascist claim that they saved Italy from going Red, their opponents held that there was nothing extraordinary in the condition of Italy after the war, that the depression and disturbances which occurred there as in all other countries of Europe were coming in the natural course of events to an end, that, in particular by the end of 1921, Socialism was in full retreat, that the menace of Bolshevism had disappeared, and that, therefore, the Fascist revolution was uncalled for and was established by sheer violence. In the absence of full facts and statistics in support of either argument, there must be a suspension of judgment on this controversy. But the fascist case does not rest simply on a favourable opinion on this controversy. Mussolini held that it was not enough to disperse the Reds, and that nothing short of a revolution could bring a permanent and thorough-going remedy to the ills from which the country was suffering. It was his case that Fascism introduced higher ethical values into Italian life, released energies so long lying dormant in Italians, and breathed a new spirit into the life of the nation.

THE FASCIST STATE

When in October 1922, following the historic march on Rome, King Victor Emmanuel III asked Mussolini to form a cabinet, outwardly he became the head of a constitutional government. But he had become Prime Minister really by an act of force, and was already the Italian dictator. He soon fascitized the entire administration and the state, though he still maintained constitutional forms. First, he obliged the cowed parliament to vote

him full powers for a year, and, after he had utilized the time to turn all opposition elements out of office, he compelled it to pass a law by which the party that polled a plurality of the national vote should be entitled to two-thirds of the seats of the lower house, that is, be transformed into the majority party. In the first elections held under the new law (April 1924) the fascists gained a majority of the votes, and, thereupon, were given two-thirds of the seats in the new chamber. The consolidation of the dictatorship of Mussolini and the fascists followed as a matter of course. Strikes to enforce economic demands were forbidden; the press was censored; municipalities, towns, and cities lost their political rights and were placed under the control of appointed *podestas*; "seditious persons" (meaning the opponents of the regime) were put under arbitrary arrest and indefinite confinement, if they were not, like the young Socialist deputy, Matteotti, waylaid and murdered; and all political parties except the Fascist were dissolved. Mussolini was given the power to issue decrees with the force of law, and became the commander of all the armed forces. Under a new penal code, promulgated in 1931, his person became sacred like those of the King, Queen, and Crown Prince, and any attempt on his life, as on theirs, became punishable with death.

In 1926, the reigning Fascist Party received a new constitution. At the apex stood the Fascist Grand Council, which was made up of twenty outstanding party figures, with Mussolini, of course, as the perpetual Chairman, under the title of *Il Duce* (The Leader). With Mussolini serving also as the head of the government and all the members of the Grand Council occupying ministerial posts, the connection between the state and the party became as close as in the communist system in Russia. A further point of similarity of the Fascist Party to the Communist Party in Russia lay in the elaborate use of symbols and ritual. As the communists had as their party emblem the hammer and the sickle, so the fascists had the axe and the rods (in Latin *fascēs*) associated in the days of Roman greatness as the symbol of authority with the Consul. Tied in a neat bundle, axe and rods spoke to Italian patriots primarily of the necessity for union but also of the majesty of ancient Rome. The members of the party gave each other the fascist salute in the ancient

Roman manner with the outstretched right arm. (The wits said that was because they were tired of raising both arms during the war.)

THE DOWNFALL OF FASCIST ITALY

During 21 years (1922-43) the nation gave the appearance of being thoroughly converted to the Fascist ideology. Actually there never was more than a small minority of convinced fascists (in 1939 the party membership was 2,000,000); just as there was a small minority of convinced anti-fascists (chiefly communists and democrats). The majority of the people simply adjusted themselves to the new regime; they accepted Fascism but were not fascists. When the crisis of Italy's invasion arose during the Second World War, the latter refused to run risks in order to defend the Fascist Government, which simply disintegrated as a result of the landing of the Allied forces in Sicily, July 1943. On 25 July 1943, the Fascist Grand Council repudiated Mussolini's leadership and the king appointed a soldier to succeed him. In September German paratroopers rescued and established him as head of a republican Fascist Party, a move intended to split Italian loyalty rather than to re-establish Fascism. Eighteen months later he was in the village of Dongo on the shores of Lake Como, attended by his advisers and body guards. Around them the Rome-Berlin Axis collapsed in fire and rubble.

About Mussolini's last moments, a statement appeared on 30 April 1945 in *Unità*, the Italian communist newspaper, over the signature of one "Colonel Valerio", who claimed to have "executed" Mussolini. He says that by a "stratagem", i.e. by telling him that he was going to liberate him and that he was taking him to his son, Vittorio, whom he had already liberated, he induced Mussolini, with whom was his mistress Claretta Petacci, to accompany him in a journey by car to a place he had already selected for the deed. The rest in his own words, as follows :

"There I stopped the car and told Mussolini not to talk, saying I imagined I had heard a noise and was going to investigate. I got out and walked to the end of the walls.

'Get into that corner', I said. Though he obeyed promptly he appeared uneasy, but stood with his back to the wall at the place I indicated. Petacci came and stood on his right. Suddenly I pronounced sentence—'By order of the General Command of the Liberty Volunteer Corps I am instructed to render justice in the name of the Italian people.'
"Mussolini was terror-stricken. Petacci threw her arms round his shoulders and screamed: 'He must, not die.'
"I told her: 'Get back if you don't want to die with him'.
"She jumped away. From a distance of three paces I shot five bursts into Mussolini. He fell to his knees, his head slightly bent. Then it was Petacci's turn." (Henry Gibbs, *Italy, on Borrowed Time*, pp. 49-50.)

DOMESTIC POLICIES OF THE FASCIST STATE—THE CORPORATIVE STATE

During the fascists' fight with the socialists one Edmondo Rossoni organized what were called "fascist" syndicates by converting into fascist unions such of the socialist labour unions as were willing to cooperate in the struggle against the socialists. Rossoni was a syndicalist, but he rejected Marx's doctrine of class warfare and accepted the capitalist class as a necessary factor of production. He also wanted that representation should be based on economic units of occupational classes rather than, as prevailed everywhere, on geographical political units.

The fascists adopted these ideas of Rossoni but, in conformity with their totalitarian notions, wanted that Rossoni's employees' syndicates should be balanced by employers' syndicates, and that all kinds of syndicates should be subordinated to the state. They insisted on a close partnership of employers and employees to the end of sustaining society and state by an uninterrupted flow of production. By a law of 1926, thirteen confederated fascist syndicates, six of employers, six of employees, and one of intellectuals, were given legal status. All thirteen were put under a minister of corporations (who, at least at first, was Mussolini himself), and to them belonged the sole right of drawing up collective contracts between the two production partners. Strikes and lockouts were alike forbidden, and conflicts between employers and employees were referable to special labour

courts, from whose decisions there was no appeal. A Charter of Labour that followed defined the rights of labour in a fairly liberal spirit. It forbade employers to work their men more than eight hours a day or six days a week or to discharge them on the score of illness or military service. It also obliged employers to contribute to the insurance of their men against accidents, illness, old age, or unemployment.

By these measures the state began to take on a syndicalist or corporative structure. In 1928 the electoral law entitled the thirteen syndicates with political functions; each would nominate parliamentary candidates to be passed upon and approved by the Grand Council of the Fascist Party before a general election. In 1930 the thirteen syndicates were reformed and coordinated as "corporations" under a General Fascist Confederation of Industry, headed by a state minister of corporations. In 1934 a National Council was created of Deputies from the various corporations in order immediately to advise parliament on economic and social legislation and eventually to supplant parliament as the law-making body of the realm.

THE LATERAN ACCORD AND THE CONCORDAT WITH THE POPE

One of the most outstanding achievements of the Fascist Government was the bringing to an end of the fifty-year-old quarrel between the Italian State and the Pope. Not exceptionally religious, Mussolini was anxious that religion should be enlisted for rather than against the state. On his side, the reigning Pope, Pius XI, without being an advocate of Fascism, wanted to end a conflict, which was to nobody's advantage. The two parties accordingly came to terms by signing an agreement at the Pope's second palace at Rome, the Lateran, on 11 February 1929, according to which the Pope renounced his claims to Rome, and acknowledged it as the capital of the Kingdom of Italy, and the latter, in return, agreed to the creation of a separate state to be called the Vatican City, which was to be under the complete ownership and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See. Simultaneously with the signing of the Lateran Accord, a Concordat and a financial agreement were concluded between the Papacy and the Italian Government. The Catholic Church was accepted as the sole religion of the state, which undertook to main-

tain the already assumed obligation of paying clerical salaries. The Pope was to appoint the bishops, etc. subject to the condition that no appointee should be an active opponent of the Fascist Government. Civil as well as religious marriages were to be valid in the eye of the law. The Pope received a sum of approximately \$100,000,000 as an indemnity for his territorial renunciations. The Accord and the Concordat survived Mussolini's downfall, and were embodied in the Constitution of the present-day Republic.

MUSSOLINI'S FOREIGN POLICY

RHODES, THE DODECANESE, CORFU

As soon as he assumed the reins of power, Mussolini revealed his purpose to bring about a thorough reorientation not only of Italy's domestic policy but her foreign policy as well. He had been established in office only a few months when he reasserted Italy's claims to the Greek islands of Rhodes and the Dodecanese. Though Italy was in occupation of the islands since her conquest of them during her war with Turkey in 1912, the question of their permanent ownership remained open, and Greece expected that they would be eventually restored to her. That was because, in 1913, Premier Giolitti had emphatically repudiated the idea of "annexing territories of Greek origin" and on 29 July 1919 a convention had been signed between M. Venizelos, the Greek Premier, and Senator Tittoni, the Italian Foreign Minister, by which 12 of the islands were to be ceded to Greece. On the other hand, full Italian sovereignty over the islands had been recognized in the Secret Treaty of London, 1915, and this was confirmed by the Treaty of Sèvres, 10 August 1920, while the Greek cause suffered eclipse on account of the disasters in Anatolia followed by the fall of Venizelos from power, etc. (see above, p. 18). In any case, Mussolini emphatically repudiated what some of his predecessors in office had said or done, and laid all doubts as to Italy's resolve to hold on to the islands at rest by organizing Leros (one of the Dodecanese) into a fortified naval base and Rhodes into a powerful military station. With the same highhandedness, as we have already seen (see above, Chapter 5—Greece), Mussolini,

in retaliation for the alleged murder on Greek soil of four Italian members of a boundary-delimiting commission, bombarded the Greek island of Corfu, defied the League, to whom Greece had appealed, and did not leave the island till, at his suggestion, the Council of Ambassadors took up the case; they eventually awarded to Italy the indemnity which he had demanded. Mussolini's handling of the affairs from beginning to end, was expressive of the new spirit of boldness that he claimed Fascism had introduced into the nation's general attitude to the world at large, though at this time it was tempered by caution. At the same time it was an ominous indication of his resolve to do the utmost to strengthen Italy's position in the Mediterranean, which the fascists had already begun to designate as "our sea".

FIUME AND ALBANIA

The next incident in which Mussolini figured related to Fiume, which, as we have seen (see above, Chapter 5—Yugoslavia), after being set up as a Free City, had been acquired by Italy as a result of an agreement signed with Yugoslavia on 27 January 1924. The acquisition of Fiume signified a strengthening of his Adriatic position; and control of the Adriatic, an arm of the Mediterranean laid envelopingly along the eastern coast of Italy, was an indispensable preliminary to an enlarged Mediterranean role. It was because of the same reason that Mussolini fastened his attention on the Adriatic coastland opposite Italy, Albania. We have seen how Italy virtually established a protectorate over the country, and eventually, in April 1939, invaded and conquered it (see above, Chapter 5).

FRANCO-ITALIAN RELATIONS

The relations between France and Italy before the Great War were, to say the least, strained for a number of reasons, the most important being their mutual rivalry in the Mediterranean. It was mainly due to this that Italy had aligned herself with the Central Powers in the so-called Triple Alliance. As we have seen, Italy joined the war on behalf of the Allies in the hope of getting some rewards as promised to her by the Allies by the

Secret Treaties of London. She failed to get the entire booty because of President Wilson's objections on the ground of self-determination. Though Britain and France supported her case at the Peace Conference, Italy thought that they did not do so strongly enough, and her anger on the score was specially directed against France, whose voice had generally prevailed at the Conference. After the Peace Settlement, Italy was thus placed at an anomalous position; she was a strong critic of that settlement, though she was a victor nation and a member of the League of Nations. By and by she took up an attitude of distinct unfriendliness, if not hostility, to France, because the latter was a strong upholder of the Versailles Settlement, and to France's allies in Eastern Europe, not only because they were France's allies, but on many other grounds which we shall examine presently.

The relations between France and Italy worsened after the fascist revolution: democratic France was naturally an anathema to totalitarian Italy. Besides, the fascists complained that opponents of their regime found a ready asylum in France, and many Italians, not only anti-fascists, migrated to that country in search of employment and were encouraged by the French to become naturalized citizens. (The French view was that the emigrants were forced upon their country and that they included many professional criminals). The fascists, because they had reviled their democratic predecessors in office for their failure to assert national claims, had to shout louder, use stronger language, hurl worse threats, and act very boldly while pursuing national aims of foreign policy. They had to rake up old claims, such as on Corsica, Savoy, Nice, Tunisia, show greater determination in pursuing old policies, e.g. trying to make Italy, according to them a prisoner in her own sea—the Mediterranean—its mistress, not hesitating to quarrel even with friends, e.g. England, if they thought it was necessary for them to do so, e.g. by raising the issue of Malta, and generally to carry on a ceaseless, nerve-racking propaganda at home and abroad in support of their claims.

Apart from ideology and psychology, there were a number of concrete issues, on which France and Italy had their differences, and which we may deal with at some length. The first and foremost was Italy's insistence, which, after Mussolini's advent,

she was determined to back up with action, that France must fulfil the Treaty of London of 1915 in letter and spirit. We have already seen that Italy resented what she thought was lack of support by France and England to her claims in the Adriatic coastland under the terms of the treaty. It was no doubt President Wilson's opposition which balked Italy of this territory, which she thought was vital to her safety as a Mediterranean state. Mussolini thought he found definite proof of French complicity in the plan to 'rob Italy of the promised territory in the attempt made by France after Versailles to push the rise of Yugoslavia in terms of men and money and in French hostility to Italy's Albanian policy. In the opinion of Mussolini, France had no vital interests, historical, geographical, or economic, in the area, and he concluded that France was manoeuvring to encircle Italy in Italy's own natural sphere in order to check Italy's growing power and influence in Europe.

Another cause of Italy's embitterment against France arising out of the Treaty of London was over the fulfilment of Article "3" of the treaty, whereby Italy had been promised "equitable" compensation in the event of France or Great Britain increasing their territories in Africa at the expense of Germany. By the Treaty of Versailles, Great Britain and her Dominions took most of the German colonies, while France took Alsace-Lorraine, and smaller concessions outside Europe, and Italy alone got no increase to her poor colonial possessions. After much haggling Italy obtained the cession of Jubaland from Great Britain in 1925, but from France she got nothing except some unimportant "rectification" of frontier lines through uninhabited wastes, which, added to some more land handed over in 1936 (see below), still amounted to, as Mussolini later told Eden, "half a dozen palm trees in one place, and a strip of desert which did not contain a sheep in another". This was a rankling sore, which drove Mussolini to seek an empire in Abyssinia, and lay at the root of all the troubles in his relations with the Western Powers.

Behind it was the great question, which Mussolini was ever afterwards to keep on asking, and he once put in telling language as follows: "As soon as the British have sated themselves with colonial conquests, they impudently draw an arbitrary line across the middle of the page in the Recording Angel's book,

and then proclaim : 'What was right for us till yesterday is wrong for you today.' Englishmen could only point out that, even though the U.S.A. had forbidden immigration, the population pressure argument in favour of colonial imperialism did not apply to Italy, who, far from encouraging emigration to relieve such pressure, was actually in need of more population to resettle the vast stretch of territory between Naples and Rome, which, once poisonous swamps, had been reclaimed by the draining of the Pontine Marshes. But with England's own glorious example in acquiring a worldwide empire, Italy, a new entrant in the field, asked why what was sauce for the gander could not be sauce for the goose. Mussolini said : "We are hungry for land, because we are prolific, and intend to remain so."

Tunis was an old sore, which kept on festering, and prevented better Franco-Italian relations from growing up. It was French occupation of Tunis in 1881 which, by shattering Italian hopes of expansion in North Africa, had been largely responsible for Italy's adherence to the Triple Alliance. In 1896, a species of Convention was arranged to secure, under French régime, the "Italianity" of the Italians in Tunis, their institutions and their children ; but Italy complained that these rights were gradually whittled away by various decrees. During the Great War, in which France and Italy were co-belligerents, the French showed greater regard to the principles underlying the 1896 Convention, giving facilities for the mobilization and embarkation of Italians to join the Allied forces. But, as the war's end was in sight, France (on 9 September 1918) denounced that Convention, and followed this up by issuing a decree which made the acquisition of real property practically prohibitive to Italians, and by another, in 1921, against which Britain joined Italy in protesting and which imperilled the birthright of 130,000 Italian residents of Tunis.

Italians strongly resented these blows. The Italy of Mussolini refused to accept these conditions as final. In 1935, as the result of the talks that M. Laval, the French Foreign Minister, held with Mussolini during his visit to Rome, a concession of further territory in Africa, considerable in extent though of small value, was made by France to Italy in supplementary and final redemption of her pledge in the Treaty of London. At the same time

a settlement was arrived at whereby children born of Italian parents in Tunisia before 1945 should retain Italian nationality, and those born in the ensuing twenty years should have a right of option. These concessions did not entirely please the Italian dictator who told Eden that he "had yielded to France 100,000 Italians in Tunis", besides complaining about the barrenness of the land ceded by France. Mussolini also objected to France's alleged desire to bar Italy's "reasonable and logical aspirations" at Tangier as a participator on equal footing with Britain, France, and Spain in the international zone—Italy basing her claims on her position as a Mediterranean power and as a signatory state to the Act of Algeciras. He refused to recognize the validity of the new statute concerning the international status of Tangier, which had been worked out by Great Britain, France, and Spain in a conference to which Italy had not been invited. In 1928, however, these powers invited Italy to share in the international government of Tangier.

ITALY'S POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE

There were several reasons why Italy's eyes were turned to Eastern Europe. We have already dealt with Italy's resolve to be the mistress of the Mediterranean Sea, which she considered to be her own sea, and how this led her to seek to control the coastlands of the Adriatic, an arm of the Mediterranean laid envelopingly on her own eastern frontier. This induced her to establish a protectorate over Albania, with the result that the so-called Nettuno Convention concluded with Yugoslavia in 1924 was jeopardized. With Yugoslavia, indeed, a lasting settlement was difficult to arrive at, because, as we have seen (Chapter 5—Yugoslavia), fundamentally, the relations between Yugoslavia and Italy were the same as those which had existed between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, the role of the latter now being played by Italy. Again, in historical perspective, Austria-Hungary may be looked on as a remnant of the old Holy Roman Empire, which had held Italy in fee for centuries on end. The policy which Mussolini followed towards Yugoslavia and for that matter the other succession States of the Hapsburg monarchy, viz. his attempt to develop an Italian sphere of influence in the whole Danubian region would thus

appear to be, but the natural reaction to the whole history of Italy. In any case, barred in the west, where, as Mussolini explained, national states had been definitely formed, to which Italy could send only labour, the export of which too might be prohibited or restricted any day, "the lines for the possible expansion of Italy lie towards the east". Finally, herself occupying a position midway between a revisionist and anti-revisionist power, Italy felt sympathetic to Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, who smarted under the Versailles system, and formed a bloc consisting of these states, which faced the French-controlled Little Entente states. After the historic enemy, Austria-Hungary, had been laid low and all "Italian soil" at long last "redeemed", Italy could not have left it at that and pursue a passive role, because that would have meant a static policy which would put her at the mercy of whatever future events might befall the newly created states which had succeeded to the place of the fallen Austro-Hungarian empire.

With regard to Eastern Europe, Italy could have followed either of two policies: (1) attempt to keep under subjugation the ex-enemy states, i.e. follow a policy similar to the one France was following towards Germany; and (2) help their economic and social reconstruction, while ensuring the security of the Adriatic seaboard, which contained, at Cattaro, the key-position to the naval mastery of Italy; in other words, place the Adriatic and Danubian region under a sort of economic hegemony of Italy. Mussolini adopted the latter policy, which had favourable reactions on Austria and Hungary, but encountered opposition from Yugoslavia, backed by France. Mussolini attempted to counteract this Franco-Yugoslav move by concluding commercial and friendship pacts with Yugoslavia, which, however, proved dead letters. This was one of the contributory factors of the Franco-Italian tension, dealt with above. Connected with his policy of bringing about the stabilization of Eastern Europe was Mussolini's desire to establish economic friendship with Russia. As we have seen, Italy was among the earliest of the capitalistic nations to accord *de jure* recognition to Soviet Russia, which he believed was coming back to normalcy. Thereby he also assured himself of the preservation of the communications from the Black Sea and security in the eastern Mediterranean. He followed this up by en-

couraging and finally securing a network of reciprocal non-aggression and arbitration pacts between Russia, Turkey, Greece and Italy. The Italian Government proceeded to fortify the Dodecanese island of Leros in the Aegean and with the organization of Rhodes as a military station—the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, having given Italy full possession of the Dodecanese group. A pact of friendship, a treaty of commerce and twenty-eight secondary agreements were concluded in 1925 with Yugoslavia.

Thereupon France and Italy entered into a competition with each other in winning the graces of the Little Entente states. The latter should have preferred to build up a Danubian bloc independent of outside influences, but their mutual differences and divergences of interests ruled this out. Failing this they liked to multiply their agreements with the Great Powers as a guarantee against the exclusive hegemony of any one of them. Thus M. Benesh followed up the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of 25 January 1923 by a treaty with Italy in July. Italy, however, desired a monopoly of friendship with the Little Entente states, and in 1924 she had a slight advantage over France since she had concluded treaties with both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, while the latter had definitely succeeded in her negotiations with one of them only, viz. Czechoslovakia. In 1926 France scored a success in signing a treaty with Rumania, by which she recognized the seizure of Bessarabia by Rumania which Russia refused to recognize. Italy was concerned to keep on good terms with Russia, and so her recognition of Rumania's action was withheld till 1927. Meanwhile the Locarno agreements had been signed in 1925, and, considered by the Soviet as a western move against themselves, had produced some worsening of Franco-Russian relations.

In 1925 France negotiated an agreement with Yugoslavia to which she desired the adhesion also of Italy, but the latter refused to collaborate and the treaty was initialled finally on 11 November of the following year. Italy now began to pursue her "forward policy" in south-eastern Europe much more vigorously. In 1926 there was a *rapprochement* between Italy and Greece, whose mutual relations were strained since the Corfu bombardment of 1923. Italy also helped Bulgaria, who was always in difficulties with her neighbours on account of

IMRO activities, in various ways—notably in raising a loan for refugee settlement, for which she had appealed to the League of Nations. In October, approaches were also made to Hungary, suggesting an outlet on the Adriatic for Hungarian export trade, though these laid her open to the accusation that they were inspired by the desire to outbid Yugoslavia, who had made similar proposals to Hungary. Yugoslavia, however, continued to be conciliatory till the signature of the Treaty of Tirana between Italy and Albania (27 November 1926) revealed Italy's firm resolve to dominate that country and made it impossible for her to ignore the danger which she was exposed to by Italy's Adriatic policy. From now on she complained, with some justification, that Italy was intriguing at other Balkan courts with a view to making things difficult for her in her relations with the latter, and even of an attempted encirclement. In April 1927 a treaty of arbitration and amity was concluded between Italy and Hungary. Yugoslav politicians even thought they saw the hand of Italy in the intensification of the terror campaign launched by IMRO. The calm reception by Greece of the Treaty of Tirana and the rejection by the government which succeeded General Pangalos of the agreement that the Yugoslav Government had concluded with him respecting the question of providing a Yugoslav Free Zone in the Greek port of Salonika were also looked upon with suspicion by Yugoslavia.

THE ALTO-ADIGE (SOUTH TIROL) QUESTION

By the Treaty of Versailles, Italy had acquired not only that part of South Tirol (Trentino) which was inhabited by Italians, but the northern part which was inhabited by a quarter-million Germans. Her representatives at the Peace Conference had promised that the language and cultural institutions of the German minority in the region would be respected. Under fascist rule, Italy forgot these pledges, and introduced a policy of forced Italianization. The fascist justification was that, taking advantage of the leniency of former administrations, Alto-Adige had become an active centre of German irredentism. Local autonomy was first excluded by the erection of the whole territory into one province, Bolzano.

The Italian language progressively replaced German first in the courts, and all public services, including railways, banks, and water, gas and electric works and then in schools. Most of the former officials were replaced by non-German-speaking Italians. After 1924, even kindergarten instruction had to be given in Italian, with the result that children were deprived of any effective education.

Such measures led to repeated protests from Austria and Germany. Mussolini replied to them with denials and even threats. "This is the last time I shall speak on the theme," said he on 3 March 1928, "next time I shall let acts do the speaking." He declared that the Fascist Government had adopted in the province of Bolzano the same policy as in the ninety-two other provinces of the realm, and that Bolzano shared with them the same rights and duties. "It is time to say that all further Brenner manifestations are useless and hurtful Today we make it known to the Tirolese, to the Austrians, and to the world that all Italy, with her dead and her living, stands at the Brenner." Austria was worried by the tenor of Mussolini's speech and in 1930 signed a treaty of conciliation and arbitration. Germany had already done so in 1926, and even after Hitler came to power, did nothing to help her "racial comrades" under Italian rule. Strangely enough, Italo-German friendship grew in spite of Italian oppression of the German minority in Alto-Adige. It really indicated that a re-grouping of the European powers was in the process of taking shape; Italy was drawing away from France, Poland and the Little Entente, and becoming increasingly friendly towards Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey. It recalled, too plainly, the pre-war division of Europe into the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance Powers. But before the new alliance systems were to have definite crystallization, certain events took place, to which brief references are necessary.

THE FOUR-POWER PACT

In sum, Italy had definitely ranged herself on the side of the "revisionist" states, and against France, her sister Latin country. On the ninth anniversary of the March on Rome (1931) Musso-

lini advocated a revision of the Peace Treaties both in the interests of the Central Powers and of Italy. In 1932 Foreign Minister Dino Grandi proclaimed the urgency of a territorial redistribution in North Africa. "Revisionism" gave Mussolini a common platform with Germany, the foremost "revisionist" power, and his aims in 1933 were therefore to restore Germany as quickly as possible to a position of equality with other Great Powers, and to loosen the bonds between France and the Little Entente Powers and Poland. When the British Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, after presenting a plan of disarmament, which bore his name, to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, paid a visit to Rome (18 March 1933), Mussolini presented to him at the seadrome of Ostia a plan of peace in the shape of a Four-Power Pact. It embodied his view that a trustworthy pact between the four Great Powers of Europe (England, France, Germany and Italy), either in respect of the maintenance of peace or with regard to their armaments, was likely to be able to avert another world war more effectively than the League of Nations, which was vitiated by being based on the principle of the equality of all nations. Whatever might have been his motives, its acceptance by France, even for the purpose of consideration, created difficulties for her in her relations with Poland and the Little Entente countries. The latter suspected that it implied the abandonment of her allies by France and her collaboration with Germany and Italy in a policy of treaty revision. France herself was not anxious to have the German cuckoo in the nest of her own security, and, unwilling to reject the proposal outright, suggested important modifications of the draft. As signed at Rome on 7 June 1933, it left treaty revision in the hands of the League, and, in other ways, it was rendered so innocuous that at the last moment Germany almost refused to be a party to it. Polish *amour-propre* was gravely hurt at one Great Power, viz. Poland (Poland was always very touchy on the subject) not being asked to be a cosignatory, and all her anger was now turned at France, while the Little Entente states, professing to be content with the final draft, still remained with the feeling that they had been let down. The positive outcome of the Four-Power Pact, therefore, was an increase in the prestige and stature of Mussolini, who was now placed in a better position for realizing

his particular plans and policies.

THE ANSCHLUSS QUESTION

To the idea of the *Anschluss*, i.e. the union of Austria and Germany, Mussolini had early expressed his definite hostility. Addressing the Senate on 25 May 1925, he had said: "It is not admissible. Italy will never tolerate such a blatant violation of the Treaties. The annexation of Austria to Germany would increase the territorial and demographic strength of Germany, and that would present us with the paradoxical situation that the sole nation which would so increase its strength, making itself the strongest *bloc* in Central Europe would be no other than Germany. It would be a frustration of the Italian victory." As a contributory measure against *Anschluss* tendencies he intensified the policy of financial aid for the establishment of an economically independent Austria. During the regime of the Christian Socialist Premier, Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss, Austria became virtually a protectorate of Italy, since Dollfuss, anxious to maintain the independence of his country, made it a dependency of Italy, which was the price Mussolini demanded for his support. When, on 25 July 1935, the Austrian Nazis murdered Dollfuss, Mussolini promptly despatched three Italian divisions to the Brenner Pass, and for the moment, Austria was saved from annexation to Nazi Germany. In 1938, when the international situation was altered, the *Duce* made the best of what was an unpleasant surprise and acquiesced in the German absorption of Austria.

THE LAVAL-MUSSOLINI PACT AND THE STRESA CONFERENCE

Immediately after New Year, 1935, M. Laval, the French Foreign Minister, set out for Rome, held conversations with Mussolini, and signed a pact with him, whereby agreement was reached between the two parties on a number of outstanding questions. Laval believed he had succeeded in building up a "Latin Front" as a prelude to further negotiated agreements, which should prevent Mussolini from joining the Nazi camp in the final showdown which many people in Europe were considering as not far off. Mussolini, however, was hardly pleased with the paltry

concessions which Laval had made, and rightly or wrongly thought that Laval had assured him of a free hand in Abyssinia, the conquest of which he had already resolved upon.

A few months afterwards, Germany having in the meanwhile repudiated some of the vital clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, imposing restrictions on the armed forces of Germany, and France having lodged a protest with the League, an extraordinary meeting of the League Council was summoned, and as a preliminary the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Italy met at a conference at Stresa to consider what attitude should be taken by the three powers to the new situation. So great was their anxiety to present a common front to Germany that the British and French representatives at the conference, by a conspiracy of silence, refrained from raising before the Italians for a thorough discussion the question of Abyssinia, which had been hanging as a thick black cloud over all their heads for a pretty long time and was about to burst into a blinding storm in which the remaining moral values of the civilized European nations besides the material interests which they valued most were likely to perish. The story of that and the rest of Mussolini's dictatorship belongs to a later chapter.



CHAPTER IX

CHINA AND JAPAN IN WORLD POLITICS TILL 1941

CHINA AND JAPAN—A CONTRAST

ON the eve of the Japanese aggressions in Manchuria (to be discussed in the next chapter), the contrasts between China and Japan—the one a giant and the other an athlete—were, in many respects that determine relative military strength, as great as they were amazing. One of the largest among the world's states, China was the most populous country of all—with nearly 452,791,069 inhabitants, or about a fifth of the world's total population. China boasted that her civilization was the oldest and the best in the world, and, for centuries, the occupant of the throne at Peking claimed that he was the Son of Heaven. The unfortunate reality, however, was that at least for a century she had no central government worth the name which fact had been taken full advantage of by many western nations, and that they had robbed China of valuable provinces and revenues, subjecting the people in their respective "spheres of influence" to little better than colonial status and to humiliations and sufferings that beggar description. Japan, who, by the side of the huge land mass of China, looks something like a few of the latter's offshore islands and had a very much smaller population—something like 72,000,000 souls—and had had a little taste too of the brutal might of the West, had, however, quickly mastered the science and technology of the western nations, and, counted as a great power, joined the others in despoiling and oppressing China. However, reeling at the heavy blows of the imperialist powers of the world, the collapsing body of the huge giant had, as if by a miracle, of late shown unmistakable signs of coming to a new and vigorous life. A national movement, aiming at unifying the country, driving out the foreigners, and modernizing Chinese life and government, had begun, and already attained an appreciable measure of success.

DR. SUN YAT-SEN AND THE KUOMINTANG

The principal leader of the Chinese national movement was Dr. Sun Yat-Sen who as a young man had organized a society in Hongkong known as the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party). His early efforts were unsuccessful, and in 1895, he had to flee successively to Hongkong, Japan, Honolulu, and America, busying himself with stirring up the Chinese emigrants in these countries. In 1896, while in London, he was decoyed into the Chinese embassy in London, and was saved from being carried away by the agents of the Chinese Imperialist Government, none can say where, only by the intervention of Lord Salisbury who had demanded that he be set free immediately. It is interesting to note that Swami Vivekananda, who was at the time in London, was gravely perturbed at the news of his detention inside the Chinese embassy, and felt happy when he was released. A few days later Swami Vivekananda's younger brother, Sri Mahendranath Datta, happened to meet him at the British Museum, where both had gone for study, and had a brief talk with him. It is probable that the young Chinese patriot had heard of Swami Vivekananda's mission in the West, and felt the inspiring influence of the great apostle of the Orient.

The Kuomintang counted its supporters among the intellectuals of China, specially in the student classes, and was also strongly supported by the Chinese emigrants in the United States, the East Indies and the Malay Peninsula. The Revolution of 1911, which was brought about by the constant "boring from within" of the Kuomintang and other secret societies, brought the old imperialist organization to a state of collapse, with the further result that the provinces became virtually autonomous, i.e. they were governed by the leaders who had taken the initiative in organizing the revolutionary societies, or were in command of the revolutionary armed forces. At a conference of the delegates of these provincial leaders, summoned to meet at Nanking by the Shanghai junta, the group then dominating, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen was elected Provisional President. Meanwhile, the Throne promulgated a new constitution of a parliamentary type and named Yuan Shih-kai as Premier. On February 1912, the Manchu rulers abdicated and a mandate was promulgated establishing a "republican gov-

ernment" under Yuan Shih-kai. Thus at this time there were two governments each claiming to represent the Republic. Eventually they accepted a compromise; the Nanking National Assembly accepted Yuan Shih-kai as Provisional President while he in turn accepted the Provisional Constitution drawn up at Nanking and the capital was moved to Peking.

Against the strong protests of the Nanking National Council, Yuan, who planned to mount the throne as Emperor, negotiated with the Four Power Group the Reorganization Loan for \$25,000,000. By heavily bribing the parliamentarians, he had himself elected full President, instead of Provisional President, and promptly issued a mandate unseating all the Kuomintang members of Parliament. Thereupon, five southern provinces declared their independence and formed a Southern Confederacy (April 1916). Before he could do further mischief, however, he died (June 1916). Li Yuan-hung, as Vice-President, succeeded to the Presidency, with Tuan Chi-jui of the Anhwei faction of the Peiyang Military Party (the "Anfu" clique) as Premier. The Kuomintang parliamentarians led by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen opposed the military party on the question of China's entry into the war on the ground that this would give the militarists undue authority. On 10 May 1917, the parliamentarians found themselves locked out of the house when they wanted to enter it, and many of them were badly handled by the soldiers. The Parliament refused to consider the resolution to declare war until the cabinet was reorganized, i.e. Tuan was dismissed, and the President had to comply. On 23 May Dr. Wu Ting-fang was appointed Premier. The militarists, however, compelled the President to dissolve the Parliament, and Dr. Wu, refusing to sign the dissolution mandate, resigned. Almost the first act of Tuan who was reappointed Premier was to declare war against Germany (14 August 1917). President Li resigned his office, and Feng Kao-chang, who belonged to the Chihli faction of the "Anfu" clique, and was the Vice-President, became President. Tuan ruled as premier-dictator for several months without any parliament.

SPLIT BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH

The next year witnessed a complete break between the Kuomin-

tang and the Peking Government. The Northern militarists set up a new parliament composed of their own tools, known as the Tsuchun's Parliament, which assembled in August and elected Hsu Shih-Chang, a close friend of Yuan Shih-Kai, as President. The southern leaders refused to recognize the Peking Government, and set up a directorate of seven members to form the "Southern Constitutionalist Government". Almost immediately war broke out between the two "governments", which continued fruitlessly for about a year. In 1919 the Southern Government took the first step to gain recognition from the powers by demanding a pro-rata share of the customs surplus. In July 1919, an agreement was reached, and a share of the surplus was released and credited to the Canton Government. Meanwhile a countrywide protest was being organized by the student community against the Peking Government's negotiations with Japan for loans, which amounted to Y 200,000,000 (\$100,000,000), and were put to unfair uses, and against their acceptance of the Shantung Award at the Treaty of Versailles. The student movement reached its peak in Shanghai, where an anti-Japanese boycott was organized, and gave a great stimulus to the nationalist movement of Dr. Sun. The Kuomintang henceforth expanded in numbers, organizers were sent into schools, and the writings of Dr. Sun were published in immense quantities and circulated among the students. Soon afterwards, and as a result of Dr. Sun's alliance with the students, the Kuomintang underwent a radical change: it became uncompromisingly nationalistic, everywhere anti-militarist, and anti-feudalist, but not yet anti-foreign.

Unfortunately, however, quarrels broke out among the southern leaders, many of whom objected to Dr. Sun's anti-feudal ideas, and Dr. Sun was compelled to flee from Canton. The Kwangtung faction, however, soon succeeded in regaining control of the province, and Dr. Sun, returning to Canton in 1921, was able to establish himself there. The important revenues of Kwangtung, of which Canton is the capital, were now at his disposal, and his movement henceforth gained steadily in strength and influence. In April, he was elected "President of the Chinese Republic", but, once again, he was compelled to flee from Canton, as the civil governor of the city objected to his anti-feudal policies, and revolted. This marks

the end of one period of Kuomintang history, for when the party again returned to Canton in 1924, it had begun its alliance with the communists.

CHINA IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE

We have now to turn our attention to the Government of North China, where, as we have seen, the "Anfu" clique had been re-established in power. This group was able to continue in office largely through a series of Japanese loans, known as the Nishihara loans. As we have seen, the Northern Government, recognized by the powers as *the* Government of China, had declared war against Germany, but for financial difficulties and discords among the leaders, they could take little active part in the struggle. In 1915, Japan took advantage of the situation, and presented China with the so-called Twenty-one Demands (see below). China, however, gained a little from this lining up with the Allies: she cancelled the Boxer indemnities due to Germany and was permitted to suspend the payment of the sums due to the Allies. China sent an able delegation to the Peace Conference at Paris, representing by a strange but characteristic anomaly both the Peking and the Canton Governments. They made a vigorous demand for the satisfaction of China's nationalist claims—such as the restoration to her of the former German properties in Shantung, the cancellation of all spheres of influence, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Chinese soil, the abolition of consular jurisdiction, tariff autonomy, the relinquishment of leased territories, and the restoration of foreign concessions and settlements. President Wilson favoured the restoration of the Shantung properties, but this could not be done because by agreements with Japan in February and March 1917 the Allies had promised to support Japanese demands on the score at the Peace Conference, and Japan was confirmed in the possession of these holdings. China refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, and in 1919 a very effective nationwide boycott of Japanese goods was instituted. China made some gains from the Peace Settlement; she became a member of the League of Nations by signing the treaty with Austria, which did not contain the offensive Shantung clauses, and in her separate treaty with Germany the German share of the Boxer indemnities.

ties and German extraterritorial privileges were cancelled. A slight but significant breach had thus been made in the wall of foreign "rights" in China.

CHINA AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Japan made some attempts to adjust the Shantung dispute, but her conditions were unacceptable to China. However, as a result of the Washington Conference (see below, Chapter 10), Japan agreed to restore the former German holdings in Shantung to China. The Chinese question loomed larger at Washington than any other except possibly that of disarmament. By the so-called Nine-Power agreements the signatories promised to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China, to give China an opportunity to develop a stable government, to maintain the principle of equal opportunity in China for the commerce and industry of all nations, and to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China to seek special privileges that would abridge the rights and privileges of subjects or citizens of friendly states. Japan continued to be conciliatory, and while refusing to cancel the agreements of 1915, entered upon no new or marked aggression. Even in 1927-28 when there were anti-foreign agitation and civil war in China, and when she acted vigorously and seemed to be entering upon a new advance in Manchuria, she was much more careful to respect Chinese susceptibilities than she had been so long.

DOMESTIC POLITICS OF THE NORTH

It may be recalled that the Northern or Peking Government was headed by Tuan Chi-jui (of the "Anfu" clique) as Premier and Hsu Shih-Chang as President. Being the internationally recognised Chinese Government, it was, much more than the Canton Government, the battle ground of rival tuchuns or military governors of the provinces. In 1920, the outstanding warlords were Wu P'ei-fu, his titular superior, Tsao K'un (both belonging to the "Chihli" military group), and Chang Tso-lin, the master of wealthy Manchuria. In the summer of 1920 these

three united to drive Tuan and the "Anfu" leaders out of power, and seized control of the government whose authority, however, did not extend outside the walls of Peking. In return for Japan's promise to support him in annexing Shantung province, Chang prevailed upon the President to order the Chinese delegation to compromise with Japan on the Shantung railroad issue. Wu revealed the plot and, declaring war against Chang, defeated him and drove him back into Manchuria. Wu now posed as the national saviour and strove to restore the situation as it had been in the days of the parliament of 1913. Hsu resigned the presidency, to which Li was reinstated, and the National Assembly was recalled to Peking. Thus the last officers on whom the entire country had relied were put back into power.

Chinese unity, however, was still a long way off. In the parliament, factions wrangled for control, cabinets were formed and dissolved, and, above all, there were insurmountable financial difficulties. Tsao K'un, in a bid for the presidency, spent immense sums, totalling over \$15,000,000 (Mex.) in bribing members of parliament. President Li fled and Tsao K'un was "elected" to the presidency in October. In the following year (1924) Wu and Chang renewed their war, Wu was defeated, and Tsao K'un was ousted. Wu's reverses were due to the defection of one of his subordinates, Feng Yu-hsiang, the so-called Christian general, who was a Protestant Christian and the bulk of whose army professed the same faith. Chang and Feng called back Tuan to power as Chief Executive (not President). Tuan invited Dr. Sun Yat-Sen to attend a Reorganization Conference in Peking for the ostensible purpose of establishing the unification of China. Dr. Sun apparently having reached an understanding with the "Anfu" party for co-operation, even though it possibly meant subordination of the Kuomintang to Peking, reached Tientsin on 2 December, but was taken ill, and was unable to proceed further till 31 December. He died at Peking on 12 March 1925.

Feng and Chang could not co-operate any more successfully than Chang and Wu, and Feng, aided by the defection of one of Chang's generals, compelled Chang to retire again to Manchuria. Chang Tso-lin eliminated the traitor early in 1926, and uniting his forces with those of his quondam enemy, Wu P'ei-fu,

recovered Peking. Feng fled to Moscow, and Tuan to Tientsin, and the former President, Tsao K'un, was released from custody, but he promptly resigned the presidency. On 2 December, Chang and a number of other generals formed the Northern Military Alliance, with Chang as Commander-in-Chief. Wu, who was at the time in the region of Hankow, seems to have had no particular rank, and was clearly out-manoeuvred by Chang, who, on 17 June 1926, proclaimed himself with great ceremony as the Dictator of the Chinese Republic.

GROWTH OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Dr. Sun's death strengthened rather than weakened the Kuomintang. He was a man of vision, but not a great organizer, and, after his death, he was recognized as a national hero and his influence increased. He left behind him a "will", a message to the people of China, which became virtually a religious testament. Briefly, it consisted of three principles—Nationalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Pending the unification of the country, the full realization of democracy was to be postponed, and dictatorship by a single party, the Kuomintang, was to be substituted. At his death his party had a right wing and a left wing, the latter being dominated by the communists. In the carrying out of his mission Dr. Sun had received considerable help from Soviet Russia, which had meanwhile surrendered most of the privileges acquired at the expense of China in the Tsarist days. Stalin had moreover sent him an excellent adviser, one Michael Borodin, and an able strategist, General Galen. Borodin found that the basic problem of China was one of organization and he promised to secure arms and ammunition from Soviet Russia on easy terms, together with a corps of military and civilian experts to aid in reorganizing the party and government along Soviet lines. Borodin's proposals were endorsed at the Congress of the Kuomintang Party in January 1924, which also admitted the communists to the Kuomintang.

Shortly after this, on 31 May 1924, China signed an agreement with the U.S.S.R. whereby the latter gave up her extraterritorial rights in China, remitted the unpaid balance of the Boxer indemnity, promised not to make communist propaganda in the

country, and to restore Mongolia to China. By another agreement, the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria should continue to remain under the joint control of the two states until China could redeem it with her own capital. In 1924 the Whampoa Military Academy was established, along lines devised by Borodin, and Soviet military officers were invited to train the Nationalist forces. Great quantities of military supplies of all kinds were furnished by the Soviet Government—mostly without any payment by the Chinese. On 23 May 1925, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, which was dominated by the communists, adopted a resolution stating that the Kuomintang would not co-operate further with the government then in Peking, and that the only government with which it could co-operate was Soviet Russia.

The communists, using their familiar tactics of "boring from within", fomented labour troubles in foreign-owned enterprises which further accentuated anti-foreign feeling—a dominant note of Chinese history for over a century. On 30 May 1925 the British-commanded police of the international settlement in Shanghai fired into a crowd of students who had gathered before the police station to demand the release of their comrades arrested for agitation in connection with a strike in the Japanese-owned cotton mills. Anti-foreign and specially anti-British feeling spread like wild fire over China. Aggravated by a skirmish between Shameen, the foreign settlement in Canton, and the Chinese, an anti-British boycott was instituted which was particularly effective in the south.

THE KUOMINTANG DRIVES NORTHWARD

Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's mantle fell on General Chiang Kai-shek, the then principal of the Whampoa Military Academy. Though an early member of the Kuomintang, Chiang was comparatively little known up to this time. His early life is rather obscure: he seems for some time to have been engaged in banking business in Shanghai; later to have gone to Japan to study military science and then to Soviet Russia to study in a military academy attached to the Red Army. During Dr. Sun's lifetime, Chiang Kai-shek was not a significant figure, and he did not have any important post in the party councils. He remained quietly at

work training his cadets for the coming struggle, but although he was the principal, the Whampoa Military Academy was under the control of Russian advisers, and Borodin's approval was necessary in all questions of policy. In 1926, Chiang who had become Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Forces made an attempt to throw off the control of the communists, which, after some initial successes, failed. Chiang was constrained to make a reconciliation with Borodin who promised him, on conditions dictated by himself, military assistance in the launching of the Northern Expedition which he projected. Chiang agreed to have Russian military advisers to participate in the war, and received immediately 20,000 rifles, ample ammunition, field pieces and aeroplanes, and the promise of further supplies from Vladivostok as soon as they could be obtained.

In the summer of 1926, the march to the north began triumphantly, and by the coming of winter, the Nationalist forces led by Chiang drove Wu P'eifu into Honan, and, soon afterwards, practically eliminating him, were in possession of the Wuhan cities—Hankow, Wuchung and Hanyang—and the Kuomintang agitators denounced the unjust treaties, the foreign merchants and the Christian churches, schools and hospitals as "imperialistic". They also organized labourers and peasants to make exorbitant demands on employers and landlords, and in some places, notably in Honan and Hupeh, a virtual reign of terror began. By March 1927 the Chinese forces had taken over the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang, and the northern militarists, alarmed, had put themselves under the direction of Chang Tso-lin to stem the oncoming flood, if possible. On 24 March, nationalist troops, entering Nanking, savagely looted foreign dwellings and killed a few foreigners.

These excesses, which were committed mostly by the communists with the express purpose of discrediting the Nationalists, created dissensions among the Kuomintang. Within a few weeks, however, Chiang Kai-shek set up a government at Nanking and denounced the radicalist leaders and their excesses. By the autumn of 1927 the anti-communist reaction was in full swing, and Borodin and other communist leaders were ousted from Wuhan. In December 1927 a conference of the leaders of the Kuomintang was held at Shanghai to try to heal the breach, but it came out strongly against the communists, and ordered

MANCHURIA

U. S. S. R.


SAKHALIN

NORTH KOREA

SOUTH KOREA

SEA OF JAPAN

JAPANESE ISLANDS



the closing of Russian Consulates in and the expulsion of their staffs from nationalist territories. The Nationalist Government severed all diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, 14 December 1927. In 1928, the Nationalists, reorganized under moderate and conservative leaders, began a new northward advance. Chiang Kai-shek led, in co-operation with Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. In June, they entered Peking. Chang Tso-lin was killed by a bomb as he was retiring into Manchuria, and his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, known as the Young Marshal, made his peace with the Nationalists, and was given a place on the chief council of the Nationalist Government. The Nationalists moved the capital from Peking (now renamed Peiping—"Northern Peace") to Nanking, and in October set up an administration reorganized to conform to Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's programme. On 6 July 1928, the three national commanders attended a celebration organized in the Western Hills near Peking, and announced to the spirit of Sun Yat-Sen that they had carried out the task he had commissioned them to perform. 1928 to 1930 were years of great progress, but in 1930 Yen and Feng revolted against Chiang. The latter with the assistance of Chang Hsueh-liang, defeated them. Paradoxically enough, it was no longer China's weakness but her growing strength that exposed the country to attack by foreigners—not by the Western Powers, who had been weakened by the war, but by Japan, to whose story we now turn.

JAPAN TILL THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

In 1663, a hundred and ten years after Commodore Perry entered a Japanese harbour with an impressive squadron of war vessels and, training his guns on the opposite coast, frightened the Japanese Government practically to open their country to trade and intercourse with the West, Japan comprises much the same area—some 142,000 sq. miles—as she did then. The area and the landscape still remain the same, but Japan, since then, has undergone a metamorphosis that has wrought a revolutionary change in everything that affects her life—her government, her social and economic organization, her culture and outlook on the world. The intervening years are filled with momentous events and developments, which include the famous Meiji

Restoration (1867), the phenomenal growth of Japanese industries, the introduction of a modern constitution, and the growth of the Japanese empire, leading to the recognition of Japan as a Great Power and playing by her of a conspicuous role in world politics. In the closing years of this period—during the Second World War—Japan contended for a time on more than equal terms with the mightiest of the Western nations, making them reel at the hard blows she administered them and carrying her victorious arms far and wide—in China, South-East Asia, and indeed as far as the borders of British India—till, overpowered and over-exhausted, Japan had to own defeat and surrender to her enemies—the *coup de grace* coming from the annihilation of two of her most prosperous cities by atomic bombs hurled on them by the Americans.

The expansion of Japan began shortly after the Meiji Restoration. By 1874 she had established a legal claim over the Ryukyu Islands, and in 1878 occupied the Bonin Islands. Then came two considerable wars—one with China and the other with Russia. The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), which closed the Sino-Japanese war, required China to recognize the independence of Korea, to cede the Pescadores, Formosa and the Liaotung peninsula, and to pay an indemnity. It was a revelation to the world not only of the relative strengths of the two nations but of the changed situation in the Far East. It showed that, while, at the hard blows received from the West, China had attempted to defend herself by going deeper into her own shell of orthodoxy, Japan had mastered the science and technique of the West which she was now using against China and could use later against the Westerners themselves. In the eyes of the Western nations, therefore, the positions of China and Japan were now reversed, and they felt that China, whose weakness was fully exposed by the war lay at their mercy, while Japan, whose strength as also ambitions they now first fully sensed, had taken her place with them as a factor in world politics. Russia quickly reacted to the situation, and aided by France and Germany, intervened to get the Liaotung peninsula, which Japan had acquired by the treaty, to be retroceded to China. Her motives in thus ostensibly coming to the rescue of China became clear when, not long afterwards in 1898, she obtained a leasehold of the territory which she had forced

Japan to give back to China. In 1902, Japan and Britain concluded the Anglo-Japanese alliance as a means of checking Russian expansion in the Far East.

The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 was not a mere episode in the duel between the two countries for domination of the rich and, for both of them, strategically important Chinese province of Manchuria, or for getting a free hand for cutting out for themselves further sizable slices of the luscious Chinese melon—hitherto considered as a privilege reserved for the Western nations only. It was an epoch-making event; Japan's resounding victory reverberated throughout the world; it astonished the West, and thrilled the nations of the East, so long suffering under western exploitation and thralldom. Its concrete results were that it awakened Asia, and gave her peoples the promise of a new life and better times. Unfortunately for Japan, it also showed herself as a serious rival to the U.S.A., which, under the imperialist President Theodore Roosevelt, had launched upon an expansionist programme. The latter, determined to keep the newly rising Asian nation in its place, intervened to suggest the holding of a peace conference in American territory, at Portsmouth in New Hampshire. By the terms of the treaty concluded there, on 5 September 1905, Japan acquired, subject to China's consent, Russian rights in the Liaotung leased territory, part of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, and Russian-owned mining concessions in Manchuria. The southern half of the island of Sakhalin was ceded to Japan. Russia acknowledged Japanese paramount rights in Korea and also granted to her fishing rights in Siberian waters. In the Treaty of Peking, 1905, the Chinese confirmed the Russian cessions. China opened her Manchurian cities for Japanese residence and trade. Japan secured the right to maintain the military railway she had built from the Korean border to Mukden. She organized the South Manchuria Railway Company to own and operate the railways in Manchuria and to develop mines and other concessions along the right of way. The rights thus obtained were augmented by treaties signed in connection with the Twenty-one Demands, described below. In 1910, Japan formally annexed Korea.

Japan entered the World War on the side of the Allies, and invested Tsingtao, the principal town in the German leased

territory of Kiaochow. It fell on 7 November 1914, and was immediately brought under her administration. Japanese war-ships co-operated with those of the British in chasing Admiral von Spee's ships and ultimately sinking them off the Falkland islands. The Marshall, Pelew, Caroline and Marianne islands were captured. At the Peace Conference at Paris, it was decided, in spite of China's protests, to give Kiaochow to Japan. The former German islands north of the Pacific were also given to her as League of Nations mandates. Meanwhile in 1915, when the powers in Europe were passing through a most critical phase of the war, and the issue seemed to be uncertain, Japan, whose prospects in China were not at all favourable in case Germany won, thought it fit to utilize the situation, created by her recent victories against the Germans, to strengthen her position in China.

She sought to do this by presenting to China, a co-belligerent, the so-called Twenty-one Demands. The latter were ranged in five groups, dealing with (a) Shantung, (b) Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, (c) the Hanyeping Company, (d) an engagement that China would not cede any harbour to a third power. The fifth group was not at first made public but was presented confidentially as "wishes". It included the appointment of Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military matters; the priority of Japanese capital in railways, harbours and mines in the province of Fukien opposite to the Japanese possession of Formosa; and other important points. China had no option but to accept the demands when they were pressed on her under threat of the use of force, and signed two treaties implementing most of the demands—one relating to Shantung, and the other to Mongolia and Manchuria. By the latter the leases of Port Arthur and Dairen as well as of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway were extended to 99 years, and Japanese were accorded special privileges, residential, commercial, agricultural and industrial. However, as the result of informal discussions between Japanese and Chinese delegates at the Washington Conference (see below, Chapter 10), Japan withdrew many of the demands listed in the fifth group, viz. the preferential rights regarding Japanese advisers, etc. The agreements relating to the Kwantung Penin-

sula (another name for the Dairen territory), South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia remained in force.

AIMS AND METHODS OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

Ever since Japan was transformed into a "modern" state, her policy has been one of unceasing expansion at the expense of her neighbours, specially China, and the method employed by her has been almost unvaryingly *force majeure*. Fair-minded Japanese do not deny this fact but they usually justify it on the ground of necessity, that is, as dictated by the needs of self-defence, and even Japan's integrity and independence. It has further been argued that only by following the policy and using the methods that she did could Japan become or win recognition as a Great Power. She certainly was a good student of the imperialist powers of the West and she not only learned lessons from them but put them to practical use thoroughly and rather too well. By studying the methods which the British had followed to force the door open for their exploitation in China, Japan not only learned how she could escape a like fate, but reaped profits in China by following the same methods herself. Pretty early, also, she realized that if she did not "forestall" Russia and other western nations, the latter would finish off China, and not only leave nothing for herself but menace her own independence.

With regard to Korea, which was a bone of contention between China and Japan, it has been pointed out that its strategic position—as a "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan"—made the question of its control a matter of life and death for Japan. China, who was its titular suzerain, could not prevent it from being occupied by Russia, who had in 1884 undertaken to reform its army and was bringing pressure to bear upon its government for the grant to her of the use of Port Lazaroff. Korea also produced a vast quantity of rice, which Japan needed; and by 1894, when the Sino-Japanese quarrel developed into a war, 90 per cent of its foreign trade was with Japan. China's weakness was demonstrated when soon after the end of her war with Japan, in which she had to cede to the latter the peninsula of Shantung, Russia forced Japan to retrocede the territory to its rightful owner and then

got it leased out to herself. Thereupon ensued a scramble among the other Western Powers for obtaining for themselves "slices of the Chinese melon", and, most ominous of all, Russia's steady infiltration into China's northern provinces, specially Manchuria. Japan's war with Russia was but the inevitable consequence of western, and particularly Russian, aggression in China and the latter's domestic difficulties.

Japan, who resembles Britain in being an island and a naval power, could not, any more than the latter, be indifferent to what happened on the continent that lay on the opposite coast. Britain maintained her integrity and her position as a great European power by adopting and judiciously alternating her two policies of "blue water" and "the old system" of maintaining a balance of power on the continent. But to Japan the latter method of maintaining her power was not open as there was no balance of power in Asia and as, so long as China remained weak, the natural dominant power in Asia was Russia. Japan beat Russia in 1904-05, but could not do so sufficiently, and Russia quickly resumed her old policies with regard to China. Not only she retained a position of paramount significance in North Manchuria, but she pushed a project which would put much of North China under her influence by making a protectorate of Outer Mongolia. Japan who was anxious about the success of her railways in Manchuria, felt she must have an understanding with Russia. A political convention of July 1907 pledged the two states to respect each other's rights accruing from agreements with China and to recognize the independence and territorial integrity of China and to "preserve and defend the *status quo*". A secret agreement provided for a division of Manchuria between them and for the special position of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Outer Mongolia. Another convention signed on 4 July 1910, declared that should the *status quo* be threatened, the two states would decide on steps to be taken to protect it. A secret article, directed primarily against the United States, provided for common action should the Far Eastern interests of Japan and Russia be threatened. Under these circumstances, Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910.

The collapse of the Tsarist power in Russia, the engrossment in and enfeebling by the World War of the other Euro-

pean powers, and the internal disorders in China enabled Japan vastly to strengthen her position in China by the presentation to her of the Twenty-one Demands and by her gains at the Peace Settlement. But the growing strength of the Nationalist forces in China, now aided by the Russian Communists, who had their own motives, which were viewed with suspicion by Japan, for doing so and the growth of the power of the United States, which had vast stakes in China, into the most powerful nation on earth, posed new problems for Japan. At the Washington Conference, 1921-22, Japan had to beat a temporary retreat before the united front presented there by the Western Powers, led by the U.S.A., against her policy in China, and, as we have seen above (see also below, Chapter 10), she had to make a number of concessions to China and also agree to a restriction on her capital ships' strength.

From this time and till about the spring of 1927 Japan followed towards China the so-called "friendship policy", which was particularly associated with the name of Baron Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs during the latter part of this period. Evidence of this new attitude towards China was seen in Japan's withdrawal of her troops from Shantung and Hankow; the closing of her post offices throughout China; the remission of her share of the Boxer indemnity, which was to be henceforth used as a special fund for Chinese educational and cultural work; and her reluctance to use force to support her position in China. With the coming to office of the opposition party, the Seiyukai, under its leader, Baron Tanaka, in April 1927, however, there was a reversal to the old policy, which came to be called "the positive policy". This was revealed in the sending of two military expeditions to Tsinan, Shantung, in the summers of 1927 and 1928 (see below) and in a more vigorous assertion of Japan's special rights in Manchuria (see Chapter 10). This policy resulted in serious friction with China, a damaging anti-Japanese boycott, and was severely criticised by Baron Shidehara. In July 1929, the Minseito party again came into power, and Baron Shidehara once again became Foreign Minister. The new government proclaimed that Japan's policy towards China should be revised and that Japan desired "the co-existence and common prosperity of the two countries". Baron Tanaka had sent troops into Tsinan in 1927 (as has been

stated above) ostensibly for the protection of the lives and properties of the Japanese residents there, which, he said, had been endangered by the Nationalist forces which were then marching against Peking, and, in doing so, would shortly pass through Tsinan. Both Peking and Nanking had protested against this, and the latter, moreover, stated that the Japanese troops interfered with the advance of the Nationalist forces towards Peking. On account of an anti-Japanese boycott, these troops were withdrawn, but, in the following year (1928) when the Nationalist forces made their second northward drive, Japan again sent troops to Tsinan. On May 1, both Chinese Nationalist and Japanese troops entered Tsinan, and on 3 May, they began to fight with each other, resulting in a heavy loss of life and property. Both governments reported the matter to the League of Nations, but, on 28 March 1929, an agreement was signed between the two parties, and the Japanese troops were withdrawn.

PARTY POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

There is not much difference between the programmes of the political parties in Japan, and there is not much genuine democratic feeling among the people as a whole. However, at this time the Minseito party headed by Baron Shidehara stood for a more conciliatory policy with respect to China than the Seiyukai party headed by Baron Tanaka. To credit particular policies to particular parties and their leaders is, however, to over-simplify the factors that have shaped Japan's foreign policy. The deciding factor in governmental policy in Japan has often been not the ascendancy of this party or that, but the intensity of pressure that the military leaders have on particular occasions exerted on the government nominally installed in power. Japan has a long tradition of militarism. Under a feudal system the Samurai were one of the privileged classes; they were the architects of the Imperial restoration. In the constitution which Japan adopted in 1889 the emperor was given absolute control over the military (Articles 11 and 12). The denial of the supreme command to the popular agencies of government perpetuated the special position of the military services and continued the dual government of feudal Japan. The services

had the right of private access to the emperor. The minister of war and the minister of marine were required to come from the services, and the resignation of either could bring about the downfall of a government. The services were able to dictate the terms on which a new government could be formed. Closely allied with the militarists were reactionary groups opposed to liberalism, representative government, popular suffrage, labour movements, social reforms and international co-operation.

The economic factor exerted an almost equal influence on governments. The phenomenal development of industries and trade had brought greater and greater profits to the *zaibatsu* (the name given to some great "families" or combines who dominated all large-scale enterprises in Japan), but it had not greatly improved the living standards of the masses. By 1920 the population of Japan was 55 million—an increase of about 85 per cent in 65 years. But industrialization and trade did not improve conditions enough to raise the standard of living substantially. This was particularly true of the peasants, who remained at a low subsistence level. Further industrialization and greater development of trade were required to create a better life for the masses. Immigration of the surplus population into countries where it could move into for finding sure employment, the most important among which was the United States, virtually ended with the passing by the American Congress on 15 May 1924 of an immigration law excluding Asiatics—the culmination of a series of anti-Japanese laws that had been passed by Pacific coast States, beginning in 1893. To improve the economic condition of the masses Japan needed a period of peace, which should enable her to cut down military expenditure and adopt sound policies that might invigorate trade, and this was what the Minseito government attempted to give the country during the years of their power, 1929-31. But the military leaders, who, under the constitution, enjoyed a special status and were only too ready to strike at parliamentary government, had an alternative plan: war, which would put themselves in control of the state and, resulting in annexation of China's rich province of Manchuria, if not some others too, would solve the problem of mass poverty and unemployment.

FASCISM IN JAPAN: THE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA

It is now generally admitted that the conquest of Manchuria and setting up of a puppet state, Manchukuo, there by Japan in 1931-32, in defiance of the League of Nations and public opinion all over the world, came in the wake of a series of incidents of Sino-Japanese clashes in that country, which were both provoked and capitalized by the militarists in Japan. They did so with the deliberate purpose of overthrowing civilian and parliamentary rule in Japan and converting her into a Fascist State, which might be their instrument for the implementation of imperialistic policies which they advocated. Parliamentary government in Japan, as in Italy and Germany, the two important European States where Fascism found a congenial soil to thrive on, was a weak plant with shallow roots. The causes of its overthrow here were partly the same as those which were operating in many European countries to discredit democracy—popular apathy, inefficiency and venality of political leaders, economic distress. But they had some features peculiar to Japan, which merit careful analysis, since they led to an abrupt break in Japan's foreign policy and profoundly influenced world politics.

On 18 September 1931, when the first Sino-Japanese clash occurred near Mukden precipitating the Manchurian crisis, a Minseito government was still firmly entrenched in power in Japan. In the preceding decade, parliamentary government had made notable strides, a conciliatory policy had been followed towards China, Russia and the West, and disarmament arrangements were negotiated at Washington in 1922 and at London in 1930 and the Kellogg Pact had been signed. Active opposition to these measures was confined principally to the military and to some sections of the aristocracy. The World Economic Depression, which hit Japan sorely, however, brought them new allies. The lower middle class suffered badly, and the drop in agricultural commodity prices brought the farmers to the verge of bankruptcy. The miseries of the people were blamed on the politicians, who were admittedly corrupt and had unsavoury connections with big business. So-called fascist societies grew up in an attempt to give organized form to the growing popular revolt. The military and naval leaders—alive to the sentiments

of the men in the ranks for whose difficulties they felt a paternal sympathy—entertained similar hostile feelings towards the politicians and the big bourgeoisie. They now came forward to lead a revolution allegedly in the interests of the masses against their despoilers.

The Manchurian problem summed up in striking form the political contradictions within Japan. Shidehara's conciliatory policy towards China and advocacy of the policy of peaceful penetration in Manchuria were criticized as not only unsuccessful but actually encouraging Chinese intransigence. It was also pointed out that the economic benefits derived from Manchuria were appropriated in large measure by the great Japanese financial and banking interests. The critics advocated a policy of knitting Manchuria with Japan into an economic whole, which would permit an intensive development of Manchurian resources, give employment to the middle-class intelligentsia, and, while the government subsidized mass colonization projects, relieve the farmers. During 1931 and 1932, the critical nature of these underlying developments was evidenced by a growing spirit of hostility between Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria. Two rather ugly incidents occurred, which Baron Shidehara tried hard to settle amicably and which infuriated the military leaders, already plotting to put an end to civilian rule in Japan, to such an extent that they now, without authorization from the government, began their own war in Manchuria, at the same time seizing power in Japan.

On 19 and 20 September, 1931 the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria simultaneously seized the chief cities along the South Manchuria Railway, including Mukden, Changchun, Antung, Yingkao and Fushun. The city of Kirin was occupied on 21 September. These operations placed the whole of South Manchuria under complete Japanese control. The initial cause of this unprecedented military action was stated by them to be the destruction of a section of the South Manchuria Railway tracks just north of Mukden in the neighbourhood of the Chinese barracks at Peitaying, where the first clash occurred in the night of 18 September. The official Japanese statement relating to this incident declared that at 10-30 on the night of 18 September a detachment of Japanese railway guards discovered that some 400 Chinese soldiers from the Peitaying

barracks had just blown up a section of the South Manchuria Railway line. The ensuing exchange of shots resulted in further fighting between larger bodies of the combatants, ultimately resulting in the capture of Mukden on the same day. (Later enquiry found the charge of the blowing up of the railway line to be untrue, or substantially so, for the south-bound train from Changchun had passed over the line safely to its destination at Mukden soon after the alleged explosion took place.)

Japan's conquest of Manchuria was effected in four well-defined stages. In the first stage which began on 18 September 1931, the military took over all important centres in South Manchuria. Towards the end of October the advance on Tsitsihar was initiated, resulting in the capture of the city on 18 December. In December the attack was shifted to Chin-chow, which was taken on 2 January 1932. The final stage began late in January, with the despatch of an expeditionary force to Harbin, which was occupied on 5 February. The entire business was directed by the local commanders, who received orders from the War Office, which enforced acceptance of its decisions by the civilian authorities.

The position of the government at home, forced to become the official apologists for a policy and actions which they totally disapproved, was becoming more untenable as the days passed. On 11 December the Minseito government resigned, and was succeeded by a Seiyukai ministry headed by Inukai. The appointment to the War Ministry of the new government of General Sad-ao Araki, who was sympathetic to the aggressive aims of younger military officers, reinforced the steady drift to Fascism, which was, by this time, affecting all phases of Japanese life. Fascism drew its strength in Japan from a reactionary ultra-nationalistic patriotism, appealing to the sentiments of religious veneration for the Emperor implicit in Japan's monarchical creed. It was a twentieth-century Bushido (the traditional ethical code of the Japanese warrior), calling upon the youth to sacrifice life itself in an endeavour to re-order the modern state, and challenging the nation to overcome the new dangers threatening Japan in this difficult modern age. It was an unmistakably direct reaction against Westernism, represented in Japan by parliamentary government and the pur-

suit of a western-aligned foreign policy, and, spiritually, a shift to an exaggerated "Nipponism" and emphasis on Japanese *Kultur*

The younger military officers, who had precipitated the crisis in Manchuria, were the chief sponsors of the fascist movement. By virtue of their constitutional independence, traditional prestige, nearness to the common people and possession of means to force action, the military class in Japan was best fitted to lead the coming revolution. A month after the first Sino-Japanese clash in Manchuria, on 17 October there came the abortive *coup d'etat*, which had marked half a dozen leading politicians and financiers for assassination as a prelude to the establishment of a military dictatorship. Most of the younger General Staff officers up to the rank of colonel were implicated, as well as many of the younger officers in regiments in and near Tokyo. The plot was discovered and frustrated before it materialized, and the whole affair was hushed up. Not only did the officers involved go unpunished, but the future conduct of military affairs passed largely into their hands. On 15 May Premier Inukai was murdered by a band of military cadets and young naval officers. His was virtually the last parliamentary cabinet in Japan; his successor, Admiral Saito, the nominee of the military, headed a super-party coalition government, which placed foreign affairs in the hands of the military, while leaving internal affairs under party control. In Manchuria, the aims of the military were fully adhered to by the Saito government. After Manchuria had been conquered, the military authorities transformed it into a puppet state, named Manchukuo, with the former Manchu Emperor of China, Hsuan Tung (Mr. Henry Pu-yi) as the Provisional Dictator (*Chin Cheng*).

On 12 March Hsieh Chieh-shih, Foreign Minister of Manchukuo, sent a telegram to the foreign ministers of seventeen countries having consular representatives in the country, announcing the formation of the new state, declaring the principles which should guide its foreign policy, including respect for the "open door" and for the treaty obligations of the Chinese Republic, and requesting for the establishment of formal relations. The communication was ignored by the Western Powers, but Japan, without making a reference to the

question of recognition, acknowledged it. On 12 March Premier Saito stated: "Japan's recognition of Manchukuo must depend on the usual conditions of their recognition of a new State, including proved capacity to maintain itself as such." However, on 8 August, General Nobuyoshi Muto was appointed as Japan's supreme representative to Manchukuo, and the Japanese Foreign Office was thus fully subordinated to the military authorities. Japan's recognition of Manchukuo was accomplished by the signing of a treaty of alliance between Japan and Manchukuo on 15 September, confirming Japan's existing treaty rights in Manchuria, and giving Japan the right to station such troops in Manchukuo as might be necessary to the "maintenance of the national security of both countries."

TOWARDS A NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA

While the Lytton Report was being considered at Geneva (see the next chapter) fighting had broken out on 1 January 1933 at Shanhaikuan, the gateway to North China, and on 3 January Japanese troops had taken possession of the city. On 25 February, the day after the League Assembly had adopted the report, the Japanese military forces invaded Jehol province, and on 4 March, entered Chengteh, the capital of the province. On 8 May, they launched a much more determined invasion of North China and by 20 March were within 35 miles of Tientsin and 13 miles of Peking. General Chiang Kai-shek, who should have headed the armies personally and marched against the enemy, as the nation demanded, judged it of greater importance to continue the anti-communist operations, in which he was engaged at the time in Kiangsi province. Huang Fu, a former Foreign Minister at Nanking, who was educated in Japan and had many Japanese connections, and had been appointed by Chiang to be the head of the civil government of China, signed a formal armistice with the Japanese at Tangku (31 May). The published terms of this agreement enforced "demilitarization" of the major portion of Hopei province north of the Peiping-Tientsin area. By agreeing to a truce which prevented further armed resistance, the Nanking Government virtually recognized for a time at

least the Japanese incorporation of Manchuria and Jehol into their empire.

While the League's collective security system had proved to be unable to prevent the aggression of one of its powerful members against another, weak member, and none of the Western Powers had rendered the latter the least assistance in defending itself, the U.S.A. at least was alive to the fact that the "treaty structure"—embracing the Kellogg Pact, the League Covenant and the Washington Conference treaties—had been completely undermined by Japan's successful aggression in China. The magnitude of Japan's territorial gains, and their value to her not only for defensive purposes but as a base of operations strengthened by the construction of strategic railways for further acts of aggression against China—and also against the Soviet Union—completely upset the prevailing balance of power in the Pacific. Though Japan had not yet repudiated the arms limitation agreements of the Washington and London conferences, the scuttling by her of the Nine-Power Treaty was considered by Washington as having a bearing on those agreements. The Roosevelt administration immediately appropriated \$238,000,000 from the public works fund for naval construction. Taken in conjunction with the active demand for additional naval construction in Japan and Great Britain, this meant that a naval building race within treaty limits had begun. (None had as yet built up to the permissible maximum limits fixed under the agreements.) Now also at long last the U.S.A. accorded her recognition to the Soviet Union, believing this would encourage the latter to adopt a bolder attitude towards Japan in its disputes with that country concerning its rights in Manchuria and their common border. A 50 million dollar wheat and cotton credit was negotiated between the Nanking Government and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The Japanese press complained that this was being partially diverted to military purposes. American aviation experts and technicians were engaged to train Chinese military pilots at the Hangchow aviation school on a three-year contract basis. A 5 million dollar air-plane plant was constructed by the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, capable of turning out 60 military planes per year. The sale of American aircraft and accessories to China, which had amounted to \$207,000 in 1932,

rose to \$2,359,000 in 1933. Nationals of other foreign powers, particularly Germany and Italy, were tendering military assistance to Nanking in advisory capacities, while two naval instructors were lent by the British Government.

THE AMAU STATEMENT

Japan could not but view the policies and activities of the Western Powers, particularly the U.S.A., as constituting a serious menace to herself. On 22 June 1932, Viscount Ishii warned Ambassador Grew that a grave situation would be created if the United States "ever attempted to dominate the Asiatic continent and prevent Japan from pacific and natural expansion in this part of the world". On 17 April 1934, Eiji Amau, Foreign Office spokesman at Tokyo, delivered a statement to the press, which gave a clear-cut expression to the policy of Japan with regard to China, or, for that matter, East Asia, and conveyed a clear warning to the western nations against interference in the entire region in any manner whatsoever.

The statement (which is to be found in full in Toynbee's *Survey of International Affairs, 1934*, pp. 650-51) first laid down certain broad principles regarding Japan's "special position and mission" in Eastern Asia. It then noted that Japan was compelled to act "single-handedly" on her own responsibility for maintaining "peace and order in East Asia", a responsibility shared only by China. Japan would, therefore, oppose, it went on to say, "any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan" and "any action taken by China calculated to play one power against another". Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers, even in the name of technical and financial assistance, were "bound to acquire political significance" at this time. More specifically, "supplying China with war planes, building aerodromes in China, and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan, China and other countries and to disturb the peace and order of Eastern Asia". Japan would oppose such projects "as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country nego

tiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to peace in Eastern Asia".

The Amau statement created a furore in Western Chancelleries, and Britain took the lead in making a "friendly enquiry" at Tokyo, which clarified the position Japan had defined for herself in that declaration by assuring that she "would observe the Nine-Power Treaty". Six months later, on 23 March 1935, Japan settled her dispute relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway with the Soviet Union by arriving at an agreement as to the sale of this railway to "Manchukuo". Two months later, taking advantage of European complications caused by Hitler's reintroduction of military conscription, Japan presented a series of demands to the North China authorities. Nanking accepted them in toto with the result that its political and military influence in North China was considerably reduced. This notable change of status of North China was carried through with virtually no opposition from the Western Powers.

THE CRISIS AT NANKING

Ever since his government had established itself at Nanking, General Chiang Kai-shek had two major political problems: the communist opposition and the Japanese aggression. In November 1934, Nanking's anti-communist operations finally succeeded in ousting the main Red armies from their Kiangsi and Fukien provincial strongholds, which they had maintained for six years. Despite a vast concentration of nearly half a million government troops, aided by the new airplane bombers purchased abroad, Chiang Kai-shek failed in his main object of surrounding and annihilating the communist armies. Under Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh these forces escaped from the net and, commencing in October 1934 their historic Long March from Kiangsi, emerged in November 1935 far to the north-west in the provinces of Shansi and Shensi, where they built up a state within a state. While they were acquiring the discipline, organization, and military skill which were, not long afterwards, to make them the masters of China, Chiang Kai-shek's government, which drew its strength from the support of the

bankers and industrialists of the port cities and landlords in the rural districts, was becoming more and more militaristic and authoritarian, and showing itself as more ready to strike down its political opponents than fighting the national enemy. The General, who so long defended his policy by asserting that China must have national unity before she could successfully fight the enemy, had never, even in the crisis leading to the conclusion of the humiliating Tangku truce, deployed his forces fully against the invaders, and was at this time aiming at a negotiated betrayal of the national cause just to maintain himself and his clique in power.

At the end of October 1935, however, Japan, taking advantage of the Abyssinian crisis, had embarked on a policy, which revealed the far-reaching character of her aims in China. The new idea was to create a few more Manchukuo in China, and thus, by disintegrating the country, to effect its complete conquest. The first step was to negotiate with the governors of the five northern provinces—Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar, and Suiyuan—with a view to setting up an "independent" regime in North China. At the critical point, Chiang Kai-shek, awakening at last to the danger to his own position, intervened and ordered the governors to break off the negotiations. Even then, in November, a small autonomous regime under a puppet ruler was organized in a strategic corner of East Hopei, and in December an Autonomous Political Council was set up in the provinces of Hopei and Chahar. The former proved useful to the Japanese in two of their most disreputable schemes for weakening and disrupting China: the drug traffic and the "special trade" or smuggling.

THE SIAN INCIDENT

In 1936, China seemed to have arrived at the cross-roads of sliding back to civil war and marching unitedly to face the national enemy. There was a vigorous national revival as witnessed by the student demonstrations of December 1935. At the same time the revolts of the military commanders of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, which had begun in June 1935, and threatened once again to disrupt the country, were brought to an end in a manner which brought them into closer and more

co-operative relations with the Nanking Government. Following upon these developments the central authorities were immediately called upon to deal with a series of demands, which recalled the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, made by the Japanese Ambassador, Shigeru Kawagoe. General Chiang Kai-shek, who displayed an unwonted firmness in his discussion with the Japanese of these demands, seemed, however, to have changed little his policies, and to be on the verge of launching upon a fresh move against the communists.

In order to keep the communists penned in Shensi, Chiang had sent Chang Hsueh-liang, the Young Marshal, as "Pacification Commissioner" with his *Tungpei*, that is, North-eastern troops—the name by which Chang's troops were known all over China, but the latter deserted to the communists. Still the Generalissimo persisted, and, on 7 December 1936, accompanied by his bodyguard, his staff and certain other Chinese commanders, arrived at Sian. Brushing aside the protests of Chang Hsueh-liang and his officers, he ordered Chang, on pain of dismissal, to co-operate with him in his projected attack on the communists. Early on the morning of 12 December, units of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops surrounded and captured the Generalissimo, his staff and his associated officers. In the conversations which were held between Chang and Chiang, Chou En-lai, even at that time recognized as one of the most distinguished communist leaders, participated, though in the Generalissimo's published diary (see *China at the Crossroads*, London, 1937), for obvious reasons, there is no mention of Chou's talks. They told him to return to Nanking, establish nationwide political unity embracing the Red armies, and make preparations for resistance to Japan. When the General flew back to Nanking—he was released on Christmas Day—accompanied by Chang Hsueh-liang, he had given up his own policy of "unity by force", and agreed to the communists' proposal of a united front against the national enemy.

THE LUKOUCHIAU (OR MARCO POLO BRIDGE) INCIDENT

On 30 June 1937 *Reuter* reported from Peiping that considerable anxiety had been caused in Chinese circles in the city on account of the fact that Japanese troops were holding field

exercises at Marco Polo Bridge and that there were rumours to the effect that plain-clothes men were smuggling themselves into the city. The Chinese authorities had been given to understand that the military exercises, which the Japanese Government claimed they were permitted to hold in certain cities in China in accordance with the so-called Boxer Protocol (Article 9 of the Final Protocol, signed on 7 September 1901) and which, without admitting the "right", the Chinese did not object to, were scheduled to last one day only, but actually continued for three days more. They were carried on for a week more, and on 7 July a shooting incident allegedly happened at Lukouchiau, or Marco Polo Bridge, which, followed by a series of events, led to an undeclared war between China and Japan, which became merged in the Second World War, and was brought to a close only with Japan's surrender to the Allies on 2 September 1945.

The truth about the incident, which like that at Mukden on 18 September 1931 happened at night, will never perhaps be known, each side having its own version of it. According to the Japanese authorities, some time before the midnight of 7 July Chinese soldiers about 1,000 metres north of Lukouchiau fired several tons of rifle shots at a body of Japanese troops holding manoeuvres in that vicinity. This led to further clashes, each side claiming it fired in self-defence, till, after some serious fighting, the Japanese seized Wanping on the morning of 8 July. It may be noted that the Lukouchiau-Wanping area is of extreme strategic importance, as it lies athwart the Peiping-Hankow Railway, which, in view of the Japanese occupation of the Fengtai railway junction in September 1936, afforded the last unobstructed access to Peiping from the south for Chinese troops. It is possible that Japan deliberately provoked the incident with a view to striking at and crushing China before the Nationalist-Communist alliance could take concrete shape. She was emboldened in her decision to do so by the fact that the only power that might help China against herself, viz. the Soviet Union, was at the time too heavily entangled in the Spanish Civil War and, as an insurance against that possibility, Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in November 1936. A month earlier Italy and Germany had concluded a

pact, forming thereby, as Mussolini said, the Rome-Berlin Axis. A year later Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, and the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis was formed. Italy recognized Manchukuo on 29 November and Germany on 20 February 1938. As the Sino-Japanese war progressed, the three Axis powers drew closer together.

It is probable that Japan had wanted to keep her military operations confined to North China, expecting that her policy of "persuasion by force", which had yielded good results in the past, would succeed this time also, and that Chiang Kai-shek would break away from his new communist allies and accept her overlordship. Chiang was perhaps not feeling happy in the strange company of the communists, who were anathema to his conservative associates at Nanking. But there are forces before which the strongest personalities have to bow, and the Chinese people had now stood up to a man, and were prepared to—and they did—suffer unheard of privations and calamities in order to win their right to live as a free people. It was in vain that the Japanese directed their most ferocious attacks at the centres of Chinese strength, capturing by successive lightning strokes the great cities of Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, and drove Chiang Kai-shek to find a capital that the invader could not reach in the far west at Chungking. The communists fought splendidly against the enemy—harassing them by their guerilla tactics. None of the western nations, who had their own worries, gave the Chinese nation the least diplomatic or military support. They rather helped the parties to prolong the war by selling arms to both and thereby made huge profits. They thought that, whatever the outcome, their own interests in China—their investments and their trade—were quite safe, since victorious Japan would be unable to take up the building up task of war-devastated China alone (as Mr. Chamberlain said in the House of Commons). Japan's only worry was about Soviet Russia, who gave China her unstinted support and assistance in every way, and for which throughout the war Japan had to keep some 300,000 of her best troops in Manchuria. This largely explains why, after her emancipation, China went Red.

JAPAN'S "ASIA FOR THE ASIANS" AND "CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE" PLANS—THE SECOND WORLD WAR

As the war in China progressed Japan matured her plans for the elimination of all western domination in East Asia, inviting the peoples of the area to pool their economic resources in a "Co-prosperity Sphere" under her control. She set up a puppet regime in North China with a view to the administration of the "Co-prosperity Sphere" plans and sought to integrate three economies—the development of precision industry in Japan, heavy industry in Manchuria, and salt production and light industry in North China. Meanwhile, under the exigencies of the war, the dictatorship of the fascist-minded bureaucrats and the military had been fully established in Japan; the major political parties had been dissolved and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association created.

As the war in China reached a stage of stalemate, the attention of the Japanese warlords was turned further south. They took advantage of the Nazi victories in Europe to demand of the authorities of the Netherlands East Indies (later to be known as Indonesia) the supply to them of greater quantities of essential raw materials, freedom for Japanese to enter that colony and opportunity for investment. The French authorities in Indo-China were ordered to halt the shipment of supplies to China, and the British to close the Burma Road, connecting Kunming with Wantung and Wanting on the Burmese border. Both the demands were instantly complied with. Meanwhile, President Roosevelt, alarmed about the safety of the Philippines, had issued his first proclamation under the National Defence Act. On 25 July 1940, a virtual embargo was placed on the export of scrap iron and petroleum products, without which Japan could not carry on the war. Japan drew still closer to Germany and Italy, and in September 1940 signed a full military alliance with the former. She demanded and was given the right to maintain air bases in French Indo-China and to send troops to protect them. By stirring up the Thais, she forced the French also to yield portions of Laos and Cambodia in Indo-China to Thailand. On 7 December 1941, she launched a dramatic attack on Pearl Harbour, almost annihilating the U.S. war vessels and planes stationed

Chapter 1). As we have seen, the Saar was to be governed for fifteen years by an international commission under the League, and Danzig had been set up as a Free City under the League. The League's supervision of these two key districts of Europe did not redound much to its credit. The Governing Commission of the Saar became a tool of French foreign policy and in 1923 Great Britain asked the League Council to investigate. In 1926, the French President of the Governing Commission resigned, and, as Germany joined the League, she had a representative on the Council. Thereafter the administration of the Saar somewhat improved. In Danzig there was a constant friction between the German and Polish inhabitants, and the former carried on an intensive agitation for the annexation of the Free City to the *Reich*. It is not fair to blame the League very much for the failure to improve matters in these two places and the Peace Conference's decision to entrust them to the League was inspired by their anxiety to get rid of problems for which they had failed to find solutions, or which were insoluble.

Social and Humanitarian Work. In addition to its two main tasks, viz. prevention of war and reduction of armaments, the League was entrusted with some humanitarian services which it discharged with conspicuous success. Such services were the control of traffic in women and children and the no less pernicious traffic in opium and other similar drugs. In these fields the activities of the League almost amounted to international government. The production of such drugs as morphine, heroin, and cocaine registered a marked decrease and the number of addicts in many countries diminished. A particularly valuable work was performed by the League in the field of health. It set up appropriate commissions which studied sleeping sickness in Africa, and followed malaria along its course in Greece, Albania, Italy, Sardinia, Asia Minor and India. In 1929 several members of the League's Malaria Commission came out to India. Other diseases, like cancer, small-pox, plague, etc. were examined by special commissions. The League's health work is too vast to be described in detail, but it may be mentioned that infant mortality underwent detailed enquiry.

The League also took under its wings many problems of an

international scope which had been created in the aftermath of the war. Dr. Nansen's achievement of restoring to their homes from 1920 to 1923 some 427,000 helpless prisoners of war scattered through Russia and Central Europe, was a great human service, swiftly and economically performed. Equally praiseworthy were the efforts of the League to rehabilitate Austria and Hungary by floating huge international loans, though unfortunately the recovery that was thus brought about in these countries was short-lived. In 1922 the League helped to resettle nearly a million and half Greek refugees from Asia Minor on Greek soil by means of floating a huge foreign loan. Between 1926 and 1928 about 30,000 Bulgarian refugees were similarly assisted to start their life anew.

Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Even in one of its two main and most difficult functions, viz. settlement of disputes among sovereign nations, the League, during the first decade of its working, achieved some successes. During this period, eighteen "political disputes", roughly two a year, were handled by it. They were not confined to Europe or to Peace Treaty problems. The Anglo-French nationality dispute in Tunis and Morocco involved North Africa; the Anglo-Turk dispute involved the Middle East; the Bolivia-Paraguay affair involved Latin America. It is not possible to deal with them in detail here and only the leading features of a few of the disputes may be given as follows. In the case of the dispute between Finland and Sweden over the sovereignty of the Aaland islands (1920)—the first dispute to be handled by the League—Article 11 which gives a disinterested nation the friendly right of referring a dispute to the League was for the first time invoked by a member, Great Britain, and the matter was eventually settled—the Council awarding the islands to Finland with the provision that they were never to be fortified. The first use of a threat of employing sanctions (under Article 16 of the Covenant) was made in the Albano-Yugoslav crisis which arose out of alleged advance into Albanian territory by Yugoslav troops and Albania's complaint to the Council on that score. Prime Minister Lloyd George telegraphed the Secretary-General that the "continued advance of Yugoslav forces into Albania being of a nature to disturb international peace, His Majesty's Government desires to call the attention of the Council thereto and

requests that you take immediate steps to summon a meeting of the Council to consider the situation and to agree upon measures to be taken under Article 16 in the event of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government refusing to execute their obligations under the Covenant". Within a week the Council met : both nations gave public assurances ; a neutral zone was established ; and within a short time the trouble ended.

The parties in the two above-mentioned disputes were weak and small nations, and the League's success in handling their disputes proved that at least in such cases the League could play a useful role as mediator. The high-water mark of the League's success in handling this type of disputes was reached in its settlement of the Greek-Bulgarian conflict. The facts relating to this dispute have already been narrated (see above, Chapter 5—Bulgaria), and the following are the highlights of the League's activities in dealing with the dispute. A frontier incident leading to actual outbreak of hostilities (as in the Corfu case, for which see below) ; Greek ultimatum ; mobilization and advance ; Bulgarian appeal to the League ; within six hours, convocation of the Council ; within three days, a meeting (one member arriving by plane) ; a twenty-four hours' request to withdraw troops and a sixty hours' request to return to pre-hostility conditions. In a few more days a commission was appointed to investigate the matter on the spot, both parties agreeing in advance to accept its decisions. The report was ready in a week's time and involved a payment of \$210,000 by Greece to Bulgaria as damages, and this was duly paid in full by Greece. As a final instance we may take the seizure (1932) by Peru from Colombia of the border province of Leticia. By its timely interference the League not only prevented war but brought about a peaceful restitution of Leticia to Colombia.

Turning to the League's handling of disputes in cases where a Great Power or its interests were involved, we have a different picture altogether. In 1920 Poland seized Vilna by force of arms, thereby separating it from Lithuania, which was actually in possession of the place. With French backing Poland was able to push aside League mediation and her seizure of Vilna was upheld by an independent accord between France and two other Great Powers, viz. Britain and Italy, which was concluded

in 1923. The same year witnessed Mussolini's defiance of the League over his dispute with Greece, who had appealed to the League against his bombardment and seizure of Corfu in retaliation for murder on Greek soil of some Italian members of an Albanian boundary commission. Though war was averted and Corfu was returned to Greece, the settlement did not redound to the credit of the League, because it was brought about by the good offices of the Council of Ambassadors, and Greece had to pay the indemnity that Mussolini demanded and the ambassadors upheld the League proposal that the matter be referred to the Permanent Court being rejected by the ambassadors (see also Chapter 5—Greece). This incident which really exposed the weakness of the League machinery in dealing with disputes involving a Great Power that was determined to have its way was considered by League enthusiasts as a success since in the past such instances had frequently led to forced cession of territory. Some are even now of opinion that it was "not wholly discouraging" on the ground that the League acted with vigour, was within an inch of success in negotiating a settlement, and it had proved that there was a forum before which even a Great Power had to defend itself at the bar of world opinion. (*The New Cambridge History*, Vol. XII, p. 486). Earlier in the same year, in January 1923, Lithuania, not a Great Power, had seized Memel, which was held by the Allies pending a decision as to its fate, and the League was constrained to acquiesce in this act of aggression, though it was able to effect an arrangement which secured some autonomy to the German population of the city.

Another case of dispute which was referred to the League and was between states of unequal strength, one of which was a Great Power—and, incidentally, the first such case in which one of the parties was a non-member—related to the boundary of Mosul, which was in British possession since the armistice, and was claimed by Iraq, or really by Great Britain, the mandatory for Iraq, since it was rich in petroleum. Turkey, the other party in the dispute, agreed in advance to accept the decisions of the Council, on which she was given a seat, as provided by Article 4, with full membership rights, including the right to vote, which signified that, as the decision had to be unanimous, it could not be taken without her own consent.

When the boundary commission appointed by the Council gave the place to Iraq (Great Britain), Turkey went back on the above-mentioned agreement, and the League referred the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which ruled that the decision of the League Council would be binding on both the parties. Thereupon, Turkey made the best of a bad bargain, and accepted the new frontier which was confirmed by an Anglo-Turkish treaty, by which a small portion of the vilayet was returned to Turkey and some royalties were granted to her on the Mosul oil. The case cannot be considered a conclusive test of the League's strength in imposing its decision on a Great Power, since the settlement was favourable to Great Britain, and she gladly accepted it.

THE FAILURES OF THE LEAGUE—(1) DISARMAMENT

A function of the League, which was second only to its primary purpose, the maintenance of world peace, was disarmament, or, to put it in the exact words of the Covenant, "the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety". The League's failure to bring this about was a grievous one, if only because it supplied Hitler with the excuse for unilaterally violating the restrictions imposed upon German armaments by the Treaty of Versailles, and so with the means for plunging into the Second World War.

After a war which set the whole world aflame—and one of the major causes of which was recognized to be the mad race for armaments which had preceded it—the minds of statesmen naturally turned to the question of a sensible reduction of armaments as one of the important ways of preventing another Armageddon. The first major step that was taken to bring the question within the sphere of practical politics was to apply the principle effectively to the states defeated in the war. Under the treaties of peace, Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria accepted an immense reduction and a rigid limitation of the armed forces which they respectively maintained. Although it was one-sided, this disarmament of the former enemy powers was nevertheless a considerable factor in the general post-war situation and in itself did much to make general disarmament practically important. For, apart from

its obvious political effect, the preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles contained an express obligation: "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."

In the second place, specific obligations with regard to disarmament were imposed upon all the members of the League of Nations by Article 8 of the Covenant. In this article, the members "recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations". The article went on to provide that the Council of the League "shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments". To this must also be added that in the final act of the Conference of Locarno in 1925, new undertakings to carry out Article 8 were made by the Great Powers assembled there. Third, these obligations were supported by the personal pledges of the statesmen of all parties and countries. In Britain, important politicians including Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, Mr. Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Lord Grey declared more than once in emphatic language their devotion to the cause of disarmament. Said Lord Grey: "If civilization cannot destroy armaments, armaments will destroy civilization."

The hopes thus aroused proved to be illusory, and no general disarmament was ever achieved. France, it is true, cut its standing army in half by reducing the terms of service from three years to eighteen months. Italy called fewer men to the colours, and the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were ruthlessly carried out (see above, Chapter 4). Still the principle of universal military service was in effect not only in most countries where it had obtained before the war, but also in all the newly created and newly unified states. The Bolsheviks built up a Red Army, which was not only larger and more efficient but had a stronger morale than the Czarist forces. In spite of reductions the British navy was more efficient, and, with the German fleet lying at the bottom of the North Sea, relatively stronger than it had been before the war. The American and Japanese navies were also stronger than they had been. All round, there was a continuing "preparedness"

of the national forces, which was financially ruinous (specially for war-devastated nations like the French), and fraught with grave danger, because it kept up the rivalries and alarums and the chronic sense of danger, which had attended the "armed truce" of pre-war Europe.

Speaking generally, what prompted the nations to keep up their state of military preparedness and stood in the way of their accepting any plan of disarmament was fear. It was born of the conviction that while one's own armed forces were the minimum consistent with its safety, those of other nations were decidedly not so and were dangerous. Plans for disarmament in short foundered on the rock of security and in the early post-war years at any rate what specially blocked their progress was the French demand for security. Americans and Englishmen sharply criticized France for spending vast sums on armaments not only for herself but for her allies, which, incidentally, prevented her from repaying the loans she had taken from them during the war. Frenchmen replied that each nation had its own conception of security, which depended on the geographical, the economic, and even the historical conditions of its national life; that, accordingly their needs of security differed; and asked whether the U.S.A. and Great Britain were prepared to reduce their navies. They also reminded them about the promises which they had glibly made to them during the Peace Conference days to assist France in protecting herself against possible German invasions. They contended that the absence of the United States had paralysed the League of Nations: the latter could not think of using its economic weapon (under Article 16) without the risk of coming into clash with that state. Without any guarantee of security from her allies, and unable to rely on the League, maimed and weakened as it was, France had no option but to build up her own system of security, based on armaments and alliances, as she was doing since the Peace Settlement, so they declared (see also above, Chapter 6).

The French view on disarmament was based not merely on the needs of their own security but on certain fundamental principles which had much wider import. They rejected the idea, which they characterized as a peculiarly Anglo-Saxon conception, that disarmament created security. Armaments, they

said, might be dangerous in the future, but reduction of armaments was far more dangerous, for, if they reduced their armaments to the German level, what prevented their enemy from tearing up the Treaty of Versailles and renewing the World War? Nations can disarm, the French said, only under conditions analogous to those which, within a nation, have made possible the disarmament of the individual citizen, i.e. after guarantees of security had been created by social organization. In other words, there is an incontestable and absolutely necessary connection between security and the obligation to reduce armaments. "Limitation of armaments and security are the two sides of one and the same problem", they said.

Article 8 of the Covenant, in fixing the reduction of armaments at the minimum compatible with national safety coupled the two questions, according to the French. Their argument is further elucidated as follows. Article 8 signifies that the pledge to reduce armaments is limited in two ways: a nation is not obliged to reduce armaments below the needs of national defence; but it is obliged not to reduce below the point requisite for the maintenance of peace through co-operative action against dangers which may threaten. Disarmament, therefore, cannot be the work of a single day; it has to progress by successive stages. If the conquered nations strictly observed the armaments restrictions imposed on them by the Peace Treaties, and if the increase of security assured to the victorious nations under the collective security provisions of the League of Nations (briefly Articles 10 and 16) was proved by experience to be real, there could be a strong case for bringing about a considerable reduction of armaments.

In the opinion of the French, both these bases of disarmament had been rudely shaken; there had been a constantly increasing doubt both as to the strict observation of the treaties by the conquered nations and as to the efficacy of the promised guarantees of security. The public mind had been gradually convinced that Germany and her former allies were systematically rearming in silence. The refusal of the U.S.A. to become a member of the League of Nations had seriously weakened its efficiency as an instrument for protecting its members against aggression, and, in general, preserving the

peace. Its record had shown that it had a certain amount of usefulness in the cultural and the humanitarian sphere, and was able to do some justice in disputes among small nations, who did not have powerful friends on the Council, but was powerless when the question arose of imposing its will on the Great Powers.

THE TEMPORARY MIXED COMMISSION

Though, under Article 8, it was the special responsibility of the Council to prepare plans for bringing about disarmament, the first measure, such as it was, in the direction was adopted not by that body but by the Assembly. At the first Assembly in 1920 a resolution was adopted calling for the creation of a special committee of experts of various kinds to study, in their entirety, the political and economic questions raised by the study of the reduction of armaments. It was called the Temporary Mixed Commission and existed up to the 1924 session of the Assembly. It first met in 1921 and early in its discussions Lord Esher, the British delegate on the Commission, produced a scheme, restricted to the limitation of the land-armaments of Europe, naval armaments having already been dealt with at the recently held Washington Conference (See below). The Esher plan was a simple one; the proposal was to fix a unit of comparison for the land forces as the Washington Conference had done for naval armaments. The commission considered that armies are not the same thing as fleets, nor are military effectives like warships; that the number of soldiers is not the only factor to consider in the military strength of nations. This latter could not be expressed by a mathematical formula which took no account of either economic power, or of the industrial resources. The commission pointed out that by reason of the character of war between armed nations, each nation possessed, behind the visible front of its peace-time armaments, potential war-waging capacity. In view of the complexity of the disarmament problem thus exposed, the British plan was rejected. At this moment the French delegation pressed their own point of view, linking disarmament to security, and for the next three years, instead of framing plans for disarmament, the Assembly got busy with such

proposals for enhancing security as the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol, etc. (See above, Chapter 6.)

THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION

It was not till December 1925 that the Council of the League, which since the previous September was receiving information about the negotiations which were to end at Locarno in October, felt that they could again face the thorny question of disarmament, and then it constituted a Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference. The new body first met in May 1926, and included among its members the delegates of non-members of the League, such as the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. From the very beginning it encountered serious difficulties: sufficient to detail a few of the questions it had to solve to realize where it was. To begin with, it put the questions: what is meant by the expression "armaments"? How is a limit to be fixed, and how may they be compared as between one country and another? Are some armaments offensive and others defensive? Can civil aviation be distinguished from military aviation? It was not till March 1927 when the British and French delegations submitted draft disarmament conventions that the Preparatory Commission really came to grips with its subjects. These drafts differed widely, and there were fundamental divergences of opinion on vital questions. The Commission took all of six years to frame a "draft treaty" providing for a limitation, "in principle", of the number of men in active service in land, naval and air forces, of governmental expenditure on army material, and of military (but not commercial) aircraft; a condemnation of the use of poisonous gases and "all bacteriological methods of warfare"; and a permanent commission to collect information and report periodically on the progress of disarmament. The document was "a mere outline, a frame without contents," and was of little practical value. It contained, moreover, a special "escape clause", which was clear warning that it should not be taken too seriously: "If a change of circumstances constitutes, in the opinion of any high contracting party, a menace to its national security, such high contracting party may suspend temporarily, in so far as it concerns itself, any provision or

provisions of the present convention other than those expressly designed to apply in the event of war."

THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The World Disarmament Conference met at long last at Geneva on 2 February 1932. It was attended by representatives of sixty-one states, and was presided over by Mr. Arthur Henderson, who, at the time of his appointment, was Foreign Secretary of the (Labour) Government of Great Britain, but the latter having resigned and he himself having lost his seat in Parliament, was just a private person when the Conference opened. At the time, too, the international sky was getting overcast with threatening clouds; in May 1932, in Germany, the "Junker" government of Herr von Papen replaced that of the conciliatory Dr. Brüning; the economic crisis had begun, and Japan had invaded Manchuria. The Conference could be expected to take up the Draft Treaty prepared by the Preparatory Commission after nearly six years of toil as its basis for its work. Instead, the leading delegates proceeded to make their own proposals, which only prompted others to make counter-proposals and provoked long and futile discussions with the result that they were all rejected. To give a few instances, Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, suggested what came to be called "qualitative limitation" of armaments, i.e. not by numbers, but by their being considered "offensive" or "aggressive", or, in other words, their suitability for making sudden attack, as distinguished from "defensive" weapons. The idea was not altogether new, and, as Signor Grandi, the Italian Foreign Minister, pointed out, "limits were imposed on Germany and her former allies (in the Treaties of Peace) in pursuance of the idea of depriving the forces of those states of weapons that are particularly aggressive in character". The possibility of a distinction being drawn between two such classes of weapons had also been there laid aside as not feasible. M. Tardieu, the French delegate, pointed out that, first, it was not possible to draw the line between aggressive and defensive weapons, and secondly, that a country subjected to invasion had at some time to undertake a counter-offensive so that a state of stalemate in the war may be terminated. Thus,

said he, German and French armies were deadlocked for nearly four years during the World War, and, if the tank or a similar decisive weapon had not been invented and used, "the war might have lasted a hundred years".

Even before the Conference met, it was widely known that Germany would seize the occasion for making a public demand for equality in the matter of armaments, and that France would oppose it tooth and nail, or as condition precedent, would ask for guarantee of greater security. Only three days after the Conference met, the French, with a view to seizing the initiative, made a demand for an international police force to be placed at the disposal of the League with a view to strengthening it "in truth and in fact". The proposal included the placing of all bombing planes and other aggressive weapons at the League's disposal. In view of the difficulty of preventing civilian planes from being converted into bombers in time of war, the French made a bold suggestion, viz. the internationalization of all civil aviation in the world. The French never pressed their proposal for the creation of a League army, which was criticized by all other delegations, but every time that some concrete measure of disarmament was discussed, raked it up as an alternative suggestion for lending them greater security, which was their unalterable condition for conceding equality to the Germans.

In July, the Germans, who had been consistently demanding the recognition of Germany's right to rearm, and failing this, other powers disarming to her level, gave notice that they would not take further part in the Conference in the absence of a "clear and definite recognition of equality of rights between nations". When the Conference reassembled after the recess in October, Germany's place was vacant, and continued to be so till 11 December when a compromise formula was found, conceding her claim to "equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations". The German Government now headed by General Schleicher in place of Papen sent their delegation back to the Conference, which now became a cockpit for the wordy fights between them and the French delegation. On 30 January 1933, Hitler became German Chancellor, and this fact intensified French opposition to concession of equality to Germany. In March Mr. Ramsay

Macdonald, the British Premier, sought to end the deadlock by putting forward a plan, which came to be known as the Macdonald Plan, and represented the mean between the opposing theses. It was accepted as the basis for further discussions, and the Conference adjourned for the Easter Holidays.

On 17 May, Hitler, addressing the *Reichstag*, referred to the negotiations going on at Geneva, and, demanding a "strict parallelism" and a "true equality" among nations, declared that, if a decision were to be imposed on Germany on the pretext of its being a majority decision, Germany would prefer to resign from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Unheedingly, the powers went on discussing between themselves possible modifications of the Macdonald Plan with a view to making it acceptable to Germany. Their latest idea was to divide the disarmament convention drafted by the British Government (the Macdonald Plan) into two periods, during the first of which, lasting four years, the *Reichswehr* was to be turned into a militia while they themselves were progressively to reduce their armaments. If the results were satisfactory, they would proceed to the second period, in which disarmament was to proceed further, equality coming into being by right and by fact at the end of the eighth year. On 16 October 1933, the German Government issued a Note vehemently criticizing the idea of a trial period as a fresh badge of inferiority forced on Germany. Nevertheless, on 14 October Sir John Simon defended the scheme before the Bureau of the Conference. The same day a telegram reached Geneva announcing that Germany had withdrawn from the Conference and from the League of Nations.

The withdrawal of Germany sounded the death-knell of the Conference and of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles too, for the failure of the Allies to act up to their promise to disarm gave the Nazis the pretext, if not the moral justification, for tearing them up. Efforts were made to save the Conference, and in February 1934, when Eden visited Hitler at Berlin, the latter made some offers, which were outright rejected by the French, since they amounted to a legalization of German rearmament, which, they held, had been clandestinely going on. The Conference met intermittently

for some time more, but in the summer of 1934 Great Britain acknowledged that disarmament was not practicable and that she would enlarge her own armaments, particularly her air force. The Conference was neither formally brought to an end, nor did it adjourn. It just ceased to have further meetings.

NAVAL DISARMAMENT

The fiasco of the League attempt to bring about disarmament on land corresponded to the fiasco of the attempt to bring about naval disarmament, with the difference that in the latter enterprise the initiative was taken not by the League or one of its members, but by the U.S.A., a non-member. The latter fiasco was even more disappointing than the first because it began with a success and roused hopes.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 1921

Americans had a sort of bad conscience with respect to the League of Nations, and they were anxious to demonstrate that some noble ideas, which their President had written into its Covenant, e.g. disarmament, still claimed their allegiance. This was one of the reasons why the American Government summoned a Naval Conference at Washington, soon after the Senate had rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. Altruism, however, was not the only, or the chief reason for summoning a disarmament conference, nor was reduction of naval armaments the only reason behind the summoning of the Conference. There was a strong public agitation in America for the creation of a navy, which would be superior to any fleet in the world, and Uncle Sam was worried about the costs at which he might have to build it, if it led to a ship-building race with the other maritime nations, particularly Great Britain, and also about the probable effects of the policy on Anglo-American relations.

Again, though the U.S.A. had disengaged herself from Europe, and professed to be quite unconcerned about the political developments there, she could not afford to be indifferent to the Far East, where Japan, principally on account of her opportu-

also from the U.S.A., with a view to finding out a solution of the latter problem. Only Great Britain and Japan accepted the invitation, France and Italy refusing to come, alleging that such a conference would only increase the difficulties of the Preparatory Commission. The meeting, which was held at Geneva, therefore, turned out to be a Three-Power Conference. It failed to achieve any results because Great Britain refused to accept naval parity with the U.S.A. in light cruisers on the ground that she had a far-flung empire to guard.

The only result of the Conference was a recrudescence of Anglo-American rivalry, which had been temporarily reduced at the Washington Conference. In September 1928, the *New York American* unearthed and published a secret military-naval agreement which had been reached between England and France and by which France had promised to support the former's stand of naval limitation in future disarmament meetings and England had withdrawn her objection to the French insistence on the exclusion of trained reserves from the category of military effectives. In 1928, however, British and American delegates drew nearer to each other in the Preparatory Commission meetings, and the ratification of the Kellogg Pact restored a measure of good feeling between the two Anglo-Saxon Powers. The moment was considered opportune for further talks on naval limitation, and a conference was accordingly convened at London in 1930.

The Conference was hardly more successful than the earlier ones in effecting a general limitation of naval armaments. Assent was given, it is true, to the prolongation of the Washington agreement for five years, that is, to 1937; and the United States and Great Britain managed to supplement it with an arrangement between themselves by which Great Britain would be allowed a superiority in light cruisers and the U.S.A. a corresponding superiority in large cruisers. In this arrangement, Japan acquiesced, though very reluctantly, on condition that she be accorded parity with the others in the matter of submarines and some increase of her ratio for cruisers. But neither France nor Italy would adhere to it, and the two, indeed, shortly began a naval race in the Mediterranean. Thus, the London agreement bound only three of the five naval powers, and its binding was weakened by a provision, under a so-called

escalator clause, that any of them was free to exceed the specified tonnage if it thought its "national security" was "materially affected" by naval increase of another power.

In 1934, Japan informed the U.S.A. and Great Britain that she would not renew the London agreement when it expired, except on the basis of full naval equality. As the U.S.A. and Great Britain flatly refused to concede the principle of equality, Japan declared that she intended to resume freedom of action in 1937. In 1935 the rapidly deteriorating naval situation was complicated by a new factor—Germany and Russia, which had thus far been negligible as naval powers, entered the competition. With the departure of Germany from Geneva (1933) and the failure of the Disarmament Conference, Europe slid back to the pre-war days of unrestricted competition in the piling up of armaments. Meanwhile, as the League machinery was proving itself to be quite incapable of handling the problem of disarmament, a dispute involving two members of the League had broken out in the Far East, and the League, simultaneously dealing with it, was demonstrating its utter incapacity to cope with it.

THE FAILURES OF THE LEAGUE—(2) JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN MANCHURIA

We have seen in the previous chapter that during the First World War Japan had presented her so-called twenty-one demands to China, and that later, at western protests, she had withdrawn some of them. In the years following the war, similarly, Japan had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the West. She had accepted the limitation which had been proposed by the Western Powers on her capital ships strength, and, in general, had given satisfaction to them by withdrawing from her expansionist policy at the expense of China. Unfortunately, however, events were soon to prove that the Japanese nation had not acquiesced in this "pacifist" policy that their government had followed and a reaction set in. The fact is that there existed at the time in Japan both a democratically minded political group, which, in a pacific way, strove to make their country prosperous, and a military clique, who hated a parliamentary form of government and civilian leadership, were totalitarian in outlook and were determined to solve political

and economic problems by force of arms. The latter gathered strength as the policy of peaceful expansion seemed to become frustrated by foreign immigration laws and by the world depression which led to tariff barriers and regional agreements. They called for an early repudiation of the naval agreement and the nine-power treaties which bound their country and for an aggression policy towards China.

By 1931 as we have seen, the domestic situation was definitely changing, and bringing about a simultaneous change in the foreign policy of Japan. In March 1931, a military coup was attempted by some younger military officers and though it failed of its immediate purpose, it was followed by a series of political assassinations which served to transfer authority from pacific civilians to bellicose generals and admirals, planning to establish a totalitarian regime. In May 1932, the last of the parliamentary prime ministers, Ki Inukai, was murdered and was succeeded by Admiral Saito, a protege of the military. Already in September 1931, officers commanding the Japanese troops which were policing the South Manchurian Railway had opened hostilities against the Chinese governor of the territory. They had done so on their own authority, "to repress banditry", as they said, but as soon as Admiral Saito was in power in Tokyo he committed Japan to the conquest of Manchuria and heavily reinforced the troops in charge of it. Japanese armies speedily overran the entire territory, dispersing the forces of the Chinese governor and putting him to flight.

We are not concerned here with the correctness or otherwise of Japan's own interpretation of her treaty rights in Manchuria, on which her actions in Manchuria were allegedly based, or with the rights and wrongs of her China, or for that matter, her East Asia policy, or with the alleged responsibility of the western nations—and in particular the U.S.A.—in goading her to adopt such a policy (see the previous chapter). But both China and Japan were members of the League of Nations, with reference to which both had rights and obligations, and we have to examine what action was adopted by the League in respect of the obvious aggression by Japan, since China appealed to it for action (on 21 September, 1931) under Article 11 of the Covenant "to safeguard the peace of nations". We have to begin the story of the League's handling of the matter by stating that, on the

protestation of the Japanese delegate that the matter was not serious, Chinese troops had blown up the South Manchurian Railway—a charge found later to be untrue, for the south-bound train from Changchun had passed over the line safely to its destination at Mukden soon after the alleged explosion took place—and that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China, the League Council passed the usual resolution urging the parties to abstain from further violence and to withdraw their forces from one another's territory (30 September). On account of the opposition of the Japanese delegate, also, the Council failed to accede to the Chinese request for the appointment of a committee of neutral observers, as had been done in the case of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute in 1925, to supervise the evacuation of the invading troops. They, however, at the suggestion of the British delegate, Lord Cecil, decided to keep the American Government informed of the proceedings, and received, through Mr. Hugh Wilson, the American Minister at Berne, a promise of diplomatic support. At the October meeting of the Council, the United States established an official basis of co-operation with the League, by accepting an invitation from the Council Members, with the exception of Japan, to have Mr. Prentiss Gilbert, the American Consul at Berne sit at the Council table. Mr. Gilbert participated in four meetings of the Council, beginning from October 16.

By the time the Council re-assembled on 13 October 1931, it had become clear that, far from withdrawing her troops, Japan had greatly extended her occupation, and had even gone so far as to bomb from the air a Manchurian town. The Council passed a resolution, asking Japan to withdraw her troops before 16 November, though Japan's dissent deprived it of legal sanction, because any action under Article 11 required or was presumed to require absolute unanimity (24 October). The League, however, failed to take any further action, such as under Articles 15 and 16, which provided for diplomatic and economic sanctions respectively. The fact was that the invasion of Manchuria by Japan was well-timed, synchronizing as it did with an acute financial situation caused by the World Economic Crisis. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Reading, used his personal influence with his fellow-members on the Council to see that sanctions were not thought of.

When the Council re-convened at Paris on 14 November, it again became clear that Japan had considerably extended her occupation. After lengthy discussions, on 10 December, the Council passed a resolution, which was accepted by the Japanese, reaffirming the resolution of 30 September and pledging the two parties to refrain from taking any initiative which might lead to further fighting. The Japanese, however, reserved their right to take action against "bandits". At long last, also, the Council appointed a commission, consisting of the representatives of England, France, Germany, Italy and the United States, to examine the situation on the spot and to report to the Council the facts, with recommendations for a solution. The British representative, Lord Lytton, was appointed to be the President of the Commission. The Commission reached the Far East in March 1932, examined numerous witnesses, and held many meetings. Its report which was unanimous was signed at Peiping on 4 September 1932, and was communicated to the members of the League on 1 October.

Before the Commission could even commence its task, however, an ugly incident had happened. The Chinese had instituted a boycott of Japanese trade, which reduced it to more than one half. The boycott had been conducted peacefully, but, unfortunately, on 18 January 1932, a Chinese mob in Shanghai maltreated five Japanese monks, one of whom subsequently died. An ultimatum from the Japanese Consul-General followed, demanding punishment of the assailants, compensation and dissolution of anti-Japanese organizations. The Chinese Mayor of Shanghai accepted the Japanese demands in their entirety, and the Japanese Consul-General considered his reply to be completely satisfactory. An ugly incident, nevertheless, followed. On the plea that the Chinese were concentrating their forces at Chapei, a suburb of Shanghai, the Japanese Admiral in charge of the forces protecting that part of the International Settlement which was assigned to Japan, landed his marines, and, quickly overpowering the Chinese defence, began a slaughter which went on for some weeks. But the conquest of Shanghai was not in the present Japanese programme, and their action here jeopardized the safety of the Foreign Settlements, where the British and others had invested huge sums. "The maintenance of the law of peace under the

Covenant," says Lord Cecil, "might be belittled as idealism. But the protection of British property was British interest." Accordingly, British warships were sent there, all available reinforcements were also despatched, and fears of Japanese reprisals on Hongkong were forgotten. Tokyo was convinced that the Western Powers were in earnest and the Japanese naval and military reinforcements were withdrawn, without having secured a cessation of the Chinese boycott.

Meanwhile, on 29 January, China had demanded the application of Articles 10 and 15 of the Covenant, and followed this up with the request that a special session of the Assembly be held for the consideration of her proposal. She no doubt expected that the Assembly, where the smaller powers predominated, would be more favourable to the coercion of Japan. The Assembly met in March, but could not take a decision as the report of the Lytton Commission had not yet been received. Meanwhile, too, Japan had completed her conquest of Manchuria and on 18 February 1932 the Japanese military authorities had installed at Mukden a native "provisional government", and inspired it to proclaim Manchuria an "independent" state with the name of Manchukuo. The new state came into official existence on 1 March. On 9 March 1932 Mr. Henry Pu Yi (Hsuan Tung), the last survivor of the Manchu dynasty of China, who had been a pensioner of Japan since boyhood, was installed as its provisional dictator (Chin Cheng). On 23 February 1932 Mr. Stimson, the American Secretary of State, declared, in a letter to Senator Borah, that America would not recognize a situation created by the disregard of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. On 11 March the Assembly passed resolutions unanimously, except for the disputants, whose votes under Article 15 are not counted, reaffirming the previous resolutions of the Assembly, declaring it incumbent on the members of the League "not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations"—accepting thereby the Stimsonian doctrine of non-recognition—and constituting a Committee of Nineteen to follow events and report to itself.

The Lytton Commission report was submitted to the Council in November 1932, and was successively considered by the Council, by the Assembly and by an Assembly Committee which

was charged with the task of drafting the report required by Article 15 of the Covenant. This report followed closely the lines of the Lytton report, and was skilfully drafted inasmuch as it avoided any pronouncement which might have entailed the application of sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant. It declared that the sovereignty over Manchuria belonged to China, that the independent Manchukuo State was a fiction, and generally condemned the military measures of Japan. It recommended, as the Lytton report had done, that an autonomous regime should be set up in Manchuria as the result of negotiations between China and Japan under the auspices of the League. It proposed that members of the League should refuse to recognize the existing regime in Manchuria, but it rejected any return to the *status quo*. On 24 February 1933—eighteen months after the initial shot had been fired at Mukden—the Assembly adopted the report by 42 votes against the one single adverse vote of Japan, which as that of a party to the dispute could not affect the validity of the decision. Mr. Matsuoka, the chief Japanese delegate at once rose from his seat, and, with a theatrical gesture, uttered the words Jesus had used before an angry mob determined to pelt the courtesan, Mary Magdalene, to death: "He that among you is sinless first cast a stone at her." The entire delegation then left the Assembly. At a second session on 24 February, the Assembly adopted a resolution setting up a Far Eastern Advisory Committee of 21 members in which it invited the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to participate. The former accepted the invitation, and appointed Mr. Wilson, the American Minister to Switzerland, to participate in the committee's deliberations, without the right to vote. The U.S.S.R. declined to participate, pointing out that 13 of the 22 states named to the Committee had not recognized the Soviet Union. A month later, in a letter to the Secretary-General on 27 March, Japan gave notice of the termination of her membership of the League. She also now gave formal recognition to the State of Manchukuo.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE LEAGUE HANDLING OF THE MANCHURIAN DISPUTE

The Manchurian episode was a rude eye-opener to the realities

of world politics and of the position of the League in relation to them. The most striking feature of the League's handling of the business was that, at no stage of the military operations conducted by the two parties, was it declared that a "war" was in progress, or that Japan, who was condemned by public opinion all over the world, had violated the League Covenant or the Kellogg Treaty. The League confined its measures to persuasion and diplomatic pressure alone, and did not resort to or even contemplate stronger action under Article 15 and Article 16 which might have checked Japan. In circles favourable to the League, it was claimed that the League action alone resulted in the localization of the conflict, that it was because war was not formally declared that Japan was prevented from extending her military operations and political demands, and that the doctrine of non-recognition, which had refused legal title to territory seized by force, would in future discourage aggression.

In spite of the "gains" secured to China by the League for which Mr. Sze, the Chinese delegate thanked it in the Assembly session of 1932, the net result was the loss by her of Manchuria. It is significant that Chinese integrity formally preserved throughout the worst days of imperialist penetration in Asia—through the policy of Open Door enunciated by the U.S.A.—was lost only after the creation of the League of Nations and the solemn renunciation of war by the Pact of Paris. The non-recognition of Manchukuo had no practical results. The U.S.A. and Great Britain maintained consulates at Mukden and Harbin, and their consuls dealt with the established authorities on an informal basis. The Far Eastern Advisory Committee, set up by the League on 24 February 1933, busied itself for a few months with a series of innocuous measures, and then lapsed into inactivity. For the first six years of its existence, Japan and the Central American Republic of El Salvador were the only States which recognized it. Italy recognized it on 30 November 1937, Germany in 1938, and Poland did so *de facto* in 1938. Undeterred by the non-recognition of Manchukuo by the Western Powers, only a year later, Japan extended her aggression into the North China province of Jehol, and incorporated it with Manchukuo.

On 31 May 1933, having had enough, and to spare of League

sympathies and little practical support, China was compelled to accept the terms of surrender dictated by Japan in what became generally known as the Tangku Truce. It left Manchukuo and Jehol in Japanese possession and provided for a demilitarized zone as far south as Peiping and Tientsin. In December 1934, preparatory to further aggression, Japan denounced the Washington treaty which had imposed limitations on her naval armaments. In 1937, she sent her army into the North China province of Hopei, within which lay Peiping and Tientsin, thereby inaugurating an undeclared war against her helpless victim—which ended only with the surrender of Japan after the Second World War (and after the atomic devastations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) in August 1945.

CAUSES OF LEAGUE FAILURE IN MANCHURIA

The failure of the League to deal with the aggression of Japan was ascribed, in part at least, to a legal difficulty. We have seen that neither China nor Japan declared war, so that Japan claimed, and the League did not formally or categorically dispute the contention that she had not violated the Covenant. Consequently, the question of applying sanctions did not arise, and no nation, not even China, broke off diplomatic relations with Japan. The Japanese Government claimed that their actions in Manchuria were simply "interim measures of self-defence which are interdicted by no resolution of the League" and that all treaties, including the Kellogg Pact, left "unimpaired the legitimate right of self-defence". Now, it is curious that at the Peace Conference, nearly all the drafts of the Covenant prohibited "resort of armed force" while the final text limited this prohibition to "war". The reason for this change is not revealed in the minutes, but it has to be assumed that the League Covenant prohibited only those acts of force which resulted in a state of war.

Even if it is admitted that states are not debarred under the Covenant from resorting to force, including military action in the territory of another state, by virtue of the right of self-defence, the question arises whether the League should not have some control over or regulate the amount of force that has been employed. In two previous cases, where the law had been

already taken in hand by one party by way of military action, viz. the case of the bombardment of Corfu by Italy in 1922, and that of the invasion of the Bulgarian border by Greek armed forces in 1925, the League Council had definitely tended to apply the doctrine that all acts of force, whether or not amounting to war, should be under its control. In the case of Manchuria, the League failed to find out whether the right of self-defence was justified in the circumstances of the case, or to place the acts of force employed by Japan under its own control.

No doubt, Japan, and, we may take it, even China, found it to be against their interests to declare that they were in a state of war (there was a parallel India-China case in 1962), but it is difficult to see why even upon the final advance of the Japanese forces on Chinchow, which resulted in the complete elimination of Chinese authority in Manchuria, the Japanese military operations were not regarded as a resort to war, within the meaning of Article 16 of the Covenant. It is probable that differences of opinion about the interpretation of some of the Articles of the Covenant helped the Japanese to get through the business without effective intervention by the League. But it is against common sense that the failure of the League was due only or principally to the "flaws" in the Covenant. The conclusion is inescapable that the Great Powers who dominated the Council were swayed by political motives and did not make proper use of the League machinery. We have seen that, whether deliberately or not, Japan timed her aggression to the onset of the World Economic Depression, due to which in some countries power had been assumed by conservative elements who were sceptical of the idea of collective security. We have already spoken about the activities of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Reading. In France there was a lot of sympathy for Japan. It was believed that there was a secret understanding between the two countries to the effect that, in return for support in Manchuria, France was to receive Japanese help in acquiring Yunnan. The existence of such an understanding was denied. It was, however, a fact that the French press was heavily subsidized by Japan. When M. Yoshizawa, who had defended Japanese action at Geneva, left for his country to become Foreign Minister, he was decorated by the French Government with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour.

Commenting on this aspect of the case, Mr. A. Lawrence Lowell observed :

"For the future of the League, this attitude is the most significant aspect of the matter. Mistakes in particular cases may be made, the true nature of events may be misunderstood, and the future may not be prejudiced, for the like may not happen again ; but if world opinion is ineffective against a determined nation, and the members of the League cannot be relied upon to carry out its sanctions, the prospect of preventing wars by means of the League is much reduced." (*Foreign Affairs*, April, 1932.)

In plain language, you can rouse from sleep one who is sleeping, but not one who is wide awake while "sleeping". The failure of the League in Manchuria, in short, was not due to any "gaps" or "flaws" in its machinery, not also because it was not universal in its membership. We have already seen that the question of "sanctions" never arose, as a matter of fact, it could never arise, because they did not brand Japan as a violator of the Covenant. The United States, in her own interests, did co-operate in this particular case, and, indeed, as was revealed later, when the State Department published the entire text of its correspondence with Japan during the critical months (between 22 September 1931 and 7 January 1932), had taken a stronger stand against Japan than the League of Nations.

Worst of all, the Manchurian aggression of Japan showed to other intending aggressors that aggression paid. One more such aggression ; it came in Mussolini's right time ; and the League was lost.

CHAPTER XI

HITLER OVER EUROPE

THEORY AND AIMS OF NAZI GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY

THE NEWS of the seizure of power in Germany by Hitler and his Nazis was received abroad with mixed feelings. The man in the street in the Western European countries deplored the downfall of the German Republic and its displacement by a totalitarian government. But many politicians, specially in France, who had been fed up with Hitler's junker predecessors, who had ruled with the help of presidential decrees, and yet had shown their power by wringing from France the declaration of 11 December (see above, Chapter 10), conceding to Germany "equality of rights" on the armaments question, considered Hitler as rather more acceptable on the ground that, after all, he was a popular leader with millions of followers. In a world used to violence both in the domestic and foreign relations, the stories of Nazi lawlessness and cruelty did not cause much excitement, except in socialist circles. It seems also that something of the spell, which Hitler—a mystic personality, a teetotaller, a vegetarian, a non-smoker, an ascetic, and, in short, nothing but the devoted servant of his people—had cast over millions in Germany, was working abroad too. No doubt much of the halo which surrounded Germany's new leader began to fade away as day after day, despite the formidable propaganda machine, which his henchman, Dr. Goebbels, wielded, the truth about the aims and ideals of the movement and the methods by which they were being given shape, came to be known even to the man in the street in Europe. The ruthlessness with which the National Socialist government practised totalitarianism, the lengths to which were carried the efforts to bring everybody and everything in Germany under their heels—the political parties, the press, education, industries, agriculture, labour, even religion—and in particular the savage persecution of the Jews in obedience to a totally unscientific racist theory, sickened and alienated the common folk at least

in the countries of Western Europe, who felt them to be anti-thetic to everything that they knew to constitute the rudiments of the centuries-old culture of Europe.

The question of questions, however, which at the moment was anxiously asked and eagerly debated everywhere was, "What was going to be the foreign policy of the Nazi State?" Statements and writings of Hitler and other Nazi leaders before they came to power had already given enough indications of the main lines of foreign policy which the Nazi State would follow, and these had roused considerable apprehensions. As set forth in the National Socialist Party's official programme, and, above all, in the *Mein Kampf* which Hitler did not repudiate (as Gladstone, after he became Prime Minister, had repudiated some disparaging remarks he had made about Austrian policy during his electoral campaign against Disraeli) and which he now asked all German adult men and women to read and which became in fact the Bible of the Third *Reich*, the foreign political goal was the union of all Germans in one Great Germany.

THE "MEIN KAMPF" DECLARATIONS OF ADOLF HITLER—EMPHASIS ON
EASTWARD EXPANSION

In the *Mein Kampf*, Hitler had placed special emphasis on the acquisition of new territories in Europe on which Germans might settle and which would ensure freedom of existence to the German people. In order to attain this end, the *Reich*, he said, must have military allies, for "an alliance, whose aim is not war, is useless". No state, however, would want to ally itself with present-day Germany which could give no military help; hence the immediate object of German foreign policy, Hitler had said, must be the transformation of the nation into a strongly armed military state. "Oppressed peoples," wrote Hitler, "are never freed and unified in a common empire by means of flaming protests, but through a sharp, unsheathed sword. The forging of the sword is the task of the leaders of a people's domestic policy; the consummation of this work of forging the sword and the securing of military allies is the task of the leaders of its foreign policy."

Hitler envisaged Italy and England as the two future allies of the *Reich*. "France," he wrote, "is and always will be the

deadly enemy of Germany." "Not until the Germans have realized that they must engage in an active and final conflict with France will it be possible to bring the fruitless struggle to a conclusion—on condition, however, that Germany sees in the extermination of France a means of providing her people with the necessary room for expansion." Germany, in other words, must wage a war for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. It was, however, at the expense of Russia, thought Hitler, that the *Reich* could secure the new territory which would fully rectify "the false relation between our people and our land" and thus "free the Germans for ever from the danger of disappearing from the earth or of becoming a slave people". Said he :

"We National Socialists have deliberately drawn a line under the pre-war tendency of our foreign policy. We are where we were 600 years ago. We stem the Germanic stream towards the south and west of Europe and turn our eyes eastward. We have finished with the pre-war policy of colonies and trade, and are going over to the land policy of the future. When we talk of new lands in Europe, we are bound to think first of Russia and her border States. Fate itself seems to wish to give us our direction. When fate abandoned Russia to Bolshevism, it robbed the Russian people of the educated class which once created and guaranteed their existence as a State. . . .

"The present-day rulers of Russia have no intention of entering into any alliance honourably, or of sticking to one. We must not forget that they are low, blood-stained criminals, that it means dealing with the scum of humanity. . . . We must not forget that the international Jew, who continues to dominate Russia, does not regard Germany as an ally, but as a State destined to undergo a similar fate."

HERR ROSENBERG'S ADVOCACY OF A NORDIC EUROPE

This eastern policy was also stressed by Alfred Rosenberg, Hitler's "second soul", who was head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the National Socialist Party and the cultural dictator of the *Reich*, and was much closer to the sources of power in the *Reich* than Baron von Neurath, the Foreign Minister.

Rosenberg, who was born in Reval in Estonia, the old city of the Livonian Order of Knights, and educated in Tsarist Russia, conceived the Nazi mission in the east as a revival of that of the old Order of the Teutonic Knights. He advocated a Nordic Europe with a German *Mitteleuropa*, which required that Russia must be pushed back into Asia and enable Germany

“... to procure sufficient territory for its future 150 million inhabitants. . . . In this great battle for existence of the future—a struggle for honour, freedom and bread—a creative nation such as Germany can have no consideration for impotent, worthless, and presumptuous Poles, Czechs, etc. These people must be forced eastward in order to free territory for German peasants to cultivate. Only thus can there be the possibility for the German people to breathe again. . . . Thus also will the foundation of a new cultural epoch for the whole race be made possible.”

Rosenberg proclaimed that the Nazis desired “no *Mitteleuropa* without racial and national differences such as Naumann dreamed of, no Franco-Jewish Pan-Europa. A Nordic Europe is the solution of the future, together with a German *Mitteleuropa*. Germany as a racial and national State from Strasbourg to Memel, from Eupen to Prague and Laibach as the central power of the continent, as a guarantee for the South and the South-east. The Scandinavian States and Finland as a second alliance to guarantee the North-east; and Great Britain as a guarantee in the west and overseas necessary in the interest of the Nordic race.”

There were Hitlerites before Hitler, and in the twenty-five point programme of the party (then called the German Workers Party), which was drawn up by one Gottfried Feder, a disgruntled engineer, and dated 24 February 1920, before Hitler officially joined the party, the two following points form the first and the second: (1) The union of all Germans, by right of self-determination, in one Great Germany; (2) Equality of the German people with all other nations and the consequent abrogation of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. In the official commentary, Feder stated that “all people of German blood, whether they live under Danish, Polish, Czech, Italian,

or French rule, must be united in a German *Reich*". And he added: "We will not renounce a single German in Sudetan, in Alsace-Lorraine, in Poland, in the League of Nations colony, Austria, or in the Succession States of old Austria."

GEOPOLITICS AND NAZI FOREIGN POLICY

The Nazis believed that their thinking on foreign policy received "scientific" confirmation from Geopolitics, one of the main conclusions of which had been expressed long ago by its founder, the Englishman, Sir Halford J. Mackinder, as follows: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland (i.e. the vast region stretching from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic Ocean, in short, Euro-Asia); who rules the Heartland commands the World Island (i.e. the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa); who rules the World Island commands the world." The "science" of Geopolitics considered geography to be the absolute factor in the rise and fall of peoples aspiring to attain world domination, and Mackinder, in expounding the pivotal role played by the Heartland, which was inaccessible to ships but in antiquity lay open to the horse-riding nomads, in this story, warned that Germany should never be allowed to dominate East Europe, which was the key to the Heartland.

The ideas of Mackinder were pursued by a German geographer and major general, Karl Haushofer, who, in 1922, founded a research centre at Munich, known as the Institute of Geopolitics. Haushofer shared the Pan-German, expansionist schemes of the Nazis, and was equally anxious that his country should rise on the ruins of the British empire as a "World Power". As early as 1923 he had predicted that it would be a natural ambition for Japan to dominate East Asia, and asserted that Japan and Italy were the inevitable allies for Germany in the latter's pursuit of her ambition for world domination. Through Rudolf Hess, who had been his aid-de-camp in the First World War, Haushofer met Adolf Hitler, who found so much value in his ideas that, after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, he permitted him to retain his Jewish wife and recognized his children by her as "honorary Aryans". Haushofer's geopolitical ideas on the vital importance of the Heartland and

the necessity of Germany dominating East Europe as the road leading to it fell in with the "eastern" policy of Hitler and Rosenberg. But the Nazis ignored his advice that Russia should be drawn into partnership in the bid for political power, and his deprecation of a frontal attack on Russia, which he predicted would bog down in the vast reaches of Eurasia. Till Hitler's attack on Russia in June 1941, the Nazis generally followed Haushofer's ideas, and they lauded him to the skies. But when disasters came as the result of their attack on Russia (which he had warned against) they became furious and confined him in the concentration camp at Dachau. With the end of the war Haushofer was released, but two years later he committed suicide along with his faithful wife.

HITLER'S PACIFIC PROTESTATIONS AS CHANCELLOR

These and many other statements of Nazi foreign political philosophy and aims before the party assumed power form a striking contrast to Hitler's speeches on foreign policy after he became Chancellor—in which he attempted to reassure the world that Nazi Germany only desired "work and peace". Hitler made his first pronouncement on foreign policy after assumption of power on 17 May 1933, at a special meeting of the *Reichstag*. He began with a bitter denunciation of the Versailles Treaty, which, he said, was designed to perpetuate "the degradation of a great people to a second class nation". But he denounced war equally emphatically, characterizing it as "madness", and pointing out that it would plunge Europe into "communist chaos". He disclaimed all desire to "Germanize" foreign peoples. As evidence of the *Reich's* peaceful intentions, Hitler cited its complete disarmament, demilitarization of the Rhineland and execution of the Versailles Treaty. He categorically denied the charge that the Nazi Storm Troops had any connection with the *Reichswehr*, and insisted that they were not militarized, and could not be counted as trained reserves. Finally, he demanded complete equality for the *Reich* with other great powers and fulfilment by the latter of their promise to disarm. He insisted that Germany was entitled to security and declared that she was ready "at any time to give up offensive arms if the rest of the world did likewise". The *Reich* was ready to become a

party to every solemn non-aggression pact, for Germany was not thinking of aggression but of her own security, he announced.

Even after Germany left the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, Hitler and other Nazi leaders continued to stress these very points. In addition to making peace protestations, Hitler, on the very day that Germany left Geneva (14 October 1933), delivered an internationally broadcast radio speech, in which he made an earnest appeal to France to agree to a mutual burying of the hatchet. He said :

"I speak in the name of the entire German people when I solemnly declare that we are imbued with the sincere wish to wipe out an enmity that . . . is out of all proportion to any possible gain. . . . It would be a tremendous event for all of humanity if the two peoples could once for all bar force from their common life. . . .

"The German people are ready for this. . . . After the return of the Saar only a mad man could believe in the possibility of war between the two States. . . ."

On 12 November the German people were asked to pronounce on the foreign policy of their government in a plebiscite held for the purpose. The manifesto issued by the government which was an integral part of the ballot, contained the following statements :

"The German government and the German people are united in the will to pursue a policy of peace, reconciliation and understanding as the foundation for all decisions and negotiations.

"The German government and the German people, therefore, regard force as an unsuitable means of settling existing differences within the European community of States.

"The German government and the German people renew the assurance of their readiness to destroy the last German machine-gun and to discharge the last man from the army as long as the other peoples decide to do the same. . . ."

In so far as Hitler's words alone could bring assurance, Russia

also might consider herself secure on the side of Germany, and the *Mein Kampf* tirade against her leaders and threat to her integrity as non-existent or cancelled, for in an interview which he granted to Mr. Ward Price and which was officially released at Berlin on 17 February 1934, Hitler ridiculed the very suggestion of a possible attack by Germany on Russia. He assured Mr. Price that there was no need for Germany to fight Russia, since the increase of her population had stopped. In any case, it being a truism that there is nothing permanent in the relations, either of friendship or of hostility, among nations many critics thought that the effusions of the Nazi leaders in their denunciation of Bolshevism amounted to a calculated bluff and "a gigantic piece of political fraud". The view did prevail in many quarters, at least in the United States and Great Britain, that National Socialism was little more than a German nationalist movement aiming at the removal of some of the worst features of the Versailles Treaty, though there was considerable public indignation at the savage treatment of the Jews and of the political opponents of the Nazis. But the governments whom Hitler had threatened by his statements in the *Mein Kampf* and elsewhere did heed the warnings, with the result that there was an anxious reappraisal of their diplomatic positions and relationships, which was reflected in a number of realignments, which we shall presently describe. Before, however, we take up this subject, it would not be out of place to give some account of certain revelations concerning the real aims and ideals of Nazi foreign policy which gave the lie to the pacific protestations of Hitler after he assumed power and threw a considerable light on, and confirmed his earlier pronouncements. They relate to the so-called Nazi New Era Plan for the refashioning of the world, which Hitler believed would work for a thousand years and which formed the charge against Goering and others at their trial at Nuremberg.

THE RAUSCHNING REVELATIONS

Hermann Rauschning, who became President of the Danzig Senate after its Nazification in May 1933 had some conversations with Hitler in the last year before his seizure of power and the first two years of Nazi rule (1933 and 1934) and he published

them in a book, *Hitler Speaks*, in December 1939, shortly after the Second World War broke out. The words which he put into Hitler's mouth were such as the Führer spoke only in exclusive circles to which Rauschning belonged, and show Hitler as a criminal conspirator against peace. They would have been justly considered as suspect and unworthy of credence, if it were not for the fact that many events which actually happened much later substantially confirmed them. At the Nuremberg Trials also a vast mass of evidence substantiated the statements of Rauschning. The following quotations from the work are revealing indeed :

"If Germany is to become a world power, and not merely a continental State (and it must be a world power, if it is to survive), then it must achieve complete independence. Do you understand what that means? Is it not clear to you how tragically mutilated we are by the restriction and hemming-in of our vital space, a restriction which condemns us to the status of a second-rate power in Europe? Only nations living independently in their own space and capable of military defence can be world powers. Only such nations are sovereign in the true sense of the word.

"Russia is such a State, the United States, Britain—but only by artificial means, not at all from the nature of its populated areas. France is such a State up to a certain point. Why should we be worse off? Is this an unavoidable inferiority? This is why I must gain space for Germany, space big enough to enable us to defend ourselves against military coalitions. In peace time we can manage. But in war the important thing is freedom of action, for in war one is mortally dependent on the outside world. Our dependence on foreign trade without even an ocean coastline would condemn us eternally to the position of a politically dependent nation.

"We need space to make us independent of every possible political grouping and alliance. In the east, we must have the mastery as far as the Caucasus and Iran. In the west, we need the French coast. We need Flanders and Holland. Above all we need Sweden. We must become a colonial power. We must have a sea power equal to that of Britain.

The material basis for independence grows with the increasing demands of technique and armaments. We cannot, like Bismarck, limit ourselves to national aims. We must rule Europe, or fall apart as a nation, fall back into chaos of small States. Now do you understand why I cannot be limited either in the east or in the west?"

NAZI VISION OF A NORDIC WORLD SOVEREIGNTY

Even while they were absorbed in their life-and-death struggle with the British Empire, the Nazis lost no time in reorganizing their conquests on the continent in accordance with plans openly discussed in the German press since 1933. The following is a reconstruction of the plan from various sources, including statements of Hitler and other leaders during the Second World War and the actual disposition by the Nazis of territories which they conquered during the few years of their victories and supremacy in Europe during the war. The Nazis believed that the era of small national states, which they thought were merely pawns of the great powers and had no right to hold rich colonial possessions—such as Belgium had in the Congo or Holland in the Dutch East Indies—was definitely over. The new era, they claimed, would see the emergence of vast continental areas, each ruled by a dominant race. Under this scheme, Europe, except for the Soviet Union, would be ruled by Germany; the Far East by Japan; Africa by Germany and Italy, with the collaboration of Spain and Portugal; the Western Hemisphere possibly by a United States "purified" of anti-Nazi elements, but only on condition of free access to the resources of Latin America by a German-controlled Europe.

After this New Order had been established, Britain and the United States would be excluded from any influence in Europe. Germany would rule the continent, while Italy would control both coasts of the Mediterranean and obtain parts of the Near East, and Spain would be awarded Gibraltar and a section of French North Africa. The European continent, whose relations with other continental areas would be conducted solely by Germany, would be reorganized into a hierarchy of vassal peoples, whose status, functions, and treatment would be

dictated by Berlin. In this hierarchy, it was conceivable that France, once described by Hitler as Germany's "mortal enemy" might be treated better than Britain; Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, whose peoples are regarded as akin to the Germans, would receive preferential treatment as compared with the Slavs of Eastern Europe, who would be condemned to the role of helots; while an ally like Italy would be allowed to have a share in the spoils of victory. From the reorganized continent all Jews—presumably defined in accordance with Germany's Nuremberg laws—would be excluded, being offered the choice of either starving or settling in some remote regions like Madagascar or Ethiopia, the expense of travel and settlement to be borne by their co-religionists in the United States. The remaining populations would be shuttled back and forth across the continent at will, wherever their services might be required by the needs of German economy. And the entire continent would be forced to accept the concepts of Nazism.

This grandiose plan of establishing a Nordic world sovereignty required for its success only one condition—the acquiescence of the U.S.S.R. On the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War, the Soviet had conceived their interest to lie in maintaining their neutrality and expected that the conflict would result in a general weakening of all the capitalist states in the world and the triumph of Socialism. But they had no illusions about their ability to remain neutral all the time the conflict lasted, and they realized the need of strengthening themselves by all means possible. The Soviet reaction to the Nazi "new order" was thus expressed by Mikhail Kalinin, President of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, which was published in the Soviet press on 30 November 1940: "We are a besieged fortress. It is true this fortress is a huge one—one-sixth of the earth. But the remaining five-sixths are our principal and irreconcilable enemies." He called for "eternal vigilance", increased armed forces and improved discipline. While continuing to fortify the "socialist fatherland" against a hostile world and vigilantly guarding its neutrality, the Soviet Government extended its borders by a series of "military-offensive" operations, acquiring thereby parts of Poland (western Ukraine and western White Russia), consider

able portions of Finland, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

THE HOFFMANN PLAN VS. THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN

On their side, the Nazis were under no illusions as to their ability to establish their "new order" without having a supreme struggle with the Soviet Union. They were ready with their plan of war with the U.S.S.R. which had been drawn up by General Hoffmann, who was a member of the German General Staff from 1901 to 1918, and as a representative of this body with the First Japanese Army in Manchuria in 1904-05 had witnessed the Russian colossus being bored through as if it were a feather-pillow by a very small, energetic, and disciplined Japanese force. Having learned his lesson well, Hoffmann, using the same tactics as the Japanese, had defeated the Tsar's troops near Tannenberg (though the credit for the great victory went to Hindenburg). He remained in the eastern front till Brest Litovsk, where the Bolshevik army begged peace and gave in to his brutal conditions. He conceived the mistaken idea that the army which surrendered to him was the Red army—it was really the Tsarist army trained for but a few months by the Bolsheviks and thought that this strategic scheme, which was a return to the Napoleonic idea, would succeed against the U.S.S.R. in the future. He succeeded in getting it accepted by the former German Crown Prince, who fashioned it into a complete politico-military scheme. Beaten in the west Germany had to strike eastwards, and in alliance with France (and, if possible, with Britain also), make a crusade against Russia and exploit her natural resources. The ex-Crown Prince sent his former personal adjutant, Arnold Rechberg, to Marshal Foch, who approved the Plan.

The Hoffmann Plan meant basically a total break not only with the Schlieffen Plan, which had an "anti-westerly" orientation, and advocated a march on Paris, and thereafter on London, but with the whole scientific school of German strategy, and a reversion to the school of Napoleon. It was opposed by Generals Seeckt and Ludendorff, who knew that "the fighting inefficiency of the Bolshevik army", like many other ideas on which it was based, was untenable. It neverthe

less came to the fore, as the result of a lot of complicated political intrigues in which Herr von Papen was involved. Before Thyssen and heavy industry came to the support of Hitler, Hoffmann and his circle befriended his movement. The Hoffmann Plan got into the brain of Hitler and Rosenberg and promised to enable them to bring to fruition all their plans against Bolshevism and the conquest of Eastern Europe.

IMPACT OF NAZI FOREIGN POLICY ON OTHER STATES

(i) *The Soviet Union*—(a) *Soviet-German Relations*. We have seen that, after the war, Germany and the U.S.S.R.—two pariah nations—had arrived at an understanding with each other, and in 1922, had concluded the Treaty of Rapallo, which produced dismay and consternation in the Allied countries. In Germany, some statesmen, including Walter Rathenau, Count Brockdorf Rantzau and others favoured a policy of eastern orientation. They were supported by industrialists, who looked upon Russia as an untapped market for German manufactures as well as a source of raw materials, and by the *Reichswehr*, which, though afraid of Communism in Germany, foresaw the possibility of establishing on Soviet territory the armament factories and training cadres prohibited by the Versailles Treaty. On the whole, Soviet-German relations thereafter remained cordial, and the heyday was reached in 1923, when the Soviet Government openly sympathized with Germany during the French occupation of the Ruhr, and threatened to attack Poland if the latter should seize the opportunity to attack East Prussia, as she seemed to be on the point of doing. The alliance, based on the solid interests of the two nations, survived the usual strains of each occasionally charging the other with measures and countermeasures in relation to ideological differences. A serious crisis, however, appeared when Stresemann entered into those negotiations with the western countries, which led to the signing of the Locarno Agreements and which the Soviet considered (as we have seen in Chapter 6) as the drilling of capitalism. She feared that by her new policy of western orientation, Germany would act as the spearhead of western intervention, and as a member of the League of Nations, be forced to permit

the passage of Allied armies through her territory in fulfilment of Article 16 of the League Covenant.

These fears, however, had little justification as, at the time, Germany was more concerned in buttressing her own position in Eastern Europe, as a possible counterweight to the Allies than in assisting the latter to conquer Russia. The German attitude was reflected in the Berlin Treaty of 24 April 1925, concluded by Germany and Russia for five years, which provided for non-aggression, and for neutrality in case of attack on one of them by a third power. The two countries also promised to join no alliance with other states in war or peace whose object would be an economic or financial boycott of the other. The Berlin Treaty was accepted by the Soviet as balancing off the Locarno Treaties, and by Germany as another form of the "reinsurance treaty" of 1887 by which Bismarck had hoped to end Germany's perennial danger of having to fight on two fronts. So matters stood till the accession of Hitler to power, when, in view of the past statements of Hitler, Rosenberg and others on Russia, the Soviet were compelled to make a reappraisal of their position with regard to Germany, and, indeed, of their entire foreign policy. Immediately, however, the Soviet press refrained from making editorial comments on the event, and, three months after it had happened, on 5 May, the two countries concluded a protocol in Moscow prolonging the Berlin Neutrality Treaty of 24 April 1925, and the conciliation convention of 24 June 1931. Commenting on this, the *Voelkische Beobachter*, the Nazi official organ, which had previously attacked them, observed that a German-Soviet agreement, intolerable as long as Communism existed in Germany was no longer undesirable now that Communism had been crushed by Nazism. Similarly, *Izvestia*, the official organ of the Soviet Government, stated that "in spite of their attitude towards Fascism, the people of the U.S.S.R. wish to live in peace with Germany, and consider that the development of Soviet-German relations is in the best interests of both countries". The Russians, however, were rudely reminded and rather confirmed about the previous declarations of Hitler and Rosenberg regarding German expansion to the East and seizure of the Ukraine, when, soon after this, on 16 June, Hugenberg, then German Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, asked the

World Economic Conference in London to restore to Germany her former African colonies and give her "people without room" some additional territory, presumably in Europe. A break in relations was, nevertheless, prevented for commercial and financial considerations, and German credits continued to be available to the Russians.

(b) *Moscow's Western Orientation*—(i) *Relations with France*. The Soviet Government was by no means quite reassured, and for "reinsurance" sought to improve its relations with the West. As we have seen in a previous chapter, many circumstances were tending to the latter end—the most important among them perhaps being the shifting of emphasis from the ideology of the World Revolution to Stalin's idea of Bolshevism in one country and the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan, which engrossed the national energy in constructive labours at home. The set-back received by Communism in China and the severance of Sino-Soviet relations in 1927 worked in the same direction and also drew off the Soviet to Europe. Japan's conquest of Manchuria, and the setting up there of the puppet State of Manchukuo alarmed the U.S.S.R., and compelled her to pay greater attention to the defence of her western frontier. The Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact, concluded on 26 January 1934, had the same effect, as the Soviet suspected that it contained a secret clause for a deal at their expense (see below).

Among the capitalist countries, France was Bolshevik Russia's special *bête noire* having sheltered White Russians, permitted them to conspire against the Soviet Union, and sent one of her distinguished soldiers, General Weygand, to aid Poland in her defence against Russian aggression. France was the main champion of the European *status quo*, and her satellites in Eastern Europe—Poland and Rumania—were her instruments of "encirclement", besides having robbed her of territories. On her side, France could not forget Bolsheviks' treachery in deserting her and her other allies at a moment when they were fighting for their life against Germany, or the latter's repudiation of the Tsarist debts, or the "unholy alliance" they had formed with Germany at Rapallo. The French, further, disfavoured the Soviet Five-Year Plan as an attempt to destroy capitalist economy by "dumping" cheap Russian goods pro-

duced by forced labour on western markets. Again, the balance of trade with the Soviet Union was unfavourable to France, since, while France offered an outlet for Soviet raw materials, specially oil, manganese, flax, and lumber, France's principal exports, consisting of articles of luxury, found no market in the Soviet Union. The French complained that the Soviet Government used the proceeds of sales in France for purchases in other countries, notably Germany. As a countermeasure against the unfavourable balance of their trade with the U.S.S.R., the French Government, in October 1930, subjected Soviet goods to a system of licences.

The rapid rise of Hitler, whose work, *Mein Kampf*, was published at Munich in 1930 by Frank Eher induced both countries to draw together and negotiate trade and non-aggression pacts with each other. The attempt made by the Soviet to come to a trade and non-aggression agreement with France in August 1931 was unsuccessful on account of fresh bickerings on the subject of the Tsarist debts and the criticism of the French nationalists. But, a year later, when Soviet relations with Britain were strained and a Radical-Socialist cabinet headed by M. Herriot, who had long favoured Franco-Soviet *rapprochement*, came to office (June 1932), the two countries signed a non-aggression pact as well as a conciliation convention with each other (29 November 1932). This policy of friendship was followed by Herriot's successors in office, and on 11 January 1934, a one-year trade agreement was signed. Meanwhile, the Soviet Government was going ahead with their general policy of western orientation by relegating the Third International to the background (no meetings of the Comintern were held between 1928 and 1935).

The principal exponent of the western orientation policy was the Soviet Foreign Commissar, M. Litvinov. The culminating point of his efforts was reached in 1935, when the Soviet Government, on 2 and 16 May respectively, signed five-year pacts of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. These gave the Nazi Government the pretext for denouncing on 16 March 1936, the Locarno Treaties, and remilitarizing the Rhineland in defiance of the Versailles Treaty. The failure of Britain and France to stand up to Hitler and the refusal of Italy, embittered by the League sanctions in the case of

Ethiopia, to co-operate with them in doing so—early evidences of western attempt to “appease” Hitler, taken in conjunction of the conclusion in November 1936 of the anti-Comintern pact by Germany and Japan (subsequently joined by Italy, Hungary, and Franco Spain)—compelled the Soviet again to revise their policy.

(ii) *Anglo-Russian Relations.* In a previous chapter we have traced the story of Anglo-Soviet relations till 1934. After Britain had denounced her trade pact with the Soviet (17 October 1933) in the interests of Canada, she gave notice of her readiness to sign a new trade treaty. The negotiations which opened in London on 15 December, had apparently made little progress when they were interrupted by the arrest, on 11 and 12 March 1933, of six British engineers in the Soviet Union on charges of espionage, bribery, and “wrecking” of the Soviet electrical industry. These engineers were employees of the Metropolitan Vickers Company, which had been operating in the Soviet Union for the last ten years. The arrest evoked passionate protests from the people and Government of Great Britain. However, the strange behaviour of some of the accused Britishers, who made damaging confessions, and, further, refused to arrange for their own proper defence, though they were absolutely free to do so, and also the fairness of the trial and the lenient sentences passed on the accused had a reassuring influence on British public opinion. The British Government, nevertheless, laid an embargo on Russian goods after the sentences were pronounced. Again, however, as had been the case in 1929, both governments had to bow to hard realities, and readjust their mutual relations accordingly. On 16 February 1934, a new trade pact was signed between the two countries, aiming at the equalization of the balance of trade, long unfavourable to Britain. The Soviet released the two Britishers who had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment.

(iii) *Relations between the Soviet Union and Italy.* The Soviet Union and Fascist Italy had friendly relations since 1924, when the latter recognized the Soviet Government. Despite ideological differences, the economic and political systems of the two countries presented certain striking similarities. The Soviet Union shared Italy's disdain for the League of Nations

and its doubts that either disarmament or economic co-operation could be achieved by international conferences. Nor had Italy, which must import timber, oil and other raw materials, had occasion to complain of Soviet "dumping". Italo-Soviet trade relations were cemented by the agreement of 2 August 1930, which was revised on 27 April 1931. It was, however, unpopular in Italy as the balance of trade was unfavourable to her, and was denounced by Italy on 18 January 1933. On 6 May, however, the two countries signed a fresh trade agreement, and the friendly relations were further cemented by the visit of the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, to Rome on 25 December.

(c) *The U.S.S.R. and Turkey.* Another dictatorship, which was vigorously opposed to Communism—Turkey—had invariably good relations with the U.S.S.R. ever since the close of the war. The Soviet abandoned the traditional Tsarist policy of seeking to obtain control of Constantinople and the Straits and repeatedly expressed their respect for Turkey's national independence. The first ever non-aggression treaty signed by the Soviet Union was the one they concluded with Turkey in Paris on 17 December 1925, which was prolonged for five years on 31 October 1931. Turkish-Soviet relations were further cemented in May 1932, when the Turkish Premier, Ismet Pasha, and Foreign Minister, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, visited Moscow, where they signed an agreement by which the Soviet Union undertook to grant Turkey credits totalling \$8,000,000 for the purchase of machinery and equipment, which Turkey was to repay with exports of agricultural and mineral products over a period of twenty years; no interest was to be charged by the Soviet Government on these credits.

(d) *The Soviet Union and the Baltic States and Hungary.* Suspicions about the aims of Pan-German expansionism in the Baltic littoral induced both the Soviet Union and some of the Baltic States, viz. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, to prolong until 1945 their mutual non-aggression pacts on 4 April 1934. The Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact, which had been concluded on 25 July 1932, was prolonged until 1945. On 13 February 1934, Hungary recognized the Soviet Union.

(e) *Further Rapprochement and "An Eastern Locarno".* On

3 July 1933, at the World Economic Conference in London, the Soviet Union and seven of its neighbours—Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Rumania and Turkey—signed a non-aggression pact, containing a broad definition of aggression. On the following day, the U.S.S.R. concluded a similar pact with the three Little Entente states—Rumania, Yugoslávia and Czechoslovakia. The latter pact was hailed as a sort of an Eastern Locarno, and it was particularly interesting because it was the first time that the Soviet Union entered into an agreement with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The former had recognized the Soviet Union *de facto* in 1922 but the latter had so far no official relations with her. It was believed that prior to signing the pact with Rumania, the Soviet definitely abandoned their claims on Bessarabia. It is also said that Russia returned the Rumanian State treasure which had been held in Moscow since the Revolution.

(f) *The Soviet Union and the League of Nations.* On 15 September 1934, as the result of a week of feverish negotiations in which France took the leading part, the U.S.S.R. was invited to become a member of the League of Nations. On the same day the League Council unanimously voted to give Russia a permanent seat and on 18 September, Russia was officially admitted to the League—only three members voting against her, viz. Switzerland, Portugal, and Holland. In the following year, M. Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, presided over the League Council meetings. It was a strange development, for Soviet leaders, from the time of Lenin, who had personally characterized the League as “an instrument of brigandage”, had emphasized the idea of the “robber League”. Addressing the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1928, Stalin had said: “The League of Nations is an organization designed to mask preparations for war. If we were to enter it, we should have the choice between the hammer and the anvil. We wish to be neither the hammer of the weak nations nor an anvil for the strong.” Even though dire necessity, viz. the Nazi threat, induced Stalin to turn to the West and as a corollary to this policy of Western orientation to join the League, he continued to cherish his own views of the League. The U.S.S.R. never felt interested in “collective action” against aggressors, since such action threatened to

involve her in war with Germany, or Japan, or both. What she was concerned with was "collective security", which might presumably check aggression, shield her from aggression from West and East, and permit her to fulfil Stalin's plans for building up "socialism in one country".

The Soviet desire to avoid war sprang from Stalin's conviction that Russia's industrial system, which had proved unable to supply the peace-time needs of the population would be unequal to the needs of a major war. He also knew that the Red Army, however strong in man-power and morale, was not likely to match the highly mechanized German forces, backed by the *Reich's* efficient industry. In any case, soon after her entry into the League of Nations, the U.S.S.R.—a formidable enough military power—was reduced to the "perfect and absolute blank" of an unknown quantity on account of the fact that from August 1926 to April 1937 she witnessed an astonishing succession of purges, which thoroughly discredited and perhaps substantially weakened her.

(2) *Italy—Relations with Germany.* Mussolini had an academic sympathy for Germany as a fellow-sufferer under the Versailles system and had more than once declared that the peace treaties were not "eternal" or "irreparable" and that Germany must be re-established if Europe was to be saved from disaster. He, however, always claimed to maintain an attitude of independence, and, along with England and France, guaranteed the frontiers of France at Locarno. Italy, nevertheless, had many causes of difference with France, as we have examined them in a previous chapter, and vigorously pursued the role of a rival of France. In the London Naval Conference, 1930, Italy began a new controversy by demanding naval parity with France. The rise of Hitler weakened the bargaining power of France and strengthened the hands of Mussolini. He put forward a plan of peace in the shape of a four-power pact, which was favourably received by Premier Macdonald of Britain but was criticized in France and her satellite circle, specially in Poland (See above, Chapter 8). The efforts of the French Government to improve their relations with Italy bore little fruit.

Mussolini welcomed Hitlerism as a sign that Europe had at last realized the advantages of Fascism, but showed little eager-

ness to conclude political agreements with Nazi Germany. Although in favour of treaty revision, he was strongly opposed to Austro-German union, which might threaten South Tirol by bringing Germany on the Italian border. He, accordingly, supported the government of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, and helped him establish a Fascist regime in Austria. He had long supported Hungary, which had claims against some of the territorial acquisitions of France's friends, the Little Entente powers, with at least one of whom, Yugoslavia, Italy's relations were definitely hostile. In March 1934, a sort of Italo-Austro-Hungarian bloc was set up by the conclusion of a series of politico-economic agreements between the three states. As, however, these agreements made no allusion to treaty revision, which was Hungary's prime objective, she, while negotiating with Italy, kept the door open for collaboration with Germany.

(3) and (4) *The Little Entente States—the Balkan Nations.* The establishment of the Nazi Government in Germany and nearly all the developments in European countries in reaction to it affected and perturbed the Little Entente states. The demand of the Nazis for the inclusion of all German-speaking people in the Third Reich—based on their theory of so-called "race allegiance" (*Bekennntnis zum Volkstum*)—posed a threat for every member of the Little Entente. France's hobnobbing with Italy for improvement of relations also alarmed them, because this could be brought about only if she consented to put pressure on them for accommodating Italy. The Russo-Polish non-aggression pact disturbed Rumania, who thought that this conflicted with the Polish-Rumanian treaty of 1921, by which each power had promised to help the other in case it was attacked by a third power, e.g. if Russia invaded Bessarabia. So did the Polish-German non-aggression pact, which made also Czechoslovakia uneasy.

Unfortunately, however, the divergences of interests among the Little Entente states, which were already too many, were further increased as also accentuated as the result of the impact on them of the Nazi Revolution in Germany. To Yugoslavia Germany was less of an enemy than she was to Czechoslovakia. The latter would not be much endangered and the former would be very much so if Italy established a protectorate over Austria in order to prevent the *Anschluss*. Rather, Yugoslavia would

welcome the *Anschluss* since it would be a counterweight to her enemy, Italy. Rumania was too far off to be directly affected by the *Anschluss*, but similarly, her partners, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, were too far off from her chief enemy, Russia, to have a solidarity of interests with her against the latter. The three states, too, now had different forms of government; in Yugoslavia and Rumania post-war liberalism had faded. In Rumania, a Fascist movement had grown up and its extreme section, the Iron Guard, was anti-Semitic. In Yugoslavia King Alexander had established a dictatorship. Only in Czechoslovakia, constitutional government still persisted, though there too authoritarian trends had appeared—notably as the result of a decree passed in 1933, which granted the government emergency powers and the right to suspend and suppress political parties which threatened the integrity or security of the State.

Faced by these problems, the Little Entente states drew together by concluding between themselves a "pact of reorganization" at Geneva on 16 February 1933. They were to have a permanent council, composed of the foreign ministers of the three States, for the purpose of conducting a common foreign policy and an economic council for the purpose of co-ordinating their economic interests. The pact was welcomed in France, but denounced in Germany, Italy and Hungary as a French manoeuvre. M. Benesh denied this charge, and declared that it indicated that "the old dreams of Pan-Germanism or Pan-Slavism as well as the new chimeras of French or Italian hegemony in Central Europe and the Balkans belong to the past" Unfortunately, however, the Little Entente states could not act together in economic affairs as is evidenced by the fact that Yugoslavia signed a trade agreement with Germany on 3 May 1934.

The establishment of the Nazi Government in Germany had the general effect of encouraging "revisionist" sentiments and alarming the states who stood for the *status quo* all over the continent of Europe. In a situation like this, France's adhesion to the Four-Power Pact (7 June 1933) caused further misgivings among the latter, two of whom, Rumania and Yugoslavia, were members of the French-aligned Little Entente, and as Balkan Powers were also involved in the confused poli-

tics of the Balkan peninsula. Faced with the new situation, the Little Entente not only sought to strengthen its own organization, but to secure the co-operation of the Soviet Union. In 1953, the Little Entente states concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, containing a broad definition of the term aggression although, among them Czechoslovakia alone had recognized the Soviet Union, and that only *de facto*. They also attempted to improve their relations with their former enemy, Bulgaria. A further complexity was introduced into Balkan politics by the fact that the success of the Nazis encouraged the growth of Fascist groups in the states of the Balkan peninsula, notably in Rumania. In spite of all this, in 1934, Turkey (who had made friends with Greece in 1930), Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece signed the so-called Balkan Pact mutually guaranteeing each other's Balkan frontiers. Greece and Yugoslavia, however, continued to be cool towards each other, as Greece, afraid of the Italian navy, declared that she recognized no obligation to engage in hostilities with a non-Balkan power, meaning thereby Italy, with whom Yugoslavia had bad relations. However, the relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria improved, since the latter, freeing herself from Italian influence, dealt firmly with the Macedonian terrorists, who were specially responsible for bad blood between Bulgaria and her neighbours. On the whole, the situation in the Balkan peninsula remained, in spite of the improvement of relations of some of the states with some others, undefined and confused, as well as quite unpredictable.

CHAPTER XII

THE BEGINNING OF TOTALITARIAN AGGRESSION

THE NAZIFICATION OF DANZIG—THE SAAR QUESTION

IN THE preceding chapter we have examined the aims and objectives of the foreign policy of Hitler by reference to his declarations on the subject before he assumed power, to his disavowals and clarifications soon after he became Chancellor, and also to some later revelations which confirmed some of the worst apprehensions which his earlier statements had aroused. We have seen that Europe was not quite reassured and that there were a number of realignments among the nations who felt threatened by the establishment of the new government in Germany. Nevertheless, there were many in Europe who felt that, in spite of the violence of language used by the Nazis, they would refrain, at least for some time, from actual use of force in the attainment of their objectives, which were also believed to be no more than breaking "the shackles of Versailles". With "revisionism", however, there was a lot of sympathy in the Allied countries, and almost the only question which was anxiously discussed was whether the Nazis wanted to achieve their objectives by methods of peace or by war. Even on the latter subject there was not much apprehension, for it was calculated that in a conflict between the revisionist states, with even Italy included, and the rest, the former could bring into the field some nine million men, at least half of whom would be poorly equipped, while the latter could command about 11 to 12 million soldiers, all properly armed and equipped.

In the first few months of their seizure of power, the Nazis confined their activities to routing their enemies at home while proceeding with the Nazification of Germans beyond the borders of the *Reich* and infiltration of neighbouring peoples rather than with annexations of territory. The first major success in this direction was secured on 28 May 1933, when elections held in the Free City of Danzig resulted in a decisive victory for the followers of Hitler. A new government was formed and

Dr. Hermann Rauschning, Nazi leader in the Free City, became President of the Danzig Senate after he had conferred with Chancellor Hitler in Berlin. The Nazified Danzig Government, however, instead of creating increased friction, improved its relations with Poland by ending the controversy between Danzig and the new Polish port of Gdynia. According to an agreement arrived at between Poland and Danzig, the former was to direct 45 per cent of its imports and exports passing by way of the Baltic through Danzig, and the remaining 55 per cent through Gdynia.

After achieving this success in his Nazification policy in Danzig, Hitler turned to the Saar, which had been detached from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, and placed under the administrative control of the League of Nations, with the condition that after 15 years its future status would be determined by a plebiscite of the inhabitants who would be asked whether they wished (1) to be reunited with Germany, (2) to be annexed to France, or (3) to continue under the League regime. In view of the fact that, according to this provision of the Versailles Treaty, the plebiscite was to be held after 10 January 1935, Hitler proposed to France that in order to avoid "renewed incitement to national passions", the matter should be immediately settled by the two countries. He declared that after this question was settled "there would be left no territorial question between France and Germany". France, however, did not agree to this, expecting that the German workers in the Saar, who had been scared by the fate which had overtaken their fellow-workers in the *Reich*, might vote at least for the last alternative. The result was the growth of unrest in the Saarland, with complaints reaching the League Council both of favouritism by the Governing Commission and of Nazi terrorism preferred by the German and non-German inhabitants respectively. On 20 January 1934, the League Council decided that the plebiscite must be held and appointed a committee of three, composed of representatives of Italy, Spain, and Argentina to conduct it.

THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT

Whatever may have been the basis on which the French specu-

lated, even without owning matted locks, one could safely predict that Germans, for long separated from *Deutschland*, irrespective of party, should vote for Germany. The only thing which might prevent the Saar from dropping into Hitler's palm like a ripe plum in due time was any effort by him to push through the business by violence. Hitler at this time, however, was all for peace and his protestations of peace and condemnations of force were many and well nigh disarming. No doubt, Nazi Germany had withdrawn from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations also, but she had asserted her pacific intentions by offering to conclude non-aggression pacts with all nations who desired to do so. Professedly with the same aim, Germany concluded a non-aggression pact with Poland for ten years on 26 January 1934. This agreement specifically outlawed war between Germany and Poland, and defined more precisely the obligations of the Anti-War Pact. It was an unexpected development, because the Nazis before they came to power, had reiterated that the eastern frontiers must be altered, and naturally it roused suspicions. As we have seen, the U.S.S.R. suspected that it contained secret agreements for a deal at the expense of herself: Poland to make territorial concessions to Germany in the Corridor in return for help to grab the Ukraine, or some other Russian territory. Whether Russia's surmises were correct or not, they actually strengthened the Western-oriented trends of her foreign policy.

It is clear that, apart from any ulterior designs it might serve, the pact suited admirably the present needs of both Germany and Poland. It lifted Nazi Germany out of the situation in which she was at the time placed, viz. one of complete isolation. Then, Hitler and the other Nazi leaders had repeatedly declared that Germany's advance must be southwards. The pact paved the way for it simply by Germany undertaking to refrain from any action against Poland, whether by propaganda or otherwise, for ten years. The motives of Poland were equally plain and understandable. The emergence of a powerful Germany posed a peculiar threat to her—a direct threat from German irredentism and an indirect threat of Poland becoming a battleground between Germany and Russia. Now she could hope to play off one against the other, or herself become a neutral

buffer between them; and, somehow or other, by playing an independent role, secure the best possible safeguard for her independence. She need not cut herself off from France, but she had now less necessity for being a hanger-on of France, whose motives in signing the Four-Power Pact were dubious and had aroused apprehensions, and who, in any case, was now much weaker than in the earlier post-war years. For Hitler and Nazi Germany, let us not forget, it was a demonstration of their love of peace and detestation of war.

THE PARTY PURGE OF 30 JUNE 1934

But the "enforced postponement" of the day when Germany, once more possessing overpowering military strength, would recover one lost land after another brought on a domestic crisis. In the days of their struggle for power, the Nazis had laid equal emphasis on their twin slogans of nationalism and Socialism: Under their banner consequently had flocked a motley crew of followers—workers, lower middle-class tradesmen, and ex-servicemen like Captain Röhm who stood at the head of the S.A. or Brownshirts, who formed a private army and had done service to the party by protecting the party meetings, or breaking those of other parties, or simply by their demonstration marches, impressing the nation by their discipline and organization. These services being now not needed, they not only became sources of embarrassment—"poor relations"—but dangerous too because they demanded that the nationalist revolution, now completed, must be followed by a second, socialist, revolution, ensuring jobs and prosperity, if not for the whole nation, at least for the faithful members of the party. Scenting a plot against himself personally or against the High Command, Hitler decided that there must be a purge of these "second revolutionaries", who were counterparts to the "Trot-skyeites" of Russia. He struck on 30 June 1934, a date that became thereafter known as the "Night of the Long Knife". His weapons in the purge were the chief rivals of the S.A. men, the S.S. men (*Schutzstaffel*) or the Black Guards and the secret State police, the *Gestapo*, formed by Goering in 1933. Thus perished Rohm, Heines, and other Brownshirt leaders, General Schleicher, Hitler's predecessor in office as Chancellor and his

wife, and many others—their exact number being not known but 200 being not considered as much above the mark. The significance of the Purge at home was the liquidation of those forces which wanted to hold Hitler to the socialistic features of the party, the men who wanted butter, and the elevation of the elements of the party who stood for big business, and wanted to produce not butter but guns; abroad, it meant a choice of militarism, and—aggression.

THE NAZI RAID ON AUSTRIA AND MURDER OF DOLLFUSS

Three weeks after Hitler's bloody purge of his enemies at home, the regime of the long knife was transferred to the international plane when, on Wednesday, 25 July 1934, a band of Austrian Nazis, about a hundred and fifty strong, disguising themselves as militiamen of the Civic Guard, gained admittance into the Chancellory building at Vienna. They surprised Dollfuss, who was parleying with two other ministers, and wounded him with a bullet fired from a revolver. As they held the Chancellory building, preventing succour to Dollfuss, who slowly bled to death, another armed band who had seized the radio station, announced the changeover. The events which led to this tragic incident may be summarized as follows. As we have seen, there was nothing which both Germany and Austria desired more to have than the *Anschluss*, and if it could be done before the rise of Nazism in Germany, it would have provoked no opposition in Austria. Hitler, himself an Austrian, ardently wanted it, which conformed to the basic principle of Nazi political philosophy—the so-called race allegiance (*Bekennntnis zum Volkstum*). But, after the seizure of power in Germany by the Nazis, the *Anschluss* had assumed a different character, and the Austrian Social Democrats and numerous Christian Socialists bitterly opposed it. Austria's independence should perhaps have been saved if the Christian Socialist Chancellor, Dollfuss, could trust the Socialists, but instead he ruthlessly crushed them and established a dictatorship, relying mainly on the *Heimwehr*, a private Fascist organization, and attempting to play politics with the neighbouring States. In the end, he accepted as his principal patron the Italian dictator, Mussolini, who, as we have seen, for reasons of his own, was definitely opposed to

the *Anschluss*. Austria soon became in domestic and foreign policies but a dependency of Italy.

For over a year a fierce Fascist-Socialist war was waged in Austria, in the course of which the Austrian Social Democrats, unlike their counterparts in Germany, attempted to hit back with all their strength. At length, in February 1934, they were overpowered; the Socialist Party was dissolved, its property seized, and its leaders either imprisoned or executed except for a few who escaped across the border after the fighting was over. The Nazis who had kept the peace while this struggle was going on, now entered into the fray, being openly backed by the German Government. In May 1934, a wave of terror swept over Austria and frequent bomb explosions occurred. The Munich radio-station frequently issued warnings to the Austrian Government and money and weapons were smuggled across the frontier to the Austrian Nazis. Hitler's visit to Mussolini at Stra (in Venice) on 14-15 June, and their agreement about the maintenance of Austrian independence served as the proverbial lull before the storm. On 30 June, Hitler purged the party and on 25 July, as we have seen, the Austrian Nazis raided the Chancellory building and killed the diminutive Chancellor, Dollfuss (he was four feet and eleven inches in height).

The *Putsch* failed disastrously. The regular army was alerted; it recaptured the Chancellory building where the rebels had locked and barricaded themselves together with the two other ministers, whose conduct, to say the least, was suspicious, and who had been "detained" as hostages. At the intervention of Dr. Reith, the German ambassador in Vienna, the murderers yielded their "hostages", and were provided with a safe conduct which enabled them to cross the German border. President Miklas promptly appointed Dr. Schuschnigg as Chancellor, and proclaimed a state of siege. At 7-30 p.m. the insurgents surrendered, and law and order were everywhere restored. The decisive event of the day was the immediate despatch of three Italian divisions to the Brenner Pass by Mussolini. Germany's complicity in the rising in Austria was established beyond doubt, but Mussolini's attitude compelled Hitler immediately to disavow any connection with the miserable happenings. He cancelled the passports of the insurgents,

driving them back to Austrian territory, and dismissed Reith, the arch-bungler, whose conduct alone had sufficiently incriminated his government. The only effect of the *Putsch* was to strengthen the European combination opposed to his designs. It brought about a reconciliation—which, however, proved to be temporary—between Italy and France.

FRANCO-ITALIAN AND ITALO-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

In a previous Chapter (Chapter 8) we have discussed at length the causes of friction between France and Italy. Again, in the previous Chapter (Chapter 11), while discussing the reactions of France, Italy, and the Little Entente states to the rise of Hitler to power in Germany we noted that France desired an improvement of her relations with Italy, but the Italian response to it was poor, and that another and formidable difficulty in the way of her attempting to bring about this improvement was the opposition of France's friends, the Little Entente states, and particularly Yugoslavia, to her hobnobbing with Italy. In the early summer of 1934, the French Foreign Minister, M. Barthou, made a determined attempt to strengthen the existing defence of his country and to construct new ones. In connection with the execution of the first part of his programme, he visited Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade; the second part took the form of a proposal for an Eastern Pact of Mutual Guarantee, a sort of an Eastern Locarno, which he proposed to be concluded between the U.S.S.R., the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany. A pact, which sought to include so many states, who naturally had so many diverse and conflicting interests, was sure to find opposition somewhere, and actually fell through on account of the reluctance of Germany to join it. As regards his effort to improve relations with Italy, the common interest of France and Italy to prevent the *Anschluss* seemed to provide the necessary basis for an Italo-French accord. But the trouble was that France's friend, Yugoslavia, was definitely opposed to the establishment of Italian overlordship over Austria, clearly preferring, in case Austrian independence was impossible to maintain, and somebody's overlordship was bound to be established, that it should be German hegemony, or even that the *Anschluss* should be

accomplished. It was to the problem of reconciling the interests of the Little Entente states with those of Italy so that the latter might not oppose Italian control of Austria that M. Barthou was devoting his attention and to which end he had invited King Alexander of Yugoslavia to visit his country, when they both met their end, within a few minutes of the latter's landing at Marseilles, on 9 October 1934, at the hands of a Croatian assassin.

The Marseilles crime intensified the enmity between Yugoslavia and Italy, but the latter, refusing to pick up the gauntlet, showed an eagerness to bring about a reconciliation with the former. Yugoslavia's anger was now diverted to Hungary, as it was revealed that the assassin had received his weapons from some Hungarian officials. She submitted a note to the League Council accusing the Hungarian Government of complicity in the crime and demanding an investigation. At the intervention of England and France, who were anxious that the matter should not be capitalized by Nazi Germany, the League Council passed a harmless note, and entrusted the investigation to the Hungarian Government itself. The latter, after investigation, reported that "some minor officials had not kept as close an eye on Croatian emigrants as was desirable and necessary". The report was accepted by Yugoslavia, and the matter officially declared as closed. The success of the League in disposing of the case, which was compared with the Serajevo crime, was loudly acclaimed as a great achievement. Really however, it was a sample of heedlessness and lack of true purpose on the part of the Great Powers dominating the League Council. They made no attempt to go into the root causes of the dangerous controversies which were responsible for the crime, and simply freezed the *status quo*.

THE ROME ACCORD

The policy of appeasement which M. Barthou had initiated was carried on by his successor in office, M. Pierre Laval, who won a spectacular success in the field by signing on 7 January 1935, an agreement with Signor Mussolini at Rome, where he had spent a week-end—the first time that a French Foreign Minister had visited Italy. It consisted of six documents, by which, in

return for Italian concessions in Central and Eastern Europe, France met Italy's principal demands in Africa. In the first place, France and Italy declared their intention to consult each other, as well as Austria, in the event of a new threat to Austrian independence, and to *communicate* with other interested states. They thus served notice on Hitler that a Nazi *Putsch* against Austria would encounter Franco-Italian opposition, and at the same time reassured the Little Entente states—specially Yugoslavia—which had feared after the July events that Italy might seek to establish a protectorate over Austria. Secondly, with reference to Germany, the two powers agreed to “concert upon the attitude to be adopted” in the event of Germany pursuing a policy of rearmament. Thirdly, the two powers also agreed on the necessity of a multilateral understanding in which Austria and her neighbours—Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia—would undertake to respect their mutual frontiers and not to interfere in each other's internal affairs. Finally, the pledges made by Italy in Europe were balanced by French concessions in Africa. The meagreness of these concessions, which we have described in an earlier chapter (see Chapter 8), gave rise to reports that France, in addition, had given Italy a free hand in Africa. Though Laval asserted that nothing in the Rome Accord tampered with “the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ethiopia”, and that France had given Italy a free hand in that country in economic matters only—Mussolini contested this in a talk he had with Mr. Eden—the reports received an apparent confirmation in the fact that when Mussolini embarked on a campaign against Ethiopia (10 February 1936), there were no protests from England, or France, or the League of Nations.

THE SAAR PLEBISCITE

Simultaneously, in January 1935, the plebiscite in the Saar, which, as we have seen was provided for by the Treaty of Versailles, was held. The inhabitants, asked to signify whether they wanted to return to Germany, or be absorbed by France, or continue under League administration, left no doubt about their sentiment, since 90 per cent of the voters expressed themselves in favour of returning to the Fatherland. In justice to

the much-criticized League of Nations, it needs to be remembered that, if the plebiscite resulted in a triumph for Germany, it stands on the credit side of the League also, for with respect to the Saar plebiscite affair, the League discharged its obligations with commendable success. The return of the territory to Germany took place on 1 March. Emboldened by this success—a legitimate one—Hitler proceeded to nazify other separated districts, preparatory to their annexation, legitimately or otherwise, to the *Reich*. In the Free City of Danzig, the Nazis gained control of the parliament and in Memel they created great difficulties for the Lithuanian Government.

WESTERN REACTIONS TO THE NAZI THREAT

By now, the objectives of Nazi foreign policy had become clearly defined, and Europe had had some taste of the methods which Hitler was ready to follow in order to attain them. Under the circumstances, two clear courses were open before the Western Powers to follow, unless they chose to remain passive spectators of Hitler's "piecemeal repudiation of the Versailles settlement" and final establishment of the New Order of Nordic supremacy in Europe. (1) They might form military alliances among themselves and overawe Hitler, compelling him to seek a peaceful course in his foreign policy. (2) Or they might strengthen the collective security system, leaving the way open for Germany's return to the League, and meet his demands by constructive measures—examination of Germany's territorial claims under Article 19 of the League Covenant, and limitation of armaments. Both courses had their advocates as well as opponents in Great Britain and France; in Britain, the former was opposed by the Liberals and Laborites, who, believing that Hitler's grievances were just and that Hitler was sincere, advocated the second course. Their opinion that the Allies should make concessions to Germany was shared by profascists like Viscount Rothermere, a prominent newspaper-owner, and by extreme Tories who agreed with Hitler that Germany was the strongest bulwark against Communism. These groups and their leaders, however, had little faith in the League or the method of collective security, and advocated direct negotiations with the Dictators.

In France, one group, which united M. Herriot, representing

the Radical Socialists, with the extreme nationalist and militarist elements, was convinced that Germany wanted war and that France, which was bound to be involved in it, should conclude mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union and Italy which should automatically come into effect in case of German attack. Another group, represented by Foreign Minister Pierre Laval believed that war was not inevitable and that, in collaboration with Britain, France should try to bring Germany back to the concert of nations. M. Laval was of opinion that an automatic alliance with the Soviet Union would alienate, thus playing into the hands of Hitler. The sheet-anchor of his policy was Franco-British collaboration to preserve European peace.

Neither in Britain nor elsewhere, however, did the advocates of peace attempt in any way to come into grips with hard facts. Everybody agreed that concessions should be made to Germany, many of whose grievances were just, but just did not decide who was to be called upon to make the necessary concessions, or just how much of concessions should satisfy Hitler. The principal difficulty lay in the fact that Nazi aspirations, based on racial rather than geographical considerations, embraced territories which had never formed part of the German empire—notably Austria, the western portion of Czechoslovakia and Soviet Ukraine. The task of persuading Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania and Poland to cede voluntarily the territories they obtained from Germany in 1919 should have provided a sufficiently formidable test for European diplomacy. It would be difficult to imagine France agreeing to the absorption of Austria or Czechoslovakia by Germany, or the U.S.S.R. viewing with equanimity Nazi expansion in the east. It would be almost impossible for Britain even to persuade South Africa to disgorge her gain at the expense of Germany's colonial empire, or to propose that Japan should do so.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT WITH NAZI GERMANY

Under the circumstances, Britain and France did all they could do without risks to their own interests, and, after mutual consultations, hit upon a "new deal" in European politics, which

they launched on 3 February 1935, in the form of a joint communique. Apparently, the two governments, who were quite aware that Germany was rearming herself, had decided that there was no alternative for them but to accept the fact; and they adroitly declared their readiness to abrogate the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles by imposing upon Germany some conditions for this "concession" to her. The condition France was most anxious to impose upon Germany was the latter's adherence to the Eastern and Central European pacts proposed by M. Barthou. The communique also contained the suggestion that the Locarno Treaty should be supplemented by an Air Pact, under which the Locarno Powers would agree to give the assistance of their air forces to any one of their number which was attacked by another from the air. It was noteworthy that this was an acknowledgement of the fact that Britain needed French aid against aggression from the air as France needed that of Britain from land and sea. It was the first open expression of Britain's apprehension concerning her vulnerability in the matter of air attack, which played a decisive part in shaping the policy of appeasement. On this subject, Mr. Churchill observed as follows: "With our enormous metropolis here, the greatest target in the world, a kind of tremendous, fat, valuable cow tied up to attract the beast of prey, we are in a position in which we have never been before, and in which no other country is at the present time."

The Franco-British proposals were presented to Germany as an integral whole, for their sting lay in the invitation to Germany to a general settlement. The Germans, however, found virtue only in the proposal for an Air Pact, since it implied the existence of a German air force, prohibited by the Versailles Treaty, and in a non-committal manner suggested Anglo-German talks. To the annoyance of the French, the British Government accepted the idea of talks, and Sir John Simon received an invitation to visit Berlin on 7 March. Three days before the date proposed for the visit, however, the British Government published a parliamentary paper announcing a considerable increase in their armaments. Hitler immediately developed "a slight cold" and a hoarse voice, which he said were caused by his participation in the Saar celebrations, and asked Sir John to postpone his visit *sine die*.

THE FIRST GERMAN REPUDIATION OF VERSAILLES

On 9 March 1935, Hitler officially notified foreign governments about the existence, in spite of the prohibition in the Versailles Treaty, of a German air force. The announcement did not have the dramatic effect Hitler intended to produce, for the fact of German rearmament, which was taking place even in the early days of the Republic, was known to the world. Nevertheless, 9 March is an important date in post-war history since it marked the first open repudiation by Germany of her treaty obligations. The next week-end proved to be more sensational. On 16 March, Hitler unilaterally denounced the principal military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, reintroducing conscription, and placing the peacetime strength of the German army at thirty-six divisions, totalling roughly 550,000 men, as compared with Germany's pre-war army of 670,000.

To make a long story short, at the invitation of Hitler, Sir John Simon visited Berlin and held talks with him on 25-26 March, which yielded little definite results. Similarly, Mr. Eden—more or less to reassure France, who had been displeased with the British policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hound—visited Moscow (28 March), Warsaw (1 April) and Prague (5 April). Meanwhile, France had sent a note of protest to Berlin, and reported Germany's action to the League, calling for a special session of the Council in April, in preparation whereof it was decided that the Allied statesmen should meet at Stresa (in Italy) and decide on their course of action. The Conference was attended by Ramsay Macdonald, Simon, Flandin, Laval, and Mussolini; and, after hearing Simon's report of his talks with Hitler, passed a resolution, which was "distinguished by masterly circumlocution" and which stated that the discussions should be continued at Geneva. The real significance of the Conference was that it demonstrated that the three heavily-armed powers of Western Europe, England, France, and Italy, could still put up a united front in defence of the *status quo*.

The League Council duly met in April, and, after holding what Mr. J. L. Garvin called a "mock trial" of Germany, "unanimously" passed a resolution, sponsored by the "Stresa Powers" (Denmark the only League member abstaining) rebuk-

ing Germany for unilateral repudiation of her international obligations. Hitler was reported to be bitterly resentful against Britain for "deserting" him at Geneva, but his speech on 20 April, replying to the League resolution, was surprisingly mild. The League's failure to take appropriate action against Germany, however, at long last awakened the U.S.S.R. to the realities of the situation, and on 2 May, Litvinov signed with Laval a treaty of mutual assistance between France and the Soviet Union; and this was speedily extended to include Czechoslovakia (see also above, Chapter 10—Moscow's Western Orientation). For the moment it seemed that Hitler had received a check, for to the three "Stresa Powers" had now been linked the U.S.S.R.

THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT

Appearances are proverbially deceptive. Events were soon going to prove that the Stresa participants had not been frank to each other. Mussolini was definitely known for long to be planning an attack on Abyssinia but on this subject there was a veritable conspiracy of silence among the representatives of the powers at the Stresa Conference—the most charitable explanation of which was that the others were so anxious to win Mussolini over that they did not raise this controversial topic. England's mask was the soonest to fall to the ground; she was plainly jealous of the enhanced position of France through her alliances with Italy and the Soviet Union, and particularly fearful of the effects of the Franco-Italian combination on naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. Besides, the British public, assured by Premier Baldwin's declaration in Parliament on 28 November 1934, that German air strength was less than 50 per cent of British strength in Europe, had become panicky ever since they had come to know, what Hitler had told Simon, that it was equal to that of the British. About this time, too, the British Admiralty had come to know that, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the Germans had, about two years ago, begun the construction of two pocket battle-ships, the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, which turned out to be 26,000 ton light battle-cruisers or commerce-destroyers of the highest class. In June 1935—scarcely two months after Stresa—the British Government suddenly

announced that they had signed a naval agreement with Germany. The effective part of the bargain related to the Germans' promise to restrict their naval strength in all categories of ships (including submarines which were totally prohibited at Versailles) to 35 per cent of that of the British in return for British condonation of Germany's unilateral violation of the military clauses of the treaty.

The British action has been described as "a tribute to British common sense" and as a success in securing the limitation of German naval strength as contrasted with the French failure, due to lack of spirit of compromise, to make Germany agree to any disarmament in land forces. The gain to the British—of "the half loaf obtainable"—cannot be disputed, but it would have been less objectionable if it had been brought about by prior consultation with Italy and France. It was a violation of the agreement reached at Stresa that any release granted to Germany from the Versailles restrictions should be as part of a general settlement. By weakening the Stresa Front, Great Britain helped Hitler to do so, and, as his aider and abettor, became a sharer of Hitler's guilt of violating solemn treaty obligations. Finally, this retreat from Versailles, to be soon followed by others, made the Soviet dictator think again of the defence needs of the U.S.S.R., and, in particular to consider again the utility of the policy of Western orientation, which he had recently inaugurated.

THE ITALIAN REPUDIATION—ATTACK ON ABYSSINIA


Abyssinia or Ethiopia, a small land-locked state wedged in the mountainous country between Somaliland and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was the only independent country in East Africa. The greedy eyes of Italy, longing ever since her unification and independence for imperialist expansion, had for long fallen upon her and her natural wealth, which ranged from pineapples to platinum. It was specially vulnerable to an Italian attack because it lay between the two Italian East African possessions of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, and so could be attacked both from the north and the south. If conquered, it would round off the whole Italian East African empire. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Negus Negasti (King of Kings),

Menelik II (1889-1913), who claimed descent from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, succeeded in fighting off the Italian invaders, and winning from Italy and other European powers a recognition of Ethiopian independence.

Italian imperialist ambitions were revived under fascist rule, with its ideological glorification of the power of the state, and Mussolini, who, as we have seen, wanted to win for his country a commanding position in the Mediterranean, wanted to conquer Abyssinia, and, thereby, also wipe out the painful memories of the humiliating Italian defeat at Adowa (1896). (See also above, Chapter 8—Mussolini's Foreign Policy.) At first he tried diplomatic negotiation. In 1925 an agreement was arrived at with Great Britain, whereby the latter was to receive free water-rights in northern Ethiopia for the benefit of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, in return for her giving Italy a free hand in Ethiopia. This evoked an appeal to the League from Ethiopia who had been admitted to its membership in 1923 on the earnest advocacy of France and Italy, protesting against 'this foreign partitioning of "spheres of influence" within her territory and implied affront to her "sovereignty"'. The League contented itself with recording "explanations" from Great Britain and Italy which really did not explain. Mussolini's next move was to seek the favour of the Empress Zauditu, daughter of Menelik, who had come to the throne in 1916 after the deposition of the Emperor Lij Yasu, grandson of Menelik, and that of her Regent, who was a kinsman. In 1928, he succeeded in concluding with them a treaty, pledging "perpetual friendship" and arbitration of all disputes. But after the death of Zauditu and the accession to the throne of the Regent as the Emperor Haile Selassie, difficulties arose, as the latter refused his requests for exceptional favours and concessions.

Thereupon Mussolini decided that he must use force, even if this involved the flouting of the League of Nations and violation of existing treaties. Bereft of moral scruples himself, he had been encouraged by the way Japan and Germany had recently violated moral and legal obligations with perfect impunity, and Great Britain and France had acquiesced in the violations, and how the former had acted as the aider and abettor of them. At the moment, with Great Britain and France paying court to him and needing badly his co-operation

with them against Nazi Germany, he was in a strong position. As we have seen, Laval had possibly given him a free hand in Abyssinia in January 1935, or at least given him to understand that France was not interested in his Abyssinian plans if they did not clash with French interests. He knew from the con-



idential Maffey Committee Report, which the Italian Secret Service had succeeded in photographing in the British Embassy in Rome, that the British experts who were responsible for that report were not worried over Italian predominance in Abyssinia so long as the head waters of Lake Tsana were safe.

In accordance with established imperialist technique, Mussolini precipitated a number of border clashes between Italian and Abyssinian troops, to serve both as excuses for and as a prelude to an invasion of Abyssinia. After one such incident had happened at the village of Walwal on 5 December 1934, in which 30 Italian colonial troops were killed, Mussolini demanded compensation. Abyssinia asked for arbitration under her 1928

treaty with Italy, and, on the latter's refusal, appealed to the League Council under Article 11 of the Covenant (3 January, 1935). France and Britain, who were at this time engaged in wooing Musolini, succeeded in getting the hearing of the appeal postponed till the May session of the Council. The situation grew rapidly worse, and on 16 February, the Italian Government began to move troops into East Africa, leaving no room for doubt as to their aggressive intentions. On 16 March, Abyssinia made a second appeal to the League, this time under Article 15. England and France, gravely perturbed at Hitler's unilateral denunciation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, which occurred on the same day (16 March), adopted delaying tactics and even in the May session of the Council it was decided, on the plea that Mussolini had agreed to arbitration, to postpone action for a period of three months, and, in case settlement was not reached by 25 July, to meet again to discuss the matter. This suited the Italians perfectly, since, during the ensuing rainy season, military operations were not possible and military preparation could be completed. England and France at the same time laid an embargo on arms for both parties, which meant an unfair discrimination since Italy was already heavily armed and Abyssinia was very far from being so.

On 3 July, Emperor Haile Selassie, reading clearly the writing on the wall in Europe, made a desperate appeal to President Roosevelt, and requested him to find some way of making Italy observe her obligations under the Kellogg Pact, by which she had renounced war as an instrument of national policy. The appeal was promptly rejected by the American President at a press conference on 5 July, even before the text of the Abyssinian note had reached Washington, on the ground that the dispute was already being considered by the League of Nations. In due time the State Department reiterated the argument of President Roosevelt, adding that the U.S.A. "would be loath to believe" that either of the two governments "would resort to other than pacific means as a method of dealing with this controversy or would permit any situation which would be inconsistent with the commitments of the pact". This pious hope was contradicted on 6 July, when it became known that the American Government had advised all American citizens

in Ethiopia, numbering 125, most of them missionaries, to leave the country. The United States, which twice in the Hoover administration had invoked the Anti-war Pact—during the Sino-Soviet clash over the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929 and the Sino-Japanese conflict over Manchuria in 1931, both times without success—thus indicated that it no longer regarded the pact as a practical instrument for the prevention of war, and left the responsibility for the maintenance of peace to the League of Nations—which it refused to join.

The Council met on 31 July and again on 4 September. On 3 September, the Commission appointed to investigate the Walwal incident submitted its report, which exonerated both the parties. Meanwhile in England, Mr. Baldwin had replaced Mr. Macdonald, who had resigned, as Premier, and Sir Samuel Hoare, who as Secretary of State for India had successfully piloted a new constitution granting India provincial autonomy, had replaced Sir John Simon as Foreign Secretary. On 11 September, Hoare made his historic speech at Geneva, explaining his country's attitude towards the League of Nations, which, promising to inaugurate a new chapter in the chequered history of that institution, raised unprecedented enthusiasm throughout the world. He said :

"In conformity with its precise and explicit obligations, the League stands and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression. The attitude of the British nation in the last few weeks had demonstrated the fact that this is no variable and unreliable sentiment, but a principle of international conduct to which they and their government hold with firm, enduring and universal persistence.

"There, then, is the British attitude towards the Covenant. I cannot believe that it will be changed so long as the League remains an effective body and the main bridge between the United Kingdom and the Continent remains intact."

Two days later, Premier Laval, in an address to the Assembly pledged French support to the maintenance of the obligations of the League, and promised "close collaboration with Great

Britain for defence of peace and safeguarding Europe". He assured the Assembly that "France is faithful to the League Covenant. She cannot fail in her obligations The Covenant remains our international law." (By way of explanation it may be mentioned that the demonstration of the attitude of the British people referred to in Sir Samuel's speech above quoted was an allusion to the results of the so-called Peace Ballot, which was held in Britain in the latter part of 1934, and which was overwhelmingly in favour of Britain remaining a member of the League, and of the employment of sanctions, particularly of an economic nature, to resist aggression.) On 3 October, without a formal declaration of war, Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, and the League, at long last, took action. On 7 October, the League Council, unanimously, except for the delinquent, declared Italy to be the aggressor, and four days later the Assembly by a vote of 50 against only 4, viz. Austria, Hungary, Albania and Paraguay, who dissented, concurred in the view adopted by the Council. The Assembly immediately set up a Committee of Coordination of Measures under Article 16 (consisting of all League members except Italy), which in turn set up a Committee of Eighteen to act as its general staff. Acting with commendable speed by 19 October, the Coordination Committee adopted four measures, the combined effect of which was considerable :

- (1) the prohibition of the export to Italy of arms, ammunition and implements of war ;
- (2) the prohibition of loans, credits, issues of or subscriptions to "shares, or other capital flotations for any public authority, person or corporation in Italian territory" ;
- (3) the prohibition of the importation of Italian goods ;
- (4) the embargo on certain exports to Italy, including transport of animals, rubber, bauxite, iron ore, chromium, manganese, nickel, tungsten, and certain other key-minerals, together with tin and tin-ore.

The sanctions came into force on 18 November 1935. President Roosevelt operated the American Neutrality Laws, restricting trade in arms and ammunitions.

CAUSES OF THE LEAGUE'S FAILURE IN ABYSSINIA

So, at long last, the League had asserted itself, and named a Great Power, which had committed an act of aggression, an aggressor, and even applied sanctions against it. People all over the world felt enthusiastic, and keenly watched the developments. Great Britain stood ready for any eventualities, and adopted necessary measures for the protection of her fleet in the Mediterranean. She was known to have received an assurance from France to the effect that should the British navy be attacked by Italy while making preparations to apply League sanctions, France would come to her assistance. The failure to stop the aggressor from carrying out his fell purpose, after the League and its members had apparently done everything possible to prevent him from doing so naturally discredited and disgraced the League, which was never again trusted by any nation in the matter of anything that vitally concerned itself. In other words, the League was now a pronounced failure; yet the question may be asked, "Why this failure, or whose was this failure?"

According to expert opinion it should have been quite easy to frustrate Italy's aggression, for the strategic position was exceptionally easy. Once Mussolini's army had crossed over to Abyssinia, it had placed itself in a very dangerous position, it could be strangled to death quite easily, even without closing the Suez Canal, and if the Suez Canal were closed, the Italian army could be prevented from launching the aggression altogether. "If ever," says Mr. Churchill, "there was an opportunity of striking a decisive blow in a generous cause with the minimum of risk, it was here and now." As Mr. Toynbee (*Survey*, 1927, Vol. 1) has pointed out, the Abyssinian case was a more effective test for the League than the Manchurian case for a number of reasons. It occurred not at a time of acute economic crisis but when the world was already on the road to economic recovery. In the Abyssinian case the issue was clear and not sought to be obscured by an appeal to treaty rights as in the Manchurian affair. Nevertheless, League action was too slow, and when it came, was halting and timid. So far as application of sanctions was concerned, "it was lamentably short of the complete and general boycott visualized by the founders

of the League, or indeed of the minimum obligations under the letter of the Covenant". To mention only one omission, oil, which was vital and even indispensable for the Italian army, was never put under embargo. Oil sanctions, threatened Mussolini, would lead to war.

The truth is that England and France had decided that under no circumstances whatsoever they were going to have war with Italy. In this matter, Laval's position is more understandable than that of Hoare. The French had all along stood for a League having overwhelming military force at its command to make collective security a reality. The British had always opposed this conception of the League, wanting it to play the role of a mediator in a Europe, where it was possible for them to uphold this role of the League, because, as British foreign policy always insisted, there was a balance of power on the continent. Threatened by the rise of Nazi Germany as England was not, and despairing of British co-operation, France had, at long last, found a friend in the Fascist dictator, who likewise wanted French support in order to prevent Nazi Germany reaching the Brenner Pass, while England had just concluded a Naval Agreement with Hitler. It was idle to think that Laval saw with equanimity Italian invasion of Abyssinia; it would reduce the value of Italy as a military ally, besides threatening vital French economic interests, such as the French-owned Jibouti-Addis Ababa railway and the half share owned by the Bank of France in the rich gold and platinum mines of Abyssinia. If England now chose to uphold collective security, it was admittedly not for moral or altruistic considerations, but for her own vital interests, or, because it fell in with the needs of her traditional foreign policy, viz. insisting on the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe. France was not too eager to pull British chestnuts out of the fire, but she was prepared to co-operate with Britain in this particular case, because she could not safely dispense with British friendship altogether. Sir Samuel Hoare fully grasped the situation and, like Laval, did not want to go too far to defeat Mussolini, for, after all, Hitler's Germany was the real enemy and nothing must be done to weaken the anti-German front. (Templewood, *Nine Troubled Years*.) Besides, if it really came to war with Italy, Britain could not expect to receive any assistance from any

League member, not even France. A League war against Italy would really become Anglo-Italian war, pure and simple, and that would also mean the end of the League's collective security system. It has been suggested that, placed between two stools, British policy in the Abyssinian crisis met with disaster.

Hoare and Laval were agreed that, under the circumstances, some "face-saving measures," viz. some "innocuous sanctions" might be adopted, but, as Laval saw it, he must keep the favour of his new ally, and, as Hoare saw it England must not follow a course of action which would lead her to fighting Italy single-handed. So, why did Hoare go to Geneva and sound the call to arms against Italy? Mr. Toynbee's comments on the speech by Hoare at Geneva as well as Baldwin's declaration of Britain's loyalty to the League, are that "they were bluffing" or "deliberately throwing dust in the eyes of the world". A more charitable and also plausible explanation is that they were of opinion that Italy's military venture would either fail or be a long-drawn affair, and that in both cases a chastened Mussolini would come back to their bosom and be ever afterwards a trusted ally against Hitler and a firm believer in and upholder of the League's collective system.

The unexpected and speedy successes of the Italians upset all the calculations of Hoare and Laval, and that explains "the plan" that they together devised to "save" Abyssinia, (December 1935). "I believed, and I still believe, that the plan was the best possible, or, should I say, the least bad in the circumstances", asserts Templewood (Hoare) in his work to which a reference has been made above. The fact really is that, on account of the military successes of the Italians, oil sanctions could be no longer left out, and in spite of the blocking and delaying tactics of M. Laval, the project was shortly due to come for consideration. If the non-member states co-operated in the laying of an embargo on oil—and the U.S.A. was believed to be agreeable—the hostilities would come to a speedy termination. The plain fact was that Hoare and Laval, i.e. their two governments, never desired that the Abyssinian episode should have such a termination. In the name of an "exchange of territories" and providing to Italy a "zone of economic expansion and settlement", Hoare and Laval, accordingly, fabricated their infamous "plan". They proposed thereby to

reward the aggressor with more territory than had yet been invaded by his troops, giving to Abyssinia the sop of a passage to the sea through British Somaliland. On 9 December, that is, three days before the League Committee was scheduled to meet for discussing fresh sanctions, the plan was disclosed in two Parisian dailies, and there was a storm of indignation in Britain over what was justly considered as a shameful betrayal of Abyssinia. Hoare resigned, and the plan was abandoned.

The rest of the story is soon told. The League Council met on 20 January, and again on 2 March 1936, to consider oil sanction, but failed to adopt it. Left to her fate, Abyssinia succumbed to the brutal might of Italy, who used the prohibited mustard gas, and on 2 May, the Emperor left his capital, which was already being subjected to gas attacks, and was occupied by the Italian troops a few days later. On 8 May, the King of Italy was proclaimed Emperor, and the entire country officially annexed to Italy. On 30 June, the Emperor of Abyssinia (Haile Selassie) personally attended a meeting of the Assembly, and, after reviewing the course of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, and narrating the miseries of his people, asked: "What reply have I to take back to my people?" The Assembly's answer, which was delivered by the delegates of the small as well as the Big Powers was that the Abyssinian question, long regarded as dead, now only needed some kind of a burial. On 2 July, the Assembly rejected the Abyssinian request for a loan, and declared that it remained firmly attached to the principles of the Covenant and other documents "excluding the settlement of territorial questions by force"—thus leaving every member of the League free to decide for itself whether it would recognize Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. It also recommended the adoption of measures leading to the lifting of the sanctions, which was formally done on 4 July "in the most depressing session it had ever held". In May 1937, the Emperor of Abyssinia, among other crowned heads, was invited to participate in the coronation festivities in London. The curtain fell in May 1938, when the Council decided that each member should settle for itself the question of the recognition of the new status of Ethiopia.

The Abyssinian affair had far-reaching effects on the international situation in Europe. The destruction of the Stresa Front

emboldened Hitler to fresh acts of aggression since he was now convinced that he could have his way without opposition from the Western Powers. It did not help Mussolini too because he could not now dare oppose Hitler's absorption of Austria, and, more and more, had to accept the overtures of Hitler for an alliance with Nazi Germany. The eclipse of the League was a loss to England and France, for the additional security, however uncertain, promised to them under the League Covenant, was also to be denied to them. No victim, or prospective victim, of aggression, neither Austria, nor Czechoslovakia, nor Finland, hereafter thought it worth while to invoke the provisions of the League Covenant for security. Besides expelling Russia on 14 December 1939, for aggression against Finland, the League did not take any action against any aggressor, and remained a passive spectator of wars and annexations that took place in Europe and elsewhere.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PRELUDE TO WAR

MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN AND THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT

WE HAVE noted in the last chapter that in Britain, France and the U.S.A., there were political groups and leaders who thought that the League method of maintaining collective security had been given enough trial and been found wanting and that peace could be better assured by direct contact and settlement with the Dictators. Many of these groups and politicians had every sympathy for the Dictators—believing that they were national leaders whose only sin was their patriotism—and were convinced that they could and should be pacified if their just grievances—which, thought they, were strictly limited to the satisfaction of legitimate nationalist claims—were remedied. There were, however, some politicians in both France and Britain, who went beyond this and professed an ardent faith in the policies and even methods of the Dictators, believing them to be the only safeguards of European society and culture—of course as viewed from their own conservative standpoint—against Communism. A handful of these were to turn out to be traitors to their respective countries and collaborationists of the German invaders during the crisis of the Second World War. But the majority of them were sincere politicians who abhorred war and were determined to keep the peace at any or almost any price, and believed either that the policy of pacifying the Dictators, which their political opponents sneeringly called “appeasement” was likely to have results, or that in any case—under the circumstances—it was the only policy open to them to follow. Perhaps they thought too that, if it could not avert war, it would surely put it off and so enable them to strengthen their military defences, or, who knew, delaying often meaning denying, do so indefinitely. They thought too that once their demands had been substantially met and fears allayed, the Dictators could be persuaded to accept a reasonable

scheme of disarmament and would once again become active members of a contented family of nations.

We have discussed the question (see Chapter 10 and 11) how far Hitler's aims could be believed to be confined to the satisfaction of Germany's nationalist claims as he himself interpreted them, and how far they were at all realizable, in view of the fact that they were in sharp conflict with the perfectly legitimate claims of other nations. The time certainly is not yet when a correct appraisal can be made of Hitler's personality and his policy—we are too near him in time to have a proper perspective—but if we could assume that he was a political leader with a clear vision wanting to lead his nation to an honourable position in the family of nations, even to one of security, strength and glory unequalled in the world, it could be believed that with patience and perseverance a reasonable settlement could be arrived at with him. Such, or nearly such, was indeed the broad impression formed by Mr. Neville Chamberlain of Hitler at the end of his first interview with him at Berchtesgaden, for he wrote about him as follows: "In spite of the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face, I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word." Mr. Chamberlain, of course, revised his opinion of Hitler shortly afterwards, and accused him of bad faith, as Hitler also accused him of bad faith, and Mr. Chamberlain even went to the length of calling him a mad man (a paranoiac).

The policy of appeasement did not originate with Mr. Chamberlain, and it is worth mentioning that when he was Chancellor or the Exchequer in Mr. Baldwin's cabinet, he was a strong supporter of Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, who believed that Great Britain had only to show her sharp leonine teeth to the Dictators to frighten them away. It was Mr. Chamberlain, who, finding that the teeth were not there, attempted to supply them by making liberal budgetary provision for Britain's rearmament programme. But after he became the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain adopted the policy of appeasement, and became an out and out advocate of every measure, no matter the sacrifices it involved for Britain and other countries, if it could help preserve peace. It has been said that Mr. Chamberlain, a hard-headed businessman, who

had no great experience of international affairs, approached the desperate situation in Europe with the common sense of the lay businessman. Already in Mr. Baldwin's regime, British policy had become "a Foreign Office affair without any popular basis of understanding and support". Mr. Chamberlain made it almost a personal affair; he carried it on as far as possible by personal contacts with foreign politicians and collected his data from reports of personal friends, like Lord Runciman, whom he sent to Czechoslovakia, and, who, like himself, had little practical training in the conduct of foreign affairs. He quickly tired of Mr. Eden, who had set views on many subjects, which Mr. Chamberlain had now discarded, and chose, as his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, (the ex-Viceroy Lord Irwin) who was also a man without much knowledge of international affairs. An empirical approach to problems—a patient, cautious, piecemeal handling of questions—naturally appealed to Englishmen; and Mr. Chamberlain, studying the situation for himself and with a bull-dog tenacity characteristic of the race pursuing peace, had a large following both in the House of Commons and the country at large, who wished him Godspeed. With the Liberal-Laborite Opposition in Parliament hamstrung in their opposition to him on account of their previous resistance to rearmament (and with a strong pacifist wing led by George Lansbury, Mr. Chamberlain had a free hand to implement his own chosen policy, and he made his best efforts to carry it out till the very last moment when war broke out. He played both for peace and for time, and, whatever may be the judgment of posterity on his "umbrella-politics" (Mr. Chamberlain was the cartoonists' Man with the Umbrella), his claim to have secured some time before the inevitable war broke out for putting the state of England's defences in better order rests on a stronger basis. It has been said, however, that if his policy was simply to put off war and gain time for rearmament, the Dictators also gained time thereby, and it is a moot question whether if the war had come earlier—before Munich—the western alliance (with the U.S.S.R. still probably adhering to it) would not have been found stronger by Hitler.

THE END OF LOCARNO

On 7 March 1936, Hitler, in the course of an address delivered by him at the Reichstag, announced Germany's denunciation of the Rhineland demilitarization clauses of the Versailles and Locarno treaties, and the offer of a sixpoint treaty to be signed with France and Belgium, with Britain and Italy as its guarantors. As he was speaking, German troops, described as "symbolic units", but consisting of nineteen infantry battalions and thirteen military sections, were goose-stepping into the area in the midst of great popular enthusiasm. Hitler's violation of the treaties was sought to be justified by his charge that France had violated it earlier by concluding a pact with the Soviet Union, May 1935, ratified on 27 February 1936, against his protests. The British public's reaction to the incident was best expressed in Lord Lothian's remark: "After all, they are going into their own back-garden." The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, speaking in the House of Commons, condemned the unilateral violation of treaties, but added that the British Government would "clear-sightedly and objectively" examine Hitler's new proposals. The French Government was unable to act resolutely, for Hitler had timed his action well—at the moment a minority government was in office—but even they strongly condemned what they called the "brutal" contempt of law displayed by Germany. General Gamelin was of opinion that he would require 400,000 men to occupy the Rhineland, obviously not knowing that the German generals had opposed the occupation, and Hitler had handed them a written order to evacuate the Rhineland without firing a shot if the French mobilized and crossed the frontier.

The League Council registered its formal finding that Germany had violated both the Treaty of Locarno and the Treaty of Versailles, but no action was recommended, or adopted. The general feeling was that, whatever the legal position on the question of Germany's violating the treaties, or France's violating it earlier, as Germany alleged, by concluding the Franco-Soviet Pact, on the principle of equality, which Hitler had invoked, a demilitarized zone should have been applied equally to the French and Belgian sides of the western border. But both France and Belgium had made this virtually impossible

by proceeding with the erection of enormous fortifications, "Treaties which violate fundamental considerations of justice or prove economically unbearable cannot be indefinitely maintained", observed Mr. Raymond Leslie Buell, a neutral American writer. He pointed out that the Second French Republic had in 1848 issued a manifesto denouncing the peace treaties of 1814-15 in much the same terms as Nazi Germany employed on 7 March 1936. The point, which, strangely enough, was not taken due cognizance of at the time was that the remilitarization of the Rhineland enabled Hitler to build his "Siegfried Line" of strong fortifications of Germany's western frontier, which was to serve as a shield behind which his next steps in aggression in south-eastern Europe might be prepared. By one stroke, he had made Germany more secure, France more vulnerable, Czechoslovakia, whom France had guaranteed, less sure of receiving immediate succour from her in case of attack by Germany, besides striking one more blow at the Versailles Treaty. At home, the generals were confounded, and had to acknowledge that his intuition was superior to their expert knowledge. Above all, the acquiescence of Britain and France in Germany's violation of the Treaty of Versailles once again raised doubts in the mind of the Russian Dictator as to the real motives of the Western Powers. Hitler declared that the fact that he constructed the Siegfried Lines at an enormous expense proved that he had accepted the western boundary of Germany as permanent, and that he did not threaten France. Was this not enough evidence, thought Stalin, that the West now freed Hitler's hands for carrying out his plans for German expansion at the expense of the U.S.S.R.?

THE PRELUDE TO WAR—SEMI-CIVIL AND CIVIL WARS

In many countries of Europe, which had not, like Russia, Italy, and Germany actually gone through revolutions, there were at this time dangerous social tensions, producing sharp rivalries among groups, professing diverse and contending ideologies rooted in divergent economic and cultural interests, which threw them into a state of disorder and confusion as much as in countries actually passing through revolution. These

internal tensions, transferred to the international plane, produced international tensions, and they acted and reacted on each other. Nowhere was this linking of internal strifes to international tensions more evident than in the history of Spain between 1936 and 1939, when the country experienced a civil war, which was both an international war in miniature and a prelude to and rehearsal of it. We shall presently deal with the subject, but before we do so it is necessary to give some idea of the semi-civil-wars, which were at the very time going on in some other countries, and producing the same effect on the international situation, and though not so glaringly as the Spanish Civil War, served as so many preludes to the Second World War.

In France, in 1935-36, as we have seen in Chapter 6, conditions resembling those in Italy before the advent of Mussolini prevailed, and so sharp were the animosities among organized groups that the emergence of a dictator was a definite possibility. The situation was, however, saved by the coalescence of all democratic and leftist groups, parliamentarians, syndicalists, socialists, and even communists in a *Front Populaire* which swept the polls in April-May 1936, and formed a government with Leon Blum as Premier. The improvements effected by the latter in the Matignon Agreement roused the ferocious hostility of the Rightists, and the Senate twice refused to grant him the plenary powers they had given to a past premier, Doumergue, a septuagenarian ex-president, who had been hailed into office as "Cincinnatus" and done something to cleanse the Augean stables. The most sensational discovery of 1937 was the plot of the Hooded Men (*Cagouleurs*), a sort of French version of Ku Klux-Klan, who were responsible for the murder of the Rosselli brothers, Italian anti-Fascist journalists, and other acts of violence.

In Belgium, about the same time, an influential fascist group, led by Degrelle, introduced an unwonted violence and vulgarity into Belgian public life. Without having at this time any active sympathy for Nazi Germany, they opposed Belgium's alliance with France, on the ground of the latter's alleged communist leanings, and demanded that France break with Russia. Under their influence, the Belgian Government announced the reversal of Belgium to her former status of a

neutral state like Switzerland (14 October 1936). The British and French Governments, accordingly, "released" Belgium from her Locarno Agreements while retaining their own guarantees of the country's inviolability. The Belgian action could be considered as a "defection", since it implied that Belgian territory and the air space above would not be available to powers engaged in resisting aggression under Article 16 of the Covenant, or the Locarno Agreements.

In Rumania, chiefly because of the failure of the government to pull the country out of the abyss of economic miseries prevailing since the World Economic Depression, a fascist party, known as the Iron Guard, led by Corneliu Codreanu, was formed, who, true to the type of Italian Blackshirts and Nazi storm-troopers, organized attacks on parliamentary politicians, Jews and workers. King Carol, as we have seen, (Chapter 5—Rumania) tried to crush them, without much success, and at the end of 1938, established a dictatorship of his own. In Poland, in 1937, there was open conflict between the government, which had been recently re-organized on the fascist model as a "Camp of National Unity" and peasants and workers, and civil war was avoided only by the former's promise of electoral reforms. In Czechoslovakia also, as we have seen, (Chapter 5), dictatorial trends had appeared, and the minorities, specially the Sudetans, who were helped by Germany, were on the war-path.

It was, however, in Spain that these trends—internal tensions projecting into international rivalries and the two acting and reacting on each other—appeared most clearly and reached their most tragic climax. A civil war, which began in Spain on 18 July 1936, out of purely local rivalries, became converted into a miniature international war on account of the intervention on behalf of both sides of foreign powers, who were shortly afterwards to lock themselves in a deadly combat with each other in the Second World War. Spain became the cockpit of the fights of international fascist and communist interests, and the Spanish people were thus in a real sense the first victims of the Second World War. In the present day terminology, it was a fight between two opposing international power-blocs, each attempting, in its own interests, to convert Spain into a satellite. The idea had already grown that each

protagonist—Soviet Russia on the one side and Italy and Germany on the other—had the right and was in duty bound to help a state, specially a small nation like Austria or Spain, whose political organization was based on its own model, or where an active group drawing its inspiration from its own ideology was found to be working to convert that state into its satellite. On this principle, the U.S.S.R. had helped China, and Germany the Austrian Nazis, but so far they had not simultaneously helped contending parties engaged in a civil war against each other in any country.

In 1936, Mussolini, fresh from his victories in Abyssinia, which strengthened Italian naval power at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, which, as we have seen, he claimed to be the Italian Sea, was anxious to extend this power to the other, or the western end. Intervention in the Spanish Civil War on behalf of the rebels, who were fighting to establish an authoritarian regime in place of the republican form of government prevailing in that country was, moreover, interpreted by him and by Hitler, as their fight against Communism. Likewise, the U.S.S.R., hoping to protect herself against Germany and Japan, had recently adopted a "popular front" foreign policy, which promised to help her spread her influence in the democratic countries and utilize them for her own ends. The victory of the *Front Populaire* in the elections of April-May, 1936 and the establishment of the Ministry of Leon Blum had made France amenable to communist infiltration and influence. So, too, in Spain, as the result of the elections held in February 1936, the Popular Front, composed of Radicals, socialists and communists, secured a majority of seats in the new parliament; President Alcala Zamora was driven out of office and replaced by Azana; and the new Radical Government seemed to be unwilling or unable to restrain their communist and anarchist allies from burning churches and monasteries, murdering priests, and terrorizing anyone suspected to be of reactionary sentiments.

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

Though Spain was neutral during the First World War, she nonetheless went through severe troubles during and imme-

diately after the war, like the war-devastated countries of Europe, and in 1923 a dictatorial regime was established by General Primo de Rivera, who had won his spurs by quelling a rebellion in Morocco led by the Riff leader, Abdel Krim. In 1930, the general, tired of his task of establishing order in the country, resigned. Next year, the King, Alfonso XIII, abdicated and a republic was proclaimed. A National Assembly decreed a theoretically perfect constitution for the young republic, and, instead of dissolving itself after the task for which it had been convened was finished, namely, framing a constitution, it continued for two years during which it passed a series of laws intended to fortify democracy, e.g. decreeing nationalization of the church property, confiscation of the estates of the nobles, etc. During the first two years the government was in the hands of the liberal intellectuals and socialists, who passed a series of laws designed to implement the radical policy initiated by the Constituent Assembly. These were considered too sweeping by the adherents of the vested interests and too slow by the masses, and aroused violent controversies. In October 1934, a series of provincial insurrections broke out, chiefly supported by the socialists and the communists, but they were crushed by the government's forces.

The victory of the *Front Populaire* precipitated the national crisis. On 15 March 1936, the army chiefs issued an ultimatum to President Azana, threatening that unless the civil authorities took effective measures to quell the disorders, the military would take the matter into their own hands. The government, suspecting the fidelity of the military leaders, retired a number of officers, and transferred many others to distant posts. Among the latter was General Franco, who was "exiled" to the Canary Islands.

The signal for the outbreak of the Civil War was the murder by the Madrid fascists of a policeman on the evening of 12 July 1936, and the murder, in retaliation, of the Spanish Fascist leader, Calvo Sotelo, by the police on the following day. Four days later, General Franco flew to Morocco, and with the backing of the Foreign Legion, made himself master of the territory. Within a few days, garrisons under the leaders of prominent generals in all parts of Spain itself rose into mutiny. In July, Franco proclaimed a military rebellion, and crossed

into Spain with an army composed largely of Moorish troops. He overran southern and western Spain, and in the middle of November, advanced to the suburbs of the capital, Madrid, which was saved from seizure by the Popular Militia of workers, which had been improvised thanks to the superhuman efforts of the government.

Meanwhile, in September, President Azana had set up a dictatorship under the premiership of Largo Caballero, a stone mason and a fanatical left-wing socialist with communist leanings. The latter admitted the communists into his government, and also obtained important help from the Soviet Union, whose attention, as we have seen above, had been already drawn to Spain as a prospective satellite. Moreover, under communist auspices, "international brigades" were formed in many countries, including the U.S.A., where the "Abraham Lincoln" brigade was formed, and rushed to Spain "to defend the Republic", while leading communists, trained in Moscow and including the now-famous Tito of Yugoslavia and Dimitrov of Bulgaria, took an active part as aides to Caballero. On their side, the rebels sought and obtained immense help from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, which, along with Portugal, recognized their government in November 1936. In this way, the Spanish Civil War became converted into an international contest between Russia on one side and Italy and Germany on the other. And, as Britain and France were supposed to be sympathetic to the Republican Government of Spain, the contest was in appearance one between "democracy" and Fascism.

Anglo-French sympathy for the Spanish Republic was, however, prevented from having any tangible manifestation, for the two countries were afraid that if they actively helped the government, Germany and Italy would be provided with the excuse they wanted for giving still greater help to Franco. Nor were they willing to offend Franco, who, for ought they knew, might succeed, and both Great Britain and France had material interests in Spain. A hostile Spain might block, because of her possession of Majorca, the sea-routes between France and her African possessions, and might also require her to provide for the defence of the Pyrenees frontier. Similarly, Spanish Morocco and the Balearic Islands might be used by Franco

Spain's fascist friends to interfere with British imperial communications in time of war. Britain also had large capital investments in Spain. Britain and France also feared "the red communist thread in the texture of Spanish democracy".

Acting in close concert with each other Great Britain and France took upon themselves the role of neutrals, and placed an embargo on the supply of war material to both sides of the Civil War. They then invited all European countries to follow their example, and to form a Non-Intervention Committee in London to supervise the working of the agreement. But soon the two parties and their foreign supporters began to accuse each other of violations of the agreement, and with good reason, because neither Russia nor Italy and Germany desisted from sending help to their proteges in Spain. The Non-Intervention Committee was soon reduced to a farce, and the despatch of war materials and troops to the two sides was not only vastly increased in volume but quite openly done. The preponderance of foreign help was on the side of Franco, for his friends, Italy and Germany were near, and Russia was far off. In addition to technicians, planes, submarines, etc. Germany supplied to him an army unit of about 15,000 men. Italy transported 100,000 troops between December 1936 and mid-April 1937, sent an air force with more than 6,000 men and supplied 4,370 trucks, tanks and automobiles, 750 cannon, and 40,000 tons of ammunition.

From the middle of 1937, the tide of war began to turn in favour of the rebels. This was due to better generalship, and to the rebels' superiority in air power, thanks to German help. The common people of Spain, who supported the Republican Government at the cost of tremendous sacrifices, suffered heavily—the casualties were a million dead and exiles—for the Spanish Civil War was waged with a ferocity and brutality unheard of even in the history of civil wars. Much more serious was the loss of freedom—which in the days of their power they had not perhaps used too well—and subjection to fascist tyranny. In January 1939, Barcelona, the main republican stronghold, fell, and in the following March, Madrid. By the 29th of the month, the whole of Spain was in Franco's possession and the Civil War came to an end after two years and 254 days of bitter fighting.

The accession of Spain to the fascist camp could not be regarded as a great material gain to the latter : Spain took no significant part in the power-struggle in Europe, and during the Second World War, though causing infinite anxiety to the Allies, she remained a neutral throughout—whatever might have been Franco's commitments to his patrons. Nor did it mean much material loss to France and Britain, and so far as the immediate present was concerned, the latter at least was assured—that partially explains her strange attitude during the Civil War—that war-devastated Spain would need the help of her capital to rehabilitate herself. But Franco's victory immensely raised the prestige of the fascist powers and lowered the colours of the democracies. It is worth stating that the Spanish Civil War, despite the assertions of partisans, was not a battle royal between fascist and communist forces in Europe : of the protagonists only Italy was heavily committed in the fighting in Spain. But it certainly emboldened the Dictators, specially Hitler, to go ahead with his aggressive designs, though it is too much to say that the events which followed, viz. the seizure of Austria, the conquest of Czechoslovakia, etc. were its immediate outcome. But it had some appreciable effect on the formation of rival groups in Europe, as we shall see presently.

THE SHIFTING OF BALANCE OF POWER—THE ROME-BERLIN-TOKYO AXIS

While the Spanish conflict was in progress, Mr. Neville Chamberlain succeeded Mr. Stanley Baldwin as Premier of Great Britain (May 1937). Mr. Chamberlain, as we have seen, gave up the foreign policy which his predecessor was following, which was indeed Britain's traditional policy of trying to preserve a balance of power among the states of the Continent and preventing anyone among them from becoming too powerful. Though the policy which Mr. Chamberlain adopted was dubbed "appeasement" by his critics, Mr. Chamberlain was, as we have seen, no arm-chair pacifist, and pushed on with rearmament. He, however, was opposed to the idea of coming into a headlong clash with the Dictators which, he thought, the policy which Mr. Eden advocated was sure to lead to in the immediate future. The latter policy had been discredited by

the failure of sanctions against Italy, at least as adopted by the League of Nations under the influence of Hoare, and by the refusal of other countries, even France, to back it up by force. Mr. Chamberlain recognized that if the conditions of 1934-35 could be restored, in concrete terms, if Mussolini could be brought back to the Stresa mood, a certain balance of power could be once again built up. Much water had, however, flown down the Tiber since the days when Mussolini had sent his troops to the Brenner Pass to save Austria from Hitler; he had been embittered against France and England by the sanctions, and he had found that he could successfully co-operate with Hitler in Spain; he had indeed gone too far from his old allies and to seek new ones, to be able to turn back, even if he had the wish to do so.

Hitler had earned Mussolini's gratitude by announcing Germany's neutrality during the Abyssinian conflict, and by refusing to join in the imposition of sanctions against Italy. Mussolini returned favour for favour by remaining, though a guarantor of Locarno, publicly uninterested when Hitler tore up the treaty and invaded the Rhineland. His daughter and son-in-law, who had become violent Germano-phils, kept pressing him to improve his relations with Hitler. In June 1936, Mussolini sent his daughter for a visit to the *Reich*, and the lady, magnificently feted by the Nazis, came back with her admiration for them redoubled. At the end of the month General Valle visited the German Air Corps, and in July a mission of German officers lunched in Rome. Nevertheless, the two sides behaved cautiously to each other, and, slowly, the Germans gained ground. The signing of the Austro-German Agreement of July 1936 was the first concrete outcome of the improvement in the relations of the two Dictators. Actually, however, the agreement was more to Hitler's advantage than to Mussolini's, because, for a little loss of prestige only, Hitler removed Italian fears about the *Anschluss*, while he could now proceed with the programme for the Nazification of Austria without encountering opposition from Italy. His co-operation with Hitler in their joint intervention in Spain also showed to Mussolini the advantage to be gained by an alliance with the latter. But here also the partnership was really more advantageous to Hitler than to him. Mussolini was more active in

his support of Franco than Hitler. Hitler used the battlefields of the Civil War as proving-grounds for his planes, tanks and other war material. Thus, while Hitler waxed in strength, Mussolini wore himself out.

It was his Mediterranean policy which brought Mussolini into serious clash with the British, and it was most responsible for his final breach with them. He asserted that the Mediterranean was Italy's *vita* (life), while it was England's *via* (way) only. Italy, said he, was England's prisoner in her own sea—"the Roman Sea", as he called it. The British refused to accept this view; they asserted that it was not a "short cut" but "a main arterial road" for them; and they were alarmed at the increase of Italian naval power in the Mediterranean. The British Government, accordingly, sought to improve their position in the Mediterranean by signing a treaty of alliance with Egypt, (see above, Chapter 5) whereby they recognized Egyptian independence, and agreed to remove all troops except a guard for the Suez Canal—thus removing the fear of a hostile Egypt, which might become a tool of Italian diplomacy (1936). Moreover, at an international conference held at Montreaux on 20 July 1936, a new convention regulating the regime of the Dardanelles was signed, which altered the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean to Italy's distinct disadvantage. Italy found that she had now to take into consideration a new potential adversary in the east, viz. the U.S.S.R., since, under this Convention, the Soviet navy was permitted to issue from its protected haven in the Black Sea in time of peace, or during a League war against an aggressor.

The result of the developments mentioned above was the signing at Berchtesgaden on 25 October 1936 of a protocol between Italy and Germany, which was a fitting sequel to the visit to Germany of Mussolini's son-in-law, Count Ciano, now the Italian Foreign Minister. Germany recognized Italy's Abyssinian empire, in return for which she was to receive some economic concessions. The two powers declared their resolve to maintain the territorial and colonial integrity of Spain (a sop to the democracies), to defend European civilization against Communism, work towards the conclusion of a new Locarno pact which would exclude Russia, as a basis of European peace, and co-operate economically in the Danubian region.

Speaking about this Rome-Berlin Pact before a rally of the Blackshirts of Milan, Mussolini declared it to be "an axis round which all European States animated by the will for collaboration and for peace may collaborate". The solidarity of the Rome-Berlin Axis was given a spectacular expression during the four-day visit paid to Munich and Berlin (September 1937) by Mussolini. "Tomorrow," said he in the course of a speech in Berlin, "all Europe will be Fascist; one hundred fifteen million men will arise, joined together in an unshakable faith." M. Poncet, the French Ambassador at Berlin, who was an eye-witness, has recorded that immediately the *Duce* finished these words, a fierce storm broke out; there were bursts of thunder and flashes of lightning, and it seemed as if "the very elements warned mankind of what evils the mating of the dictators was to let loose on mankind". (M. Andre Francois-Poncet, *The Fateful Years*, p. 246.)

A month after the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis (in November 1936), Germany and Japan had signed an Anti-Comintern Pact, by which they declared their resolve to fight Communism and the Comintern. So far as the language went, it was not directed against Russia but against Communism and the Third International. A year later Italy also adhered to it with the result that the Rome-Berlin Axis now became the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. It was not a formal or a military alliance, but all the same conveyed a distinct warning to all concerned that the three powers had now resolved to work as an aggressor group—an inference also to be drawn from the fact that all the three had resigned their membership of the League of Nations (Italy left the League on 11 December). Japan's linking herself to the two aggressor states in Europe was, first of all, a warning that a change had taken place in her domestic politics, viz. the ascendancy of the militarist faction, headed by Generals Koiso and Tojo, which meant, in foreign policy, that she was no longer satisfied with Manchuria but wanted to conquer all China. In July 1937, following some irregular fighting at the Marco Polo Bridge in the outskirts of Peiping, Japan's full-scale aggression on China actually began. This alarmed the Soviet Union, which concluded a Non-Aggression Pact with the Chinese leader, General Chiang Kaishek, in August 1937.

Such was the international scene when Mr. Chamberlain succeeded Mr. Baldwin as Premier (May 1937). He shared the Conservatives' distrust of Soviet Russia, and promptly set about repairing the damage caused to Anglo-Italian relations by the policy pursued by Britain during the Abyssinian conflict. Already on 2 January 1937, a Gentleman's Agreement had been concluded between Great Britain and Italy in which each had recognized that the other had vital national interests in the Mediterranean. Mr. Chamberlain wrote friendly letters to Mussolini, hoping through him to improve relations with Hitler. On 15 June, it was announced that Baron von Neurath, the Nazi Foreign Minister, had accepted an invitation to visit London. On 25 June, Mr. Eden stated in the House of Commons that in order to keep his country at peace he was prepared for "peace at almost any price". Nevertheless, the Germans called off Neurath's visit, taking umbrage, it was said, at certain comments on the subject in the British press, which indicated that a section of the cabinet, headed by Eden, was opposed to the visit. On 12 November 1937, behind Mr. Eden's back, Mr. Chamberlain sent Lord Halifax, the Lord President of the Council, on a visit to Berlin. At his trial at Nuremberg, Ribbentrop stated that during his visit Halifax had given Hitler to understand that if Germany annexed Austria, England would not offer any opposition. But the visit was not considered a success and Mr. Chamberlain again turned to Mussolini. In this policy, Mr. Chamberlain was supported by nearly all his colleagues, with the exception of Mr. Eden, the *enfant terrible* of his cabinet, who wanted to stand up to the Dictators. To please Mussolini, Mr. Chamberlain accepted Mr. Eden's resignation and appointed Lord Halifax as the Foreign Secretary (20 February 1938). This smoothed the way for the conclusion of an agreement between Italy and Britain, which was finally signed in April 1938. In return for Italy's promise to withdraw from Spain "as soon as practicable", Britain promised to use her influence with the League of Nations to secure general recognition of Italy's conquest of Abyssinia. The agreement showed to what humiliating lengths Mr. Neville Chamberlain could carry his policy of appeasement.

THE ANNEXATION OF AUSTRIA

The international scene was now fully set for the launching by Hitler of his policy of aggression. Through the Axis and Anti-Comintern agreements, Germany was in close friendship with Italy, Japan, and Spain. The Non-Aggression Pact with Poland acted as a buffer against the Soviet Union in the east as the newly constructed Siegfried Lines protected him against France in the west. Whether it was correct or not, as Ribbentrop alleged, that he had received through Halifax the British Government's blue signal for Austria, he was sure that both Britain and France were too anxious to keep out of war to interfere with the carrying out of his plans. At home, too, luck had favoured him; he first compelled General Blomberg, who had married his typist-secretary, whom the police declared to be a former prostitute, to retire, and then, when Himmler brought a dirty accusation against General Fritsch, forced him to resign; Hitler then assumed personal command of all the armed forces of the *Reich*, and exacted from the *Reichswehr* a personal oath of allegiance.

There was no project which was dearer to Hitler personally or which called for his more urgent attention than the *Anschluss*. It might be considered as the last remaining of the "shackles" of Versailles, which had put a virtual ban upon it. Austria was Hitler's home; it was a German land, and so, according to Nazi theory, an indispensable part of a reconstructed Greater German *Reich* and of a *Lebensraum* for the German people. This time Hitler made no bones about his job; on 11 February 1938, he summoned the Austrian Chancellor, Schuschnigg, to meet him at his mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden, and there at the end of a conversation protracted far into the night, made him agree to admit a Nazi into his cabinet. A Trojan horse thus admitted inside the gates, the fall of the citadel could not be long delayed. Schuschnigg vainly appealed to Mussolini, now deeply involved in Spain and, also otherwise, too strongly bound to Hitler's chariot, and finding no response made desperate attempts to save his country's independence. He even made his peace with the Austrian socialists, and declaring in a passionate speech delivered at the Federal Diet on 24 February that "Austria must

remain Austria", announced a snap plebiscite for 13 March on the issue of Austrian independence. "And if you want to hear it," said he, "I trust in the good Lord who will not forsake our country Until death: Red-White-Red. Austria!"

On 11 March, Seyss-Inquart, the Austrian Nazi leader, whom, according to the Berchtesgaden demand, Schuschnigg appointed to be the Minister of the Interior, forced the latter to resign, after extorting from him a promise that the plebiscite was cancelled, and got President Miklas to appoint him Chancellor (12 April). The new Chancellor then "invited" the German army to invade Austria and put down the disorders. On the same day Austria was occupied by the Germans, who this time had no fear that Mussolini would contest their passage; for meanwhile, Hitler had received a message from the Italian Dictator saying that Austria was "immaterial" to him, and he had flashed back his reply on the hot wire: "Mussolini, I will never forget it." Hitler reached Vienna on 14 March, Austria became Ostmark, and on 10 April, a plebiscite was held, and by an almost unanimous vote the union was ratified. "Thus died Austria." Schuschnigg was imprisoned and subjected to gross ill-treatment. Besides the material gains—an addition of 7 million Austrians (Germans) to the *Reich's* population of 66 million Germans, mines, metallurgical works, the gold reserves of the Austrian National Bank, etc.—Hitler secured important strategic advantages, viz. road, rail, and river communications of the Middle Danubian valley, and direct contacts with Italy, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Above all, his hands were now freed for the affairs of the Sudetan Germans. The conquest of Austria made Germany's boundaries run along nearly half of that of Czechoslovakia but otherwise did not alter the strategic position very much, since a German attack from the south, which the annexation of Austria had exposed, was not, from the military point of view, a safe proposition. (Churchill, *Second World War*, Vol. 1, p. 252.)

THE END OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Lord Palmerston, who was a vehement critic of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, calling it by the name of "European China", "Old Woman" (Swami Vivekananda said that if

Turkey was the Sick Man of Europe, Austria-Hungary was the Sick Woman), had once remarked that if there were no Austria-Hungary, it would have to be created. A principal result of the First World War and of the Peace Treaties was the destruction of the political and economic set-up of the Danubian region, which the Habsburg empire had built up. According to President Benesh of Czechoslovakia, the Little Entente was an effort to restore the lost equilibrium of the Danubian region (see above, Chapter 5—The Little Entente). As such it stood for the preservation and stabilization of the post-war *status quo*, which was sheer anathema to the Germans. Czechoslovakia, as the leader of the Little Entente, thus became Nazi Germany's Public Enemy No. 1. Apart from this, being the most industrialized among the Little Entente States and having also industries which competed with and some of which even rivalled those of Germany, she was an obstacle to Germany's trade drive in south-eastern Europe. Unfortunately, the Little Entente States, though united with each other in common opposition to Hungarian irredentism, had otherwise divergent interests, and, so far as their attitude to Germany was concerned, could not take up a common stand in opposing Germany's challenge to the particular interests of one of themselves. To give one example, nearly 40 per cent of the Czechoslovakian population being agrarian, they were opposed to the marketing by Rumania and Yugoslavia, predominantly agricultural countries, of their produce in Czechoslovakia, thus predisposing the two latter countries to opening their trade relations with Germany. Thus, when Hitler singled out Czechoslovakia for his attack, the latter could not count on the other two partners of the Little Entente for any help, or even for much sympathy. Similarly Italy, who had a rival (Italo-Austro-Hungarian) bloc in Eastern Europe and could be expected to impede the German progress to economic mastery of the Danubian region, had lately virtually thrown up the sponge and become aligned to Hitlerite Germany. It is probable that Germany's trade drive in south-eastern Europe, which was a revised version of the *Mitterleuropa* idea of Friedrich Naumann and Moeller van der Bruck, did not aim at political domination but, read in the context of the Nazi exposition of the New Order and Nordic supremacy, it acquired a sinister import, and was considered

by Czechoslovakia as a threat to her liberties.

The immediate and ostensible reason for Hitler's attack on Czechoslovakia was the three and a half million Germans (the so-called Sudetans) who had been left as minorities in that country by the Peace Treaties. The peace-makers had violated the imperative doctrine of self-determination on what they considered as the still more imperative ground of military strategy and historical traditions. The German minorities in Czechoslovakia had their genuine grievances, but without Nazi Germany to fan the flames—in her own interests—these were capable of being remedied by constitutional methods. Under the pressure of France and Britain, the Czechoslovakian Government were making a sincere effort to solve their minorities problem, and in 1936-37, the Sudetan German movement, led by Konard Henlein, was believed to be declined. But Hitler could not leave Czechoslovakia alone; the latter had committed a number of offences in his and, indeed, all German eyes, and, after Austria had been annexed, the international situation seemed all the more favourable to the execution of his plans. It has been said that the real offence which Czechoslovakia had committed in the eyes of Germany was in her very coming to birth. The state was a creation of Allied diplomacy after the First World War, and one of the pillars of the Versailles system, which the Nazis had sworn to undo. Strategically, the Bohemian mountains constituted an impregnable line of natural fortifications—the last barrier—it has been said, which stood between Germany and the realization of her ambitions in south-eastern Europe. Economically, as we have seen, being the most industrialized among the Little Entente states, she was the least amenable to the trade methods of Germany and her armament factories rivalled those of the *Reich*. In a conversation with M. Poncet, the French Ambassador in Berlin, Captain Goering bluntly expressed Nazi German's feeling on Czechoslovakia in the following words: "Consider the shape of Czechoslovakia on the map. Isn't this a challenge to common sense? Czechoslovakia is the vermiform appendix of Europe! We shall have to operate!" (M. Poncet, *The Fateful Years*, p. 257.)

As the political order built up at Versailles had well nigh collapsed, and Europe was split up into two hostile camps, the

position of Czechoslovakia, a democratic island in a totalitarian sea and aligned to France and Soviet Russia, had become an untenable one. The Germans could perhaps tolerate the existence of Czechoslovakia, and even guarantee her independence—notwithstanding the minorities question. But they wanted her to be within their own orbit; and the Franco-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet pacts had entirely altered the situation in their eyes. Hitler was also perhaps aware of the intimate personal relations which existed between Benesh and Stalin. Apart from this, the position of Czechoslovakia had been thoroughly weakened since the day Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland and began constructing the Siegfried fortifications. England had not given any pledge to defend Czechoslovakia, but France and Russia had done so and Russia's support again was conditional on France's giving prior assistance to her. As Hitler had almost hermetically sealed Germany's western boundary, France could not come effectively to the assistance of Czechoslovakia in case of an attack by Germany; Belgium's "defection" had rendered this still more difficult. Russia could come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia only through Bessarabia, which belonged to Rumania, and a passage could be demanded of Rumania only if the League named Germany the aggressor. The position by no means was a hopeless one, but, as France and Great Britain (that is, Mr. Chamberlain) viewed it, it was a very difficult one; it certainly discouraged them from coming to Czechoslovakia's assistance at the risk of war during the critical days before Munich.

The minorities problem in Czechoslovakia was, no doubt, a serious one. It has been said that the Sudetans were the most decently treated minority in the whole of Europe. But the question was not a minorities problem, pure and simple; it was, first, a racial question—the old Teuton versus Slav problem, secondly, a psychological problem—a question of the top-dog and the under-dog changing places. Even as what was generally recognized as a well-treated minority, the Sudetans had genuine grievances. Widespread unemployment, with its concomitant evils of under-nourishment and disease, produced a spirit of despair among them, and they had the highest suicide rate in Europe. They also complained that they were debarred from top positions in the public services and the army. The

Czech Government admitted that the Sudetans had genuine grievances, and, beginning in 1936, started serious negotiations with the Sudetan leaders for the accord of "reasonable decentralization, with economic and administrative regionalism".

Hitler's seizure of Austria completely altered the situation. In Czechoslovakia, all the German parties, except the Social Democrats, immediately broke away from the government coalition and joined the *Sudetendeutsche* Party (S.D.P.) led by Konard Henlein, who stepped up his demands, which were now openly backed by Hitler. In May, there was a regular crisis, and the Czech Government ordered a partial mobilization. Mr. Chamberlain warned Hitler that Great Britain might become involved if war broke out. The German press bitterly criticized British "intervention" and duplicity, but the crisis passed off. Nevertheless, Mr. Chamberlain, alarmed at how near Britain had been to war, gave up his vacillation and hit upon a policy—his policy which shortly led him to Munich. In August, he sent Lord Runciman, who, like himself, had little knowledge of international affairs, to Prague on the role of a mediator between the Czechs and the Sudetans. The mission failed, and a crisis again developed. There were some movements of the military forces in Germany which the British considered as amounting to partial mobilization, and the British and French also announced some precautionary military and naval measures. The French Government quite categorically and the British Government somewhat less so declared that they might be involved in a European war. The effects which the measures and declarations of the two governments might have produced were, however, watered down by disclamatory statements, believed to be officially inspired, in the press. Writing editorially, The *Times* of London, 7 September, suggested that England favoured the cession of the Sudetan districts to Germany with a view to making Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous state—forecasting what exactly happened later. At his much-awaited speech at the Nazi Party Rally on 13 September, Hitler denounced in violent language what he called the oppression and mishandling of three and a half million Germans, who, he said, were "robbed in the name of a certain Mr. Wilson of their right of self-determination". He declared. "And I say that if these tortured creatures cannot obtain rights and assistance by

themselves, they can obtain both from us."

Apprehending that a German invasion of Czechoslovakia was shortly to begin, even though it might not involve a general European war, Mr. Chamberlain now decided to put into operation a plan he had in mind for a considerable period as a last resort. After receiving the assent of M. Daladier in a conversation on the phone on the night of 13-14 September and Hitler having responded with "cordiality", Mr. Chamberlain resolved to go to Germany "and interview Herr Hitler and find out in a personal conversation whether there was any hope yet of saving peace". Strange as the course of action that Mr. Chamberlain now was about to embark upon was for a British Premier to adopt and howsoever much a departure from the normal course of diplomacy, the policy behind it—appeasement—was by no means a new one. But M. Daladier's approval of it, in view of France's definite pledge to defend Czechoslovakia, requires an explanation, for the step he now took was a decisive one, and made him accompany Chamberlain to Munich. The distressing—and shameful—fact was that the French cabinet was divided on the question of France's carrying out her pledged word. In the meetings of the French cabinet on 12 and 13 September only M. Reynaud, the Minister of Justice and M. Mandel, the Minister of Colonies, were for resistance, that is, for immediate partial mobilization. M. Bonnet, who had met M. Litvinov and M. Commene, the Soviet and Rumanian Foreign Ministers respectively, two days ago at Geneva, took up the opposite line, using as his arguments what he said were what the Russian and the Rumanian Foreign Ministers had told him and which were deliberate lies. Litvinov had urged resistance to Germany and immediate consultations by French, Russian, and Czechoslovak General Staffs. M. Commene had declared that in case Czechoslovakia were attacked, Rumania would fulfil her duty as League member and permit the passage of troops and planes of Russia through her territory. M. Bonnet said that Litvinov had promised only 200 planes and one division within twenty days, whereas the fact was—and the Germans so alleged—that 500 Soviet planes were already installed on the Czech airfields, which had been long prepared for the purpose.

However, on 15 September, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, aged sixty-nine—he had never yet been in a plane—proceeded on a

mission, which was to make him "fly, fly, fly again". At his first interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, incidentally in the very room where the latter had brow-beaten Schuschnigg, the Führer bluntly told him that no concession of autonomy would now suffice, and that only if the British Government accepted the principle of self-determination for the Sudetan Germans with the right to "returning, if they wished, to the Reich" was he prepared to "refrain from active hostilities" until Mr. Chamberlain had time to obtain the reply of his government. Mr. Chamberlain, thereupon, immediately flew back to London, where a conference of British and French ministers was held on 18 September. On the following day, the decision of the two governments was despatched to Prague, with the intimation that they thought that their proposals, which amounted to a demand for the cession to Germany of all territories where more than half the inhabitants were Germans, were reasonable and that they would not consider themselves responsible for the consequences of their rejection. Actually, the proposals involved the surrender not only of extensive territory, but also some 800,000 Czechs inhabiting it and the whole of the Czech Maginot Line, and leaving the rest of the country exposed to any subsequent attack. On 20 September, after many hours of anxious deliberation, the Czech Government virtually rejected the terms, whereupon, at 2-15 a.m. on 21 September, the British and French Ministers at Prague, as instructed by their governments, drove to President Benesh's palace, and informed him that, if, as the result of his rejection of their terms, war broke out, France would not take part in it ("*ne s'y associera pas*"). Then, under the greatest duress, on the afternoon of 21 September, President Benesh unconditionally accepted the proposals, adding only that he hoped that England would now guarantee the new frontiers of the country.

Meanwhile, the Poles and the Hungarians also put forward territorial claims on Czechoslovakia urging that their minorities in the country should also be treated on the same basis as the German minorities. Their claims were supported by Mussolini, who thought that if these were conceded Poland and Hungary would have a common frontier, which would be a welcome barrier against German aggression in the south, which Czechoslovakia in her present predicament would be unable to provide. Mr.

Chamberlain requested them to stay their hands, but they refused to do so, and the Poles moved their army towards Teschen. When, therefore, with the Czech surrender in his pocket, Mr. Chamberlain returned to Germany and met Hitler at Godesberg (22 September), he found that the latter was in a still more uncompromising mood. Hitler bluntly told him he was not prepared to discuss "ways and means" of transfer of territories from Czechoslovakia, as he had agreed to do at the previous meeting, but insisted, "in the form of an ultimatum" that occupation by German forces must be effective by 1 October. Mr. Chamberlain thus found that he had nothing more to do, and he "bitterly reproached the Chancellor" for his failure to respond to his efforts for peace, and returned home with a heavy heart and a memorandum on the conversations, supplied to him by Hitler, in his pocket. Hitler's latest demands were duly forwarded to the Czechoslovak Government, to be almost immediately rejected by them. The Czech Government immediately ordered general mobilization, the French mobilized some 500,000 men, and military conversations were held between the French and British General Staffs.

In the course of the conversation at Godesberg, Hitler had fixed the deadline for Czechoslovak capitulation as on 1 October but, on learning after his return to London, that Hitler was not prepared to wait so long and was going to invade that country at 2 p.m. on 28 September, Mr. Chamberlain sent Sir Horace Wilson with a personal message to him (26 September). When Sir Horace told Hitler just what a German invasion of Czechoslovakia would involve, namely, an immediate French and British intervention, Hitler flew into such an ungovernable rage that Sir Horace thought it prudent to leave the room for a while. On his return Sir Horace found Hitler quieter. The same afternoon he flew back to London with Hitler's reply, and delivered it to Chamberlain at 12.30 a.m. on 28 September. Hitler's reply was on the same lines as his Godesberg 'ultimatum' but contained one addition, namely, his reiteration of his Berchtesgaden promise to guarantee the boundaries of the new Czechoslovakia. The indomitable old man considered even this as "rather a reassuring statement"; and immediately sent "a last appeal" to Hitler, proposing one more meeting with him for discussing the arrangements with him and the representatives

of the Czech Government, and, if he so desired, also with those of the French and Italian Governments. He also sent a personal message to Mussolini apprising him of his request to Hitler. The French Government did the same. Mussolini immediately asked Attolico, his ambassador at Berlin, to meet Hitler and request him "not to go ahead". M. Poncet, the French ambassador, met Hitler at the same time that Attolico came to meet the Führer, and suggested the same course to him.

The same day (28 September), Mr. Chamberlain narrated in the House of Commons his efforts on behalf of peace, and after he had announced—towards the end of the recital—that Mussolini had succeeded in getting a postponement of German mobilization, he was noticed scanning a message which had just been handed to him. In the midst of tense excitement on all sides, Mr. Chamberlain broke off: "But that is not all! I have something further to say to the House yet!" Then he said, with intense dramatic effect, that Hitler had invited him with Mussolini and Daladier to meet him at Munich next morning. The House burst into wild cheers: there was to be no war yet. The House adjourned with Godspeed for Mr. Chamberlain from Mr. Attlee, the Leader of the Opposition. One lone figure who had not joined in the wild cheering continued to sit in his place below the gangway, with hunched figure and lowering brow, visibly remembering the past and foreboding the future—Winston Churchill. Next morning (29 September) Mr. Chamberlain flew to Munich, reaching it at noon, and the conference began almost immediately.

On the last day of September 1938, at about 1.30 a.m., an agreement was signed at their conference at Munich by the Big Four, whose terms differed little from the Godesberg demands of Hitler, save that they agreed to act as an international commission to supervise the transfer of territories, and agreed to guarantee the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia. A Czech delegation had arrived at the town shortly after the conference began but they were not allowed to attend. After everything was over, the agreement was briefly explained to them, "with the suggestion that it was considerable improvement on the Godesberg memorandum, and had better be accepted" and, of course, they had no option but to accept it. (Lord Strang, *Home and Abroad*, p. 145.) "Collective security for the Czechs had been

replaced by collective blackmail to preserve the peace." Mr. Chamberlain, on alighting from his plane at Heston, was welcomed like a conquering hero by thousands of his countrymen who had gathered there in spite of inclement weather. Again and again, before the cheering crowds he waved a piece of paper which he had brought from Munich and on which he and Hitler jointly declared that their two countries were never to go to war against each other, and as he did so for the last time from the window at the hall of No. 10, Downing Street, he exclaimed: "This is the second time in our history that there has come from Germany to Downing Street peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time."

Czechoslovakia suffered further losses of territory in the actual execution of the agreement. Then the Poles and Hungarians pressed on with their claims; the former had to be pacified with the cession of the Teschen area which contained the valuable Karvin coalfields and the important railway junction of Bohumin, which might enable Poland to resist German moves to the east; Hungary received large tracts of territory, including one along the border of southern Slovakia which demanded autonomy, and became increasingly separated from the Czech regions. Hungary, however, was not given the province of Ruthenia, which would have given her a common border with Poland, and it remained nominally included in Slovakia which was increasingly coming under German control. The cessions of territory deprived Czechoslovakia not only of valuable territory and population but also of the whole of her defences, most of her industrial areas and vital communications in Bohemia and Moravia, nearly 75 per cent of her coal output, nearly all the lignite, kaolin, the entire radium and tungsten productions and half of her largest towns. Militarily, the position of the new state was hopeless and—the unkindest cut of all—the promised international guarantee was simply talked out. Economically, she could live on only as an adjunct of the *Reich*.

On 5 October 1938, President Benesh resigned and left the country to be succeeded in his office by Emil Hacha, who was supposed to be more acceptable to Hitler. Slovakia and Ruthenia were granted the autonomy they asked for and the state, henceforth called Czecho-Slovakia, became a loose federation of three semi-autonomous provinces—Czechia (Bohemia and Mora-

via), Slovakia, and Carpatho-Ukraine. Even the liberal autonomy which they thus obtained did not, however, satisfy the Slovakian and Ruthenian diets, and on 14 March 1939, they declared their independence. On the same day Hacha was summoned to Berlin, and, after being subjected to third-degree methods from 10 o'clock at night to 4 in the morning, and told by Goering that Prague would be bombed into rubble if he did not agree, he consented to surrender his country to the Germans. He had no constitutional right to do so, but Hitler was enabled thereby to make out that, as in the case of Austria, he was acting according to legal form. German troops, which were already on the march, seized Prague at 6 a.m., and the whole country was forthwith brought under German occupation. Czechia became converted into the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia", Slovakia into a puppet state like Manchukuo, and Carpatho-Ukraine was transferred to Hungary. The Republic of Czechoslovakia ceased to exist.

BACK TO WAR

THE news of the German occupation of Prague was received in British official circles with considerable equanimity. Asked in the Parliament in the afternoon of the day when the event took place (15 March) about the guarantee that had been given to Czechoslovakia, Mr. Chamberlain said that it could scarcely apply to a state that did not exist. This was just as Mr. Chamberlain with the Umbrella could be expected to react to an act of aggression by the Dictators whom he was out to appease. Two days later, however, Mr. Chamberlain had completely changed: in a speech at Birmingham, he accused Hitler of a flagrant breach of personal faith, quoting in this connection Hitler's assurance to him at Munich that he had no more territorial claims to make in Europe. "Is this," asked he, "the end of an old adventure, or the beginning of a new?" It is rather difficult to account for this change of Mr. Chamberlain's attitude to Hitler, for many evidences clearly suggest that he was aware about the latter's resolve to do away with the Czechoslovak State long before it actually happened, and he was not then thinking of giving up the policy of appeasement. (Writing in the *Contemporary Review* in its issue of June 1939, Mr. Wickham Stead declared that he had personally learnt about it, on good authority, in mid-December, 1938, and it is not possible that what he and many other private persons knew was not known to the British Government.) It was the strength of public feeling against this latest act of aggression by Hitler, producing among the Conservative electorate a sense of danger as to their probable fate in the next elections, together with the strong pressure that the party bosses brought to bear on Chamberlain and the Cabinet, that most probably wrought the change in Mr. Chamberlain's mind. In any case, the net result of the final destruction of the Czechoslovak State was that the policy of appeasement was now abandoned—at least so far as the public policy of the Chamberlain government (as distinguished from secret manoeuvres, about which we shall see later) was concerned.

On his side, neither by word nor by action, Hitler showed any change of heart or even that he felt that he should proceed with caution. He went out of his way to sneer at England's Palestinian difficulties; he made a personal attack against Mr. Duff Cooper, the First Lord of the Admiralty, who had resigned as a protest against the Munich Agreement; he named him, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden as war-mongers; indicating that it was for him to dictate whom England should choose as ministers. Quite unmindful of the storm that was gathering in England, he thought the moment to be opportune for plucking the apricots that would readily fall into his palms. On 23 March, German troops quietly occupied Memel, after Hitler had demanded from Lithuania its ready surrender. On the same day, Ribbentrop "peremptorily dictated to the Polish Ambassador" terms which Germany proposed to impose on Poland. He demanded Danzig which, though a Free City, had, as we have seen, already come under the control of the local Nazis, and now vociferously clamoured for "reunion" with the *Reich*. If this demand, which violated the Treaty of Versailles, could be considered as based on the doctrine of self-determination, both treaty and principle were violated in Germany's other and simultaneous demand that she should be given an east-west highway and rail-line (virtually a corridor within a corridor) across the Polish Corridor, which separated the German province of East Prussia from the *Reich*. Poland, of course, refused to concede any demands.

It being plain that Hitler was pointing the road to "Munich" once again, and British public opinion being now strongly roused, Mr. Chamberlain now made a right-about turn in the direction of his government's foreign policy. He adopted what he called the policy of the "Peace Front", but what really was meant to construct the battle lines of the Second World War, and gave Hitler the justifiable ground for complaint that England once again meant to play her old game of "encirclement" of Germany. The analogy of the years preceding the First World War readily comes to one's mind while reflecting on the guarantees which Mr. Chamberlain now gave to countries far and near; the difference only lies in the magnitude of his commitments. On 31 March, Mr. Chamberlain told a cheering House of Commons that, with the full backing of the French Government, who were already committed to defend Poland

against aggression, he had assured the Polish Government that "in the event of any action that clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces", Great Britain would lend them all support that it was in her power to give. Again, soon afterwards, learning that Italy had invaded and annexed Albania (7 April), Mr. Chamberlain told the House of Commons (13 April) that Great Britain had pledged Greece and Rumania (on whom Germany had imposed a trade agreement on 15 March) "all the support" in her power in case the independence of these two countries was "clearly threatened", and they "respectively considered it vital to resist with their national forces". On the same day M. Daladier on behalf of France confirmed these pledges. On 12 May it was announced that "a definite long-term agreement" had been concluded between Great Britain and Turkey in which each power had pledged to support the other in case of any threat to its interests in the Mediterranean area. A similar pact between Turkey and France was concluded when Turkey's claims on the *Sanjak* of Alexandretta had been fully met. On Poland's insistence the guarantee given to her by Britain and France was made reciprocal. Finally, at the urgent insistence of Mr. Hoare Belisha, the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Chamberlain announced the introduction of conscription (27 April). For the moment no doubt this was little more than a "symbolic gesture"—the country's determination to resist aggression—for the men conscripted had first to be trained, and then to be provided with arms. But Hitler's reaction to these "peace efforts" of the British Government was just the opposite, though quite natural. The very next day (28 April) the German Government denounced the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact—declaring the former to be inconsistent with the agreement signed at Munich between Mr. Chamberlain and Hitler, and the latter as inconsistent with the guarantees given by Poland to Britain and France on a reciprocal basis.

THE STALIN-HITLER PACT OF NON-AGGRESSION

We have seen that the "appeasement" policy that was being

pursued by France and Britain towards Nazi Germany (first clearly evidenced by their failure to take action against Hitler's violation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles), taken in conjunction with the conclusion in November 1936 of the Anti-Comintern Pact by Germany and Japan (subsequently joined by Italy, Hungary and Franco Spain) made the Soviet Union just as suspicious of Britain and France as she was of Nazi Germany. The Soviet Government, nevertheless, made no official move to dissociate themselves from the Western Powers. On the contrary, they continued to use Geneva as a forum for the expression of their views on foreign affairs, where M. Litvinov made repeated pleas for action against Germany, Italy and Japan, and urged France and Britain to live up to their declarations under the Covenant. Internal developments in the Soviet Union, however, indicated the direction in which the wind might blow. The drastic purges of 1936-37, which eliminated many Old Bolsheviks, including Marshal Tuchachevsky, on the ground that they were conspiring with Germany and Japan with a view to overthrowing the Stalin regime and dismembering the U.S.S.R., reflected a widespread outburst of xenophobia—mis-trust of all foreigners—which was a familiar feature of Russian history and in line with Soviet doctrine. At bottom this was but an expression of the not unnatural suspiciousness of a backward people, who had been cut off from the main stream of development in the West, when confronted by actual contact with the Western world, as well as of fear that the "socialist fatherland" might find it difficult to survive in a 'hostile capitalist environment'. Yet the immediate result of the purges was all the more to increase Russia's isolation, for while they made Russians almost morbidly fearful of foreigners, the character of the trials alienated many in the West who sympathized with the Soviet Union.

It would be interesting to speculate as to what might happen if—as indeed the man in the street in the western countries expected—France and Britain had welcomed Russia's policy of western orientation, and, rearming themselves adequately, reassured the Soviet Government about their determination to prevent Germany's eastward expansion. It is probable that, if they were really earnest about it, ideology would not have stood in the way, and Russia becoming joined to France and Britain,

the combination might have deterred Hitler from further acts of aggression either in the east or the west, for the thing which the Germans dreaded most was having to fight on two fronts. Far from doing so, France and Britain acquiesced again and again in Hitler's successive acts of aggression—in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Spain. In Spain, France and Britain failed to back up the Soviet Union, who openly intervened, after Germany and Italy had definitely done so—thus confirming Moscow's belief that the governments of Mr. Chamberlain and M. Blum, in spite of their public protestations, really subscribed to Hitler's thesis that Nazism was the bulwark against Communism. No doubts were left in the minds of the Soviet leaders about this, when Britain and France left Russia on the doorstep at Munich, and concluded an agreement with Germany and Italy, which, according to M. Coulondre, the French ambassador at Berlin, "was only a method of disarming Czechoslovakia before annexing it". The four Western Powers, thereby, also assumed the role—desired by Mussolini in the Four-Power Pact of 1933—of becoming the arbiters of the continent and excluding the Soviet Union from their councils. The Munich Agreement and still more the acquiescence of France and Britain in the Nazi occupation of Prague served as a warning to the Soviet that the Western Powers had agreed that Communism was their common enemy, against which Hitler should now be left free to enter upon a holy crusade. In the light of this, the Anglo-French guarantees to Poland, Greece, and Rumania in March-April 1939 were rather inconsistent and difficult to explain and assess, and Hitler himself felt disappointed and in a sense betrayed. However, Hitler, meanwhile, had succeeded in winning over France and on 6 December, the French and German Foreign Ministers had signed a declaration in Paris whereby their two countries recognized their common frontiers "while reserving the particular relations of the two governments with third powers" and expressed their desire for peaceful collaboration. According to M. Coulondre, this was designed to cover Germany in the west, while the Nazis launched new enterprises in other directions—in precise terms—the conquest of the Ukraine. If this was the belief of the French ambassador at Berlin, similar information about Hitler's designs must have reached Moscow's rulers from their own embassy in Germany:

and it is curious that it is to this point that the origins of Soviet-German negotiations for a pact may be traced—roughly, January 1939, about two months before the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia.

The Russian bear had made a fairly correct estimate of its own position, and on 10 May had openly uttered an angry growl. Addressing the Eighteenth All-Union Communist Party Congress on that day, Stalin had complained that the non-aggression states, and in particular England and France, had been "retreating and retreating" and "making one concession after another" to the Dictators. Thereby, said he, they had completely repudiated the policy of "collective security" and the plan of a united front for protection against the "bandits". Even more significant, he charged England and France with the Machiavellian plan of inciting Germany to attack the U.S.S.R., so that after Germany and Russia had exhausted themselves, they might intervene "in the interests of peace" and dictate conditions of peace solely on the basis of their own interests. He even asserted that the two powers had "shouted lies" about the weakness of the Russian army, hinting thereby that Russia would be an easy prey, so as to push Germany into a war with the Soviet Union. That, Stalin said, looked "very much like encouraging the aggressor". He warned that the Soviet Union would observe caution and not allow itself to be drawn into conflicts "with the *provocateurs* of war who were accustomed to make others pull their chestnuts out of the fire". Stalin, however, forgot that, for various reasons, which have been discussed in earlier chapters, the Western Powers had understandable reasons for being suspicious of and cautious towards allying themselves with the U.S.S.R. Apart from Communist ideology, which the Tory rulers of Great Britain hated, the Soviet Union had certain aims of foreign policy which they did not share, and if the former banked on a future Nazi-Communist war, the latter made no bones about proclaiming their faith in the World Revolution. If, after the inauguration of the Stalinist policy of Bolshevism in one country, the Soviet had temporarily desisted from actively pushing forward that ideal, they had, of late, adopted a *Front Populaire* foreign policy (see above, Chapter 12) designed to give them influence in a few countries such as France and Spain—the path to it being made smoother by their membership of

the League of Nations. Soviet intervention in Spain was believed to have been due in part to the pressure of the Communist International, whose energetic new Secretary, Georgi Dimitroff, advocated resumption of Russia's activities on behalf of the ideal.

East and West, indeed, were tarred by a common brush, though possibly there were distinguishable shades; but necessity knowing no law, talks were begun between the British and Soviet Governments on a mutual assistance pact on 16 April. The former proposed that the U.S.S.R. should come to the assistance of Poland and Rumania at such time and in such form as these two countries—who feared the Bolshevists as much as the Nazis—might decide provided they had already received British assistance. To this the Soviet Government immediately objected on the ground of its one-sidedness, and they proposed a Six-Power Conference consisting of Britain, France, Rumania, Poland, Greece and Turkey, besides themselves (18 April). The Soviet counterproposal was coldly received in London, and it was not till 8 May that a reply was sent. Meanwhile, an event of decisive significance had taken place: on 4 May M. Litvinov had resigned—or been dismissed—and M. Molotov, a member of Stalin's inner circle, had become the Commissar for Foreign Affairs. As a Jew and as an advocate of the western orientation policy, M. Litvinov (whose better half was an English lady, the sister of Sir Sidney Lowe) was *persona non grata* to the Nazis. His removal, without either public disgrace, or a "treason trial" of the type which other Old Guards like himself had been subjected to, was obviously a measure of political expediency, and indicated a change of policy. At about the same time, the Nazis, after having been violently anti-communist and advocated conquest and expropriation of the Ukraine, had swung full circle to the Rapallo policy of co-operation with Russia. On 9 May, M. Coulondre reported that rumours had spread throughout Berlin that Germany had made or was going to make proposals to the Soviet for a partition of Poland. He urged that Anglo-Soviet negotiations should be pushed forward vigorously.

The Soviet now were in the happy position of being courted by both sides, and on 31 May the new Soviet Foreign Minister made his first statement on foreign policy, which the Soviet press described as an "ultimatum". "We stand for peace and against

aggression," he said, "but we must remember Stalin's admonition that we cannot be used to pull chestnuts out of the fire." He criticized the proposals which the British Government, jointly with the French, had, meanwhile, presented (26 May) to them in the form of a draft treaty, but did not close the door to further negotiations, and laid down three "minimum conditions" for their continuance. He called for the conclusion of an effective mutual assistance pact, defensive in character, between Britain, France and the U.S.S.R.; a guarantee by these powers to the States of Central and Eastern Europe, "including all European countries bordering on the U.S.S.R., without exception"; and a concrete agreement among them "regarding the form and extent of immediate and effective assistance to be given to each other and the guaranteed States in the event of attack by the aggressors". He concluded his speech with the rather ominous suggestion: "We do not refuse to improve our trade relations with Germany. Negotiation may be resumed."

France and Britain declared their readiness to make a fresh effort to arrive at an agreement, and it was decided to send a special envoy to Moscow in the first week of June. The Soviet Government hoped, and it is said that they requested, that the mission should be headed by a prominent figure in English public life, say the Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax. Mr. Eden voluntarily offered to go, but Mr. Chamberlain selected for the task Mr. William (later Lord) Strang of the British Foreign Office—a singularly unfortunate choice, because of his former activities in the British Embassy in Moscow and his participation in the Munich negotiations. Mr. Chamberlain, the Soviet recalled, had flown thrice to Germany to meet Hitler. However, in the Moscow discussions, which began on 15 June and went on till 2 August, Mr. Strang fared rather badly, when the Russians demanded "territorial guarantees" in Finland and the Baltic States, by which they meant that their own naval and military forces should occupy strategic points and some of the islands, notably Hango in the Gulf of Finland. In short, they said that they must have the necessary strategic advantages on their side in fighting Hitler. The Baltic States were strongly opposed to the proposals, which they thought would provide the U.S.S.R. with an entering-wedge into their territories. The Soviet, moreover, wiser by their experience of 1935, when, after concluding

mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia, they had failed to get a military alliance from Paris, this time insisted that a military agreement must accompany a political one and that both must come into force simultaneously.

While Mr. Strang was valiantly wrestling with the question of the guarantees and his discussions had virtually reached a stalemate, the British and French Governments announced their decision to send a military mission to Moscow (31 July). In spite of Coulondre's repeated requests for hurry, the military missions did not reach Moscow till 16 August. Once more the personnel was, from the Russian point of view, poor, and Russian misgivings were heightened by the fact that their British and French guests preferred a six-day voyage by sea to a plane trip of six hours. On their arrival, it was found that they had left their credentials behind; and when these arrived, the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact had already been signed on 23 August and the Allied officers found that they had nothing to negotiate about. By the pact, which was to endure for ten years, the two governments undertook to refrain from any act of aggression against each other, either alone or in combination with other powers; to consult one another concerning their common interests; and adjust any conflict that might arise between them by peaceful means.

THE DIRKSEN REVELATION

The news of the conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact burst like a bombshell on the world, but to the British and French Governments it was by no means a surprise. The entire democratic press rang with stories of Soviet duplicity and treachery while it kept itself absolutely mum over the negotiations carried on by the British Government, simultaneously with their talks in Moscow, with the Germans, as in the case of the Hudson-Wohltat talks which leaked out in July and the more serious Wilson-Wohltat and Buxton-Kordt conversations, which escaped the press and the full story of which became known when, after the fall of Berlin, the Soviet Government got possession of and published the so-called "Dirksen Papers". The Hudson-Wohltat talks which, as we have said above, had leaked out, were briefly referred to by certain American authorities, and a summary of

the Dirksen Revelations was given and commented upon in the present author's work, *Europe Between Two World Wars, 1918-39*, published in 1951. Briefly, Dirksen was Ribbentrop's successor in the office of German ambassador in London, and had talks with Mr. Butler, Under-Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, Sir Horace Wilson ("which means," says he, "with Chamberlain"), Lord Runciman, Lord Chatfield and others on the subject of Anglo-German relations while British talks were going on with Moscow, and found them dissatisfied with Soviet "cold and haughty response" to Britain's "wooings".

Of course, these talks were quite normal and unexceptionable, but, according to Dirksen, at Sir Harold Wilson's initiative, a meeting was arranged between him (Wilson) and Staatsrat Wohltat, who had come to London ostensibly for "whaling negotiations". Wilson outlined a comprehensive programme for adjustment of Anglo-German relations which, strangely enough, included (i) Britain and Germany signing a non-aggression treaty, (ii) England thereupon disembarassing herself of her commitments to Poland, (iii) the two powers further signing a pact of non-intervention, "which was to be in a way a wrapper for a delimitation of the spheres of influence of the Great Powers", and (iv) agreements about limitation of armaments, colonial questions, etc. The broad results of these, according to Dirksen, would be to push questions like Danzig into the background, and leave Germany directly to deal with Poland. Wohltat had talks also with Mr. Hudson, Secretary for Overseas Trade, which leaked out; he then left, entrusting the business to Kordt of the German Embassy, who met Mr. Charles Roden Buxton, Parliamentary Adviser to the Labour Party, who, obviously inspired by officials, stated that "England would drop treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union" and use her influence with France to get her give up her alliance with the Soviet Union and her commitments in south-east Europe in return for Germany's promise to co-operate in Europe and to agree to a reduction of armaments. Dirksen informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin about the Buxton-Kordt conversations as well as his own conversations with Wilson. The latter drew from Wohltat's and his own reports the conclusion, which they had arrived at from other sources also, that England would not intervene on the side of Poland in case Germany attacked the

latter—out of her weakness. It only hastened the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact of non-aggression, which, Hitler thought, would frighten England out of her commitments to Poland and other states. If, however, Hitler had judged Chamberlain correctly, he had completely misjudged the British people, whom no British Government could defy. Contrary to his expectations, therefore, the war against Poland became the Second World War, in which, however, with the Soviet Union as neutral and to draw upon for supplies, he had an initial advantage.

Stalin took full advantage of this turn in the situation by pressing as rapidly as possible with his own programme for Eastern Europe, whose main object was to remove the danger of future German attack on the U.S.S.R. On 7 September, within a few days of the German invasion of Poland, Soviet forces invaded Poland from the east, and on 28 September in Moscow an agreement was signed between Germany and the Soviet Union tracing the "final" Soviet-German frontier in Poland. The delimitation placed Polish territory in which the Poles are in a majority under German rule, the Soviet Union obtaining land peopled principally by White Russians and Ukrainians. It also gave the Soviet Union direct access to Poland's former frontier with Rumania, and control of the Galician oilfields. Stalin also exploited the situation to secure by peaceful negotiations the naval bases in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, that he had demanded and failed to get during the negotiations for a pact with London, but when he made similar demands on Finland, the latter refused. The Soviet forces at once invaded Finland, raising a storm of indignation all over the world, and leading to the expulsion of the U.S.S.R. from the League of Nations. There is little doubt that the conclusion of a pact with Nazi Germany in the midst of negotiations with the Western Powers was, for the U.S.S.R., only a choice of evils. It gave her a temporary respite, which, for various reasons, as we have seen, she badly needed.

THE ITALO-GERMAN PACT OF STEEL

Hitler neglected no precautionary measures that might make Germany's victory in war humanly certain. On 7 May, follow

ing a conference in Milan, Germany and Italy announced that they would transform the Rome-Berlin Axis into a formal military alliance. This was followed by the conclusion of the so-called Pact of Steel between the two countries—an offensive as well as a defensive alliance—designed to rebuild Europe on a new basis of “justice” and provide “living space” for the two partners. It provided for consultation between the two countries whenever their interests were threatened, co-ordination of their economies for wartime purposes, and a fight to finish in case of war expressly prohibiting the conclusion of a separate peace or armistice.



DANZIG ONCE AGAIN

The situation in Danzig, which, as we have seen, was by now completely nazified, was not at this time more critical than it had been a year ago, and there was little necessity for provoking a crisis there. Hitler, however, was unwilling to let the grass grow under his feet, and determined to settle his accounts with Poland immediately. On 26 May, Poland had rejected his proposals, though declaring her willingness to carry on negotiations. In July there was a slight lessening of the tension in Danzig, but in August a serious situation developed on account of the intervention of the German Government in a dispute between Poland and Danzig, which they had already mutually settled. The Polish Government warned Germany that any interference by them with the rights and interests of Poland in Danzig would be considered an act of aggression. On 22 August, Mr. Chamberlain, in a personal letter to Hitler, pleaded for a relaxation of tension to render possible the resumption of peaceful negotiations between Poland and Germany. He also sought to remove all possible misunderstandings of England's position. "It has been alleged," he wrote, "that if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe could have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding. If that case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged." Hitler's reply was uncompromising. "Germany, if attacked by England, will be found prepared and determined", said he. On 25 August, however, he summoned Sir Neville Henderson, the British ambassador, "in a new effort to come to an understanding". He told Henderson that he was determined to put an end to the "Macedonian conditions" on the eastern frontier, and that the problem of Danzig and the Polish Corridor must be solved. After this was done, he said, he was determined to approach England once more with a comprehensive offer. Hitler also exchanged letters with Premier Daladier.

The British Government's reply to Hitler's verbal communication to Henderson was issued on 28 August in a memorandum

which stressed their obligations to Poland and proposed direct discussions between Germany and Poland and a settlement of the issues which should be safeguarded by international guarantees, in which they were willing to participate. At about 7 p.m. on the following day, 29 August, Hitler landed to Henderson his reply to this memorandum, accepting the proposal for direct discussions, and asking for the good offices of the British Government in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers—the latter to arrive on Wednesday, 30 August 1939. At about 2 a.m. on 30 August, Lord Halifax sent a telegram to Henderson asking him to inform proper quarters that it was obviously impossible for them to produce a Polish representative on that day, and promising to give a careful consideration to Hitler's message. At 2.45 p.m. Mr. Chamberlain sent a message to Hitler through Henderson saying that he had asked Poland to reinforce all instructions for avoidance of frontier incidents, and requesting Hitler to confirm similar instructions on his side. This was followed up by another telegram at 5.30 p.m. on the same day (30 August) from the British Government to Henderson to the effect that complaints had been received of acts of sabotage being committed by the Germans in Poland and asking him to make it clear to the German Government that Poland could maintain an attitude of complete restraint only if the German Government reciprocated. According to the German White Book, on the same day, Germany received reports that Poland had ordered general mobilization.

The position as on 30 August 1939, therefore, was that the German Government had accepted "British mediation or suggestion" and "declared themselves ready to receive a personage appointed by the Polish Government up to the evening of August 30, with the provision that the latter was, in fact, empowered not only to discuss but to conduct and conclude negotiations". The British Government considered the procedure suggested by the Germans as "wholly unreasonable", and wanted that they should "adopt the normal procedure, when their proposals were ready, of inviting the Polish ambassador to call and handing proposals to him for transmission to Warsaw and inviting suggestions as to the necessity of negotiations". It is clear that the Germans had "accepted" the British offer of

mediation' by making a travesty of their proposals : they had converted the suggestion for negotiations into a call for submission of the Poles directly to them within a strict time limit of about twenty-four hours. No self-respecting nation, far less the Poles, who had no inferiority complex with regard to the Germans and cherished the memory of the battle of Grunewald (1410), in which they and the Lithuanians had crushed the mighty Teutonic Order, could submit to such bullying. By this time both armies had been mobilized and were standing face to face ; the prospect for an honourable settlement that might avert war was, therefore, to say the least, bleak.

WAR

When Sir Arthur Henderson met Ribbentrop—it was not till midnight of 30 August that the meeting could take place—only to tell him that Germany's suggestions would be given to Poland and that the latter could not be expected to have sent a plenipotentiary by the evening of that day, the latter informed him that, since a Polish negotiator had not arrived, Germany's proposals were no longer relevant. The door to negotiations, if they had ever been really opened, had thus been bolted ; but still, just to inform Henderson what he had proposed to offer the Polish representative if he had come, Ribbentrop read out to him rapidly in German the entire document containing his proposals. When Henderson asked for a copy of the document, Ribbentrop refused to comply, saying that it was now too late. Henderson considered the German proposals, which included the return of Danzig to the *Reich*, a plebiscite in the Corridor, the provision for temporary transit facilities to East Prussia across the Corridor, etc. as "not on the whole too unreasonable". He communicated the principal points to Lipski, the Polish ambassador in Berlin, who promised to transmit them to his government.

During the afternoon of 31 August, the Polish Government informed London that they would authorize their ambassador in Berlin that they had accepted their proposals for negotiations. The same evening M. Lipski met Herr von Ribbentrop and delivered the same message to him. He declined the latter's invitation to discuss the German proposals. The German Gov-

ernment, thereupon, broadcasted their proposals (during the night). M. Lipski tried to contact his government, but failed to do so, because all means of communications between Germany and Poland had been closed by the German Government. According to the German White Book, the German proposals were described as "unacceptable" by the Polish Government Radio Station.

Early in the morning of 1 September, the German army invaded Poland. The same night the British and French ambassadors in Berlin handed separate but almost identical notes to Ribbentrop saying that England and France would fulfil their obligations to Poland unless the German Government withdrew all troops from Poland. Ribbentrop told them that Germany rejected the suggestion in the notes that Germany's action against Poland amounted to aggression.

A last-minute attempt to avert a world war was made by Mussolini. As Count Ciano revealed, on 16 December, while speaking before the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations, the Pact of Steel contained an unpublished proviso pledging the parties to avoid war for at least three years. The *Duce* had hoped that in the course of three years he would finish his military preparations, and, in alliance with Hitler, would succeed in having "Munich" solutions of his Mediterranean disputes with England and France. He had also hoped that this alliance would enable him to keep himself informed about Germany's plans, and thereby to restrain the Führer. It was during the visit of Count Ciano to Salzburg and Berghof on 11-13 August that he and Mussolini, with whom he was in constant touch by phone, had learned that Hitler was determined to gain his ends by force. Mussolini sought desperately to dissuade Hitler from this course, first, by proposing arbitration, and then by warning that Italy would refuse to carry the military clauses of the alliance into effect. Again, the German-Soviet pact of non-aggression had, in the opinion of Mussolini, dealt a blow at the Axis. He favoured a policy which would prevent Russia from joining the "democratic encirclement of the Axis", but the terms of the pact had been more far-reaching than he had expected.

These facts explain why in the last days of August when there were feverish military preparations in almost all countries of Europe Italy was almost normal. On 31 August, Mussolini

offered to call a conference to discuss a general revision of the peace treaties and proposing an armistice. According to the German White Book, Germany and France agreed to the proposal but England refused it (2 September). A communique issued by *Stefani*, the official Italian News Agency, on the night of 4 September stated that England and France agreed to the proposal, but made the German evacuation of all Polish territory the *sine qua non* and that Hitler refused it. The die was cast. On 3 September, the British ambassador at 9 a.m. and the French ambassador at noon presented almost identical notes to the German Government to the effect that unless the German troops were withdrawn—the British Note specifying 11 a.m. as the time limit—England and France would consider themselves at war with Germany. England and Germany at 11-15 a.m. and Germany and France at 5 p.m. were at war with each other.

THE U.S.A. BECOMES THE "ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY"

When the Second World War broke out, public opinion in the United States was still overwhelmingly opposed to being drawn into the implacable animosities of the Old World. The government, though in the past offering a limited and ineffective co-operation in the affairs of the League of Nations, was committed to a policy of non-participation by a Neutrality Act passed by Congress in 1937. Since the sale of munitions was supposed to have been responsible for drawing the U.S.A. into the First World War, the new Neutrality Act forbade the same to any and every country engaged in war. President Roosevelt, however, realizing that the states attacked by Hitler must be provided with American Arms, if they were to survive, proceeded to weaken the Neutrality Act with a view to removing it finally from the statute book, while public opinion, alarmed and outraged by Hitler's victories, veered round to supporting his views. Of these presidential preparatory measures, the most important were : (1) the so-called Cash and Carry Act, 4 November 1939, which permitted belligerents to buy munitions provided they paid in cash for them and carried them home in their own ships, and which favoured the western democracies because they controlled the seas and had large investments and credits in the United States ; (2) the Selective Service Act, which for the first

time in American history summoned the people to arms in time of peace—the mobilization being rendered effective by Congress sanctioning expenditure to the tune of \$17,000,000,000 for the equipment and materials needed in war; and (3) the so-called Lend-Lease Act (11 March 1941) which authorized the President to 'sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of . . . any defence article' to any nation whose defence he found vital to the defence of the United States. The last-mentioned Act was immediately put into operation, and aid was given to Britain and China. Three months later, when Russia was attacked by Germany, she too came within the scope of lend-lease. From this time to the end of the war America became, in the words of President Roosevelt, the "arsenal of democracy".

THE FAR EASTERN POLICY OF THE U.S.A.—FROM THE WASHINGTON
CONFERENCE TO PEARL HARBOUR

It was evident that the U.S.A. would be drawn into the war in the same way she had become involved in the First World War; but the immediate cause of her entry into the Second World War was to be found in events which were happening in the Far East and bringing about a crisis in her relations with Japan. We have seen that for about a decade after the Washington Conference of 1921-22 Japan seemed to be reversing her policy towards China and she also cultivated good relations with the Western nations. Her relations with the U.S.A. which were particularly cordial during this period, worsened with the passing by the American Congress of the Immigration Act of 1924, prohibiting the immigration of Japanese and other orientals into the U.S.A. The gulf widened when, as the result of domestic pressure caused by the World Economic Depression of 1929 and the growth of an anti-western, militarist and pro-fascist sentiment in Japan, the Japanese Government began its adventure in Manchuria, which resulted in the conquest of that territory and the setting up of the state of Manchukuo. The American Government thereupon announced the so-called Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition (1932), refusing to recognize "any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris

of August, 27, 1928".

The Stimson Doctrine had little practical results and Japan, emboldened by the course of events in Europe, which portended the outbreak of a war in which all the principal nations of the continent might be involved, inaugurated a bolder policy of expansion of her influence in China. Washington responded with huge naval appropriations, and the grant of large-scale aid to Nanking. Also, at long last, it afforded its recognition to the U.S.S.R., hoping thereby to encourage the latter to adopt a bolder attitude to Japan concerning her rights in Manchuria, and their common border. Japan protested against this unfriendly trend of American policy towards herself, and in April 1934 issued a clear-cut statement of her China policy (the so-called Amau Statement) as a warning to all Western nations against interference in East Asia. In 1935, taking advantage of the Abyssinian crisis, she adopted a new policy aimed at creating a few more 'Manchukuo's in China, thereby disintegrating and finally conquering that country. In November 1936, she insured herself against intervention by the Soviet Government, at the time heavily engaged in the Spanish Civil War, by concluding an Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. A month earlier Italy had signed a pact with Germany, forming the so-called Rome-Berlin-Axis, which turned into the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis when Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact a year later. In June 1937, following a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops at Lukouchiau (Marco Polo Bridge), Japan entered into a new phase of her China policy, aimed at the complete conquest of that country. (See above, Chapter X.)

As the war in China progressed Japan matured her plans for the elimination of all Western domination in East Asia, inviting the peoples of that area to pool their economic resources in a "Co-prosperity Sphere" under her control. As simultaneously her western partners were going on winning victories and the Netherlands and France were brought under their domination, Japan's war aims were expanded to include the colonies of these two powers in Southern Asia, viz. Indonesia and Indo-China, which were rich in mineral resources. Japan ordered the authorities of the Netherlands East Indies (later to be known as Indonesia) to supply her greater quantities of essential raw materials, freedom for Japanese to enter that colony and opportunity for

investment. She also ordered the French authorities in Indo-China to halt the shipment of supplies to China and the British to close the Burma Road, connecting Kunming with Wantung on the Burmese border. All these demands were immediately complied with. In July 1940 a definitely pro-German cabinet took office in Japan under the premiership of Prince Konoye, and in September treaties of alliance were signed with Germany and Italy, making Japan a full-fledged member of the Axis. At the same time, Japan extorted from the Vichy governor of Indo-China bases in the French dependency and not long afterwards she brought Siam (Thailand) under her control by helping her to despoil Indo-China of some 11,000 sq. miles of her territory.

Meanwhile, American attitude to Japan was hardening, and in July 1939, the U.S.A., had given the required six months' notice of the abrogation of her 1911 commercial treaty with Japan, so as to be free, early in 1940, to restrict her trade with Japan in any way it might be expedient. In short, "methods short of war" were already in the offing. In October, Ambassador Grew had publicly warned the people of Japan that the policy of their government was alienating the friendship of the U.S.A. Faced by the hostile attitude of the United States Japan had (as we have seen above) drawn closer to her Axis partners, and in September, 1939 signed with them fresh treaties, pledging each other of assistance if any of them was attacked by a "power not at present involved" in war, that is, the United States. The latter responded by reaffirming her determination to intervene in the global struggle in the aid of Great Britain. Soon after his re-election as President, Mr. Roosevelt proposed the lend-lease policy (see above), which became law in March 1941. During 1940 the U.S.A. had also begun to exert economic pressure on Japan. The launching of the rearming programme in the spring and summer furnished a pretext for cutting off supplies from Japan on the ground that they were needed at home. In July 1940 the President prohibited the export without licence of petroleum, petroleum products and scrap metal. Six days later he placed an embargo on the export of aviation gasoline to all countries outside the Western hemisphere, except for the use of American planes in service. In September the President placed a similar embargo on exports of scrap iron and steel, except to Great Britain.

THE U.S.A. DRIFTS INTO WAR WITH JAPAN AND INTO THE
SECOND WORLD WAR

Faced by the situation, Japanese policy was directed to three objectives : (1) to conciliate the U.S.A. if possible ; (2) to bring the Netherlands East Indies into the Coprosperity Sphere ; and (3) to remove the danger of the Soviet Union attacking Japan. The last objective was attained with the conclusion in April 1941 of a five-year neutrality pact with Russia. As regards the first, negotiations were begun with Washington with the arrival of a new ambassador, Kichisaburo Nomura. In July, Japanese troops landed in southern Indo-China with the reluctant consent of the Vichy government, who also permitted the establishment of air and naval bases in the colony. The United States quickly retaliated by announcing the freezing of all Japanese funds in the U.S.A., and war seemed to be in sight.

A last-minute attempt to prevent war was made by Prince Konoye, who had become Premier in July and who now proposed direct talks with President Roosevelt. The latter was personally favourable to a meeting, and some authorities are of opinion that "it is at least possible that a Roosevelt-Konoye meeting might have produced an agreement", (Dr. Pratt, *A History of the United States Foreign Policy*). But Secretary of State Hull threw cold water on the proposal, and with the resignation of Prince Konoye in October whatever chance there was for an agreement at top level was lost. The new premier, General Tojo, announced that negotiations would be continued, and the Emperor urged that efforts at a peaceful settlement with America be redoubled. Another ambassador, Saburo Kurusu, was sent to assist Nomura, while war preparations were simultaneously continued. In November, Japan's final terms for a compromise were rejected by Hull, who stiffly insisted on acceptance by Japan of a ten-point programme on strictly American lines, which called for a withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China and Indo-China and for a virtual disavowal of the Axis Pact. Hull should have known when he presented his note—a virtual ultimatum—that Japan would spurn it and war would follow.

The President and his advisers still dallied with the idea of a last appeal to the Emperor. The idea was thrashed out at least

a week before the message was actually sent, and, curiously enough, it placed all the emphasis on South-East Asia, and none on China. It reached Ambassador Grew too late for delivery to the Emperor until almost the moment of the fateful Pearl Harbour attack. The Japanese reply to the American "ultimatum" of November 26 was similarly received at the Japanese embassy at Washington too late, and when it was presented to Secretary of State Hull, who had learned about it, by the Japanese ambassadors, who as yet knew nothing, the former showed the latter the door. (On 7 December 1941 about 200 Japanese bombers had suddenly appeared over Pearl Harbour, the great American naval base in the Hawaiian islands, and rained bombs on the fleet lying at anchor and on the planes resting on the adjacent beach. The damage inflicted was shattering: some eight battleships and a large number of airplanes were either destroyed or put out of action.)

Americans speak about the Japanese action against Pearl Harbour as a "sneak attack", but the possibility of Japan beginning her war with America by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour was long known to the American Government, who had been warned about it a number of times by Ambassador Grew since 1941. In any case the position of the American fleet was palpably dangerous, and the Administration has been charged with "culpable negligence" in leaving it at that predicament. (There is the strange explanation that its withdrawal would have looked like a retreat.) There is a still stranger theory to explain it: it was said that "Roosevelt planned it that way"—as a "bait" for a Japanese attack. The purpose for this suicidal and criminal conspiracy is alleged to have been to get the United States into the war against Germany by the "back door". A more plausible theory than that the President plotted the destruction or crippling of one of his chief weapons at the moment of entering the war in order to get into it is that the Administration relied on the American Army and Naval Intelligence report that at the moment Japanese attack seemed to be directed against the Dutch East Indies and Singapore rather than Pearl Harbour. This is an explanation and not a justification and still does not exonerate the Administration of the charge of "culpable negligence". The mystery has not been cleared up yet.

The U.S.A. immediately declared war against Japan, promptly followed by Great Britain, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and several Latin American countries. Three days later, Germany and Italy answered with a declaration of war against the United States. The war which Hitler had begun in Europe now became truly a global struggle—the Second World War.

PART TWO

THE POST-WAR WORLD



CHAPTER XV

FROM WAR TO PEACE—THE UNITED NATIONS

THE greatest and most devastating war in history—the so-called Second World War—lasted nearly six years and came to an end in Europe with the unconditional surrender of Germany on 7 May 1945, and in Asia with that of Japan on 14 August 1945. While the total losses of this war are simply incalculable, the casualties have been estimated to run to about two and a half crores dead and three and a half crores wounded, and the direct and immediate military expenditure to amount to something like 350 billion dollars for the U.S.A. and to a trillion (1,000 billion) dollars for others. It was not the immediate losses, however, which could tell the tale. Millions of young men “died as cattle” on both sides, among them many who would have been artists, philosophers, scientists, upon whose ideas and exertions the world depended for its future progress :

“These laid the world away, poured out the red
Sweet wine of youth, gave up the years to be
Of work, and joy ; and that unhopd serene
That men call age, and those who would have been,
Their sons, they gave, their immortality.”

Even more tragic was the fact that one of the greatest triumphs of modern science—fissioning the atom—had been achieved in Germany in 1939 just on the eve of the outbreak of this war. A race thereupon had begun between the scientists of Germany on the one side and those of the Allied countries on the other, in fabricating an atom bomb. On 16 July 1945, the Americans successfully exploded the world's first atom bomb at Almagordo Air Base (New Mexico). On 6 August, they hurled an atom bomb on Hiroshima, completely destroying the city and putting out at least a hundred thousand lives, and three days later yet another on Nagasaki with equally disastrous results for the city and the inhabitants. The use of a weapon

of mass destruction was wholly unnecessary from the military point of view, for Japan, badly battered as she was at the time and with her Axis partners lying prostrate, could not in any way have fought on much longer. It has been surmised that the deed was done for political and diplomatic reasons—"to forestall the Russians", with whom bickerings, soon to develop into the so-called Cold War, had already begun, in plain language, to impress America's would-be opponents with her military might.

The Second World War thus ended not in the midst of rosy dreams of a new heaven and a new earth as the first in the series of world wars had done, but with forebodings of a Third World War coming hard on its heels. Almost immediately at its termination, the Western Powers and their war-time allies, the Russians, began to quarrel, while the atom bombs had introduced an uncertain and additional element of mistrust among them, besides inspiring horror throughout the world. Under the circumstances, no Peace Conference could be summoned, as had been done in 1919, to settle the terms of peace with the vanquished Germans, who, also, unlike at the end of the First World War, had this time no government with whom the victors might negotiate a settlement. On the side of the victors too, many countries, such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Greece, and the nations of east-central Europe, had been only recently "liberated" and their governments were still either "provisional" or "in exile".

While the war was still going on and before the rot had started on the Allied side the "Big Three", viz. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, had given considerable thought to the problems of the coming peace, and issued statements which, without possessing the moving quality of President Wilson's speeches before the close of the First World War, reassured war-battered humanity of peace and freedom. As early as 14 August 1941 (before the United States had entered into the war) President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had, following their meeting at sea, issued what came to be later called the Atlantic Charter, pledging themselves to an idealistic programme of international peace and justice, to the repudiation of territorial aggrandizement, and to the right of every nation freely to choose its own form of government. "After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all

nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want . . .", so was worded an oft-quoted part of the joint declaration.

THE "UNITED NATIONS"

Four months later, the United States having entered into the war and being committed to the spirit of the Atlantic Charter undertook to have it accepted by all the countries allied against the Axis powers. Thus it came about that on New Year's Day, 1942, twenty-six "United Nations" headed by the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and the U.K. sent their representatives to a meeting at Washington. They signed a declaration emphasizing the aims set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and promising common action against the Axis powers. Britain, Russia and the United States decided, in October 1943, not to wait until the war was over, but to start at once to build up a United Nations Organization. Accordingly, at Moscow, on 1 November 1943, the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and China signed a declaration, which affirmed "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of peace and security". Draft proposals for the organization were drawn up by the representatives of Britain, Russia, America, and China at a conference held at Dumbarton Oaks, near Washington, between August and October 1944 (France was excluded because of the American State Department's dislike of de Gaulle). The proposals were submitted to the Governments of the United Nations.

Meanwhile, President Roosevelt, who, unlike President Wilson, had the backing of American public opinion, had obtained in advance a practical assurance of the ratification by the American Senate of the scheme of the United Nations. On November 5, 1943, the Senate had passed a resolution recognizing the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization "with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world." Not long afterwards, at

the Conference at Yalta, held between Stalin, Churchill, and himself in February 1945, the three leaders agreed that an organizational conference should be held at San Francisco. At Stalin's insistence, it was agreed that the Soviet Union should have three votes (including those of Soviet, Ukraine and Byelorussia). The leaders also decided that, on substantial matters, decisions in the Security Council should require seven affirmative votes, including those of the Five Great Powers, who were to be permanent members of the Council. Thus arose the so-called Great Power veto in the Security Council. On 25 April 1945, a conference was called at San Francisco to prepare the United Nations Charter.

The San Francisco Conference was composed of 44 nations all of whom had declared war on Germany or Japan or had subscribed to the United Nations Declaration, and of six other nations, who were subsequently invited to attend it. (Among the original signatories Poland was not invited, because her government had not been accorded recognition; her representative signed the Charter later.) After deliberations for two months, during which there were heated discussions on questions such as the powers of the Big Five, future amendments to the Charter, etc. the Charter was agreed upon and signed on 26 June 1945, and on 24 October of the same year, the United Nations came into being. The U.N. General Assembly met for the first time in London on 10 January 1946, the twenty-sixth anniversary of the formation of the League of Nations. The Security Council met for the first time on 18 January, and the Economic and Social Council on 23 January. On 1 February, Trygve Lie, the Foreign Minister of Norway, was appointed Secretary-General by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council.

The U.N. Charter contains 111 Articles, grouped in 19 chapters, and a preamble, beginning with the words, "We the peoples of the United Nations", and pledging the signatories to maintain international peace and security and to co-operate in establishing political, economic, and social conditions favourable to these objectives. It precluded United Nations from intervening in the internal affairs of any nation without prejudice, however, to the application of enforcement measures with respect to threats of peace and acts of aggression.

MEMBERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

The original members of the United Nations were the states represented at San Francisco, comprising states that had warred against the Axis or broken diplomatic relations with it. Poland, not represented at San Francisco, subsequently signed the Charter, and became the fifty-first original member. Additional members could be admitted under Article 4 of the Charter, provided they were "peace-loving", accepted the obligations of the Charter and were deemed willing and able to carry these out. They were to be admitted by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly upon the recommendations of the Security Council, which, in such matters, must act with the approval of all five permanent members. Though the qualifications for membership are simple enough, acute friction between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, which was responsible for the vetoing by the one side of the nominees of the other, prevented the addition to U.N. membership, during the first nine years of its life, of more than nine members only.

At the end of 1955, however, a compromise between the two sides—the so-called "package deal" which, by the way, amounted to a tacit repudiation of the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter—was responsible for the addition of 16 new members. That covered all the applications for membership then on file, except those of Japan, Outer Mongolia, South Vietnam, and the divided state of Korea. The membership is worldwide, the only notable omissions being Red China and Mongolia and divided Germany, Korea and Vietnam. At this writing (1966) the U.N. has 121 members.

The United Nations Organization established its headquarters in the United States at New York, though some of its meetings and those of its auxiliary bodies have been held at Paris, the Hague, and the palatial buildings of the now-defunct League of Nations at Geneva.

The Charter provided for six main organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice.

(1) The General Assembly, often described as the centre-piece of the United Nations, is composed of all the members, each

having one vote. It can deal with any matter within the scope of the Charter except issues on the agenda of the Security Council. However, in November 1950, by what is known as the Unit- ing for Peace Resolution, it decided that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and in any case where there appeared to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly should consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures, including, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed forces when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. This resolution meant that a two-thirds majority of all members of the Assembly could for certain purposes bypass the veto in the Security Council. It also enhanced the moral authority of the Assembly as against the Security Council. On important questions (listed in the Charter) a two-thirds majority of members present and voting is required; on other questions, a simple majority is sufficient.

(2) The Security Council consists of fifteen members, five, viz. Nationalist China, France, the U.K., the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., having permanent seats, and the other ten, who are elected for 2-year terms by the General Assembly and are not eligible for immediate re-election. The number of non-permanent members was originally six, but by an amendment passed in December 1963 and coming into effect on 31 August, 1965, it was raised to ten. The total number of members of the Security Council, which was originally eleven, has thus now become fifteen. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and members agree to carry out its decisions. Decisions on procedural matters are now made by an affirmative vote of nine (originally seven) members. On all other matters the affirmative vote of nine (originally seven) members must include the concurring votes of all permanent members: it is this clause which gives rise to the so-called "veto". A "double veto", under which a Great Power could use the veto to enforce its position that a particular issue was vetoable, was imposed by a separate declaration of the five permanent members. Above all, the Charter provided that no amendment could

go into effect without the consent of all the Great Powers. The veto is, of course, only a symptom of Great Power disagreement, and a respectable body of opinion holds that but for the veto, the Security Council might have adopted decisions which, in view of U.S.-U.S.S.R. disagreements, might have plunged the world into war. In June 1950 the absence of the Soviet Union, which was boycotting the Security Council, which had refused to seat Red China on that body, made possible the Council's decision to defend South Korea. By a tacit agreement, both sides fought a limited war, and the Korean experience does not affect the validity of the argument that the veto is a safety valve. The veto was introduced because the idea was that the Great Powers were to enforce the peace, and the U.S.A. which was the first to propose its introduction, was as insistent upon it as the Soviet Union. The U.S.A. has not yet (at this writing at the end of 1966) used the veto, but, under the Truman administration, the American Government had announced that it would veto all candidates for Secretary-General except Trygve Lie. The Eisenhower Government also had announced that it would use the veto, if necessary, to prevent the Security Council from handing over China's seat to the representatives of the People's Republic in Peiping. By the end of 1960, a total of 99 vetoes had been cast, the Soviet Union having used it 92 times.

The six non-permanent seats were divided by a "gentleman's agreement" among various geographical regions—one seat each for Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the British Commonwealth, the Middle East plus North Africa, and two seats for Latin America. In 1961, the Philippines challenged the "gentleman's agreement" by competing with Eastern Europe and her claim was supported by the U.S.A. As neither contestant got the required two-thirds majority, the term was split between them, Rumania got it for the first year, and the Philippines was promised it for the second. In October 1962, Nigeria challenged the "gentleman's agreement" by vying with Morocco for the "Middle East seat", then held by the U.A.R. She argued that the region in question should be expanded to include Black Africa. This was the first open conflict between African members for seating privileges, and intensified the pressure for the enlargement of the Council. This, however, was a matter which required an amendment of the Charter and was subject to Great

Power veto. After the amendment passed in 1963 it was decided that the Afro-Asian States would have five seats, three for Africa and two for Asia. It was clearly understood and stated in the Assembly that the two former groupings—the Commonwealth and Middle East (Arabs)—would no longer be recognized and hereafter only regional or geographical areas would be recognized. (India, who had played a leading role in getting the Charter amended in 1963, won a non-permanent seat in the Security Council on 11 November, 1966 by securing 89 votes out of the 119 votes cast. She defeated Syria.)

Besides its primary concern with the maintenance of security, the Security Council plays a decisive role in other activities and in those of other organs of the United Nations. For example, it exercises a veto over the admission and expulsion of members which were effected by the General Assembly acting on its recommendations. The Secretary-General of the U.N. is likewise appointed by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Council. It can call for a special session of the Assembly. Its powers, in short, clearly reflect the determination of the Big Five to dominate the organization.

The voting procedure has made it impossible for any of them to be considered as an aggressor by the U.N. and since, arguably, aggression of a kind likely to endanger world peace can come only from the activities of a Great Power, the U.N. has been rendered ineffectual for its primary purpose, defined in Article 1 as being "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppressing of aggression or other breaches of the peace". It was a growing realization of this that was responsible for the creation of regional security organizations like NATO. Article 52 of the Charter lays down that "nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional agreements for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security as are appropriate for regional action", and even that "the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such local agencies". Under Article 51 of the Charter, however, the Security Council must be kept "fully informed" of such activities, and, under Article 52, they must be "consistent with the Pur-

poses and Principles of the United Nations". The "inherent right" of individual self-defence against an attack is recognized under the same Article. Western defence pacts, such as NATO however, invoked Article 51 rather than Article 52, since no action could be taken under the latter without the authorization of the Security Council (except against an ex-enemy state). Under Article 51, however, nations could take individual or collective action "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". Critical discussion of Article 51 is to be found in Chapter 19, below, under "The Pact and the Charter".)

(3) The Economic and Social Council consists of 18 members elected by the General Assembly for 3-year terms of office. The Council is responsible under the General Assembly for carrying out the functions of the United Nations with regard to international, economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters. It co-ordinates the work of the specialized agencies, which are inter-governmental organizations established to deal with special problems. These latter include: (i) the International Labour Organization (ILO), (ii) the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), (iii) the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), (iv) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Bank), (v) the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and (vi) the World Health Organization (WHO).

(4) The Trusteeship Council is charged with the supervision of the administration of Trust Territories, i.e. areas, which were held by certain powers as League of Nations Mandates, or were taken from enemy states as a result of the Second World War, or are dependencies which are voluntarily included within the trusteeship system by an administering power.

The Trusteeship Council consists of all member states administering trust territories, permanent members of the Security Council which do not do so, and a sufficient number of states selected by the General Assembly for 3-year terms to balance the number of administering powers. Each member has one vote, and decisions are taken by a simple majority. In addition to considering reports from the administering powers the Council accepts petitions from the people living in the trust territories and may provide for periodic visits to these territories.

(5) The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. All members are *ipso facto* parties to the statute of the Court, and non-members can become parties. The jurisdiction of the Court extends to cases submitted to it by the parties. Its decisions, which are final, are only binding between the parties concerned and in respect of a particular dispute. If any party to a case fails to heed a judgment of the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may decide what is to be done. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. The Court consists of 15 judges elected for a 9-year term by the General Assembly and the Security Council voting independently. No two of the judges may be nationals of the same state. Retiring judges are eligible for re-election.

The Court has not been much of a success, and the number of cases on which it has been asked to issue its Opinions or Judgments has been small. It has, indeed, played an even less significant role in the working of the United Nations than was done by the Permanent Court of International Justice in that of the League of Nations. One reason for this is that in a divided world, even law has lost its universality, and the international law which the Court interprets, being the same as has been developed in the West during the past few centuries, is unacceptable to the Soviet Union as 'bourgeoise' international law. Many Asian and African nations, similarly, refuse to accept Western legal and judicial standards as applicable to their disputes.

Of the eight Opinions issued by the Court in its first eight years, two were purely "technical"; two were curiously political—Opinions on admission to U.N. membership—which were ignored by both East and West when they admitted sixteen states to membership in a 'package deal'; two were on the status of South-West Africa, which were rejected by South Africa; and one on the interpretation of peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, which made effective propaganda for the West. The Court's latest pronouncement on the status of South-West Africa, issued in 1966, has disappointed and shocked public opinion in the entire Afro-Asian world.

Of the contentious cases on which the Court adjudicated, a

few deserve mention. The *Corfu Channel Case*, which arose out of Britain's complaint against Albania about alleged firing by Albanians on British vessels in the Corfu Channel—incidentally the first and last submission by a communist-controlled country to adjudication of its dispute by the Court—ended in a verdict against Albania, which she refused to accept. In the *Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case*, the Iran of Mossadecgh refused to comply with the Court's order indicating interim measures to protect the interests of the parties. The Case was ultimately declined by the Court on jurisdictional grounds. The Norwegian-United Kingdom *Fisheries Case*, the (*Haya de la Torre*) *Asylum Case* between Columbia and Peru and the *Miniquiers and Crehos* (Channel Islands) case between France and the United Kingdom arose out of minor disputes. In a somewhat more important case, which arose out of Portugal's complaint against India for occupation by the latter of certain enclaves in India, the Court rejected (26 November 1957) certain preliminary technical objections raised by India, and proceeded to a Judgment on its merits. India's re-occupation of Goa a month later deprived the Case of any realistic basis.

(6) The Secretariat comprises the Secretary-General and such staff as the organization may require. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The Secretary-General makes an annual report and any supplementary reports which might be necessary to the General Assembly. He may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that threatens the maintenance of international peace and security. In performing their duties, the Secretary-General and his staff must not receive instructions from any authority outside the United Nations. Members of the United Nations have agreed not to exert any influence on them. (See further below, The developing role of the Secretary-General).

AMENDMENTS TO THE CHARTER AND THE QUESTION OF CHARTER REVISION

Amendments to the Charter can be done by the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote of all its members. Such amendment, however, could not come into force until ratified by two-thirds of the members, including the five permanent members.

of the Security Council. A second method of amendment is through a General Conference of members. The decision to hold such a conference requires a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and the votes of any seven members of the Security Council. The Charter had provided that, if a conference had not met earlier, a proposal to hold one should be placed automatically on the agenda of the tenth session of the General Assembly.

In the event, however, the Tenth Assembly decided to defer the convening of such a conference. By the time the world had become familiar with the reasons why the high expectations with which the U.N. was created had not been fulfilled. To restore the U.N. to its expected place in the hearts and minds of men seemed to be a desirable goal, but there seemed to exist ample reason to question whether a revision of the Charter, that is, change via the amendment process prescribed in Articles 108 and 109, was the only or the best way to proceed toward re-invigorating the organization. The argument was clinched by Abba Eban of Israel when he said: "There is much wisdom in the view . . . that the causes of international tensions reside not in the imperfections of the Charter but in the lack of agreement between member states, and specially between the great powers." The causes of such tensions, admittedly, had much increased since 1945, when the U.N. was created and its members were still more or less united. It seemed that to concentrate on changing the words of the Charter was to divert attention from the urgent task of hacking out step by step that measure of agreement on basic issues that was essential to and was a precondition for a proper functioning of the U.N.

Those who favour a revision of the Charter are not unaware that even a reformed organization would not work unless governments made better use of the world body or guided their conduct by the high ideals of the U.N. But they are of opinion that the ideals should be stated with greater clarity, that those parts of the machinery which have been found to be weak or wrong should be repaired or remodelled, and that the entire machinery might be better oiled and modernized. They advocate, for example, that (1) membership of the U.N. should be made universal or selective, whichever was preferred, but not both as was being lately attempted (through the "package deal"), (2) the

Great Power veto in the Security Council should be abolished so that peaceful settlement might be facilitated and some load taken off the General Assembly, (3) domestic jurisdiction should be more precisely defined, (4) the World Court should be given compulsory jurisdiction, at least in some fields, and so on.

Unfortunately, however, none of the projected reforms is likely to have unanimous acceptance. Thus, universal membership would run up against the American determination to bar out Red China, while selective membership would destroy the U.N.'s value as a point of contact among adversaries. To extend the jurisdiction of the World Court might drag it into the arena of the Cold War. The abolition of the veto might facilitate the task of passing resolutions, and hence of bringing moral pressure to bear on wrong-doers, but it may have the practical effect of multiplying the instances of defiance. In a world divided by interdependent issues, created by ideological differences and political contests between communist and anti-communist blocs, between the "have" and "have-not" nations, and between the white colonial racist powers and the non-whites, it would be hard to please both sides; to please the metropolitans would be to displease the anti-colonials and vice versa.

There is another point too which should be noted. As the late Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld pointed out in his annual report for 1954, the United Nations has shown much capacity for growth and adaptation amounting to silent revision without a formal amendment of the Charter. The following examples may be cited: (1) The conventions which made it possible for absentees and abstentions of Great Powers not to count as vetoes in the Security Council, (2) the Security Council action by recommendation, rather than decision, in the Korean case, (3) the Uniting for Peace Resolution, (4) the admission of members by the method of "package deal", and (5) the system of the U.N. interest in non-self-governing territories, developed from the slender beginnings of Article 73. The U.N. Charter, as it is, offers much opportunity for more effective use of the U.N., when the members will it.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS—A COMPARISON

The planners of the United Nations Organization admittedly thought of it as a successor to the League of Nations, and the

American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, whom President Roosevelt used to call the "father of the UN", often referred to it, in his memoranda to his department's planning staff, as "The League". Prof. Schuman, for a different reason, which is not complimentary to the world body, remarks as follows: "The United Nations Organization is the League of Nations in a new guise." He thinks that while there are some differences, the two bodies are basically similar.

With the experience of the League of Nations before them, the planners of the United Nations were keen on avoiding the mistakes which had in their opinion marred the usefulness of the body. They thought that the League suffered from a few fundamental weaknesses, as follows: (1) The absence of the United States and the non-participation of the Soviet Union till 1934. (2) The lack of military force to back up its decisions. Despite the Covenant, nothing more than economic sanctions was ever considered, and, when once the latter were imposed, e.g. against Italy, oil, the one import vital to Mussolini's venture was carefully left out. (3) As the name League indicated, the members of the organization were extremely jealous of any fundamental surrender of sovereignty. Although the Covenant required members to take both economic and military sanctions against a convicted aggressor such declarations by either its Assembly or its Council required a unanimous vote (Article 5). Thus no member could be required to take action to which it was opposed. Every member state in fact made its own decision as to whether it would impose sanctions or take any other action recommended against an aggressor. (4) The Covenant did not actually forbid war, and, indeed, a state, after complying with all the procedures enjoined by the League, could go ahead with its war if it respected the waiting period required under the Covenant. The League investigation procedures required six months, and the waiting period was another three. This weakness of the League was, however, a potential one, and had not emerged before the League collapsed. (5) The Covenant was embodied in the Treaty of Versailles with the result that the League was subjected to attacks by those who attacked that settlement. Partly on this ground and also because the membership was initially confined to the victor nations the League was denounced in the vanquished countries as an instrument of oppression.

The U.N. Organization, as set forth in the Charter, was carefully designed to overcome each of these weaknesses. (1) The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were not only the founding members, but they along with Britain, France, and China were to exercise special rights and responsibilities as permanent members of the Security Council. For a number of reasons, however, the interest of the U.S.A. in the U.N. seems to have somewhat waned at present and responsible Americans have sometimes expressed their disapproval of it. In 1952-53, for example, General Douglas MacArthur and his supporters blamed the U.N. for the failure to achieve a decisive victory in Korea. The late American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, once complained that the organization had been oversold to the Americans. The U.S.A. finds the U.N. with its vastly increased membership, rather difficult to get on with, since the two-thirds majority required for important decisions by the General Assembly is difficult to obtain now.

(2), (3) and (4)—The U.N. was not, any more than the League, provided with a military force, but, under the Charter, members (and specially the permanent members) were to earmark contingents which would be at the disposal of the Security Council at all times. Membership of the U.N. carried with it a commitment to settle all disputes by peaceful means, refrain from threats or the use of force, and to comply with decisions by the Security Council. However, no member nation would be compelled *ipso facto* to provide troops: the size and the conditions for their use were to be determined by individual agreements between the Security Council and the States concerned. Though the progress of the Cold War has prevented the conclusion of any such agreements, the U.N. decisively intervened in the Suez crisis and implemented its decision by organizing a United Nations Emergency Force whose prompt appearance on the scene enabled the U.K. and France to withdraw their invading forces without much loss of face. A similar force was organized for dealing with the crisis in the Congo, but it had less decisive success, and the refusal of the U.S.S.R. to contribute anything towards the costs of the enterprise landed the U.N. in a serious financial difficulty. (See below). It may be mentioned that though, for important decisions, the unanimity principle obtained both in the Assembly and the Council of the League, the admission of

new members, which has produced more than half the vetoes cast by the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council of the U.N., required only a two-thirds majority.

The U.N. Charter specified only three legal circumstances for the use of force : when authorized by a Security Council decision, when required for individual or collective self-defence, and to prevent the resurgence of the defeated members of the Axis. The League Covenant did not provide for the members' right of collective self-defence. We have seen that, while under Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, members have the right of making regional arrangements for the maintenance of individual or collective self-defence, any action so taken requires the authorization of the Security Council (except against an ex-enemy state), where, of course, there is the question of the veto. Under Article 51, however, they could take individual or collective action in self-defence "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." The WU., NATO, and other defence pacts were formed under Article 51. (See below, Chapter 19.)

(5) With the experience of the Versailles Conference before them, the planners of the U.N. provided that the organization should have nothing to do with making peace treaties after the Second World War. For good measure, the Charter was drafted and signed before the surrender of either Germany or Japan. If the precedent of the League had been followed, there would not have been yet a U.N. because no peace treaty has been so far signed with Germany. The Western Powers made a separate peace with Japan in 1952. This was not recognized by the Soviet Union which made its own separate agreement with Tokyo in 1956. Though U.N. membership started with the victors against the Axis, the body was not viewed in the same light by the latter, partly because it was not and could not be embodied in a Peace Treaty imposed on the vanquished, and more because the onset of the Cold War quickly changed the character of Germany. That Germany is not a member is due to a partitioning of the country into two states, which are linked with the Western and Communist blocs respectively. The Soviet Union would probably agree to the admission of West Germany provided the West agreed to the admission of East Germany, but the West have refused to recognize East Germany.

The rest of the Axis powers, Italy and Japan, have been admitted into membership of the U.N.

The U.N., nevertheless, as it emerged out of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, bore one striking resemblance to the League : it is equally dominated by the Great Powers, whose special position was safeguarded by the veto power in the Security Council, and presumably also by the Domestic Jurisdiction principle, enshrined in Article 2, Clause 7 of the Charter, which precluded the United Nations from intervening in the internal affairs of a member state—obviously meaning colonial issues. It may be noted that it was the U.S.A. which first proposed the veto and was as insistent on it as the U.S.S.R. During the San Francisco Conference, however, the protests of the small powers brought about the inclusion in the Charter of provisions under which the U.N. was to assume important responsibilities in the field of human rights, as well as in the economic development of under-developed countries. Language enjoyining on all members the adoption of noble aspirations with regard to all colonial peoples, and specially the population of the U.N. Trust Territories (successors of the League mandates) was also included. It was also decided that the veto could not be used to prevent the discussion of a dispute in the Security Council. At present, the boot is well-nigh in the other leg, because of the large increase in the membership of the U.N., with consequent domination by smaller powers of the General Assembly, which has had its powers considerably enhanced, and because of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. wrangle, with the decline of the powers of the Security Council.

As regards Article 2, Clause 7, enunciating the Domestic Jurisdiction principle, it may be observed that neither the political organs of the U.N. nor the majority of the member states has considered it as a legal principle to be interpreted by the International Court of Justice or some other body of jurists. The view was soon adopted that the principle should not be so construed as to prevent discussion in, or the adoption of a resolution by an organ when such action might contribute to the furthering of the declared purposes of the U.N. (Goodrich and Simons, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security*). Actually, against the wishes of some of the colonial powers, questions relating to South-West Africa, Cyprus, etc. have been considered and action taken on them (though

generally without tangible results) by the General Assembly.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE & SECURITY

The United Nations was created after the Second World War, as the League of Nations had been created after the First World War, to maintain international peace and security and to promote international co-operation. The Charter vests the responsibility for carrying out these purposes in its main organs, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretary-General, and assigns them their respective duties in these and other regards. But, so far as the maintenance of international peace and security is concerned, it expressly charges the Security Council with "primary responsibility". In this respect it differs from the Covenant of the League of Nations, which set up the Assembly and the Council as co-ordinate authorities, both of which could deal with "any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world". Further, as if to emphasize the special position of the Security Council and its "primary responsibility" for maintaining international peace and security, it placed limitations on the competence of the General Assembly by (1) asking it to consider the "general principles of co-operation, in the maintenance of international peace and security, (2) forbidding it to make any recommendations in respect of any dispute or situation which was under consideration of the Security Council. It empowers it simply to "call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security."

The enforcement machinery of the United Nations as outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter is generally similar to that of the League of Nations as outlined in Article 16 of the Covenant. But there are some significant differences which were intended by the framers of the Charter, who had the experience of the League failure to learn from, to enable the United Nations and its chief executive organ, the Security Council, the better to discharge the duties imposed upon them for maintaining international peace and security. Articles 39, 41, and 42 of the Charter, which are the heart of the United Nations system of law enforcement go far beyond anything that

the Covenant contemplated. For instance, while, under Article 16, as interpreted by Resolution 4 of the Council, every member of the League had the freedom to decide whether a breach of the Covenant had been committed, it is the Security Council of the U.N. which *decides* such an issue and also the measures to be taken, and the decisions of the Security Council are not mere recommendations but binding on all members (Article 25). The founders of the U.N. also attempted to provide the Security Council with a military force with which readily to enforce its decisions, by asking members to execute military agreements whereby they were to make available to the Security Council forces as agreed upon between the Security Council and themselves.

These provisions of the Charter which sought to make the new world body stronger than the old League were, however, largely nullified by three other provisions in the Charter itself. The Charter left the member states with the option of determining (in consultation with a Military Staff Committee) what forces they were willing to contribute to the U.N.'s peace-keeping machinery, and, in the atmosphere of the Cold War, no agreements were concluded. Secondly, the Charter gave everyone of the five permanent members the power to veto any decision of the Council—with a view no doubt to entrenching the Great Powers in a position of supremacy in the U.N. but actually resulting in the uses of the power frequently by the U.S.S.R. and consequent virtual paralysis of the Security Council. Thirdly, under Article 51 of the Charter, the members retain the right of individual and collective self-defence, and advantage has been taken of this by the U.S.A. and others to form regional alliances like NATO, the very idea of which is inconsistent with the conception of collective security for which the U.N. stands.

Above all, the U.N., which the founders, who were practical statesmen and not ideologues, set up as the Four Policemen of President Roosevelt's conception standing guard over a war-devastated world—preventing and effectively dealing with a threat to or an actual breach of the peace anywhere in the world—was, as the Cold War raged between East and West, unable to play its intended role and largely reverted to the status of the League of Nations, viz. an agency for keeping world peace within the limits of peaceful settlement of disputes between

nations. The Security Council which was intended to be the chief instrument of the Great Powers to take decisions on cases of dispute among nations and, with a ready force at its command, to prevent a disturbance of the peace, or to stop it if it had begun, found itself unable to do these, and limited itself to giving advice or making recommendations or doing such acts as did not run the risk of the use of the veto by one side or the other of the Cold War in its meetings. (The solitary occasion on which the Security Council ordered military action, viz. North Korean aggression, had singular features which made such action possible, and is dealt with below.)

The Charter virtually precludes the United Nations from intervening in the disputes of the Great Powers by conferring on the permanent members of the Security Council the power to veto any resolution which they may disapprove. It is not also to be expected that after some Great Power has committed an act of aggression and others, banded into some regional alliance under the shelter of Article 18, have rushed to help the victim of aggression, and a war has resulted, the Security Council at some later stage may intervene and bring the conflict under its control. Article 51 states that collective self-defence may continue only as long as the Security Council has not taken action; that collective self-defence measures, whenever taken, must be reported to the Security Council; and such measures shall not affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take appropriate action. These reassurances are of a verbal rather than substantive nature: the obligation on those who have already acted by themselves to report to the Security Council is unnecessary, for by press, radio or diplomatic channels, the latter will come to know about it; as soon as the Security Council takes a step in arriving at a decision it will find itself immobilized by the exercise of its veto power by the "aggressor" or his supporter in the Security Council. No doubt, by the operation of the Uniting For Peace Resolution, the matter may be taken up by the General Assembly, but the latter, without military resources, would be powerless to intervene, and would in any case be well-advised not to do so but to stand aloof, uncommitted to either side, so that at some suitable moment it may act as mediator among the warring parties.

It is unrealistic to consider the veto power of the five perma-

ment members of the Security Council as alone responsible for the failure of that body to fulfil its obligations under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Soviet veto in the Syrian-Lebanese case did not prevent the U.K. and France from accepting the proposal supported by the majority of the Council. As long as the Great Powers engage themselves in power politics, that is in the foreseeable future, they cannot but treat every issue submitted to the Security Council as one in Cold War politics, and even if the veto power did not exist and was not used, most decisions would be inoperative because to try to implement them would mean war. Under the circumstances, both East and West have raised issues against each other in the Security Council for sheer propaganda purposes, at best to make appeals to the public opinion of the world, for any moral value they may have. What use, for example, did the U.S.A. have for her accusations of the Soviet Union in the Security Council in 1956-57 on the score of Russian military intervention in Hungary, if they were not for sheer propaganda? On the other hand, the use by the U.S.S.R. of her veto power in the Security Council in support of India for counteracting Western support of Pakistan for obvious political considerations devoid of morality has certainly prevented aggravation of the tense political situation in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent, since if success had attended the western game, its effect on India's foreign policy could not be predicted.

The Security Council has been called upon to consider many problems affecting relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, but for the most part these were peripheral to the main areas of conflict. When states brought such problems before the Security Council, they generally regarded possible U.N. action as useful and valuable, but not a decisive supplement to their own efforts. It would be wrong, for example, to assert that U.N. action in Greece determined the final outcome. The United States would have intervened to save South Korea from North Korean aggression, even if no U.N. existed, but it is probably correct to say that its NATO allies who helped her in the war did so more readily because action was taken within the framework of the U.N. Though, however, the role of the U.N. in dealing with problems of the Cold War has been limited and secondary, it has been a significant one in facilitating poli-

tical adjustments that have had to be made as the result of the emergence of nationalism in Asia and Africa. We may here examine the part played by the Security Council in settling some issues that were brought before it for consideration.

Palestine. After both the General Assembly and the Security Council had failed to bring about the peaceful partition of Palestine, it became clear that the use of force was called for. The Security Council, which alone could sanction the use of force, failed to do so, because none of the influential members of that body felt it to be consistent with its national interest. The result was the Arab-Israeli war, which the Security Council intervened to stop, but as the territorial settlement reflected the distribution of military power at cease-fire, which took place before the Israelis could use their military superiority to the limit, some credit goes to the Security Council for bringing about a cease-fire and for the actual territorial settlement which might have been less favourable to the Arabs if the war had lasted longer.

Kashmir. For obvious political reasons, the Western Powers who dominated the Security Council turned a deaf ear to India's call for action against the aggression of Pakistan, and, instead, took an unfair advantage of India's assurance to the Maharaja that after Kashmir had been cleared of invaders there would be "a reference to the people" by interpreting it as a promise to hold a plebiscite to determine the status of Kashmir. The Security Council forthwith appointed a Commission for forcing a cease-fire, which it successfully did, though coming as it did when India was on the point of winning back the last sliver of territory conquered by Pakistan by her unprovoked act of aggression, it resulted in a territorial settlement much to the disadvantage of India. The Commission failed in its other task of arranging for a plebiscite, and its many successors have failed to advance its prospects in the least. The many successive endeavours made by Pakistan's western friends to take the matter up in the Security Council have been foiled by the veto (actual or threatened) of the Soviet Union. But the Security Council has always remained a ready forum where Pakistan has been free to denounce India. In the case of Pakistan's aggression in Kutch, followed by attempts to infiltrate Kashmir and yet another war between the two countries, the Security Council

did succeed in imposing a cease-fire, thanks mainly to the untiring efforts of U Thant, the Secretary-General, to bring it about.

Anglo-Egyptian Dispute of 1947. On July 8, 1947, Egypt requested the Security Council to bring about the immediate withdrawal of British troops from Egyptian soil and the termination of the British administrative regime in Sudan. With one of the permanent members of the Council a party to the dispute, the Security Council failed to do anything, and decided to retain the question as a permanent item on its agenda, to be taken up if there was a fresh reference. No reference was made by any members or any of the parties.

The Berlin Blockade. With all the parties permanent members, the Security Council was unable to contribute anything to the issue of peaceful change raised by the Soviet blockade of the land communications between the Western and Soviet sectors of Berlin. The case was brought before the Security Council by France, Great Britain, and the United States on September 29, 1948. A draft resolution was approved by nine members and the Soviet Union vetoed it. The blockade was eventually lifted by an agreement between the parties in the negotiations for which the U.N. played no part whatsoever.

Indonesia. However, the Security Council achieved a limited success in settling the Indonesian problem. Brought to the notice of the U.N. in January 1946 by Russia and the Ukraine, the Indonesian question was dealt with as if it was an issue in the Cold War by the U.S.A. and her supporters in the Security Council. However, after India and Australia, for different reasons, joined the Soviet Union in condemning Dutch "police action", the U.N. sent a Good Offices Commission to Indonesia to negotiate a political settlement. The resulting Renville Agreement established a truce, but no political agreement could be arrived at and the Dutch denounced the Renville Agreement. The Security Council asked both parties to cease hostilities, which had recommenced, and converted the Good Offices Commission into a U.N. Commission for Indonesia with power to assist the parties in coming to a political agreement. The Dutch were unable to put down Indonesian resistance, and at long last, in May 1949, under U.N. sponsorship, an agreement was signed providing for a Round Table Conference in which the

U.N. Commission also participated, and, finally, on December 27, 1949, sovereignty was transferred to a newly created Netherlands-Indonesian Union. It is difficult to assess the contribution made by the United Nations to the ending of the colonial rule in Indonesia but it cannot be denied that it facilitated the change and limited the violence attending it.

The U.N. action in Korea. Korea is often cited as an instance of the successful use of force by the United Nations in upholding the principle of collective security. Actually, the Security Council Resolution of 27 June asking U.N. members to assist South Korea to repel North Korean attack and that of 7 July authorizing the creation of a united command under the U.N. flag were made possible only because the Russians were then boycotting the U.N. By tacit agreements, both sides fought a limited war, and further escalation of the conflict, when China entered the war, was avoided only because the People's Republic had not yet become the great military power which it shortly became and possibly because of the American monopoly of the atomic bomb. The United Nations succeeded in achieving its immediate purpose, protecting South Korea from aggression, but in spite of boastful assertions of collective security enthusiasts about circumventing of the veto in the Security Council by the passing of the Uniting For Peace Resolution, everybody concerned knew the hollowness of the claim and none was left with an appetite for a further experience of the kind of U.N. action for resisting aggression as the Korean war.

Suez and Hungarian Crises, Congo. Any doubts as to the incapacity of the United Nations for enforcement of collective security when a Great Power or its protege was involved were removed by the tragedy of the Hungarian rising of 1956. In the Suez affair the Security Council succeeded in making the Anglo-French aggressors vacate their aggression only because the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were united in the support of its action, and were prepared to take military action to back up the policy they had decided upon in their national interests. The U.N.'s usefulness was demonstrated when it sent an Emergency Force (UNEF) to the areas of conflict which provided an excuse for the invaders to retreat without much loss of face. Great Power involvement in a vulnerable area was further avoided by the fact that the Assembly wisely decided to exclude the military

forces of the Great Powers from the composition of UNEF. Neither of the major contestants in the Cold War was thus permitted to "muscle in", and both were "squeezed out." In Congo also the U.N. later sent an Emergency Force, but did not have the same amount of success since the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were in sharp disagreement with each other and their national interests collided.

CONCLUSION

The record of the United Nations to date does not indicate either that it is a pronounced failure or that it has fully come up to the expectations with which it was founded, specially in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security. The record also does not seem to prove that the organization would have been a greater success if some of its organs, notably the Security Council, had been more effective, or some provisions of the Charter (say the domestic jurisdiction principle) had been phrased differently or had not been there. The Great Power veto is now generally considered to have served as a safety valve: without it there would have been no United Nations, since both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. insisted on it, or if there had been a U.N. without it both East and West might have acted in a manner which might have led to a Third World War. Nevertheless, many thinkers have subscribed to the view that the Charter could be so revised as to make the United Nations work at least better. The difficulty about accepting their views is that there are sharp disagreements among those who propose a revision of the Charter, and the differences cannot be reconciled with each other. Finally, there was the formidable question of seating Red China in the Security Council. Without Red China there, many of the decisions of the U.N. were bound to be unrealistic and most important questions, say disarmament, were incapable of solution. But the U.S.A. for long was adamant in her opposition to the idea of Red China becoming a member of the U.N.

Some people are of opinion that the only way to make the U.N. (and its chief executive organ, the Security Council) work better as an agency for the maintenance of international peace and security is to recast it completely into some kind of world government or other form of supranational authority. But even

the advocates of world government are divided in their opinion as to the composition and constitution of a future World State. Some think that not the whole world but that part of it which has a more or less cultural similarity, namely the Western nations, should be members of a world state, or at least should constitute the hard core of a wider organization. As banded together in NATO that is how the conception stands at present. Quarrels among NATO allies, however, are well known. If members of NATO and the U.N. quarrel with each other, why should one expect harmony in a World State, which would be far more diverse and discordant in every respect than NATO, or the U.N. of the present day? A world state would run many new risks, such as the possibility of its coming to be dominated by one master nation or even one dictator. Above all, national loyalty is too strong in the world at present—and is likely to remain equally strong for the foreseeable future—to make any further advance in the direction of world government very difficult, if not impossible.

A study of the U.N. as it has worked during the last twenty years of its existence suggests that its comparative failure to discharge its tasks is due not so much to defects of its machinery as to the political climate in which it has worked. The system itself has shown a remarkable capacity for adaptation and growth within the limits of the Charter as initially written. There has gone on also a silent revision of the Charter, even though a formal revision as laid down in the Charter has not been found to be feasible. The suggestion is that with some improvement in the political atmosphere, specially in the relations among the major powers, further necessary adaptations to conditions will take place in the working of the U.N. organs, including the Security Council, and the path of wisdom lies in letting time do it.

TWENTY YEARS OF THE U.N.—A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS

OLD AND NEW U.N.'S

As its twenty years of life were about to be completed, the U.N. scored a triumph: it succeeded in imposing a cease-fire in the fighting between India and Pakistan. It was a timely reminder

of the useful role that the U.N. can, and, in general, has played in world affairs during these years; but it did not silence its critics, who are many, and to be found everywhere—in East and West. It was launched upon its career, at the close of the most devastating war in history, as the “Four Policemen”—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China—of President Roosevelt’s conception, plus France, in short, the five Great Powers, who were to stand guard over the world, settle the disputes of nations and prevent wars. In its early years, it did settle, or at least patch up, conflicts among some small powers, and if it could not prevent them from fighting with each other, at least prevented the escalation of their quarrels to a general war. In the social, economic and cultural fields, it did some praiseworthy work, which was acknowledged by friend and foe.

The United Nations, however, failed to accomplish what the world expected it to do—to prevent the Great Powers from quarrelling with each other—or to settle their disputes. The frigid wind of the Cold War killed the United Nations, which was the child of the Second World War, and replaced it by another, which is the child of the Cold War. With its assured two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, the U.S. Government now used the U.N. as a “grand alliance against the U.S.S.R.”, made it fight a war in Korea in the interest of its own Cold War policies (calling it a United Nations war to fight aggression), and, to facilitate similar other uses, had the Uniting for Peace Resolution passed by the General Assembly (November 1950) so that the Soviet veto in the Security Council might be circumvented and the latter itself bypassed.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Thus began a new role for the General Assembly—one that the Charter had not intended it to perform and was tantamount to a usurpation by it of the functions of the Security Council, paralysed as it was by the conflicts between the two superpowers: it began to assume primary and specific responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security, which properly belonged to the Security Council. Till 1955-56, when some twenty members, mostly Afro-Asians, were admitted to the U.N. mem-

bership and while the U.S.A. had a secured two-thirds vote of the Assembly in her favour, this development suited U.S. interests admirably. As more Afro-Asian members were admitted to membership in the following years, the U.S.A. lost its control over the General Assembly, which, on many issues, which were supported by the Communist bloc, such as anti-colonialism, adopted decisions which were against the interests of the U.S.A., and specially her "colonialist" allies. The U.N., which was once denounced by the U.S.S.R. as an instrument of American policy (in Soviet language, of American imperialistic war-mongers), came now to be sharply criticized by the Americans as the instrument of "a half-hundred new members who are semi-civilized and incapable of self-government", or even as "an instrument of the Soviet Communist conspiracy".

Weighted Voting? Americans are afraid that the General Assembly, which has already taken a strong anti-colonial line, may embark upon policies, such as coercing South Africa to abandon apartheid, which may produce a general war, and are busy devising methods by which brakes may be put upon the General Assembly. There is much resentment in America at the fact that Afro-Asian members of the General Assembly who represent states that make up less than 5 per cent of the world's resources and 11 per cent of the population should combine into a near-two-thirds majority, or that those who pay only 2 per cent of U.N. assessments should block action by the majority. One of the methods with which the State Department of the U.S.A. toyed was "weighted voting", a device followed successfully in certain international financial and commodity organizations. They are now said to have abandoned the idea, since, by careful computer analyses, it has been ascertained that it will be worse than the present one-nation one-vote system.

However, there is little in the present developments in their search for remedies that constitutes a real threat to the power and authority of the Great Powers. The Assembly's enhanced strength is counterbalanced by various factors: (1) It is rarely that the Afro-Asians can vote as a single unit, and they are subjected to much canvassing by nations who can and do give them aid, while, among themselves, they have their own quarrels and conflicting interests; (2) After the Uniting for Peace Resolution was passed, the Assembly has sought to enhance its powers by

certain devious and dubious methods (*see* Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 486). But with all that it is incapable of acting in respect of vital matters, such as peace-keeping, as effectively as the Security Council could have done in these matters, since its resolutions are not mandatory but only recommendatory, and it cannot order that its measures must be implemented. After all, the Afro-Asians are poor and weak nations and, except in certain matters in which they are vitally concerned, viz. rooting out colonialism, are normally unable to go against the wishes of the Great Powers. But the results of the discussions of the Assembly often carry little weight with the Great Powers, and are, therefore, frequently devoid of practical importance. More and more, the U.N., like the League of Nations before it, is left idle, it is not properly used, important decisions are often taken outside its halls. As Shrimati Vijayalakshmi Pandit said relinquishing the chair of Assembly President on 22 September 1954, "Machinery, in order to be useful, must be kept running. If allowed to remain idle, it deteriorates."

THE DEVELOPING ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Out of this situation there began what has been described as the developing role of the Secretary-General. As the Security Council was incapacitated by East-West disagreement to act effectively, the General Assembly, as we have seen, "usurped" some of its powers. But the General Assembly itself, for lack of sufficient powers, was unable to play the role which had thus devolved upon it. A fresh device was now employed: the Secretary-General was to be made to play the role which successively the Security Council and the General Assembly had failed to perform; he had, as the General Assembly's agent, to play the role of the peace-maker. Under Article 98 of the Charter, the Secretary-General, besides acting as "the chief administrative officer of the Organization", (Article 97) "shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him". More than that, under Article 99, he "may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the continuance of international peace and security." (Article 99, it is said, was introduced into the Charter at the

insistence of President Roosevelt, who wanted to give the Secretary-General such powers because he thought of taking up this office after leaving the White House.)

Without having real power at his back, the Secretary-General, in attempting to play this new role, must rely on his only assets (not inconsiderable), viz. the prestige of his great office or the advantageous position it gives him, his personality (which has been great in the case of each of the four men who have so far held this high office) and such powers of persuasion or diplomatic ability as he may possess. The performances so far have not been, however, very impressive. Mr. Trygve Lie's open championship of Israel's cause alienated Britain; and Nationalist China and the U.S.A. were angered by his campaign for the admission of Red China into the U.N. When Lie, acting under Article 99, asked the U.N. to defend South Korea, the Soviet Union was mightily offended, and vetoed his re-election. When his term was nevertheless extended for three years more, the Soviet simply refused to admit that he existed, and addressed their correspondence to the Secretariat, not to the Secretary-General. He resigned in 1952 with the remark that the smooth functioning of his office required that the Secretary-General must have the confidence of all the Great Powers.

Dag Hammarskjöld, the next Secretary-General, won his spurs by visiting Peiping for discussing with the Chinese authorities the release of American military men held prisoner there. The Americans were released soon after his return. His prestige rose to further heights during the Suez crisis in 1956, when he organized and sent a U.N. Emergency Force to Egypt. In 1958, he established a U.N. "presence" in Lebanon and Jordan, and in 1959 stationed a personal representative in Laos to observe any indirect aggression. He also tried to induce the U.A.R. to allow cargoes of Israeli origin to pass through the Suez Canal under an ingenious arrangement under which title the cargoes was transferred to a third party. The effort failed, but, successful or not, it was appreciated as a necessary move, with regard to a matter which should have been dealt with by the Security Council or the General Assembly and could not be done by either of them, to do something to find a solution. He tried to fill the vacuum created by the vacating of their respective duties by the two bodies.

When trouble arose in Congo soon after it had got its independence, Mr. Hammarskjöld tried to repeat his earlier Suez performance by sending another UNEF to the troubled area. But the circumstances were different; his action had not the united U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. backing which lay at the root of the Suez success, and he was here intervening in a domestic quarrel, aggravated by the actuality and possibility of foreign intervention. Khrushchev demanded his resignation, and there is little doubt that, if he had not met with his end in an airplane crash in 1961, he would have to follow the footsteps of his predecessor and resign.

REVIVAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

It is worthwhile recording, however, that, of late, some signs have appeared which indicate that the U.N. machinery, such as it is, is working better. According to some competent critics, there has been a revival of the Security Council. After a period of great activity from 1946 to 1949, it declined; the average of Council meetings between 1951-59 dropped to about 35 a year, less than 40 per cent of the previous years. The number of Council meetings has increased since then, it being 67 in 1961, 62 in 1962, and 101 in 1964. Another significant trend has accompanied this increased Security Council activity. Before 1960, the veto was used in 43 per cent of all Security Council substantive votes; since then it has been used in only 15 per cent. It may be stated also that the U.N. has tided over one of the greatest crisis of its whole career, one that threatened its very continuation—the Soviet assessment issue.

THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT ISSUE SOLVED

Article 19 of the Charter provides that a member shall have no vote in the Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the financial contributions from it for the preceding two years. In the 19th General Assembly (1964), the U.S.A. invoked this Article against the U.S.S.R. who had refused to pay her assessed shares of the Suez and Congo peace-making operations (amounting to \$21 million) and insisted that unless it was paid she must not vote in the General Assembly.

The U.S.S.R., France and ten other states had refused to pay on the ground that the operations were illegal because they were authorized or financed by the Assembly rather than the Security Council (in which the first two have vetoes). As a result, the Assembly took no votes until virtually the very end of the session; the little work that was done was dealt with by *ad hoc* devices, e.g. by informal polls taken by the President, Ghana's Alex Quaison-Sackey, in the lounges and his office, and inscribed as having been adopted by acclamation. In the 20th Assembly (1965), however, the U.S.A. announced that she had abandoned the effort to invoke Article 19 against the Soviet Union and the others who had refused to pay for peace-keeping operations. The crisis passed; but the questions remain how the expenses incurred are to be met, and, more important, how in future emergencies peace-keeping is to be done.

JUDGING THE U.N.

The U.N. was not responsible for the Cold War, and, in assessing its work, it is not reasonable to ask, whether it is successfully solving the problems which have arisen out of it. But it is relevant to ask a few questions. Are the nations of the world thinking of the international body in terms of ever-increasing respect? Are they going to evince greater readiness to take their disputes to the U.N.—in ever-increasing expectation that they will be settled there peacefully and justly (and not in the interests of the Great Powers), and are the two superpowers being increasingly encouraged, or impelled and even when necessary compelled to accept the U.N. as the agency which will solve their disputes peacefully? The U.N. cannot regulate or control the nuclear policies of the superpowers, but is it acting vigorously to bring about disarmament, nuclear and conventional?

The world waits for answers.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

THE EX-ENEMY STATES

THE Allies did not have any agreed policy for dealing with the Axis powers before the latter surrendered. No doubt, at a press conference, at Casablanca, at the end of his meeting with Churchill (January 1943), President Roosevelt had enunciated the doctrine of "unconditional surrender". But though this policy was largely carried out it was modified in a number of directions. Italy surrendered in September 1943, under circumstances which changed her from an enemy into a "co-belligerent." The Morgenthau Plan for "pastoralizing" Germany by drastically limiting the country's heavy industry and forcing it to live on its light industries and export of raw materials, though approved by Roosevelt and Churchill, was much modified. The Potsdam Declaration calling on Japan to surrender contained certain promises which made it far from unconditional.

However, on the eve of the German surrender, at the important conference of Yalta, in February 1945, the Allied leaders (Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill) did decide upon the sort of an administrative machinery which was to be set up for the occupation of Germany. There was to be an Allied Control Council, consisting of the Commanders-in-Chief of the national occupation armies. It would sit in Berlin, which was to constitute a separate zone under the joint control of the Allied Powers (Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.). At the suggestion of Churchill, it was also decided that France should be represented on the Allied Control Council and allotted a zone of occupation. At the conference of Potsdam, which opened on 17 July 1945, it was further decided that Germany should be treated as one economic unit, in spite of being divided into zones of occupation, and that German economy was to be fully controlled with a view to insuring an equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones and the production of a balanced economy. Ger-

many was to be demilitarized, denazified, and democratic institutions were to be built upwards from local self-government. The question of reparations which Germany was to be made to pay had provoked disagreement at Yalta, and the matter was left to be considered in detail by a Reparation Commission. At Potsdam it was decided that reparations should take the form of capital equipment which would be removed from Germany, each power generally satisfying its claim from its own zone, with the proviso that Russia was to receive 25 per cent of certain surplus capital equipment from the western zones.

At the conference at Tehran (November and December 1943) Marshal Stalin pleaded for an extension of the frontier of Poland up to the Oder river, in the interests of Russian security and for Russian annexation of Königsberg, so as to give the U.S.S.R. an ice-free port on the Baltic. The Polish question loomed large at Yalta, where Stalin proposed that Poland should annex German territory up to the Oder-Niese line, but Churchill objected to it. By the time the Potsdam Conference was held, the Poles had already occupied the disputed territory, and the western leaders agreed that it should be under the administration of Poland pending final delimitation of Poland's western frontier at the time of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. In the meanwhile, Russia had acquired the half of Polish territory which she had occupied during the Second World War. The effect of these territorial changes was virtually to shift Poland bodily westwards. The western leaders practically conceded to Stalin his own claims to German territory.

As in respect of the Axis powers in Europe, so about their partner in Asia, namely Japan, the Allied leaders did not have any concerted policy when the surrender came. A declaration issued after the meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek after their meeting at Cairo (November 1943) had announced their resolve to strip Japan of all the islands in the Pacific she had seized since the beginning of the First World War, and to restore to China all the territories she had taken from her such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores. It was also decided that Korea was to become "free and independent in due course". At the Tehran Conference which followed (November and December 1943), Stalin agreed to join in the Japanese war as soon as possible after victory in Europe had

been achieved. At Yalta (February 1945) this was confirmed, and Stalin assured of recognition of the autonomy of Mongolia, transfer to the Soviet Union of the Kurile islands and the southern half of Sakhalin, and the recovery of all those privileges and special rights that Russia had held in Manchuria prior to the Russo-Japanese war. Roosevelt undertook to inform Marshal Chiang Kai-shek about these territorial cessions to Russia. The Potsdam Declaration calling upon the Japanese to surrender repeated the demand for territorial cessions first voiced at Cairo, and, in addition, provided for the elimination of the authority of those who had misled the Japanese people into war, the punishment of war criminals, and the establishment of responsible government in Japan.

THE LIBERATED PEOPLES

At Yalta the Americans produced a "Declaration on Liberated Peoples" prepared by the State Department, which expressed their desire for the formation in the former Axis satellite states and countries liberated from the Axis yoke of interim governmental authorities broadly representative of the democratic elements in their respective populations and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of government responsive to the will of the people. Churchill and Stalin assented to this proposition which was certainly irreproachable from the moral point of view; but as practical statesmen they could hardly have entertained any illusions as regards their real worth in the domain of power politics. As a matter of fact, as the Allied Powers, including the U.S.A., commenced their victorious entries into enemy territories, it became clear that they would claim a deciding voice in the affairs of the countries which they militarily occupied. Each power, accordingly, showed an eagerness to push its armies into areas in which lay its special political interests and wanted them to be recognized as marking their respective spheres of influence.

Thus the Russians used the commanding military position which they had secured in Eastern Europe to ensure that the countries concerned came under their political influence. They insisted on the establishment in them of governments friendly to themselves, which practically meant that they should be Com-

munist. The Americans protested against this policy as a violation of the agreement arrived at Yalta. Forgetting that they themselves were following a like policy in occupied Japan (not to mention their policy in Latin America in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine and the war-time Act of Chapultepec), they accused the U.S.S.R. of the desire to spread Communism in Europe. How far, however, the ideological factor shaped Soviet policy is uncertain: Russia's security seemed to be Stalin's chief concern. It has been pointed out that his foreign policy bore a striking resemblance to that of the Tsars, and that most of Russia's gains in the post-war years in Europe and the Far East had once been included in the Tsarist empire.

Anxious to salvage what he could of Great Britain's pre-war position and aware of her greatly weakened position, Churchill negotiated an agreement with Stalin in October 1944. Under its terms, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary were to be considered as primarily within the Russian sphere of influence, and Greece in the British, while influence in Yugoslavia was to be divided equally between the two powers. This enabled England to intervene in Greece and oust the Communists, who held a commanding position in the E.A.M. (National Liberation Front), and to set up a pro-western government. The Russians did not object to this, and expected Western non-interference in Eastern Europe.

THE PEACE TREATIES

By the summer of 1945, it was generally agreed that the peace terms should be settled by agreement among the Great Powers—regardless of the wishes of the smaller Allied states, and that a Peace Conference like that summoned at the close of the First World War should be avoided. Hence at Potsdam, in July, 1945, the Allied leaders decided that a Council of Foreign Ministers representing the four Great Powers be set up to draft peace treaties with the ex-enemy countries. The search for peace, however, proved to be an extremely difficult enterprise in the face of increasing tension between East and West, which came to be called the Cold War. At the Council's first meeting which was held in London (11 September to 20 October 1945), the Russian Foreign Minister, Vyacheslay M. Molotov, quarrelled

with the American Secretary, James F. Byrnes, over procedural questions, the former insisting on their discussing the question of the occupation of Japan, while the latter wanted that they should confine themselves to a consideration of the peace treaties. With regard to the terms of the treaty with Italy, there were three main points of disagreement: (1) Russia wanted Trieste to be included in Yugoslavia while the Western leaders wanted that it should be a free port; (2) Russia wanted to acquire trusteeship over an Italian colony, preferably Tripolitana; (3) the Russian demand for reparations from Italy to the tune of 600 million dollars (one-sixth to Russia) was considered excessive by Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, and Byrnes.

The drafting of peace treaties with the Axis satellite of Eastern Europe provoked the greatest disagreement at the Council table. Russia followed her settled policy of ensuring the establishment of "friendly governments" in their states, i.e. in effect, Sovietizing them, while the U.S.A. wanted strictly to follow the relevant Yalta agreement to the letter. As regards the procedure to be followed in drafting the treaties, the American Secretary of State, Byrnes, proposed that this should be done by participation in the task of those powers which had signed the relevant armistice agreements provided that the drafts should be submitted subsequently to a peace conference at which all members of the United Nations which had supplied substantial military assistance against the Axis satellites in Europe took part. Molotov objected to this, and, in private session with Byrnes, demanded moreover that an Allied Control Council be established for Japan. He felt that the Western leaders were demanding a say in the settlement of peace in Eastern Europe but denying Russia any voice in the Far East. It appears that at this time Russia was prepared to accept Western Europe as an Anglo-American sphere of influence, and expected of Western leaders that Eastern Europe should similarly be considered by them as a Russian sphere. It was western attempts to meddle in Eastern Europe which appear to have convinced Russian leaders of the essential hostility of the West.

By the time the Council of Ministers held its second meeting at Paris (25 April 1946), the tension between East and West had considerably increased. Mr. Churchill, now the Opposition

leader in the British Parliament, had delivered a speech at Fulton, in the presence of President Truman, in which he spoke about an "iron curtain" having descended over Europe and the need of an Anglo-American alliance. At the Paris Conference Molotov attacked America more than Britain and it broke up with little work done except fixing a date for the peace conference, Byrnes having virtually conceded the Russian reparations claim from Italy. At the Peace Conference, held in Paris from 29 July to 15 October 1946, there were bitter exchanges between the two sides, which emphasized the growing division into Soviet and anti-Soviet blocs. The next stage in the treaty making was to submit the drafts to the Council of Foreign Ministers, which accordingly met for the third time on 4 November 1946. By this time, both sides had realized the futility of attempting to give way further to each other, and were anxious that the peace treaties should be finalized. By 6 December this was completed and on 10 February 1947 the treaties with the five Axis satellites, viz. Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland were signed. The Council arranged to meet again in March to discuss the German and Austrian treaties. In the meantime their deputies were to start work on the drafts of these in London.

The chief territorial changes effected under the treaties were as follows : The Franco-Italian border near Nice was altered to give Briga and Tenda to France ; Venezia Giulia went to Yugoslavia, the Dodecanese Islands went to Greece ; Trieste was to become a free territory under the protection of the Security Council of the United Nations. The entire Italian empire in Africa, covering more than 1,200,000 square miles, and including Libya, Italian Somaliland, and Abyssinia, was forfeited. Rumania ceded to the Soviet Union Bessarabia and northern Bukovina and to Bulgaria southern Dobruja, but gained Transylvania from Hungary. Finland, as provided in the armistice terms of September 1944, lost Karelia to Russia. The defeated nations paid heavy indemnities. Further, the treaties called for the destruction of old fortifications, the demilitarization of certain strategic areas, and the sharp reduction of all army, navy and air forces of the five defeated states. Italy had virtually to disband her navy, which hitherto was an important element in the balance of power in the Mediterranean. The resulting

vacuum was immediately filled by Britain and the United States. Finally, the Axis satellites were forbidden to possess, construct, or experiment with atomic weapons, self-propelled or guided missiles, and other particularly dangerous instruments of war. (For the Peace Treaties with Japan, see below, Chapter 25.)

THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY, 15 MAY 1955

After the signing of the five satellite treaties, the conclusion of peace with the remaining satellite, Austria, should have been found a simple matter. It was infinitely more simple than signing a treaty with Germany, whose neighbours might fear the growing power of a fully independent Germany. As early as ten years ago, the U.S.S.R., Britain, and the U.S.A. had declared in Moscow that they regarded the annexation of Austria to Germany by Hitler on 13 March 1938, as null and void, and had thus committed themselves to the creation of an independent Austria. Eighteen months later, Austria had been liberated and an Austrian Government constituted and recognized by the Big Four, who occupied the country pending the signing of a State Treaty that would carry out the Moscow declaration. The Foreign Ministers of the four-powers met in New York in December 1946 to draw up the State Treaty, but failed to do so, principally for disagreement on two points: (i) Yugoslavian claims to a part of Austrian Carinthia, and (ii) the definition of the German assets which were seized by the Russians in their zone of occupation. In 1949 the Kremlin abandoned their support of the Yugoslavian territorial claims, and thus one stumbling block was removed. But they claimed Austria's oil production and the Austrian Danubian Shipping Company as "German assets", and enjoyed their revenues, and covered the southern Czech frontier with their troops of occupation. In 1949 a compromise was reached on the question of the "German assets", but in the following years, which witnessed an intensification of the Cold War. Russia showed no desire to resume negotiations.

Following 258 futile meetings of the Four Powers on an Austrian treaty, the Western nations proposed on 13 March 1952, a "short" treaty of eight articles which would end the occupation and establish the independence of Austria. The U.S.S.R. rejected the short treaty, but following the death of Stalin in

March she considerably relaxed her attitude to Austria. She did what the Western Powers, specially the U.S.A., had done years ago, and notably renounced payment by Austria of the occupation costs. Even after this there was a long delay in the conclusion of a State Treaty, which was finally signed on 15 May 1955. The treaty provided for the recognition of Austria as a "sovereign, independent and democratic state" and contained an undertaking by the Allied Powers to respect the independence of Austria. She undertook not to seek any kind of economic or political union with Germany, and not to join an organization such as NATO. She was permitted to have her national armed forces, but, like the satellites mentioned above and, later, Germany in the Paris treaties (to be described in a subsequent chapter) undertook not to manufacture atomic and certain other types of weapons of mass destruction. Austria, however, had to pay heavily to the Soviet Union for her sovereignty and independence; she promised to deliver to Russia goods to the value of \$140 million, and one million tons of crude oil per year for the next ten years.

The Russians were not quite devoid of ulterior motives in signing the Austrian State Treaty. It was no doubt a departure from the Stalinist policy of the big fist, but there are reasons to believe that the successors of the Dictator, more subtle in their ways, set up the Austrian Republic as a model that Germany, and perhaps other states in Europe, might follow.

CHAPTER XVII

THE COLD WAR

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

THE strained relations which steadily developed between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. after the termination of the Second World War, and made them stand forth as each other's rivals on the edge of a Third World War, is known as the Cold War. Though it has somewhat abated or intensified at times, it has continued till the present time, and kept the world in suspense.

The roots of the ill-feeling between Soviet Russia and the West go back to the very hour of birth of the former, when the Western nations, including the U.S.A., intervened in the civil war in Russia in the aid of a counter-revolution which might nip Bolshevism in the bud. Though workable relations between them were gradually established, their mutual distrust prevented both from combining against their common enemy, viz. Nazi Germany, at the outbreak of the Second World War; and indeed, shortly before Hitler's attack on Poland, a non-aggression pact was signed between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. Hitler's sudden attack on Russia in June 1941 made her an ally of the West, and her heroic sacrifices, which contributed greatly to the Allied victory, seemed to inspire in her allies a feeling of genuine admiration and sympathy towards her and usher a new era of co-operation between East and West.

No doubt there were some causes of friction¹ between the Allies even when they fought shoulder to shoulder alongside each other.

¹ The disputes between the Allies chiefly concerned three points—lend-lease aid to Russia, the opening of a second front to divert German concentration on the Russian front, and an agreement on Russia's frontiers in Eastern Europe after the war, in particular, recognition by the West of Russia's 1941 frontiers. As regards the first, Mr. William H. Standley, American ambassador at Moscow, charged that Stalin was keeping back information about the aid from his people, and asserted that the aid was given 'out of a friendly feeling for the Russians'. As a matter of fact, American supplies were too well marked to be unnoticed by the Russians,

during the Second World War. While the West considered the aid which they gave Russia as magnificent, and even generous, and thought the Russians to be ungrateful because they considered it inadequate, the latter loudly complained of the delay of the West in opening a second front, and suspected that they wanted Russia and Germany to eliminate each other. With all these, there was enough goodwill between the Western leaders and their Communist ally at the close of the war, and President Roosevelt at least cherished the hope that East-West co-operation would carry over into the making of peace. Good intentions and even some mutual concession, as for example the withdrawal of American troops from parts of Germany and Czechoslovakia on the one hand and the dissolution of the Comintern on the other, did not alter the basic fact of mutual suspicion. While the Axis powers had been totally crushed and England and France greatly weakened, the U.S.A. and the

and the Americans did not send them for humanitarian reasons but "to whip the common enemy". As regards a second front, the Russians had asked for it as early as July 1941 (within a month of the German invasion) and it was not launched in the Western front (as the Russians wanted) till as late as August 1944, when on account of the heroic sacrifices of the Russians, the tide of war had already turned in their favour. In November 1942, however, an offensive operation was undertaken in North Africa and followed up later by attacks on Sicily and Italy, which brought little relief to the Russians.

The delay in opening a second front in the Western sector was partly due to a serious difference of opinion between the American military authorities and Churchill—the latter being opposed to the allies opening a front in France on the ground that it would lead to terrible casualties and wanted that they should divert their forces to the Balkans, which he said was the "soft underbelly of the Axis". Churchill's military strategy was based on purely political reasons: he wanted the Allied forces to reach Eastern Europe ahead of the Russian forces so as to "keep the Slavs out" and so that vital British imperial interests in the Balkans might not be jeopardized. Militarily, this was not feasible. As regards making a political agreement with the Russians as to their post-war frontiers, Churchill favoured it but the Americans, remembering President Wilson's unhappy experience with the secret treaties made by the Allies during World War I, ruled it out. This ultimately worked to the advantage of the Russians and the disadvantage of the West, since, with their tremendous military preponderance at the end of the war, and without commitments of any kind, the former could practically dictate a settlement in Eastern Europe in accordance with their own notions of security. This was one of the important contributory causes of the Cold War.

U.S.S.R. emerged out of the war with vastly strengthened world position and their armed forces immeasurably built up. As soon as the common enemy was laid low, their old ideological differences and fear of each other's aggressive intentions flared up. Divergent aims reflected in opposing ideas of post-war settlement made them pursue policies which brought increasing friction, till they stood forth before the world as leaders of opposing blocs.

America's insistence on keeping to herself the secrets of the manufacture of the atom bomb, and statements of some responsible American politicians, e.g. Governor Earle of Pennsylvania about the necessity for waging a punitive war against Russia, while the latter was without it and the Americans had it, served to convince the Russians as to the West's implacable enmity against them. America had not only the atom bomb, but the world's greatest navy, and a global ring of strategic air bases, while her position in occupied Germany and Japan brought her close to the Russian frontiers. The abrupt termination of lend-lease aid and the rejection of a Soviet request for a post-war reconstruction loan further deepened the Soviet's suspicion of American goodwill. While at Yalta¹ the western leaders had arrived at a settlement with Stalin as to the needs of Russian security, and in particular, accepted Stalin's own claim to German territory and the Polish boundary in return for the Russian leader's assurance about the holding of free elections in the

¹ *The Yalta Conference.* With a view to resolving some differences among the Allies, which grew in number and intensity as the war drew to a close, President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin, and Premier Churchill met at a conference at Yalta in February 1945. An added motive was the President's anxiety to commit Stalin to continue the war against Japan when the war in Europe ended. The agreements reached at the conference were chiefly as follows: (1) Russian gains in the Far East: (i) Outer Mongolia to be separated from Chinese sovereignty and become autonomous, (ii) the Kurile islands, stretching from Kamchatka (in Russia) to the northern end of Japan, and the southern half of Sakhalin to be transferred to Russia, (iii) internationalisation of the Port of Darien, with adequate facilities for Russia there, (iv) restoration to Russia of a share in the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railroads together with the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base; (2) Separate membership was to be given in the U.N. for the Ukraine and Byelorussia; (3) A Great Power holding the right of veto would have the full right to prevent an action against itself, or any vote labelling it as an aggressor, but not the right to prevent another state from stating its case once the Great Power was involved in a dispute (this was a

countries of Eastern Europe, each side began to complain soon afterwards about the other's bad faith. The West resented what they considered the Sovietizing of these countries by the Russians on the plea of having in them governments friendly to the Soviet Union in the interests of Russian security. The Soviet leaders on their side complained that while the West demanded and received a free hand in the areas under their own control, e.g. Japan, they refused it to the Russians in areas which came under their sphere.

THE SOVIETIZATION OF POLAND

The most crucial test of Soviet sincerity in desiring to maintain good relations with the West was to be found (according to Western statesmen) in how the Soviet treated the Polish question. The Western Allies were specially sensitive about the fate

compromise formula between American and Russian positions which was now accepted by Stalin ; (4) The Russian demand for reparations by Germany (amounting to \$20 billion, half of which was to go to Russia, etc.), though considered as excessive by Roosevelt and Churchill, was accepted in so far as it was agreed that the Reparation Commission, in its initial studies, should consider it was a basis for discussion. A programme for the control of Germany, consisting of demilitarization, denazification, trial of war criminals, division into zones, etc. was unanimously accepted ; (5) Stalin accepted the Curzon Line, which corresponded roughly to Russia's 1941 border, as the boundary between Russia and Poland. He made it clear, however, that he meant to move Poland's western frontiers deep into Germany, back to the western Niesse-Oder River lines. Churchill demurred because this would mean the eviction of six million Germans, who would have to return to Germany and find work. The issue was left in abeyance presumably for the Peace Conference. As to the vexed question of the future government of Poland (the exiled Polish government of Poland in London was at the time still competing with new Lublin government formed behind the Red army) a compromise was accepted. It was decided that the Lublin government should be reorganized to include Polish leaders, at home or abroad, and pledged to hold "free and unfettered" elections as soon as possible with all democratic and anti-Nazi parties participating ; (6) As regards the "liberated peoples of Europe", the Americans produced a declaration, which was accepted, though each side had its own interpretation of it—a fact which led to serious difficulties when it came to be implemented (See Chapter XVI).

Soon after the death of President Roosevelt a fierce controversy arose in America about what his opponents called the "Yalta sell-out", the charge being that a dying and deluded Roosevelt had made concessions to the

of Poland because, presumably, they had gone to war with Hitler to save Poland from aggression, and they naturally expected that after liberation Poland would remain in their orbit. On the other hand, a friendly Poland was for Russia a question of life and death, since, as Stalin declared at the Yalta Conference, "throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia". The Allies were prepared to concede to Russia virtually all her claims to Polish territory, and redraw the boundaries of Poland in the interests of Russian security, as the Russians conceived it. But they did not realize that by a friendly Poland Stalin meant one that had a Sovietized government, and they expected that by the application of the Yalta formula Poland would eventually have a western-type of democratic government.

It was a vain hope, and we have to go back a little into the history of war-time Soviet-Polish relations in order to understand how irretrievably the two nations had been estranged. After their country had been overrun by the Nazis the Polish Government-in-exile had first taken refuge in France and then

Russians at Yalta which amounted to giving away Eastern Europe and China to the latter. The supporters of the President assert that though indisposed before he began the journey, Roosevelt had improved greatly when he reached Yalta, and that at the conference he explained the American position skilfully and distinctly, his attitude being one of sympathy for Russia but also of great firmness and determination. It is also pointed out that Yalta was primarily a military conference, the overriding consideration being the American desire to secure Russia's aid in the war against Japan. (The atom bomb had not yet been perfected, and the war against Japan was expected to be a protracted one and to involve heavy loss of American lives.) As regards the concessions to Russia in the Far East, which were the Yalta decisions which were most criticized, they were justified on the ground either of their being necessary to Russia if she was to carry on the war against Japan, or of doing justice to Russia. As regards the claim of the Chinese nationalists that their later debacle was due to the Yalta concessions to Russia, the supporters of Yalta retort that the defeat was due to causes nearer home, viz. the nationalists' inefficiency and corruption, their effort to maintain a feudal agrarian system, etc. Above all, say these critics, there was the formidable fact that Russia had now won for herself the position of being one of the two super-powers of the world and they accuse the maligners of President Roosevelt of perversely shutting their eyes to this fact, which Roosevelt understood fully and which lay behind the concessions he made to Russia—his great object being to build up a lasting friendship with Russia in the interests of world peace.

(after the fall of France) in London. After the Nazis attacked Russia, the latter was in a mood to undo the wrongs she had done to Poland in the past, and if the Polish leader and head of the Government-in-exile, Sikoski, had shown a spirit of compromise, a settlement of the Polish boundary with Russia might possibly have been achieved. But Sikoski insisted on the boundary as settled by the Treaty of Riga in 1921 (by which Poland had acquired a good deal of Russian territory) and, as Stalin complained, refused even a *chut chut* (which in Russian means a slight alteration), which, in his opinion, did not seriously affect Poland's territorial status. After the Russians had defended Stalingrad against the Germans and begun to roll back the Nazi hordes across occupied Russia, it was they who could dictate a settlement, not the Poles.

The relations between the two peoples became specially embittered after the Nazi announcement on 13 April 1943 that they had discovered a mass grave in the Katyn Forest, ten miles east of Smolensk, containing the bodies of numerous Polish officers who had been allegedly slaughtered by the Russians and interred there. (The Poles alleged that some 8,500 Polish officers who were held as prisoners by the Russians were missing for long, and that the bodies discovered in the Katyn Forest were those of these officers.) Again, feeling was deeply exacerbated when in August 1945 an effort made by the Polish Home Army to seize Warsaw from the Germans in expectation of forthcoming Russian help failed as no help came, because (as the Poles alleged) the Russian army deliberately waited outside Warsaw for the non-communist Home Army to be destroyed. (This Polish allegation was later on found to be wrong.) Then, when the Russian troops moved into Poland they handed over the administration to the (Lublin) Committee of National Liberation which had been formed behind the Russian lines and was communist in composition.

It was agreed at the Yalta Conference that the Lublin government should be reorganized by the inclusion of representatives of other parties both within Poland and from London. The West recognized it as the provisional government pledged to hold free election as early as possible. On this understanding, Mikolajczysk, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, joined it. As his popularity grew and the Peasant Party waxed in strength,

the dominant communist minority in the government became more and more repressive. The opposition fought back against the repressive measures, aided by large numbers of underground fighters. Losses were heavy on both sides. Uncertain of success, the Government first tried a referendum, on 30 June 1946, to test its ability to "win" an election. The count was falsified and showed a huge government majority. The process was repeated in the national elections finally held on 5 January 1947, and a stupendous government victory was announced. Mikolajczyk escaped from Poland to save his life. Poland passed to the Soviet camp, but her later history showed that nationalism had not been crushed out of existence. (See below, Chapter XXII.)

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

There has been a considerable difference of opinion among historians as to the real intentions of Russia in the immediate post-war years and as to whether a friendly understanding with her was out of the question for the West. In a speech delivered at Fulton in March 1946 in the presence of President Truman (see above, Chapter 15), Mr. Churchill, then Opposition Leader in the British Parliament, declared that it was only the fear of the atom bomb which deterred Russia from doing acts, which might immediately start a Third World War, such as invading Western Europe. Some Western leaders thought that Stalin aimed at nothing more and nothing less than world domination in furtherance of World Communism; others saw in his aims a continuation of "Czarist Imperialism"; and yet others considered Russian foreign policy an enigma beyond the wit of the West to fathom. It is, however, generally recognized nowadays that Russian foreign policy in the immediate post-war years did not fundamentally differ from that of other countries, and that, like the latter, it was aimed at the strengthening of national interests.

The ideological factor made Russian foreign policy more complex, though by no means an enigma. In the early years of the history of the Soviet Union, the furtherance of World Revolution was emphasized, but after the failure of the revolution in Germany (where above all victory for Communism was expected),

this give place to the policy of building up of "socialism in one country". Stalin stood for the latter policy as against Trotsky, who stood for World Communism. With the triumph of the former over his rival, his policy, which meant an intensification of Russian nationalism, was steadily pursued. Russia, under this conception, became the communist fatherland and Russian security thus received a new significance and assumed paramount importance. This also necessarily implied the continued safety of the Stalinist regime, and the imposition on other countries of not only the socialist creed but the Stalinist brand of Socialism, and, as a necessary corollary, the installation in all communist countries of governments friendly to Stalinist dictatorship in Russia. All non-communist countries thus came to be regarded as either "hostile capitalist" states plotting to encircle and destroy the Soviet Union or as the "lackeys" of such states. Viewed in this light Stalinism and the West became mutually irreconcilable, though "co-existence" was considered possible, and was even part of the tactics of Soviet leaders, beginning with Lenin. (See above, Chapter 7.)

The conflict between the two super-powers has often been described by official spokesmen as the inevitable duel between rival ideologies—democracy and dictatorship, capitalist imperialism and people's democracy. No doubt many Americans genuinely disapprove of Socialism because of its rejection of parliamentary democracy and human rights. Similarly, the communists hate American democracy as synonymous with capitalist exploitation of the masses and colonialism. The conflict of values, however, is not the real reason behind the Cold War, but the conviction of Americans that Communism is an international movement, whose expansion means an accession of strength to Soviet Russia, and the similar conviction of the communists that the undoubted resurgence of nationalist and reactionary industrial leaders in Western Germany and Japan is a sign of aggressive and reactionary Western policy and a threat to the safety and integrity of Soviet Russia.

THE PROGRESS OF THE COLD WAR

After the end of their war-time honeymoon, East and West had their first clash in the negotiation of peace treaties with the Axis

satellite countries at the Peace Conference of Paris in the late summer of 1946. East-West tension was written into these peace treaties even more than it had been written into the peace settlement of 1919. Two decisions taken at this Conference at the teeth of Soviet opposition still further sharpened the rivalry between the two sides, viz. (1) the setting up of Trieste as a free port under the protection of the Security Council of U.N., and (2) the proclamation of the Danube and the Black Sea as open waterways. Trieste and the Danube are the two main gates through which commerce between the Balkan countries and the West is carried on. The internationalizing of these gateways exposed the Soviet Union to security risks, as they exposed the Crimea and southern Russian ports to naval attacks by the West.

The Soviet retaliated by delaying as long as they could the signing of a peace treaty with Austria, and thus enjoying the rich flow of oil from the wells of Zistersdorf, and a number of other advantages. It was not till 1955 that a peace treaty was signed with Austria. The question of signing a peace treaty with Germany was deliberately kept until last and was then bedevilled by the intensification of the Cold War. The rival blocs took shape in the domestic front with the expulsion of the communists from ministerial power in Belgium, France and Italy in March-May 1947 and the simultaneous exclusion of non-communists from the "popular front" governments of the eastern states. The communists organized strikes in the Western European countries in the severe winter of 1947-48, and created the Cominform in October 1947. Internationally, the first event in the Cold War was the Greek civil war which began again in 1947.

THE AMERICAN POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

As both Soviet and American policy stiffened, the implications of the Cold War could no longer be ignored by either side : what was going on was, as we have seen, both a struggle for political power and a struggle between rival ideologies. The United States now came forward to mobilize and lead the "democracies" of Western Europe against the constant danger to which they were exposed of Soviet-inspired communist expansion. The

immediate provocation was the threat posed to Greece by internal subversion and to Turkey by direct aggression by the Soviet Union, which gravely jeopardized the security and independence of these two countries. The U.S.A. now frankly adopted the policy of "containment" or getting "tough" with Russia, which had been first advocated by Mr. George Kennan, when he acted as counsellor to the American embassy at Moscow, prior to his appointment as the American Ambassador there. The highlights of this theory were, first, that Russia was, from motives of security based on history and geography, an expansive power; secondly, that only counterpressure could frustrate this drive for expansion; thirdly, that the U.S.A. could and ought to apply this counter-pressure so as to "contain" the U.S.S.R. within itself; and, finally, that under its impact the U.S.S.R. would either collapse or change its policy for the future. However, Mr. Kennan did not consider Russian expansionism as dangerous in any urgent sense because "the Soviet theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it". Not being thus under the compulsion of any timetable, the Kermlin, thought Mr. Kennan, did not get panicky under the necessity for a retreat, and if it encountered any unassailable barriers in its path, accepted them philosophically and accommodated itself to them. The Kennan theory did not advocate a head-on collision with the Soviet Union but "the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manœuvres of Soviet policy."

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

On 12 March 1947, President Truman sent to Congress that significant message which finally and irrevocably accepted the challenge of communist expansion and laid the basis for the new policy of "containment". He asked for authorization to extend to Greece and Turkey immediate economic and military aid to the tune of \$400 million. He went beyond this specific request, however, in outlining what became popularly known as the Truman Doctrine :

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the

United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure

The world is not static and the *status quo* is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the *status quo* in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration.

The Truman Doctrine had the merit of being a firm declaration by the U.S.A. that she was behind the European peoples and would not leave them to their fate as she had done after the First World War. As such it could be defended, but it was questionable whether such a pronouncement had to be also anti-communist and anti-Russian. No doubt Soviet Russia was consolidating its hold in Eastern Europe and communist parties in many European countries, and notably in Italy and France, were acting as Fifth Columns. But, as Mr. Kennan had shown, the process of communist expansion was a slow-moving one like that of "a fluid stream", and the remedy he had advocated was its "containment". The Russians were exhausted and dead tired after the Second World War, had shown themselves to be ready for negotiations and on more than one occasion had accepted compromises. In neither the literal nor the figurative sense were they on the war path; the Truman Doctrine placed the U.S.A. there at least in the latter sense.

Why then really did Mr. Truman do it? There has been much speculation on the subject and some answers given. Only two days before Mr. Truman announced his Doctrine, a Conference of the Foreign Ministers had begun its session at Moscow to discuss Germany and it was still deliberating when the Truman Doctrine fell upon it like a bombshell and wrecked it. Did Mr. Truman deliberately torpedo the conference? If he did not do that, he did not attach much importance to the conference anyway and may have expected that "a dose of real toughness would bring hard-boiled Russian leaders to terms". Was there a real Russian threat to the Straits which justified American assumption of their guardianship? This admittedly

is the most difficult aspect of the Truman Doctrine to assess. Once in control of Greece, the Russians could dominate the Straits, whence they could control Suez, the land bridge of three continents, and occupy Middle East oilfields and air routes, and whence also they could cross over to Africa, sweep over to Dakar, from which they could cross the narrow neck of the Atlantic to Brazil and come up to the Panama Canal and threaten American commerce. There is no doubt that arguments such as these supported by the science or pseudoscience of geopolitics have weighed with American policy-makers after the Second World War, and it is quite likely they influenced President Truman. On 24 February 1947 the British had notified the American State Department that they would evacuate their army and cease to look after Greece on 31 March. On 12 March President Truman announced his Doctrine.

The Presidential pronouncement may have signified that henceforth the British task of "keeping Russia from the sea" was taken over by the United States. But how much of justification was there for the argument that Russian control of the Straits meant a threat to the U.S.A.? We have also to find an answer to the further question, why this—a purely military argument—was presented in ideological terms as the need to contain communism, or prevent communist subversion of Greece and other European countries. If Russia was attempting to seize the Straits when Truman felt he must step in to prevent it, she was doing so for vital strategical purposes, unconnected with communism, which indeed she has been seeking to realize at least since the days of Catherine the Great. Plainly, this was no cold war issue, but, for Russia, the pursuit of an historical objective, vital to her own security. The Truman Doctrine makes better sense in the context of American party politics, and in playing that game President Truman was a past master. In the recent Congressional elections, the cry raised by the Republicans against communism and their efforts to link the Rooseveltian softness for Russia and the Democrats to communism, had carried them to victory. Something had to be done to take the communist smear off the Democratic party, and Mr. Truman did it adroitly by enunciating his Doctrine, and thereby proclaiming himself to be the world's greatest anti-communist leader.

Whatever the motives that inspired the Truman Doctrine, it set the U.S.A. to the task of fencing in the largest land power in the world. The Russians took due notice of it, and professing their thorough disillusionment of their war-time friends, the Americans, began to transfer the symbols of "aggression," and "imperialism" from their enemies, Germany and Japan, to Britain and America. The division of the world into two camps, that of the "imperialists" and "war-mongers" on one side and of the "anti-imperialist" on the other was constantly to be proclaimed by their leaders. An era now definitely ended and another began. (The genesis of the Truman Doctrine is given in greater detail in Chapter 19 below.)

THE MARSHALL PLAN

On 5 June 1947 Secretary George Marshall delivered a speech at Harvard University in which, after describing how Europe's economy had been distorted under the destructive rule of the Nazis, he referred to the current inability of the cities to supply goods to the farmers in exchange for food. The inability to get sufficient food for the cities from the local peasantry, said he, was compelling governments to use their scarce foreign credits to buy food. He proposed to break this vicious circle by granting to European governments additional help from the United States over a three or four-year period, in order to prevent "economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character" which would have serious consequences on the economy of the United States. He insisted that the European countries themselves must first come to an agreement as to their needs and the part they themselves will take. The initiative must come from Europe and "the programme should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations". "Our policy," he declared, "was directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, chaos", and he invited all countries, including the Soviet Union, to co-operate.

The Marshall plan of assistance to Europe had a different look from the Truman plan of assistance to Greece and Turkey, which was based on the Truman Doctrine. It sought to provide a cure, not a mere palliative for Europe's ills, and did not

openly aim at the containment of communism as the Truman Doctrine did. Though the first Soviet assessment of it was unfavourable (Pravda denounced it as an "extension of Truman's plan"), Molotov appeared at Paris on 26 June 1947 to confer with Bevin and Bidault, who had already met there and come to an agreement among themselves on a common programme. Molotov resented Bevin's "take it or leave it" attitude in respect of the Anglo-French agreement about the Marshall Plan, and on 2 July announced his rejection of it. He held that as the plan called for the preparation of an overall European balance-sheet, showing resources and needs for the continent as a whole, it would require Russia to supply many details about her national economy, which were state secrets upon which the security of the Soviet state depended. He held that European governments who accepted the plan would lose their former economic and national independence "because it so pleases certain strong powers".

The Soviet Union has been criticized for rejecting the Marshall Plan on the ground that thereby it frustrated the last attempt made by the West to end the East-West conflict. There should have been some real substance in such criticism if the Marshall Plan had come before the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, and not after Mr. Truman had drawn the lines and thereby compelled the Soviet Union to view Marshall's proposals with extra suspicion. Read in the context of the Declaration, the plan could not but appear to the Soviets as a means of supplementing the Declaration. There was also a real objection to their accepting the plan: it was bound to open up Eastern Europe to Western capitalist influence; and the Soviets could not allow Eastern Europe to become once again the economic hinterland of West Europe. They considered the Marshall Plan as a clever move to consolidate Western Europe as a counterweight to the consolidation of their own power in Eastern Europe. For them the plan presented a "real threat", but they were rather "inept" in turning it back, since it is difficult to believe that the American Congress would have approved of the pouring out of American money to strengthen the economy of communist nations. The Russian refusal saved America from being put to this test. However, a chief result of the American offer and Russian rejection of it was to heighten East-West ten-

sion. Russia immediately proceeded to bind her satellites more tightly to herself by a new series of trade treaties, besides warning them against accepting the plan. The new Russian mood was further indicated by the formation, on 5 October 1947, of a new international organization of all the East European communist parties together with those of France and Italy, viz. Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), with its headquarters at Belgrade. (The genesis of the Marshall Plan is given in greater detail in Chapter 19 below.)

ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION (O.E.E.C.)

Early in April 1948 Congress passed the Economic Co-operation Act, embodying the Marshall Plan, with an initial appropriation of \$5.3 billion, and established the Economic Co-operative Administration to administer it on the American side. All European countries participating in the European Recovery Programme (E.R.P.)—the official name for the Marshall Plan—subsequently signed agreements with the United States. With the object of developing economic co-operation and assisting the U.S.A. in carrying out the programme, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.) was set up (16 April 1948). The adoption of the policy of "containment" was criticized both in America and abroad, but it is a significant fact that, with the exception of the communist *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, which gave over this bastion of democracy in Eastern Europe to the communist bloc, no further communist advance has since taken place in Europe. It is believed to have been largely responsible for preventing Italy, and perhaps also France, from being swept into the communist camp in the 1948 elections in the two countries. But it greatly heightened the tension between Soviet Russia and the West, and the former retaliated immediately by establishing the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) with a view to co-ordinating the activities of the "satellite" countries.

THE EXTENSION OF THE COLD WAR—AND A THAW

The battle-front now shifted to Germany, where the three

Western zones had been already amalgamated (see the next Chapter) and where the Western Powers introduced their reform of the German currency. The U.S.S.R. retaliated by beginning their land blockade of Berlin in June 1948, whereupon the West organized a gigantic air lift which supplied the city with food, fuel, clothing, and even raw materials. On 11 May 1949, the Russians admitted defeat by lifting the blockade. The Western action with regard to Berlin signified America's determination to fix precise limits beyond which further expansion of communist influence would be resisted by all means available. The Western policy now crystallized in the policy of "containment", which was operating so far on the economic level, in the granting of loans to friendly governments and in the Marshall Plan and technical aid programme. After Berlin, it began to operate at the diplomatic and military levels also, and the U.S.A. encouraged the Western Powers in their efforts to bring about greater co-operation among themselves by such measures as the signing of the Brussels Treaty (March 1948). A year later it was extended to include the formation of a power bloc, commonly known as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), as the result of the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty by the Brussels Treaty Powers (the Benelux countries, viz. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg, as also England, and France) along with the U.S.A., Canada, Italy, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Portugal. The U.S.S.R. retaliated by introducing similar measures within its own bloc. (See below Chapter 19.)

World Communism achieved its greatest victory with the expulsion from Mainland China of the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and the establishment there of the communist government of Mao Tse-tung, 1949-50. This was followed by the invasion of South Korea by the North Korean forces on 25 June 1950, the declaration of a United Nations war against North Korea, the entry of Red China into the war, a stalemate in the fighting, and the conclusion of an armistice in July 1953 on the basis of a virtual division of Korea into two states whose boundary lies more or less along the line which existed before the war. (See below, Chapter 24.) The death of Stalin in March 1953, and the installation of a new government headed by Malenkov brought about a thaw in the Cold War, which more or less continues up to the present day, though the demand by Khrushchev, who

became Premier of Russia in 1958, for the evacuation of Berlin by the Western Powers for a time again heightened the tension between East and West. The aggression by China on the Indian border caused a crisis in the relations between the two Asian giants, which threatened a full-scale war between them. How far World Communism has been weakened as the result of the growing rift in its ranks—of which the most serious manifestation in the ideological combat which went on for years between Russian and Chinese leaders—it is difficult to determine, and its possible effects on international relations are uncertain and unpredictable (see below, Chapter 21).

THE BIPOLAR INTERPRETATION OF WORLD POLITICS

According to many acute political observers, the most remarkable development in international relations since the close of the Second World War has been not simply the growing rift between East and West, or the Cold War, but, more specially, the lining up of all other states in the world behind either the one or the other of the two blocs. The latter development has in some cases resulted from the ideological leanings of the states concerned, but in many others it has proceeded from circumstances, such as geography, or the strategical needs of the two super-powers etc. which have constrained them to so line up. This state of affairs is analogous to the magnetic phenomenon of polarization or bipolarization. It is well known that when tiny particles of magnetic substances like iron come under the influence of a powerful magnet, they arrange themselves in a definite pattern around the poles of the magnet. The smaller states like magnetic particles cling round the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., which may be compared to the two poles of a magnet.

This reading of post-war world politics, which has the support of some authorities, merits some careful discussion, since, if we admit it, we have to accept the proposition that though by law all sovereign states, big and small, are equal and free to shape their own destinies, the stark reality is that this is not so. To students of history, who consider the march of time as measured by the advance of human liberty, this is a most unpalatable idea, and some writers, e.g. W. Friedemann (vide his *An Introduction*

to *World Politics*), have attempted to refute, or at least to set limits to, the theory. They point out that there have been always in the world some very big states and many small states, and that the liberties of the latter were always more or less illusory in so far as it was possible for the former to coerce the latter at any moment they chose to do so by the ruthless use of brute force. Thus, for objects which seem to us now to be trivial or unworthy, Palmerstonian England coerced Greece and China, and "gun-boat diplomacy", or similar tactics was used for the same purposes by Kaiser's Germany, the Third Republic of France, and even the U.S.A. Those, however, were the unregenerate days of imperialism and white supremacy, and it is indeed a shock, after two World Wars have been fought for democracy and liberty, and colonial imperialism has almost taken leave of this fair planet of ours, with India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, the Arab World, and even nearly the whole of Africa free and masters of their destiny, that it is all an illusion, and that all nations in the world, except only the Russians and the Americans; are independent only on sufferance.

The advocates of the bipolar conception point to certain rather irrefutable facts in support of their contentions. The Second World War gave the finishing blows to the historic Great Powers (excluding the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.); their colonial empires were either forcibly or voluntarily liquidated; according to one view, it was only on account of American atomic might that Western Europe, in the days immediately following the close of the Second World War, could save itself from Russian occupation; and in any case, it was American dollars poured out in an unceasing stream in all the countries of Western Europe that enabled the inhabitants of many lands to keep body and soul together and to preserve from communist subversion the cultural ideals they hold so dear. If, under the circumstances, even European nations had to align themselves to one bloc or the other, how could Asians and Africans, politically inexperienced and economically underdeveloped, or undeveloped, resist the attempts of the two super-powers to persuade or force them to join their camps by offers of economic and military aid—with strings attached to them, of course—and/or by methods of overt or covert subversion?

Unfortunately, also, as the Second World War was coming to

an end, modern science achieved one of its greatest triumphs,—nuclear fission, and human perversity at once tied it to the chariot of war by the manufacture of atomic bombs by the Americans, who immediately made the most devastating use of them against Japan—a warning to all mankind of their overpowering military strength. As the Russians quickly mustered the nuclear secret, the two nations entered into a brisk race with each other in fashioning deadlier and ever deadlier weapons of mass destruction as well as the instruments of carrying them in the shortest possible time to their destination. Till at least a state of “nuclear stalemate” was reached by the two super-powers establishing a parity with each other in the possessing of their respective atomic stock-piles, the two lorded it over the entire globe, and bipolarization strode on—even the once-mighty British and French peoples, who were “victors” of the Second World War, being compelled to join one of the camps, viz. the American one. With the phenomenal development of military science and the manufacture of deadly weapons of mass destruction after the Second World War, weapons used in the last war, such as tanks, T.N.T. bombs, bombers, etc. became virtually out of date—at least so far as they were to be used in a European theatre of war—and the new weapons were so costly that they were beyond the reach of the impoverished “Great Powers” of Western Europe.

The only bright spot in the dismal picture of polarized world politics was the heroic and far-sighted effort made by the late Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, together with Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Bung Sukarno, and Marshal Tito, of Egypt (the U.A.R.), Indonesia, and Yugoslavia respectively, and others to keep their respective nations outside the Cold War zone, and, if possible, to mediate between East and West. Ridiculed and frowned upon by the Americans as “neutralists” (the late Mr. Dulles, then American Secretary of State, once describing neutralism as “sinful”), they kept an open mind on all international issues, frequently criticizing the West, yet supporting the U.S.A. on the Korean issue, and in every case and under all circumstances working hard for international peace, goodwill, and disarmament. The success of their policy was demonstrated on critical occasions, as when the Franco-British venture in the Suez was frustrated by combined U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. support in U.N. for Nasser, and by the supply of arms by the U.K. and the U.S.A.


to India and the simultaneous fulfilment of her commitment to her by the U.S.S.R. for supplying MIG fighters even during the days of the Chinese aggression. Despite persistent criticisms of the policy of "non-alignment" in the U.K. and the U.S.A. as selfish and unprincipled (see below, Chapter 27), and as a device employed by leaders of undeveloped countries to wring aid out of both East and West, the policy has stood many strains and won a considerable success. If this reading of the working of this policy is accepted, it has to be admitted that the theory of bipolarization is not so formidable as it looks.

It became also gradually clear that the possession by the two super-powers of overpowering military strength on account of their monopoly of nuclear weapons (which was a fact in the early post-war years) did not give them the absolute power to force all other states in the world to join either of them as their satellites. The Korean War demonstrated the fact that the Americans' possession of the atomic bomb did not necessarily give them the power to use it (General MacArthur wanted that it should be used against China) if they chose to do so, there always remaining the fear of retaliation by the U.S.S.R. A nuclear showdown between the two super-powers being equivalent to annihilation, perhaps of mankind itself, is unthinkable and so is ruled out altogether. The position of the two super-powers is further weakened at the present day on account of the fact that Great Britain and France have nuclear devices (which include perhaps the hydrogen bomb also) and that Red China also is now in possession of the nuclear bomb. Of course, no country in the world can ever have an atomic pile, quantitatively and qualitatively matching the American and Russian ones. But, as Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, the 'father of the atomic bomb', pointed out long ago, atomic strength is not necessarily measured by the number of nuclear weapons a country possesses. Here, as in many other fields, there is a 'saturation point', and, if, say, this means about a thousand nuclear bombs, your possession of thousands and thousands of them does not give you superiority over your enemy who may have only a thousand. Again, the latter may not have the hydrogen bomb or an I.C.B.M. to carry it to you, and he may have only an atomic bomb of the Hiroshima variety and the means of its delivery. But even this must give you a pause in your resolve to use your deadliest weapons against him, for he may deal you

at least a Hiroshima blow, which, without being perhaps a knock-out one for you, may be a sufficiently staggering one. Finally, the fact that there are more than two nuclear powers in the world at present complicates the general power-balance so much that the position that one of them may find itself in at a particular moment becomes uncertain.

Opponents of the bipolar theory also point to the fact that China, with an army of 250 million men (the largest in Asia) and an air force of 2,500 planes (the fourth largest in the world), is a world power, and, even apart from her present-day differences from Russia, could never be regarded as a satellite. We should then consider world politics as not bipolarized but as tripolarized, which is an absurdity like a square circle ; as a matter of fact the picture is extremely confused. The idea that no nation in the world at present can really maintain a neutral attitude either in peace time or during war is not sound ; because if it is contended that fear of nuclear devastation would compel a nation to place itself under the shelter of one of the two super-powers, it can be contended with equal plausibility that the same fear should induce it to keep away from the two blocs and remain neutral, since to be with one may invite atomic attack from another, or involve it in annihilation should the two super-powers have a nuclear show-down.

It has been pointed out that Eire, Franco-Spain, and Sweden were able to maintain their neutrality in the Second World War, and that the same reasons which helped them to do so may be valid for them and also for others who may intend to be neutral in a future war. The belligerents in the last war respected the neutrality of some states, neither out of moral considerations nor for want of sufficient military power. Neutrals have some uses for belligerents, such as affording facilities for the operation of International Red Cross, etc. and belligerents may, by a shrewd calculation of the consequences of the alternatives before them, decide that it would be of advantage for themselves to remain virtuous. It is probable that it may be more difficult to maintain one's neutrality in a Third World War than it was in the last Armageddon ; but some states, e.g. India may not have the same compulsion to be a belligerent in a future war as India had in the last one. (She became a belligerent under the orders of her imperialist master.)



CHAPTER XVIII

THE GERMAN QUESTION

THE TWO GERMANYS

THE future of Germany was the most critical problem to be faced by the Allied Powers. It was the focal point of the Cold War in Europe. At the Potsdam Conference it was agreed that Germany should be treated as one economic unit. It was found that this policy was impossible to carry out since the economic objectives of England and America on one side and of Russia on the other clashed with each other. Moreover, France, which was not represented at the Potsdam Conference, refused to be bound by its decisions, and exacted reparations not only from German capital machinery but from current production also. The Russians followed suit.

The Western Powers were anxious above all that German economy should be at least self-supporting and were unwilling to allow reparations to go to Russia if they had to subsidize their own zones. In 1946 the Americans stopped deliveries to Russia and proposed a merger of their zone with any of the others. The Russians refused this but the British, who were finding their zone, which included the Ruhr, a severe drain on their dollar resources, agreed. On 2 December, an Anglo-American Agreement was signed for the merger of their zones, and on 1 January 1947, Bizonia came into being. The prospect of East-West co-operation in Germany henceforward still further receded.

The German question bulked large at the Foreign Ministers Conference at Moscow in March 1947. While the meeting was going on, President Truman delivered his message to Congress, promising aid to Turkey and Greece. In the prevailing atmosphere, no agreement could be reached. After a few more fruitless efforts to bring about economic or political union between the eastern and western occupation zones, the U.S.A., the U.K., and France agreed to merge their zones, and set up a joint

administration in West Germany. A further spur to their efforts to revive Germany was provided by the necessity to rehabilitate German economy in the interests of the European Recovery Programme. The original Allied purpose of eliminating Germany as a political and economic Power gave way to one of deliberate reconstruction as the conflict with Russia grew in intensity, and the necessity for turning West Germany into a new and powerful partisan in a Western Coalition was realized.

In 1948, there were talks in London between the Western Occupying Powers and the Benelux countries, which resulted in the decision to summon a Constituent Assembly consisting of representatives from West German *Länder* (States) with a view to drawing up a constitution for a Federal German Government with powers limited only by an occupation statute. The Western Powers also instituted a currency reform in the three western zones in June 1948 which proved extremely successful.

The Russians protested against these actions and imposed a blockade on Berlin which became fully effective upon the introduction of the new currency into the western sector of the city. They claimed to safeguard the currency of their own zone, and also asserted that, by adopting the above-mentioned measures in their own zones, the Western Power had forfeited the right to participate in the administration of Berlin, which was a part of the Russian zone. The Allies organized a massive air-lift to send supplies and keep open communications. This lasted for about a year, after which the Russians gave up the blockade.

As their plans for West European integration proceeded, the Allies decided to bring Western Germany into them, and in May 1949 they approved a Federal German Constitution, known as the Basic Law, which laid down the respective powers of the Federal and *Land* Governments. The newly created Federal Union was to work within the framework of the Occupation Statute which reserved important powers for the occupation authorities. The Federal Government, with its seat at Bonn, was to consist of a Chancellor elected by the Federal Diet on the proposal of the President, and the Federal Ministers appointed and dismissed by the President on the advice of the Chancellor. The Federal Diet was to be elected for 4 years. The first elections resulted in the victory of the Christian Democratic Union, whose leader, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, formed a government, while

the Social Democrats provided the main opposition party.

The German Federal Republic became a member of the O.E.E.C. in 1949 and of the Council of Europe in 1951. More important was its association, as one of the three major partners, with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, and subsequently with Euratom and European Economic Community. The United States, Great Britain, and France concluded peace contract agreements with West Germany in Bonn on 16 May 1952, restoring nearly complete independence. Further protocols, signed in Paris, 28 October 1954, by West Germany and 14 other Western nations gave the Federal Republic virtual sovereignty, opened the way for it to enter NATO and the Brussels Treaty Organization (Western European Union), and contribute an estimated 12 divisions to the armies of the two defensive groups composed of the 15 countries. The agreements included one making the Saar semi-autonomous and increasing French economic control over the region. Following ratifications of the instruments, the Republic became officially independent at noon, 5 May 1955. As a result of the decisions reached in Allied post-war policies, West Germany quickly forged ahead both politically and economically, rebuilding her shattered cities as well as her industries, and became once again a leading exporter of finished industrial products in the world market. This was spoken of as the "German Miracle".

As a counter-measure the Russians converted the Peoples Council into a Provisional Peoples Chamber on 7 October 1949 and declared the German Democratic Republic to be established. Otto Grotewohl of the Socialist Union Party became the Prime Minister. Thus there were two Germanys. The G.D.R. became progressively Stalinized. It concluded treaties of friendship with other nations in East Europe belonging to the Soviet sphere, and, in particular, with Poland fixing Poland's boundary on the Oder-Niesse line. Coincident with the entrance of West Germany into the E.D.C., 27 May 1952, G.D.R. decreed a prohibited zone along its 600-mile border with West Germany, separated Berlin's telephone system into two sections and cut many of its lines to the West. The Soviet Union proclaimed it as a sovereign state, 26 March 1954, but said Soviet troops would remain temporarily in connection with security and the four-power Potsdam agreement. The Republic's independence was

further enhanced by a series of agreements in 1955.

THE QUESTION OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION

With the inauguration of the so-called New Look policy by Stalin's successors, there was some relaxation of international tension, and Winston Churchill, the British Premier, thought the moment opportune for high-level talks between East and West. The Foreign Ministers of the Big Four Powers met at Berlin (25 January to 18 February 1954), in which the question of Germany's reunification was initially discussed. The West proposed reunification through the process of free elections and freedom for the new and unified state to choose alignment either to East or West. M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on the other hand, proposed that a provisional all-German Government should be formed from the two existing ones, and that it should frame an electoral law and carry out elections. The all-German Government emerging out of these elections should, in his scheme, negotiate a peace treaty, but must not join any alliances in the Cold War. The Western plan was advanced with full confidence that free elections would lead to a united Germany aligned to the West and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Russians were equally aware that a Germany, reunited as proposed by the West, would choose the policies of the Federal Republic, since the population of the latter vastly outnumbered that of the Democratic Republic. The question, therefore, really was whether they were prepared to lose control of East Germany. The failure of the Conference showed that they were not prepared to do so.

Another attempt to solve the German problem was made at the so-called Summit Conference, held at Geneva between 18 and 23 July 1955, and in which the heads of the Big Four Powers along with their respective Foreign Secretaries participated. This too failed as no compromise agreeable to the two sides could be found between their respective positions as laid down at the earlier Conference of the Foreign Ministers. However, as the Conference was held in a spirit of exceptional goodwill between the leaders of the two sides, the issue was referred to the next top-level meeting which was held at ministerial level at the same venue from 27 October until 16 November 1955.

The West again took its stand upon uniting Germany through free all-German elections, if there could concurrently be established a European security pact. The Russians proposed a European collective security treaty, with the United States as member and Communist China as an observer,, which would replace NATO, WEU, and WARTO, the last named, the Warsaw Treaty Organization being the Russian counterpart of NATO. The two German Governments should join this treaty and also establish an all-German Council composed of representatives of both. This led to a deadlock, which could not be resolved, and German reunification seemed to be as far off as ever.

Thus, though West Germany has had a "miraculous" recovery within a few years of Germany's ruinous defeat in the Second World War and is at present once again a great power, her political future, i.e. the form of German emancipation and the role a resurgent Germany is to play in the family of nations have remained very doubtful. The policy of rearmament and western integration, to which the Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, committed West Germany, was and perhaps continues to be supported by a majority of Germans. But the Social Democratic Party is opposed to it, and many supporters of the Chancellor were uneasy over it—mainly because of its bearing on the question of Germany's reunification, which is becoming more difficult to solve with every year that the Cold War continues. The Catholics, who constitute half the population of West Germany and mainly formed the Chancellor's party—the Christian Democratic Party—look with passionate longing to the country's association with the Catholic and Latin nations of Western Europe, and are said to be cool towards union with East Germany which is predominantly Protestant. On the other hand, the Protestants and the Social Democratic Party, which count the bulk of the organized working class among their adherents, and have their main strength in East Germany, support reunion because their relative position in a reunited Germany would be stronger. They urge a renewed approach to Soviet Russia, aiming at a peaceful reunification of Germany even at the price of abandonment of West Germany's association with the West.

Many others, for different reasons, are opposed to Germany's towing the Western line. There are the neutralists who are prepared to have "special deals" with Moscow, and diplomatists or

militarists, who dream of the days of Russo-German co-operation in the days of suffering which the nation had to pass through after Versailles. Ideology apparently does not frighten them. There are also many who even go beyond those days to the times of Bismarck, and would have Germany work as the "honest broker" between East and West. There are some impatient idealists too, who want Germany to live "as a whole, as a nation, even if it means living dangerously". Many Ruhr industrialists—once again firmly in control—look eagerly to East European markets which a political agreement with the Soviet group might open up. There are, finally, pacifists—with bitter memories of what Germany failed to do in the past by the sword—who oppose the Western alliance because it commits the nation to rearmament. The present generation of Germans who have eaten the bitter fruits of unsuccessful war as few people in history have done, are, according to competent observers, "genuinely and deeply opposed to rearmament", which only a few support on the ground that national sovereignty implies the right to possess arms and armaments.

Western plans about Germany continued for long to be based on the supposition of the immortality of the near-nonagenarian Chancellor, but the Soviet Government, who have opened diplomatic relations with West Germany, have a preference for the *status quo* of a divided Germany. They will not accept the Western proposal for reunification by all-German elections, since it will mean the loss to them of East Germany and consequently the bringing of NATO bases nearer to their own borders. The *status quo* suits them well, and time is also on their side; and so far as German national aims are concerned, they alone can deliver the goods. The bait of advantageous trade with Russia, and with China as well may be too tempting for West Germany. Russia may even promise eventually to restore to Germany the area east of the Oder-Niesse line, or cause Poland to relinquish German lands within its border. Even if she does not do any of these but simply sits tight, she may have the fate of Germany in the hollow of her palms. The Western Powers, who left the question of German unification in cold storage for a good many years, had little interest of their own in the question, except their need to support Adenauer. France, with memories of two German invasions in the present century, cannot be

blamed if she does not ardently desire Germany to be reunited and more powerful. So far as England is concerned, even the present-day truncated Germany has within a decade of utter ruin become a formidable trade competitor. American interest in Germany, or for that matter in Europe, is only a part of the politics of the Cold War, and many Americans advocate a policy of "disengagement" in Europe.

THE BERLIN QUESTION

Under the Khrushchev regime, the U.S.S.R. abandoned her former attempts to force West Germany out of her Western alliance, and demanded in return the recognition of East Germany. She dramatically emphasized this position when, on 10 November 1958, Mr. Khrushchev handed notes to the Western Powers—(1) requesting their withdrawal from West Berlin within six months, (2) offering West Berlin the status of a free city, (3) cancelling (i) her agreement with the U.S.A. and Britain of 12 September 1944 (delineating zones of occupation of Germany and providing for the joint administration of Berlin) and (ii) the agreement of 1 May 1945 between the Big Three and France establishing the control machinery for the occupation of Germany and Berlin. (4) She also declared her intention to hand over to East Germany the functions hitherto performed by Soviet authorities under the now-renounced agreements.

The story of the post-war arrangements on Berlin begins in October 1943, when the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R., meeting in Moscow, agreed in principle on joint responsibility for and joint occupation of defeated Germany. They established the European Advisory Commission and gave it the task of working out the necessary arrangements. Out of their lengthy deliberations emerged the Protocol of 12 September, which ran as follows: "Germany, within her frontiers as they were on 31 December 1937, will, for the purpose of occupation, be divided into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three powers, and a special Berlin zone which will be under the joint occupation of the three powers." On 14 November 1944, the EAC reached an agreement on the establishment of an Allied Control Council which was to function as the government of Germany for the interim period till


an indigenous German government could be established.

These are the basic documents providing for the presence of the Allies in Berlin. However, no agreement on the West's access to Berlin was reached at that time. The Yalta Conference of the Big Three in February 1945 confirmed the arrangements reached in London, and implemented them by giving France a separate zone of occupation together with a sector of Berlin and by making France a member of the ACC. The Yalta Accord was followed by the EAC Agreement of 1 May 1945, on the control mechanism in Germany.

On VE day, 8 May 1945, the American forces were deep in the territory designated as the Russian zone, while the Russians were in possession of all of Berlin. It was clear that the Russians would not permit Allied entry into Berlin unless the Allies withdrew to their respective zones. Consequently, when the four commanders issued their proclamations of 5 June 1945, assuming supreme authority over Germany, they decided to honour the mutual obligations undertaken by their respective governments. Finally, the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, to which France was not a party, continued the antecedent agreements of the four Allied commanders and assigned to the ACC specific functions, among them the four D's—denazification, democratization, demilitarization, and deconcentration. (It may be mentioned that the Potsdam Agreement made no mention of the four-power regime to be established in Berlin.)

The problem of the access of the Western Allies to West Berlin was left to the Allied commanders. On 29 June 1945, General Lucius D. Clay, as the representative of General Eisenhower, met General Georgi K. Zhukov in Berlin. He agreed, "as a temporary arrangement" to the allocation of one main highway and one rail line, as well as two air corridors for the purpose of the Western Powers' access to Berlin. This agreement was not put to writing. In his book, *Decision in Germany*, General Clay says: "I think now that I was mistaken in not at this time making free access to Berlin a condition to our withdrawal into our occupation zone." Perhaps he did not wish to imply by a written stipulation that he had waived the right of unrestricted access to Berlin. It apparently did not occur to him that some day the routes might be required to supply the population of Berlin. In any case, this omission was subsequently rectified by

the decision of the ACC on 30 November 1945, which granted the West three air corridors to be used without advance notice. In 1948 the Soviet blockaded the land routes, and the Allies overcame the difficulty by organizing a gigantic air-lift, and after ten months, the Soviet lifted the blockade. On 4 May 1949, an agreement was reached—the so-called Jessup-Malik agreement—by which the U.S.S.R. consented to end her blockade of Berlin,



and the Western Powers agreed to lift their restrictions on communications with East Germany, which they had imposed in reprisal for the blockade.

Finally, the Nine-Power Agreement on Germany and European Defence of 3 August 1954, concluded in Paris, between the Western Powers and West Germany, which ended the Allied occupation and restored full sovereignty to West Germany, reserved to the Allies "the existing rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin". The U.S.S.R. for her part, in an agreement with East Germany on 20 September 1955, recognized the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic and reserved for herself the control of traffic—both personnel and freight—destined for Berlin.

The Allies were not unanimous in thinking that it was wise to negotiate with the Russians on Berlin. But they were agreed that (1) West Berlin was so isolated that the Russians had it in their power to destroy its economic life without resorting to force; and that (2) if Khrushchev carried out his threat to place the East German Government astride the Allies' Berlin Communications, and specially if, as the result of this, another blockade was established, the only alternative would be to be prepared for the worst (a nuclear war). However, many experts were of opinion that if the West showed up its determination to face up to all the possible consequences, Khrushchev would back out. Khrushchev, however, issued the threat that should the East German Government be attacked by the West for shutting off access to West Berlin, the Soviet Union would back the East Germans as allies with armed force. All this was pretty tough talk, but, in early 1959, more fuel was added to the fire when Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union considered that reunification of Germany was not a practical matter, and that it viewed the German question in terms of a fairly long-term division of Germany in two regimes in East and West. On 13 August 1962, East Germany sealed off the border between East Berlin and West Berlin.

Khrushchev did not succeed in attaining his goal as set forth by him in 1958, but, by flourishing a threat, he succeeded in getting some advantages; for example, he got an invitation being extended to him to visit the U.S.A. and did visit that country in September 1959. Perhaps he calculated that Western unity would crack under the threat of a war between East and West over Berlin, in which nuclear weapons will certainly be used. America's major allies did not see eye to eye with her on

the best means by which the Soviet threat might be met, but they were firm on "No Surrender" to Khrushchev. Obviously neither side was over-anxious for a show-down on Berlin.

The Berlin Wall—On 17 June 1953, some 50,000 workers rebelled in East Berlin. The uprising which spread throughout the German Federal Republic was crushed by Russian intervention. The Russians also backed the East German regime to build a wall in Berlin to stop a massive outflow of refugees to the West. On August 13, 1961, West Berlin was physically separated from East Berlin by the erection of a ninefoot wall topped with barbed wire, and its isolation from the East German countryside elsewhere secured by an encircling electrical contact fuse surmounted by watch-towers with search lights overlooking a strip of cleared ground. In an attempt to negate this manifest East-West confrontation, the U.S., Great Britain and France jointed the Soviet Union in signing a Berlin agreement in September, 1970 that was designed to ease tension. The working out of practical details for easier access to Berlin was left to officials of the two German states. The Soviet Union obtained the right to open a Consulate General in West Berlin.

EXIT ADENAUER—HIS ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES

Dr. Adenauer retired from the chancellorship of the German Federal Republic on 15 October 1963, and contemporaries—anticipating historians—are already calling the fourteen years of his administration as 'the Adenauer era'. He found Germany in 1949 a land of devastated cities, dismantled industries, and still far from being a fully sovereign State; he left her a respected member of the world's family of nations and of the West European Community, practising with considerable success a democratic form of government and possessed of a prosperous and dynamic economy which is the envy of many nations. In foreign policy, his most remarkable achievement was Germany's reconciliation with her oldest and bitterest enemy, France, which has made European reconstruction and Germany's own economic miracle much easier to accomplish, and the most decisive feature of it was her alingment to the West. He sought a close alliance with the United States, and succeeded in making his country the "favourite ally" during the period when John Foster Dulles was the Secretary of State.

Dr. Adenauer suffered some great failures and disappointments, for which in the later years of his administration he adopted certain measures and policies, which introduced a considerable element of confusion into the aims of German foreign policy, and which his successor, Dr. Ludwig Erhard tried to correct. His greatest failure was his inability to secure the reunification of Germany, and he seemed to have felt bitterly that this consummation was not really "objectively" unrealizable

but rather a result of his own policy of too much dependence on the West to bring it about. He urged the West to negotiate with the Russians from a "position of strength" and bring about German reunification, obviously exaggerating the possibilities both of western strength and of Russian weakness, and it seems clear that he had concluded that the U.S.A. shrank from the course only because it might lead to bomb of American cities by the Russians. He was suspicious of the Kennedy administration when it began to strive for some kind of a new Berlin arrangement with the Russians. His bitterness towards the "Anglo-Saxons" lent a special cordiality to the final stages of his long-term policy of reconciliation with France. Nevertheless, all told, his disagreements with the West were of the kind of lovers' quarrels, and if he could be said to have left one and clear legacy for his countrymen, it is that Germany is a western country.

SOME PROBLEMS OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY TODAY

Germans cannot but have read the clear writing on the wall that German reunification is unattainable in the foreseeable future, and yet they must keep on hoping for it and it must remain an important objective of Germany's foreign policy for the future. **Equally**, unrealizable is the hope that Germany might recover in the foreseeable future the lands she lost to Poland after the Second World War. It is a charge against Adenauer that he never educated the German people on the correct diplomatic position about these stern realities, so that he could go on winning elections and keep himself in power. The Russians cannot be expected to oblige the West by withdrawing from the Elbe and the Oder so that NATO divisions might march in, and it being impossible in the age of the hydrogen bomb to force them to do so, the West cannot but (as we have seen above) pay anything but lip service to the cause of German reunification. Whether or not reunification could have been brought about by West Germany following a policy of "disengagement" in 1950 or whether the road to such a solution—on the Austrian State Treaty model—is still open, will, however, continue to be debated by the Germans always.

The natural outcome of the baffling situation is the Bonn Government's insistence on being considered as the *sole* German Government and its adoption of the so-called "Hellstein doctrine" (named after the former under-secretary of state in the West German Foreign Office), by which it **considers** any diplomatic recognition of the East German Government as an unfriendly act. For the reason, in 1957, Bonn broke relations with Yugoslavia when Marshal Tito recognized East Germany. This policy has stood in the way of "normalizing" German relations

with Eastern Europe (all of whose states have no choice but to follow Moscow in maintaining relations with East Germany). It has also provided Asian and African states who desire West German foreign aid with blackmailing opportunities; they have hinted that they might recognize East Germany if they did not receive some West German aid. The problem also arose in connection with the Moscow test ban treaty (see below, Chapter 20), whose "accession clause" contemplated the possibility of future conferences attended by all signatory powers, which include both West and East Germany. It remains troublesome also in connection with the question of western access to Berlin, since, as we have seen above, the Russians have been repeatedly threatening to hand over the control of the traffic to East German authorities. There is, however, little possibility of West Germany pushing her truculence so far that the Allies may have no alternative but to fight the Russians. Already, West Germany's Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schroder, has found solutions to some of the problems by adopting a flexible policy of establishing "trade missions" with the East European countries, which unofficially perform many diplomatic functions; while a number of non-communist countries are trading with both Germanys by sending trade missions to East Berlin and ambassadors to Bonn.

An unhappy feature of the Adenauer policy of western alignment is that it is inextricably bound with the exigencies of the Cold War; it is the strongest when the Cold War is the coldest and mutual dependence is most necessary, while it tends to weaken when a thaw begins. Germans widely believed that the Kennedy administration, wedded to the policy of seeking a *rapprochement* with Russia, was putting what they believe are vital German problems in cold storage. The Democratic Party, they recalled, never made any promises of "liberation" to Eastern Europe (including East Germany), and they questioned the sincerity of the late President Kennedy's declaration that he would never negotiate from fear with the Russians, but would never fear to negotiate. They suspected the attempt of Mr. Kennedy to solve the problem of Allied access routes to West Berlin through the creation of a new international access authority, and when the West German Government was confidentially informed about the plan, they killed it by leaking important

details of it to the press and thus giving it premature publicity in the early summer of 1962.

The unfortunate incident confirmed Americans in their belief that West Germans were "cold warriors" and Germans in their suspicions of the Democrat Government as "soft on communism". These mutual suspicions were temporarily stilled by the conspicuous success of President Kennedy's visit to West Germany in June 1963, when he categorically told his audience at Frankfurt as follows: "The United States will risk its cities to defend yours because we need your freedom to defend ours." They were, however, quickly revived by a series of developments: the Moscow test ban treaty (about which West Germany complained that she had not been informed sufficiently in advance, though it involved an upgrading of East Germany), the wheat sales to Russia, which Adenauer openly opposed, and recurrent talks about the partial withdrawal of American troops from Europe. Americans were annoyed that in spite of their best efforts to woo West Germany, the latter was increasingly responding (with real warmth) to the advances of General de Gaulle. They were cut to the quick by the open support given by Adenauer to the insistence of General de Gaulle on *force de frappe*, that is, the necessity for France to maintain at adequate nuclear striking power on the ground that the United States could not be trusted to use her atomic arsenal to defend Europe in case of Russian attack.

Adenauer, however, for more solid reasons than expressing his grouse against the U.S.A. for her alleged softness to the U.S.S.R. under the Kennedy administration, stood for not only burying the hatchet with Germany's historic enemy but cementing an ever-lasting friendship between the two great peoples. Neither he nor his successors in office have subscribed to the political philosophy of General de Gaulle in toto, or approved all his measures. They have agreed to participate in the multilateral atomic force sponsored by the U.S.A. despite de Gaulle's criticism of their decision; they have always favoured Britain's admission to the Common Market; they scrupulously observe their NATO obligations, and they welcome continued American participation in Europe. Above all, Adenauer's successors have not shared his later-day bitterness against the West, and they have tried sincerely to improve their relations with the U.S.A. while remaining warm towards France.

CHAPTER XIX

WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

THE West European integration movement has long historic roots. Many a statesman and philosopher dreamed of the possibility of a united Europe. One need only recall the Grand Design of Henry IV, Immanuel Kant's dream of Perpetual Peace, Napoleon's vast military attempts at conquest and consolidation, and, more recently, between the two World Wars, the Briand-Stresemann efforts to create a United States of Europe.

The most powerful stimulus to Western Europe's current unity activities has come from fear of Soviet Russia and internal communist subversion, which produced a panic after the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, March 1947. Another major cause is Europe's enfeeblement, the consequence of two World Wars, and growing conviction that old-fashioned nationalism and its product, nationalistic war, can end only in everybody's destruction. Yet another powerful stimulus to integration of Europe is the growth in West Europe of a neutralist sentiment—the desire to remain neutral between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., a quiet resentment against both global powers, who, it is felt, are pushing and cold-bloodedly manipulating Europe for their own power politics or “imperialist” purposes. West European neutralism is also due to the very real fear that war—any future war—would be fought once more on Europe's soil; and, Europeans insist, two wars in one generation are more than enough. In France neutralist feeling is reinforced by communist propaganda. Neutralism is very strong in Catholic Church circles, who consider the present-day struggle between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. as one between Capitalism and Communism, both basically materialist doctrines which contain elements of evil.

THE WESTERN UNION

Chronologically the first important post-Second-World-War steps in the direction of pooling West European forces and resources

were military. One was aimed against the possibility of a revived Germany, and two were designed as defences against the Soviet Union. The first step was taken on 7 March 1948, when with a view to safeguarding the continent against Germany, the representatives of five nations, Britain, Belgium, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands met on 17 March 1948 in the Belgian capital, and signed the Brussels Treaty which was to be in force for 50 years. The parties, who thereby formed the so-called Western Union pledged themselves to give all military and other assistance in their power to any of them subjected to an armed attack, and also to strengthen their economic, social and cultural ties. The treaty provided for a Consultative Council, and, a month later, a Permanent Organ was created, which was to act when the Consultative Council was not in session. Subsequently, common defence arrangements were agreed upon and a military organization set up under Field-Marshal Montgomery as Chairman. The Pact was warmly welcomed in the U.S.A. and Canada, and was the forerunner of the next and much larger stage of military confederation—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

On 4 April 1949, plenipotentiaries of twelve nations signed the North Atlantic Pact in Washington and a new regional cluster of states came closer to realization. For the United States it marked a step toward new and unexpected responsibilities. For the Europeans it marked the end of the vision of a Western Europe strong enough to mediate between Russia and the United States, and the recognition of the need for an American military guarantee. For all it underlined the imperative demands of modern warfare, which could turn an area, sprawling over ten thousand miles from Italy to Alaska and from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, into a "region" capable of subjection to a common threat.

THE BACKGROUND

In 1945, at Yalta and at Potsdam and also at San Francisco, the war-time alliance of East and West had shown unmistakable

signs of an imminent breakdown. Even at San Francisco their relations were strained over the representative character of the new Polish government, and a personal visit from Hopkins to Stalin was necessary before a formula acceptable to both sides could be found while its implementation was in itself to provide much conflict. At Yalta and at Potsdam a programme for settlement of the issues in the Balkans and Germany was chalked out. The march of events showed that the leaders of the two sides had thought in different tongues and felt irreconcilable aims. Before the year was out it was clear that the agreements on the Balkans would not work and that neither the United Kingdom nor the United States could make them work. The Potsdam agreements on the treatment of German problems foundered on the same rock as at Yalta of the divergence between Soviet and Western interpretations of the agreements arrived at between the leaders at the conference table. When, in January 1947, the Western leaders decided to create Bizonia, the first formal step was taken down the road which was to lead to the Berlin blockade and to the creation of two Germanys.

And yet, by the end of 1946, there had come a moment of relative quiet and some of the thunderclouds seemed to be lifting. The Soviet-sponsored regime of Azerbaijan had collapsed, and the Russians had not taken steps to bolster it. A successful joint effort had been chalked up at the Nuremberg trial. Lastly, hard labour over a period of months had finally brought forth the long-delayed Axis satellite treaties and they were signed. However, as it turned out, this was to be only a partial and temporary respite, as the Allies came soon to take a serious view of the danger posed by Communism to Greece and Turkey—to the former by internal subversion and the latter by Soviet pressure for acceptance of a new regime for the Straits which was to be solely under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea Powers. On 12 March, 1947, President Truman asked Congress for a four hundred million dollar aid to the two countries so as to enable them to tide over the crises in their respective countries. At the same time in a message to Congress that bears his name the President announced an important change in American foreign policy—it was henceforth to be American policy “to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements”.

Meanwhile, Secretary Marshall, while attending the first Conference of Foreign Ministers on Germany, which was discussing its agenda at a snail's pace, was impressed by a casual remark by Stalin that delays were not tragic for the Soviet : time would bring agreement. He concluded that the Soviets were expecting that the prolongation of the economic crisis in Europe would turn over the Western nations to Communism. Soon afterwards in a speech at Harvard, he announced America's willingness to "help start the European world on its way to recovery", and asked for a joint European initiative by chalking out a programme which the Europeans themselves will follow in order to give effect to whatever action the American Government might take. The British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, promptly responded, and after consultation with the French Premier, Bidault, issued an invitation to Russia to participate in a Three-Power Conference on June 27. On behalf of the Soviet Government, Molotov rejected the principle of a joint programme, and considered the American move as designed to extend capitalist tentacles into foreign markets and as an unwarranted interference with national sovereignty. He advised Russia's European allies to stand aside from this new American "Trojan horse" proposal.

The other European nations met in Paris on July 12 and established a Committee of European Economic Cooperation for drawing up estimates of deficit over a four-year period which could be met only with American aid. The Committee submitted its report within three months, enabling the American State Department to formulate its scheme of European aid for consideration by Congress as quickly as possible. After most extensive debates, which were carried on in the midst of acute crisis caused by the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia¹ Congress

¹ *The Communist Take-over in Czechoslovakia*—The Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, which gave a great stimulus to the movement for western integration, was really predetermined by many events which had happened before. After the West had betrayed them at Munich, and with the painful memories of six years of servitude to the Nazis which followed the Czechs were well persuaded that it was Communist Russia who was their only friend and one to whom they could turn in adversity. Stalin was most sympathetic, and, when President Benes journeyed to Moscow in 1943, he recognized him as the head of the Government-in-exile, even though the Czech Communist leader Gottwald had already arrived there with the proposal for the formation of a "Lublin" type of govern-

approved the Foreign Assistance Bill, and on 3 April 1948, the measure became law. The Marshall Plan of aid to Europe

ment, with himself as its head. After liberation, Czechoslovakia continued to have a western type of government with a cabinet headed by Gottwald, the leader of the Communist party which had emerged as the single largest party out of the elections held in 1946, but which represented all parties. Apparently, Czechoslovakia had evolved a government in which Communists and non-Communists could work harmoniously together, thus serving as the bridge between East and West. Actually, the Communists were slowly getting control over the entire machinery of the state—the police force was 80 per cent communist—and their take-over could happen (with the full support of the masses of the people) any time they chose.

In February 1948, the Communists decided to precipitate a crisis for reasons which have been the subject of controversy ever since. According to one view, it was the intensification of the Cold War caused by the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which compelled the communists to act. It is likely Russia had a hand in bringing about the coup in the context of the American policy of "containment." She certainly did not want the Bohemian bastion, which was "a great forward fortress of her defence," to slip out of her control. The crisis started with the dismissal from office of eight high police officials and the installation of communists in their places. The non-communist members of the cabinet mustered a majority to condemn the action and demand the reinstatement of the dismissed officials. When this was refused, twelve among them resigned, without caring to take the socialist members with them. As this inept act still left thirteen members in the cabinet and there was a quorum, Premier Gottwald asked President Benes to accept the resignations, and the latter did so (25 February 1948). It has been said that the President did not resist the communists' demand, because he was in poor health, having had a stroke a few months back. According to some commentators, the arrival at Prague of the Soviet Deputy Premier, Zorin, on February 19th the day before the democratic ministers resigned, was significant. In any case, it was the fate of President Benes to preside over the death of democracy in Czechoslovakia once again, this time, however, with few tears shed over it by the people at large: in 1939 as the Germans marched into Prague the nation had mourned the loss of its freedom. There was, however, one gruesome tragedy which shocked everybody—it was the death either by suicide or murder of the Foreign Minister of the state, Thomas Masaryk, the son of the great Masaryk, the founder of the republic. On 10 March his dead body was found in the pavement several floors below an open window of his apartment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was rumoured that he was pushed out of the window by the communists, but the suicide theory is supported by the fact that the communist coup had put him into great mental agony, and his nerves were shattered.

committed America to use her gigantic economic strength for a planned reconstruction of non-Communist Europe, and so save it from internal subversion. But it once more roused apprehensions that Russia might be provoked to take the desperate decision to send her armies to the English Channel. The alarm was sounded more insistently by France and the Benelux countries, and, in America, by leaders like Senator Saltonstall, John Foster Dulles, and Bernard Baruch, who began to advocate a defensive alliance with the European nations, which might guarantee that America will "go to war if any of them were attacked" (as said Mr. Baruch).

THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT: IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND

Goaded by America, which saw in European unity the best tonic for European weakness, and compelled by their own fear of Communism, the Western nations now made successive efforts to submerge their differences and set up such institutions as the O.E.E.C., the Council of Europe, the Brussels Treaty, and, finally, the North Atlantic Pact. In a speech before Parliament on 22 January 1948, Bevin laid the blame squarely on Russia for creating the present tension by creating an airtight bloc in Eastern Europe, and declared that the time was ripe for a consolidation of Western Europe. His original idea was to extend the fifty-year Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 to the Benelux countries, and thus to integrate them into a system "of mutual assistance in the event of any renewal of German aggression", but to the latter countries and to France this proposal, which did not provide for permanent organs or continuous consultation, did not seem to provide adequate guarantees against Soviet aggression. The Czechoslovak coup served to dramatize existing conflicts, and, with the portent of American approval, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, concluded the so-called Brussels Pact, which received President Truman's warm approval.

The new pact was primarily a military alliance, which was to be brought into operation in the event of "an armed attack in Europe"—differing from the Dunkirk Treaty in that its obligations were not confined to action against aggression by Germany and also in that it provided for a Permanent Consultative Council which was to be "so organized as to be able to exercise

its functions continuously". The Council, a top-level political organ composed of the Foreign Ministers of the five constituent states, soon set up a Permanent Organ which was to meet in London every month and was to be assisted by a Secretariat, and also formed a permanent military establishment to be known as Uniforce with permanent headquarters at Fontainebleau in France. With the creation of Uniforce in particular, the Brussels Pact came nearer to being a full-fledged military alliance, but one that lacked the steel and bullets that are needed to change paper plans into a barrier of defence. With a view to tackling the problem fully, defence talks were held in Washington between the Ambassadors of the United States and Canada and those of the Brussels states, and on July 20 American and Canadian "observers" first sat in one meeting of the Permanent Military Committee. This work resulted in a joint evaluation of available resources and official request for financial and military aid by the Brussels states, Denmark, Norway and Italy, on 5-7 April 1949.

THE BACKGROUND IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States there were counsels supporting a policy of a close military alliance with the European nations threatened by Communism and also warning Americans against entanglements in the quarrels of Europe first sounded by George Washington. In the entire stretch of American history from the Declaration of Independence, an American government had so far signed only one defensive alliance with a European power, that of 1778 with France. Approaching the mid-mark of the twentieth century, Americans, however, looked back on two world wars in which their country had become involved and from which no fence of neutrality could protect them. But as late as 5 March 1945, when Churchill in a speech at Fulton had asked the United States to join in a "fraternal association" with Britain backed by a military alliance for their mutual defence, the American public, still believing the United Nations to be capable of maintaining international peace, had not shown any enthusiasm for it. Since then, however, Americans had realized that, on account of serious disagreements between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the United Nations, conceived of by Roosevelt

as the "Four Policemen" guarding the peace of the world, could not work, and that regional collective defence agreements as provided for under Articles 51 and 52 of the U.N. Charter could alone meet the situation.

Rightly or wrongly, President Truman had already embarked on a course in foreign policy which committed America to giving all assistance to any nation in the world threatened by "totalitarian" aggression (he had avoided naming the aggressor as a communist country), adopted measures which definitely aimed at "containment" of Soviet Russia, such as aids to Greece and the Marshall plan aid to Western Europe, and he had commended the Brussels pact. The changed attitude of the Americans in foreign policy, as evinced by the President and his advisers, was further demonstrated by the passing on 11 June 1948 in the Senate of the Vandenberg Resolution, which proposed that the United States associate itself "with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security"; and contribute to the maintenance of peace "by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 (of the U.N. Charter) should any attack occur affecting its national security". Encouraged by the resolution, "exploratory conversations" were carried on with the ambassadors of Canada and the Brussels states and in September an agreement was reached that a treaty for collective defence of the North Atlantic area was "desirable and necessary". After prolonged negotiations, which were carried on in secret, 12 nations, mostly from the Atlantic seaboard, namely Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States joined themselves in the military alliance known as NATO. The NATO treaty was signed at Washington on 4 April 1949, and within four months it was ratified by the parliaments of all the member countries. Greece and Turkey were admitted to the organization in 1952, and West Germany in 1955.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY : PROVISIONS

The North Atlantic Pact is designed to preserve the "peace,

security, and freedom" of the North Atlantic Community through collective defence on the basis of the sovereign equality of all the signatories. It is designed to prevent a repetition of 1939, when Hitler launched an attack on divided Europe, certain that the U.S.A. was immobilized behind its neutrality legislation. After the pact was signed, an armed attack on Europe would set off reaction in a triple ring of alliances. Should British and American occupation troops be attacked, the Brussels powers would be bound to automatic resistance by all means in their power; the North Atlantic signatories would be bound to consider what measures they "deem necessary" to restore peace; and the Rio treaty would require its members to consider what measures *must* be taken to help the victim of aggression. The heart of the North Atlantic treaty lies in Articles 3, 4, and 5. Article 3 provides for the individual and mutual "repair" of common security during sunny weather, before any threat has developed. Article 4 provides for consultation should storm clouds appear; and Article 5 comes into operation if the storm actually breaks. As officially interpreted, the provisions under Article 3 that the parties "will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" meant that "no party could rely on others for its defence unless it did its utmost" both to defend itself and to contribute to the general defence; in other words, it was action that they took under this Article that was to proclaim their seriousness of purpose in concluding the alliance. As regards Article 4, one of its important implications was that it bound the parties to take action against not only threats arising from some outside source, but to threats to political independence or security arising from an *internal* source, such as a purely internal revolution. Article 5, which contains the core of the treaty's military provisions, pledges all signatories to consider an attack on one of them as an attack against all "by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with others, such action as *it deems necessary*, including the use of armed force".

AN EVALUATION OF NATO

The main argument in favour of the North Atlantic Pact was that it was essential "to promote the recovery of Western Europe

so as to avert a catastrophe, possibly resulting in the collapse of Western civilization". Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium asserted that it was purely defensive and was directed against no one. Its supporters held that it was "armour but not lance; a shield but not a sword". It was denounced in Russia as a "weapon of an aggressive Anglo-American bloc in Europe . . . aimed at the establishment of Anglo-American world domination". In a memorandum addressed to each of the treaty nations, Russia charged that the treaty was obviously aggressive in character, and that it ran counter to the principles of the U.N. Charter.

That a sense of security is necessary for recovery, and that Western Europe needed rearmament could be admitted. But critics contended that the military programme envisaged under the North Atlantic Pact would have an effect exactly contrary to that desired by the signatories, since the necessity of diverting existing economic resources to armaments would delay, and perhaps jeopardize, fulfilment of the European Recovery Programme. It was also argued that no matter how much the European nations were armed by America—reliable calculations placed the estimated strength of available divisions to be about ten plus 96,000 American occupation soldiers—they could not hope even to begin to stop the steamroller army, credited to be a million strong, which the Russians could throw against them. If the deficiency was sought to be met by rearming West Germany and admitting it into NATO, as some advocated, it would only intensify the Cold War, besides being useless from the military point of view, since, as the Germans knew too well, if 200 German divisions were unable to defend Germany in the last war, forty or fifty divisions of NATO would be ridiculously inadequate to do so against the Russians, who were now much more powerful than they were when Hitler attacked them. If the atomic sword was used now—as Mr. Dulles a few years later brandished it—it would perhaps kill millions of Russians, but, with their available military resources in Eastern Europe, Russians could conquer the whole of Europe.

In any case, the armed road to peace is an extremely unsafe one to trudge, for armaments on one side call forth armaments on the other, and the resulting race in their production creates a mounting spiral of expenditure in which military estimates are bound to prevail over considerations of economic and social

recovery, thus bringing about or perpetuating the very conditions of misery, want and dissatisfaction which, according to the sponsors of NATO, breed Communism, and thus play into the hands of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, as the history of past armed races, e.g. between England and Germany towards the end of the nineteenth century, shows, a balance of armed strength satisfactory to both sides is never arrived at. The growing strength of a new alliance may also upset the balance and lead it to assume the offensive. Likewise the thesis that the Atlantic Pact would strengthen the UN was equally doubtful. Though it was a multilateral treaty, its purpose was a creation of power. Finally, as Americans have rather belatedly and painfully learned, all nations who sign agreements on ultimate aims and join with them in organizations and for making decisions on paper, do not, when the testing time comes, show the same enthusiasm for carrying out the agreements for common action. America's allies have not the same outlook on world problems and have not the same views as to the Russian menace as Americans. Under the circumstances, many critics are of opinion that by her efforts to build up strength through arms and solidarity, the U.S.A. has produced only a facade of power, easy for an enemy to pierce.

THE PACT AND THE CHARTER

The North Atlantic Pact stands in a strange relationship to the Charter. The agreement is based on the principle that an armed attack against one or more of the parties in a certain area shall be considered as an attack against them all. Action in such a case was to be taken in the exercise of the "right of individual or collective self-defence" recognized by Article 51 of the Charter. Now, at San Francisco it was clearly understood that under this article regional systems such as the Inter-American could be protected from Security Council action by great-power veto in the case of self-defence against armed attack. However, it was assumed that, generally speaking, a working partnership would develop among the big powers which would minimize the danger of armed attack and enable the Council to create an international military force as well as curb armaments. These hopes were not realized, and the result was the formation of regional

Ministry of Defence, and in particular a German High Command, but only some German contingents at the lowest possible level. It was accepted by Dr. Adenauer, because he was in favour of the political federation to which, like the Schuman Plan, it was leading, and also because he expected it would facilitate the restoration of German sovereignty. But his approach to it was a cautious one, since he knew that Germans were war-weary and feared that the country might become a future battle-ground. The Social Democrats, the leading opposition party, were hostile to the idea.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY

In the face of "British refusal, French reluctance, and German caution", a conference opened at Paris in the beginning of 1951 for the consideration of the Pleven Plan. France having already agreed that the national units would have to be larger than originally proposed, agreement was reached on most points. There was to be a European Defence Community (EDC), administered by a commission or commissioner, a committee of national ministers, an assembly, and a court to arbitrate between members on disputed matters.

The plan was approved by the French National Assembly, though with the admonition that there was to be no German national army or general staff. It was endorsed by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and it was then discussed by the NATO countries and West Germany at the official level. The negotiations lasted for 17 months and ended with the signing of the EDC Treaty in May 1951 by France, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux countries. Simultaneously, the United States, Britain, France and West Germany signed a convention providing for practically full restoration of German sovereignty when the EDC Treaty was ratified. A draft charter for EDC was prepared in February 1953, and formally submitted to the Foreign Ministers of the Six on 9 March.

By the time, however, there were some significant changes in the international scene and internal local developments, and EDC was already running into snags. In the Benelux countries, ratification was found to require constitutional amendments, and was not accomplished till February 1953. In Italy, the elections

of June 1953 reduced the government majority, and Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi, one of the most prominent "Europeans" retired from the ministry. During the following months action was delayed on account of the revival of crisis about Trieste. In Germany, the Social Democratic Party vigorously opposed ratification on the argument that Germany first should be unified before military commitments could be undertaken. Dr. Adenauer, however, resolutely committed himself to ratification, and carried it through the *Bundestag* on 19 March 1953.

Meanwhile, French opinion was becoming increasingly hostile to EDC. The French Government had agreed to German rearmament only under pressure from the U. S. A., and most Frenchmen were unconvinced that it was necessary. The "new look" in Russian foreign policy after the death of Stalin (see below, Chapter 20) induced them further to believe that something might come out of it which might yet avoid the necessity of rearming Germany. EDC was also criticized by political groups in France who looked upon their country as still a great imperial power, and thought that she must retain her own forces for stationing in the overseas territories. The particular moment, they thought, was unsuitable for the plan, as France then was heavily involved in Indo-China and also faced serious troubles in North Africa. Moreover, during 1953, the Franco-German dispute over the Saar became increasingly bitter, and the French argued that ratification of EDC must be preceded by a Franco-German accord on the Saar. Under the circumstances, Mr. Dulles, the American Secretary of State, did more harm than good by declaring, 14 December, that the U. S. A. would be compelled to make "an agonizing reappraisal" of her basic defence policy in Europe, if EDC did not come into being.

By 1954 it was clear that France had either to make a massive war effort in Indo-China, which would mean her diminishing contribution to NATO and still greater inferiority with respect to a rearmed Germany, or some sort of a negotiated withdrawal. The fall of Dienbienphu in May (see below, Chapter 26) set the stage for the latter alternative. Mendes—France, who had just been appointed Premier, performed this task successfully. When he presented the EDC Treaty for ratification before the National Assembly, without his personal commitment in its favour, it was rejected by the latter by a vote of 319 to 264.

gether, could any longer pursue an independent policy, gave fresh stimulus to the European movement. The British and French Premiers, Eden and Mollet, held conversations with each other in Paris, and Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, later Prime Minister, took the occasion offered by a visit to Washington to confer with Commonwealth Ministers of Finance on a free trade area. Britain, however, faced great difficulties in joining the projected common market because of imperial preferences within the Commonwealth and because the British electorate was unprepared to accept foreign interference with wage and social security policies. Yet it seemed equally impossible to ignore the common market, since approximately 12 per cent of British exports go into that area and might therefore be severely curtailed.

On 25 March 1957, in Rome, the Six signed two treaties, one of which proposed to bind their 160 million people into a European Economic Community based on a common market, and the second, creating Euratom, would pool their nuclear resources for peaceful purposes. After the necessary ratifications were done by the parliaments of the six, two new communities, one the European Economic Community or the Common Market, and the other the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) started working in January 1958. Structurally, they are close to the pattern of the ECSC. The Common Market is a customs union that, by stages, establishes free trade among its six members and surrounds them by a single tariff wall against the rest of the world. It also provides for the free movement of labour and capital, as well as trade, across the frontiers of member nations. Furthermore, although this was not spelled out in the treaty, the Common Market was inspired by the expectation of steps in the direction of political integration. Obviously, nationalism in Europe, though by no means dead, has changed its ways. The central idea of common action in pursuit of a common purpose implies that there is, in fact, a European interest transcending interests of member countries.

THE QUESTION OF BRITAIN'S ENTRY INTO EEC AND ECM

Britain started negotiating for full membership in the ECC, despite opposition from the Commonwealth countries, voiced un-

animously by their Prime Ministers at their annual meeting in September 1962, and from the Labour Party in opposition. The British Premier, Mr. Macmillan, however, was determined on his country's joining the EEC and was trying hard to secure some concessions for the trade of the Commonwealth countries with the EEC—without much success. The British Government's stand was expressed forcefully by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, on 4 September 1962, as follows: "If you isolate Britain from the centre of markets, she will become an offshore island and her economy will either be static or weakened." Euratom has had a more prosperous outlook, despite the fact that the oil scare caused by the Suez crisis, which gave the movement a fillip, is over, and the discovery of new sources of oil, e.g. in the Sahara, the prospect of more oil to come in Libya, the discovery of vast resources of natural gas in the south of France, and in Italy, as also the reduction of freight rates for the importation of American coal, have tended to lessen European dependence on Middle East oil and the urgency for finding nuclear power.

Britain's entry into EEC would strengthen the French preference for a confederation rather than a real union of the participating countries. It was hence not very much favoured by the advocates for a supernational organization for the body. On account of Britain's ties with America, some of the "European" enthusiasts were not in favour of her admission and considered that she would be "a Trojan horse for Washington influence in the New Europe". They, however, did not reject President Kennedy's grand design for interdependence between the Old World and the New. If, however, Europe, ultimately, was to join some sort of a large Atlantic Community, they wanted it to be "not as half a dozen Rhode Islands but as a New York or California".

DE GAULLIST FRANCE AND WESTERN INTEGRATION

Western integration faced new problems after General Charles de Gaulle became President of France (June 1958) and after a national referendum on a new constitution proposed by himself had invested him (28 September 1958) with almost dictatorial powers. He was the same Charles de Gaulle who a little more

than twenty years ago had offered to Western generals and statesmen his sword and his advice that alone, he had urged, might save France and had received from them insults and a refusal. For a second time he now appeared as the Saviour of France – to pull his country out of the morass of internal chaos and defeats abroad, and to restore to it the position of a world power.

The policy and programme of the President of the Fifth Republic may be briefly summed up as follows. At home, he aimed at the achievement of unity by strengthening the hands of the government and ending financial chaos. The keynote of his foreign policy was to free France and Western Europe from American bossing and make them an independent Third Force balancing East and West. In concrete terms, he demanded that France shall be consulted on all western policy regarding any area in the world. In the event of conflict, he insisted, France shall have a voice (and the final say also) in the use and nonuse of nuclear weapons, no matter whose weapons they were and where they might be used. Within the confines of NATO, he wanted the U.S.A. to help France build up a respectable atomic stockpile. A strong critic of NATO, which he thought was no longer adequate to its purpose, he demanded full French equality in the Standing Group—the tripartite body charged with the planning of NATO's military strategy.

In particular, President de Gaulle was scornful of Britain's present position in the Western camp, which he thought was bolstered up only by American nuclear might, and he wanted the Western Alliance, which at present, in his opinion, was an Anglo-American partnership, to be replaced by an Anglo-American-French triumvirate. In the summit meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four at Geneva (1959), the representatives of the Fifth Republic closely co-operated with those of West Germany—Franco-German co-operation was a main plank in the Gaullist programme—to press the “Anglo-Saxons” (Britain and America) to be tough with the Soviet on the question of western presence in Berlin while they (Britain and America) were showing signs of being soft. Consistent with the same line of thinking, President de Gaulle embarked on a programme for developing an independent nuclear force for France, put his veto on Britain's entry into the Common Market (14 January 1962), disapproved of the seeming U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. *rapprochement* by opposing the

proposal for a nuclear test ban treaty between East and West. Sailing, with regard to the last-mentioned subject, on the same boat with Communist China, he startled the West (27 January 1964) by according recognition to her. This act, which flabbergasted the U.S.A., should not have come as a surprise to the West; and had much to recommend it, since, as India had been long insisting, with China left out the U.N. could not be the world body that it claimed to be.

In any case, Communist China had won a great victory and western integration received a staggering blow as the result of America's oldest ally linking herself to her most determined enemy. If, as the U.S.A. believed, one important object of France in allying herself with China was to stage a come-back to South-east Asia, the old seat of her colonial power, where Chinese Communist influence is at the present moment waxing, it would follow that France was willing to pay the price elsewhere. She already voted for the first time to seat her friend in a U.N. agency, viz. the World Health Organization (February 1964) and she was sure to vote similarly for seating her on the U.N. Security Council, and it was likely she would succeed in the attempt, since her recently liberated African colonies, who are members of U.N., may vote alongside her on the issue. What was more serious for the U.S.A., President de Gaulle had been of late urging the neutralization of South Vietnam, which was but playing the communist game in South-east Asia. (See below, Chapter 26.) More embarrassing still for the U.S.A. was the interest President de Gaulle had been taking in Latin America; he had already visited Mexico and he planned to visit Brazil soon. Western integration, under the circumstances, faced new difficulties, to say the least.

Britain reopened negotiations in 1970, and Ireland and Denmark requested admission at the same time. After another period of negotiations, agreement was reached with EEC and was ratified in principle by parliament in October, 1971. In January, 1973, Britain, Denmark and Ireland formally joined the EEC.

CHAPTER XX

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE U.S.A

FROM ISOLATIONISM TO WORLD LEADERSHIP

AMERICA'S classic foreign policy— isolationism— exactly corresponded, in the days of the country's early history, to certain realities of international politics, the basic fact of which was that America was militarily weak, and while, in those days, the wars of the French Revolution and of Napoleon were ravaging Europe, America's chief concern was to avoid being crushed by forces, which it was beyond her power either to control or greatly to influence. During the century that followed these wars (1815-1914)— on the whole a period of peace and stability— America's safety lay largely in her geographical isolation and the existence of a dependable balance of power among the European states. The seas which stood between the United States and the Old World were then guarded by the naval power of Great Britain, with whom she had few differences and almost none that could not be accommodated. America did not play a serious role in world politics, though with the growth of her strength and the relative weakening of Great Britain, the temptation to essay it was growing and the imperialistic temper rising; and America acquired the Philippines by successful war with Spain, enormously enlarged her fleet, and constructed the Panama Canal. With all that, she did not aspire to dominate and was content rather to operate as the balance-wheel to preserve the balance of power between Europe's continental land empires.

Germany's outright challenge to this international order and the defence of America's interests of trade and security compelled her to participate in the First World War, but, as soon as these purposes were achieved, America withdrew to her own shell, though President Wilson's noble idealism had seemed to lead his country to a new path of power and glory as the guardian angel of a millennial age of international peace and co-operation, which was then believed to be drawing upon the world. America's

refusal to accept the Treaty of Versailles and membership of the League of Nations has been ascribed to certain tactical mistakes committed by himself, e.g. his failure to adopt a bi-partisan attitude during the peace negotiations specially in view of the fact that the Republicans then dominated the Senate, the stroke of paralysis which compelled him to abandon his lecture tour for educating his countrymen, etc. The stark reality, however, was that, with all explanations that the President offered to the critics of the League of Nations Covenant, that in spite of Article 10, America could not be compelled to intervene in any conflict unless she chose to do so (as Article 5 of the Covenant laid down), Americans continued to fear—and rightly—that by asking them to join the League of Nations, he was committing the nation to playing a new and unaccustomed as also undesired role in world politics. By their verdict in the elections of 1919 the Americans not only rejected the Wilsonian party candidate but emphatically repudiated Wilsonian principles and the new path in world politics pointed out to them by Wilson. One may say that "America failed the world". (See above p 56.)

In the years that followed, America, according to one view, retraced her steps and summoned a Nine-power Conference at Washington in 1921 with a view to achieving naval disarmament, which was an important plank in the faith of President Wilson and one of the principal objectives of the League of Nations. It has been held, however, that these measures did not imply any departure from the policy of isolationism, and that they were rather devised to safeguard American neutrality in a coming conflict in Europe or the Far East. President Harding, evidently, was worried over the developing Anglo-American naval rivalry and the rise of Japan, and his foreign policy aimed at nothing more than the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Pacific. The limited co-operation that his successors in office, Hoover and Coolidge, offered to the League of Nations meant no significant departure in policy, and what import America attached to the Pact of Paris, which was sponsored by her own Foreign Secretary, Mr. Kellogg, was made abundantly clear to the world when President Roosevelt unceremoniously rejected Haile Selassie's appeal to him, based on American signature to the Pact, for help in amicably settling his differences with Mussolini (see Chapter 11).

The rise of militant dictatorships in Europe—Fascism and Nazism—and their leaders' flagrant repudiation of the Versailles settlement and even use of force together with the total failure of the League of Nations to put any restraints on them and large-scale rearmament, which portended the outbreak of another Armageddon—did give a jolt to the American mind. America could not in particular be indifferent to the Far East—a vitally strategic area for her—and Japan's "Asia for Asians" argument for the construction of a New Order in the East, accompanied by aggression in Manchuria and even in China proper. These developments, however, induced in Americans a mood of cynicism, and produced a new spirit of isolationism—"isolationism of disgust" it has been aptly termed—which found concrete expression in the passing of a series of Neutrality Acts. But Hitler's sweeping victories in Europe—the fall of France and the raids over Britain which began in 1940, and above all, Japan's acquisition from the Vichy Government of airfields in Indo-China—opened the eyes of the Americans to the dangers of continuing their old policy of isolationism. Pearl Harbour brought America into the Second World War, which her wealth and power helped the Allies to win—Russia's contribution to the victory being equally great—and the U.S.A. seemed to have become, at long last, definitely entangled in world politics, having lost for once and for all time the option of going back to her cherished policy of isolationism.

At the end of the Second World War, American military strength—with the "absolute weapon" (the atomic bomb) in their exclusive possession—stood unchallenged in a war-ravaged world, and woe-distraught humanity, even more than in 1918, looked up to them to give a new lead to the world. Power brings the sense of responsibility, even if it does not constitute its sole justification, and it was by all means and in all ways America's responsibility now to help humanity to acquire the "four freedoms" which President Roosevelt had earlier expounded—freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear (January 1941). In a way the world stage had been well prepared for America's assuming this role, she having acquired overwhelming strength in the war-time years, but there was a risk also which it was possible she might have to undertake in order to play the part. The balance of power in

Europe which provided safety to America in bygone days had vanished. Of the six Great Powers—the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—all had ceased to be so at the end of the Second World War, save only two—the first two, who were super-powers. The question of questions was, would the two—the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—co-operate with or “confront” each other?

The U.S.A. was willing to take up the role and anxious to avoid repeating her major error after the First World War and considered that the setting up of an international organization definitely more powerful than the League of Nations, in which she must be a member from the very start, was the best instrument for the furtherance of her new policy. But the success of any such organization seemed to depend on whether the war-time collaboration with the U.S.S.R. could be continued after the defeat of their common enemy. For the time being at any rate, she would have none of agreements with other powers for spheres of influence, or on a great power concert to rule the world. Americans assert that it was Soviet Russia's refusal to use the U.N for a peaceful solution of all outstanding problems of the peace—revealing a serious divergence of views and attitudes between the two super-powers on them—together with such actual profits of the latter's aggressive designs as the conversion of the countries of Eastern Europe into satellites (in violation of the Yalta agreement) and the policy pursued in Iran, that disillusioned the U.S. Government. The Soviet leaders, of course, having their own version of the story, lay the blame on the U.S.A. for the growing rift between the two nations. In short, as we have already seen, a so-called Cold War ensued between the two super-powers, each heading its own bloc, and for a long time ruling out settlement of international problems by international machinery.

According to American reading of world politics, the situation of the U.S.A., and of the West generally, had greatly deteriorated by the spring of 1947. The United Nations as an organization was proved to be powerless to deal with repeated and continuing Soviet “intransigence”. On 21 February 1947, Britain notified the U.S.A. that she was no longer in a position to continue financial and military assistance to Turkey and to her old ally, Greece—both at the time threatened by external and internal

communist menaces. The American Government, thereupon, decided on a radical change in the country's foreign policy—for once and for all time abandoning isolationism—and embarked on a policy of aids and alliances and pronouncements of policy, which we have dealt with in detail in some of the preceeding chapters, and which it is not necessary to repeat here. We may, however, pause here and, making an appraisal of the positions of the two super-powers at the time of this writing (end of 1963), when there is a definite thaw in the so-called Cold War, attempt to clarify the issue, both general and specific.

THE U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. CONFRONTATION

There are no direct conflicts of national interests between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Neither has any territorial claims or pretensions against the other. There is no history of ancient national enmity between Russia and America. Both are "satisfied" and "rich" countries in territory, natural resources and population. The sources of conflict lie both in their likenesses and differences. Both are super-powers and contestants for world leadership, and are jealous of each other's might. They are divided by different social and political systems and by different attitudes towards problems of social organization of mankind now and in the future.

The underlying cause of the conflict is the difference between the political systems of the two states. The U.S.S.R. is governed by a group of men, constituting the elite of an upper class, who are obsessed, on account of indoctrination, nationalistic fervour and the logic of their own political position, with the notion that their system is superior to the American system and will, sooner or later, prevail in the whole world. They attribute their own motives to the Government of the United States, considering the latter to be their mortal enemy and finding confirmation of their fears in American bases, which encircle their territory, and from which waves of bombers are preparing to attack them with nuclear weapons. On their side, the Americans mistrust and fear the intentions and motives of the Soviet system and, unfortunately, constantly hearing of expansion of the Soviet threat—now in Central America, then in Laos, and so on—feel threatened and justifiably so. Unfortunately also, the American bureau-

cracy has fed so long on the Soviet threat that perhaps there is a vested interest in the continuance of the tension. In both countries, for the same reason, opportunities for lessening the Soviet-American clash are not readily availed of. All the same, as we have seen, there was a definite improvement in the relations of the two countries after the death of Stalin, and in particular, since Nikita Khrushchev assumed leadership in the U.S.S.R.

THE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS RACE

Coming now to deal with some of the foremost and most acute among the issues which have specifically caused the Soviet-American tension, and which continue to induce both to look upon each other with mistrust and fear, there is the question of the nuclear weapons. Military experts are of opinion that, in August, 1945, when the Americans hurled two atomic bombs on Japanese territory, Japan was on her last legs and could not in any case have carried on the war for more than a few weeks, and that the reasons for the infliction of horror and death on such a vast scale in Japan by the Americans were far from being strategic, or meant to hasten the end of the war and thus lessen needless human suffering. The view, anyway, has prevailed that, by her use of the horrible atomic weapon, America wanted to impress upon the world in general and the U.S.S.R. in particular about her overpowering might, she being then in exclusive possession of the "absolute weapon", and it being held that it would take the Soviet at least twenty years to devise an atomic bomb, and in any case it being confidently assumed that America shall ever have a lead in the possession of atomic strength. The oft-repeated boasts of American leaders and the demand made in some responsible circles in America for the waging of a punitive war for destroying the Soviet Union at a time when the U.S.A. alone had the atomic bomb and before the Soviet had one were very unfortunate indeed.

America's refusal to share atomic secrets with any other nation, and, strangely enough, even with Britain—who had contributed to her laboratories during the war many of her eminent scientists and all the scientific data and knowledge on atomic fission that had been gathered in British laboratories—caused

bitterness and alarm even among friendly nations. It, of course, caused in Russia considerable alarm and a deep distrust of America, and the latter's proposal in the United Nations in the so-called Baruch Plan that all fissionable material, whether meant for manufacturing nuclear weapons or for utilization for peaceful purposes, should be a United Nations (considered by Russia as synonymous with America) monopoly, naturally met with a point-blank refusal from Soviet Russia. In view, however, of the increasing weight of public opinion all over the world for the imposition of effective control over the manufacture of nuclear weapons, if not its complete prohibition, the show—in which Russia also joined after she had her atomic bomb—was kept up in the United Nations and elsewhere of endeavouring to bring about a limitation, if not prohibition, of nuclear weapons. With much greater determination, however, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. (and, haltingly, the U.K. and France) went on with their experiments for manufacturing nuclear weapons of greater variety and destructive capacity and carrying out systematic tests of them, ignoring the pleas of eminent scientists, including Einstein, of the grave risks to humanity involved in them. A spate of plans and proposals emanated from both sides—all claiming to be fool-proof devices for bringing about the international control of nuclear weapons or of ending the tests, more for propaganda and for befooling the public in the politically conscious countries of the world than for achieving the ends they all declared that they cherished. The incontestable fact, however, is that no fool-proof device for inspection of the implementation of agreements for the control of nuclear weapons could ever be devised, and, under the circumstances, American insistence on the setting up of such an inspection system was as insincere as the Russian profligacy in proposing schemes for the prohibition or controlling of nuclear weaponneering or testing.

The present position is that both sides having already stock-piled nuclear weapons which are sufficient to destroy not only themselves but the very earth that mankind inhabits, and their own positions having become lately rather beclouded on account of other nations, such as England and France, having already joined the nuclear club and Red China also having forced herself through the gates (see below, Chapter 23) there is a

virtual "nuclear stalemate"—which means that neither side is keen on a nuclear showdown which means mutual annihilation and the nuclear danger to humanity has somewhat receded. It is, however, far from correct to say that the prevailing "nuclear stalemate" is an absolute safeguard against the use of nuclear weapons in any future war, for the so-called stalemate rests on a delicate balance which may be readily upset by any change in the relative nuclear strengths of the contestants whether by the discovery by one or more of them of an especially formidable nuclear weapon, or of a means of its delivery, or of a device for warding off nuclear attacks—with the result that it may be tempted to annihilate its opponent by a surprise blow. (The subject is dealt with fully in Chapter 31.)

THE SATELLITE—ROCKET AGE

Yet another danger looms on the horizon. A new age dawned on humanity on 4 October 1957, when the first earth satellite, manufactured by the U.S.S.R., took possession of an orbit in the sky. This portended a revolution in weaponry comparable in significance to the first observation, in 1939, of the fission of a few single uranium atoms in a Berlin laboratory, which led to the manufacture in the U.S.A. of an atom bomb, the use of the weapon by the Americans in Japan, and to a fierce race in the atomic arms between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The satellite was launched by the U.S.S.R. as part of the International Geophysical Year (1957-58), a joint effort to learn more about the earth and its environment in which 66 nations—among them the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—took part. But governments immediately concentrated on the use of satellites in war—just as they had done in the case of atomic fission. The Sputniks of the U.S.S.R. and the satellites of the U.S.A. can observe any point in the world and report these observations by television or by other electronic devices such as microwave radio and radar. From satellite research can come information on the nature of cosmic and ultra-violet rays and knowledge about the earth's magnetism. The harnessing of any of these phenomena holds mighty potentials and radical implications for all people on earth.

The launching of rockets with nuclear warheads against targets

anywhere on earth from manned space-platforms is a possibility depending in part on the adaptation of nuclear energy as a rocket fuel. The space-platform does not yet exist, but the rocket machinery used by the Russians in launching Sputnik III threw a 3,000 pound object more than 1,000 miles into the air. Earlier, in the midst of talks going on in the U.N., the Soviet had announced (26 August 1957) that they had succeeded in launching the first inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) with the help of rocket engines with tremendous thrusting power. The Russian announcement, "the results obtained show that it is possible to direct a missile into any part of the world", was doubted by many in America, but the launching of Sputnik III demonstrated that it was possible. No country has yet resorted to modern missiles or outer-space weapons, but Sputniks and rockets and ICBM's have destroyed the concept of national frontiers and posed great new threats to peace and prosperity of nations. Already radiation from bomb tests and explosions has been believed to be able to produce mutations which damage—none can say to what devastating extent—the entire species. Apart from the catastrophe which may befall humanity if there is a war in which nuclear weapons are used, health and life of millions have been irreparably damaged by Strontium-90, a new poison unknown to nature, created by the atomic bombs, as they have been exploded for tests, from the fallout, which has been distributed all over the world by wind and rain, etc. The worst effect of the new poison is seen in its concentration in bone tissue causing cancer and blood changes, besides the contamination of food supplies thousands of miles away from the site of the explosion.

In spite of the fact that a test ban treaty was signed at Moscow between Great Britain, Russia, and America on 25 July, 1963, and ratified by them on 15 August, 1963, none can be sure yet about just how much restraint this is likely to introduce into the manufacture—and even further testing (underground testing is not yet banned) of nuclear weapons. The Chinese Communists were believed at the moment to be near to testing a nuclear weapon, and they were of course, not in any way bound by any agreements reached among the senior nuclear powers banning tests of nuclear weapons. They scornfully refused to adhere to the test ban treaty, expecting to explode a nuclear

device in the near future. There is, of course, a vast difference between a first test device and ability to deliver nuclear weapons on foreign targets. Khrushchev told Averell Harriman that he thought it would take quite a few years for Red China to develop a significant nuclear force. But, once she had such a force, she can accordingly add nuclear intimidation to the pressures she can bring to bear on her Asian neighbours. The existing confusion in international relations has, under the circumstances, become worse confounded, and, while at this writing the two super-powers seem to be arriving at a better understanding of each other, the overall picture is dark enough. (See Chapter 31.)

AMERICAN SECURITY SYSTEM

When, in 1947, the U.S.A. awoke to the realities of the situation in the world, there was an "agonizing reappraisal" of her foreign policy, and three courses seemed to open before her to pursue. One group, which included men in responsible positions, such as George E. Earle, Governor of Pennsylvania, urged the waging of a "preventive war" against Russia by the atomic weapon, which America alone at the time possessed (and before others could have it), which would put an early end to the struggle with World Communism by removing from the hands of the enemy the instruments of military power. Another group, equally extremist, though in the other way, advocated a policy of "Fortress America", by which America would "disengage" herself from commitments to preserve the independence of nations on or close to the Eurasian land mass. An indirect exponent of this policy was Dr. Oppenheimer, "the father of the atom bomb", who held that nuclear weapons did not provide the whole answer to the question of the country's defence, and that a radar-based transcontinental defence could be organized to give America such security as was at all possible in the atomic age. The third policy was to form alliances for collective defence with nations all over the world, even, though the latter might include some whose governments and institutions were not democratic but who could contribute to the common cause. The first course was rejected as alien to the ideas of responsilbe

leadership as understood by Americans ; the second was criticized as placing the rest of the world at the mercy of the communist bloc and turning the U.S.A. into an isolated island in a sea of Communism. America decided to take the bull of Communism by the horns with a following of allies all over the world. The policy was soon crystallized into one of "containment" or getting "tough" with Soviet Russia. (See above, Chapter 17.)

The first step taken by the U.S.A. to implement the new policy was to sign the Rio Pact with the Latin American States, which bound the Western Hemisphere countries in a defensive alliance, in which each country would consider an attack on any one of them an attack on itself. The alliance system was extended to Europe by the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), and to the Pacific area by the United States-Japanese Security Treaty (1951), the United States-Philippines Treaty (1951), the Tripartite (Anzus) treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A. (1951), the United States-South Korean Treaty (1953), and the South-East Asia Collective Defence (SEATO) Treaty (1954). America also favoured (without becoming herself a full-fledged member though joining its military committee) the formation of the Baghdad Pact (1954) later renamed CENTO, for safeguarding her interests in the Middle East. Much to the annoyance of India, she signed a military agreement with Pakistan in 1954. The U.S.A. poured out her money to her allies with a view to strengthening their defence against Communism and generally also their economy. It cannot be said that all these alliances have quite succeeded ; Pakistan, after receiving billions of dollars as aid from the U.S.A., began dallying with Red China, America's Public Enemy No. 1. CENTO created much bitterness among the Arabs, who looked upon it as an American device for dividing the Arab peoples ; and even NATO became much weakened by disagreements among the principal partners, such as de Gaullist "intransigence", and Anglo-French resentment at America's opposition to the Suez venture of the two nations in 1957. Many Americans criticized the security system as "only a facade of power, easy for an enemy to pierce". There was accordingly a growing volume of opinion in America in favour of the opening of negotiations with the U.S.S.R. which might lead to a recognition of mutual interests and thus to mutual accommodations. The U.S.S.R. in 1957, in public pronouncements and at the

disarmament discussions in London, indicated her willingness to reciprocate in exchange for abandonment by the U.S.A. of bases and military arrangements in the Middle East. But till firm guarantees were received for a global disarmament scheme, the U.S.A. was not quite ready to withdraw military support from her allies.

THE U.S.A. AND COLONIALISM

The issue of colonialism presented a dilemma to the United States. Born in a revolt against colonialism, and a strong upholder of liberty and human right, America naturally hates colonial rule. At the end of the Second World War she expiated the sin of having acquired her first colonial possession, the Philippine Islands, by successful war at the close of the last century, by granting full independence to the latter. The sympathies of most Americans, including President Roosevelt, were with Burma and India, who were fighting for independence from British rule. Their sympathies were also with Indonesia, who sought independence from the Netherlands, and with Indo-China, which sought independence from France. But Britain, the Netherlands, and France were America's allies in the Second World War, and it was American interest to guard their interests and preserve the friendship of their people. Mr. Churchill resented the advice Mr. Roosevelt gave to him on the subject of Indian independence, which had become also an American interest when Japan threatened India from Burma. But since Britain gave independence to India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, Anglo-American misunderstanding on the issue could not grow further.

It was otherwise elsewhere. The Dutch were not willing to transfer power to the Indonesians as readily as the British had been to transfer power in their colonial possessions. Serious friction between the Netherlands and the U.S.A. could not be avoided, though it was later overcome. In Indo-China, the movement for independence from foreign yoke was led by the Moscow-trained Ho-Chi-Minh, and to support it was, in U.S. eyes, to support the transfer of the people of Indo-China to communist tyranny and to strengthen World Communism. U.S. policy in Indo-China was, therefore, slow to crystallize and faltering in execution. The real difficulty for the U.S.A. lay in the fact that peoples who wanted delivery from foreign yoke did not have the same disgust for Communism as Americans, since it often presented itself as an ally to them in their struggle


against foreign rule. The efforts of the American Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, to give military support to the French in men, as he was giving it to them in money, were frustrated only because of the opposition of Sir Winston Churchill, who refused to co-operate. In the Malays, the U.S.A. had a further difficulty in opposing colonialism, because the Malays are inhabited by mixed ethnic groups and it could not be foreseen which of them would have political power in case foreign rule was ended. It was feared that the Chinese who were believed to outnumber the Malays might become a power if the country became independent. In Algeria, the 1.2 million Algerians of European origin feared for their lives if they should become a subordinate minority in an Algeria independent of France. Here, accordingly, U.S. policy aimed at avoiding intervention, in the belief that American action would only heighten passion and lead not to a solution but to bloodshed and chaos. Altogether, U.S. attitude to colonialism was nearly always dubious and ambivalent and the result has been that the U.S.S.R., who had definitely opposed it wherever found has earned the respect of peoples who have striven for freedom from colonial rule. The anti-colonial temper of the times finds a strong reflection in the United Nations, where a majority—the hard core of which consists of the Asian-African-Arab and Soviet blocs—is always found in its favour. On many occasions, such as over Congo and Ruanda Urundi (former Belgian colonies) the U.S.A. has disappointed her admirers and been accused of sympathizing, and even siding with the colonial powers.

THE U.S.A. AND RED CHINA

The establishment of a communist regime on the China mainland has posed a fundamental challenge to the long-range objectives of American policy in East Asia. During the Second World War, when they were fighting the Japanese, Americans somewhat optimistically assigned to China, liberated from Japanese thralldom, a major role in stabilizing the post-war political situation in the Far East. This hopeful prospect vanished with the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government on the mainland in 1949. The scant respect with Red China from the very start showed for the rights and interests of the United States and other Western Powers and of her smaller Asian neighbours and her participation in the Korean War dispelled any prospects for even a workable relationship being

established between the Peiping and Washington Governments. Washington stoutly refused to recognize Red China, which was in clear *de facto* control of the China mainland was insisted on considering the Nationalist regime on Formosa as the legal government of all China. It, likewise, was totally opposed to seating Red China's representative in the Security Council, or to admitting her as a member of U.N. The enmity between the two countries became bitter during the Korean War, in which U.S.A. took the leading role, and in the course of which U.N. (that is, in the view of Red China, the U.S.A.) laid a strict embargo on strategic materials to China. The U.S.A., further, imposed a total ban on any trade with China. Her military bases and alliances from Japan through Thailand and her major role in SEATO together with her extensive military aid to anti-communist Asian governments were her Asian edition of the policy of "containment" that she had devised to control Russian communism.

Peiping's differences with Moscow, which to have produced a split in the ranks of World Communism and her aggressions on Indian territory, which were frankly resented both by Washington and by Moscow, could not fail to have serious effects on international politics. The much-talked-of bi-polarization became definitely more unreal, and international relations consequently became more confused. The Peiping-Moscow rift has become as much a cause as it is a consequence of the slight improvement in Moscow-Washington relations, which was clearly visible for some years after the death of Stalin in 1953. Red China, rather than Soviet Russia, seemed to be Washington's Public Enemy No. 1, and this indicated that their mutual antipathy was to increase in the near future. The first and foremost objective of Red China's policy was to "liberate" Taiwan, the single major piece of Chinese territory outside their control, as well as the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy, which lie only a few miles off the important south China ports of Foochow and Amoy. The U.S.A. was in no mood to allow her to do so. (See also below, Chapter 23.)



CHAPTER XXI

RUSSIA AFTER STALIN

RELAXATION OF TENSION

STALIN's death on 3 March, 1953 was an event of epoch-making significance, as it clearly seemed to open out a new phase in East-West relations. At home, it ended the period of one-man rule, and inaugurated the establishment of "collective leadership", and abroad, a certain lessening of tension in the relations of East and West. Malenkov, who succeeded Stalin as Premier, and for a little over a week, also as First Secretary of the Communist Party (which latter post he relinquished in favour of Khrushchev), lost no time in announcing (15 March) that there was no dispute between East and West which could not be solved peacefully. The new rulers of the Kremlin followed up their words by a number of friendly gestures, e.g. the use of their good offices in repatriating British civilian prisoners in Korea, and also in the conclusion of an agreement for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, etc. This "new look" in Russian policy had one tangible accompaniment, which helped to create a favourable atmosphere for improved relations between East and West, namely, an appreciable change in the tone of the communist press, whose anti-Western propaganda became less strident.

Within Russia, the first fruits of the new policy were the announcement of a far-reaching amnesty for many classes of prisoners and a reduction of sentences for others, and the withdrawal (4 April, 1953) of the case which had been launched on 13 January, 1953 against fifteen doctors for murder and espionage on behalf of foreign powers. There were at the same time a number of economic concessions, e.g. the announcement that there would be more consumer goods, tax reductions on agriculture and payment of higher prices to collective farms for their produce, and a decree bringing about price reductions on a greater scale than in any previous years. The dismissal (10 July) of Lavrenti P. Beria,

First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Internal Affairs, and his execution (23 December) indicated that the struggle for power among Stalin's successors was not yet over, but it was at the same time interpreted in knowledgeable circles as a move to weaken the power of the secret police, and as such calculated to strengthen the new tendencies in Russian policy.

"NEW LOOK" POLICIES

The above-mentioned development in Russian policy after Stalin's death was generally welcomed in the West, and was considered by Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of England, as offering a chance for the opening of top-level talks between East and West. Mr. Eisenhower, the newly elected American President, however, discounted Mr. Churchill's optimism and asked for deeds, not words, from Russian leaders, such as the conclusion of an honourable truce in Korea. Soon afterwards, further proofs of their desire for the lessening of tension were afforded by the Soviet. In a note to Turkey at the end of May, the Soviet Government declared that for the sake of good neighbourly relations they were withdrawing their territorial claims, and also that they had reconsidered the question of the Black Sea Straits and now believed that it was possible to ensure Russian security on condition acceptable to Turkey. Diplomatic relations were resumed with Greece, Yugoslavia, and Israel, and Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, the Western nominee for the post of Secretary-General of U.N. was accepted by the Russian delegate in the Security Council. Above all, Russia used her good offices in inducing China to accept an armistice in Korea which brought the war there to an end. The Soviet also showed its strength in June, 1953 by easily putting down the riots in East Berlin, which had been hailed in the West as an indication of a "breach in the Kremlin wall". At home, a further development in the New Look Policy was evidenced by greater increase in the supply of consumer goods, specially foodstuffs, and in countries allied to the Soviet in Eastern Europe by a relaxation of the drive towards greater industrialization, and, in Russia and elsewhere by greater cultural freedom, though still very limited contacts with the West.

Meanwhile, the West had suffered a few setbacks as also made certain gains in its efforts to secure "positions of strength" as against the communists. In Italy, the defeat of De Gasperi in the elections of 1953 and his replacement by Pella was a severe setback, and was followed by the development of a crisis over Trieste. In Germany, however, the pro-Western Chancellor, Dr. Konard Adenauer, secured a victory at the elections held in September 1953 and, nevertheless, formed a broad-based coalition to make sure for his policy of European integration. On 26 September, the U.S.A. signed an agreement with Spain, granting her lease of areas and facilities for use of Americans as naval and air bases in return for economic and military assistance. Yugoslavia improved her security still further by signing at Ankara a five years' Treaty of Friendship and Assistance with Greece and Turkey. (28 February 1953.) At the same time her relations with the West became closer with the visits of Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary to Yugoslavia and of Tito to Britain. This development, however, was viewed with distrust by Italy, and there was a fresh crisis in Trieste, where a rising was suppressed with some loss of life.

THE MAIN QUESTION—GERMANY

Both East and West having secured some "positions of strength", for themselves, they were in better mood for the opening of negotiations, and talks of holding a top-level conference were again in the air. In the summer of 1953, a conference of the three Western Foreign Ministers was held in Washington, and it was decided to test Russian intentions on two outstanding questions, viz. Germany and Austria by summoning a conference. At this juncture, Russia announced that she had mastered the technique of the hydrogen bomb, and after some interchange of notes, proposed the holding of a conference in Berlin. Early in December 1953, President Eisenhower, Sir Winston Churchill, and M. Lanier, the then French Prime Minister, met at Bermuda, and decided to accept the Russian proposal for a conference, which eventually took place at Berlin from 25 January until 18 February 1954. This conference failed to reach an agreement respecting the question of German reunification, since neither side was prepared to budge an inch from its position on the subject. As a matter of fact, neither side expected the other to yield on this subject, the real intention of each being

to carry on its own propaganda with respect to EDC (see above, Chapter 19), whose fate was now hanging in the balance. The Russians were anxious to demonstrate that EDC was unnecessary, and that France and Russia had more to fear from Germany than from each other. They also wanted to show Germans that western insistence on rearmament was the major obstacle to reunification.

WOING FRANCE

However, the talk of a "new look" in Russian foreign policy did influence French opinion, while the reverses sustained by the French in Indo-China, which weakened them still further at a time when German strength was growing, made them distrustful of EDC, which was rejected by the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954. This was a severe blow to Western integration but the position was quickly retrieved to a considerable extent by the signing in Paris of agreements, providing for West German sovereignty, and permitting West Germany to rearm and be a member of NATO. West Germany and Italy were, further, to be admitted to an extended Brussels Treaty Organization, called the Western European Union (WEU). The original Consultative Council was replaced by the new Council of West European Union, which was to control the level of the armed forces, and direct an agency for the control of armaments, and supervise the Saar. Germany gave a unilateral undertaking not to manufacture atomic and other categories of dangerous weapons. Earlier, the western position had received an accession of strength by the signing, on 9 August 1954, at Bled (in Yugoslavia) between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, of a twenty-one-year Collective Security Pact, which thus strengthened and extended the Ankara Pact, and linked Yugoslavia more closely to the Western defence system. These diplomatic successes induced the western leaders to issue an invitation to Russia, 10 May, to a preliminary meeting of the Heads of Governments, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, with a view to removing the sources of conflict between them.

The development of the Paris Agreements had been viewed with misgivings by the Soviet, and, both before and after they were signed, there was an intensification of Soviet diplomacy designed to prevent their signature and subsequently their ratification. In December 1954, the Soviet Government sent notes to

England and France threatening to annul their wartime alliances with them and the adoption of counter-measures in Eastern Europe. Before ratification took place, Malenkov gave place to Bulganin as Premier—an event which seemed to portend the end of the “new look” at home and abroad. The new Soviet Government, however, pursued the policies initiated after the death of Stalin with even greater energy and imagination. Their first achievement in this direction was the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, 15 May 1955, which restored independence to Austria, who agreed to make a declaration of her neutrality, just 10 days earlier the Paris Agreements had come into force. As a counter-measure, the Soviet Union summoned a conference of East European countries in Warsaw, leading to the signing of a pact on 13 May establishing the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WARTO) by which a combined military organization, with the Soviet Marshal Konier as Commander-in-Chief and its headquarters in Moscow was set up. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. denounced her wartime treaties with England and France on the ground that they were inconsistent with the Paris Agreements. Shortly afterwards, Mr. Khrushchev paid a visit to Yugoslavia as an obvious gesture of the abandonment by the new bosses of Russia of the Stalinist policy of insistence on complete Russian control of communist parties everywhere, and of hostility to Tito. At Belgrade, Mr. Khrushchev made a public apology for past Soviet dealings with Tito¹ who reciprocated the overture with a declaration of his willingness to normalize relations with the Soviet. Tito, however,

¹ *The Tito-Stalin Rift*—On June 28, 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet-controlled Cominform agency, and though for some time Yugoslavia continued faithfully to support Soviet leadership in certain international conferences, it soon became evident that a definite breach had occurred in the Communist world. The western powers were at first incredulous about the Tito schism, but the history of the break in Soviet-Yugoslav relations could be traced back to the early days of the war. After the country had been overrun by the Nazis in June 1941, a resistance movement began, which was at first led by General Mihailovitch, who commanded the Chetniks (a Serb name for peasant guerillas). Then, with Russia's entry into the war as the result of the Nazi invasion which occurred in June, the communists of Yugoslavia were spurred into action, and found a great leader in Josip Broz, soon to be very much better known under his *nom-de-guerre* of Tito. After Mihailovitch's Chetniks were un-masked as German collaborators, and the

refrained from entering the Soviet bloc, and continued to pursue the Nehru policy of non-alignment, having already subscribed, during

general was captured and after a trial, executed as a traitor, the communist resistance movement grew steadily until it controlled Yugoslavia by the end of the war, possessing an army of 800,000 men and an organization which was easily transformed into a permanent government.

It was not until the war had nearly ended that the Russians sent some aid, and then mainly in the form of troops which occupied Belgrade and left a very bad reputation behind them. Nevertheless they posed as liberators of Yugoslavia, and attempted to play the role by insisting that she should accept their dictation in all matters of foreign and domestic policy, that is, be a satellite like their proteges in Eastern Europe. They wanted to exploit the mineral wealth of Yugoslavia as Austro-Hungary had done in the past, and were hostile to and sought to frustrate the plans for the country's industrialization formulated by the Tito government. When the Yugoslavs asked for machinery with which to implement their five-year plan, announced in 1947, the Russians sent them instead consumer goods, these too of poor quality. In the two Yugoslav-Russian joint stock companies permitted by Tito Russian managers and experts dominated the show, receiving high salaries and luxurious establishments, while nearly all the capital had to be supplied by the Yugoslavs.

On their side, the Russians charged the Yugoslavs with grave ideological lapses. They complained that Tito had subordinated the Yugoslav Communist Party (CPY) to the Yugoslav Popular Front—a charge which was true to the extent during the war they had all fought together and developed a brotherhood and dependent on Marxist theories, of which the large majority of Yugoslavs were quite ignorant, their Communism, though genuine, being of home brew and based on internal social and economic conditions. A further charge was that the CPY, had based itself on the peasants, instead of on the industrial workers, to which the Yugoslav reply was that it had to be so in a country having a population of the 12 to 1 ratio of peasants to workers. Stalin's real but not fully avowed complaint against Tito was that the latter was a 'nationalist deviationist' who put his loyalty to Yugoslavia above what he owed to Marxism-Leninism, in short, was not prepared to sacrifice the interests of his own country to those of Soviet Russia.

Stalin's expectation that the rank and file of the CPY would support him and rise against Tito was not justified, and Tito held his own—thus setting an example for leaders in other satellite states who wanted to establish national communism' in their own lands. The rift heartened the west, but, though Tito received aid and maintained friendly relations, he did not line up with the west (as he had refused to do so with Stalin) and remained politically non-aligned and staunchly communist.

a recent visit to Delhi, to *Panchashil* or the five principles of co-existence.

THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE AT GENEVA, 1955

According to invitations extended to the Soviet Government by the western leaders in May 1955, a Summit Conference of the Heads of Government of the Big Four Powers, viz., the U. S. A., the U.S.S.R., the U. K. and France, namely Eisenhower, Bulganin, Eden and Faure accompanied by their respective Foreign Secretaries (Dulles, Molotov, Macmillan, and Pinay) opened at Geneva on 18 July and continued till 23 July. The heads discussed an agenda which had been agreed upon previously and consisted of four items, viz., western security, German reunification, disarmament, and cultural contacts between East and West. Neither side shifted from its well-known position on any of these subjects, but they discussed them in a free and frank manner and an atmosphere of cordiality, and ended their talks with the agreement that they should be shortly resumed by the Foreign Ministers in another conference to be held at the same venue. At the conference President Eisenhower made a novel suggestion, viz. that the two atomic super-powers might supply to each other a complete blueprint of their military establishments and also offer facilities for aerial photographs of their respective countries being taken by them with a view to minimizing the possibility of a great surprise attack. The conference without achieving any tangible results helped lessen the prevailing Cold War tension and gave rise to the so-called Geneva spirit.

SOVIET SUCCESSES

Before the Foreign Ministers' Conference took place, the Soviet scored a number of diplomatic successes. In September Dr. Adenauer, the West German Chancellor, paid a visit to Moscow, which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic and a Russian promise to repatriate several thousand German prisoners held in Russia as war criminals. Just a week later Herr Grotewohl, the East German

Premier, arrived in Moscow. East Germany was recognized as a sovereign state by the Soviet Union, and admitted into WARTO as a full member. It was announced that in future the East German Government would handle questions relating to Berlin. This was interpreted in the West as a measure calculated to force upon them recognition of the German Democratic Republic. Shortly afterwards President Passikivi and Prime Minister Kekkonen of Finland paid a visit to Moscow, and, as a result of their discussions with the Soviet authorities, the Finnish Government extended their Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union until 1975 and the latter announced they would give up their military base at Porkkala Sud near Helsinki which they had acquired under the peace treaty and was their only military base outside their territories. The latter measure was designed to strengthen their demand for the withdrawal of the American foreign bases, and also to demonstrate to the Germans the advantages of neutralism.

SETBACKS FOR THE WEST

Meanwhile, the West had suffered a setback so far as their plans for West European integration were concerned in the rejection by the Saar-landers of the European Statute proposed to be given to them within the framework of the Western European Union under the terms of a Franco-German Agreement of 23 October 1954. Under the terms of the same agreement, a referendum was held on 23 October 1955, and its verdict, largely influenced by the propaganda of the previously banned pro-German parties, who were now allowed to carry on their campaign, went against the Statute, bringing on a crisis in Franco-German relations.

The Foreign Ministers' Conference, which was held at Geneva soon after this failure of Western policy in the Saar (27 October to 16 November), confirmed the deadlock on the Summit Conference issues, both sides sticking virtually to the positions they had held earlier. Early in the following year, 1956, the western cause received another set-back as the result of the General Elections in France, in which the communists emerged with 150 seats (over 50 more than what they had secured in the 1951 elections), and some fifty seats were won by a new movement—the Union for the Defence of

Shopkeepers and Craftsmen—led by a certain M. Poujade, “an embryo Hitler”, who had an ultra-rightist and anti-parliamentary programme. A new government, however, was formed by M. Guy Mollet, the socialist leader, in collaboration with the supporters of M. Mendes—France, and, in spite of communist expectations to the contrary, had a longer than average life of a cabinet in France.

A significant event, which came in the wake of the above-mentioned developments in the two camps, and which showed that East-West agreement was not completely ruled out in the Cold War, was the adoption by the two sides, in December 1955, of a “package deal” whereby membership of the U.N. was increased by 16, including ten from Europe. The states newly admitted from Europe were Austria, Eire, Finland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain who were favoured by the West, and Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, favoured by the Soviet, besides five Asian countries namely, Cambodia, Ceylon, Jordan, Laos and Nepal, and one African nation, Libya. The original “deal” had included two more states, viz. Outer Mongolia and Japan, but Nationalist China vetoed Outer Mongolia, and in retaliation, the Soviet vetoed Japan.

DE-STALINIZATION

Meanwhile, the forces released in the U.S.S.R. by the death of Stalin continued to exert their pressure on individuals and systems both within and outside the Soviet Union, and led to developments in the U.S.S.R. and her allies, which had at least in one case, viz. Hungary, tragic results. At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which opened in Moscow on 14 February 1956, A. I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, and one of Stalin's Old Guard, formally condemned some of the policies of his late master. He condemned the cult of “one man rule”, which, according to him, had been detrimental to the work of the party, and had produced errors, such as the break with Yugoslavia, and injustices, such as the purges of many of the old Bolshevik leaders. In secret sessions, Nikita S. Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, went further in “de-Stalinization”, and in a famous address at the 20th

Party Congress in February 1956, admitted some of the worst evils of the old regime which were vaguely known to the world, but the existence of which was emphatically denied by the Soviet leaders so long, and ascribed them all to Stalin. The fact remains that Khrushchev, or for that matter many others among Stalin's successors, only repudiated what they considered as isolated mistakes and errors committed by Stalin, and did not condemn his general approach, or even the use of terror as a weapon against the enemies of the Soviet power, which they considered apparently as quite correct—up to a point at any rate. Khrushchev further admitted that there were different roads to Communism, and that even parliamentary means might be used to achieve socialism. These developments had their repercussions in Eastern Europe, and further weakened the "little Stalins" of some of these countries such as Valko Chervenkov, Bulgarian Prime Minister, who resigned in April 1956, and Matyas Rakosi, First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, who was removed from office in July. At the same time, many victims of Titoist purges, among them some, like Laszlo Rajk and Traicho Kostov, who had been executed, were rehabilitated. The luckiest was Wladyslaw Gomulka of Poland, who had been denounced as a Titoist, and who now emerged as a leading figure in Eastern Europe and an advocate of "national communism".

RUSSIA'S RESTLESS SATELLITES—POLAND

The admission by Khrushchev that the evidence on which the Comintern had, at Stalin's initiative, purged and disbanded the Polish Communist Party in 1938, was false, had some results unpalatable to the Soviet leaders. At the end of June, 1958, there were riots at Poznan, which indicated that pent up grievances were now coming to the surface. Gomulka became the most popular figure in Poland and was re-elected Secretary-General of the Polish Communist party. His popularity depended on his continuing to resist the Russians, while it was clear that his creed of "national communism" could not survive without their granting the concessions which he demanded of them. After unsuccessful attempts to resist his demands, the Russians yielded. The Soviet Marshal Rakossovsky, the symbol of Soviet control in Poland, who had been removed by the Poles.

from their politburo, resigned his posts as Polish Minister of Defence and Commander-in-chief. In the middle of November, Gomulka visited Moscow, and obtained important economic concessions. Russian troops were to continue to remain in Poland, but their movements were to be under Polish control.

In many of the countries of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, there were communist governments which lacked popular backing, and depended on Russian support, so that it was not possible for the Russians to find a solution for the problem of popular unrest in these countries on Polish lines, even if they wished to do so. In Poland, fear of German irredentism, in Czechoslovakia some fear of Germany and in Albania, dislike of Yugoslavia kept these sections loyal to their Russian friends. In other East European countries, where such specific grounds for dependence on the Soviet did not exist, any attempt to satisfy the popular clamour for more independence from Soviet control was likely to what an appetite that could consume the communist governments installed in them by the Russians, and produce serious troubles. This was what happened in Hungary.

CRISIS IN HUNGARY

The dismissal of Rakosi, and the rehabilitation of Rajk (though posthumous) indicated concessions to public opinion in Hungary, July 1956, which was critical of the communist regime. Dissatisfaction, however, grew in volume, specially as the result of the happenings in Poland. In October, there were demands for the return to power of Imre Nagy, who had been associated with Malenkov's "new course" and disgraced after his fall, and for the withdrawal of Russian troops. By the end of the month, demonstrations had developed into a countrywide revolt, and Nagy was reappointed Prime Minister. Shortly afterwards, however, it was announced that the government had invoked the Treaty of Warsaw, and asked for the support of Soviet troops to restore order. Four days later, 28 October, Nagy promised a general amnesty and negotiations with the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of Russian troops and a new relationship assuring Hungary's independence. But Nagy was unable to control events. Soviet troops were

restore order and this inflamed the insurgents whose demands were now for full democratic freedom. Thereupon the Russians effected a partial withdrawal of their troops, and seemed to be ready for a compromise. Nagy, however, went ahead, and formed a new coalition government, renounced the Warsaw Pact, and appealed to the United Nations. The Russians resorted to naked force, crushed the revolt, and installed a new regime led by Janos Kadar, and wholly dependent on themselves. The United Nations called upon Russia to withdraw all forces from Hungary, but it could not secure compliance with its resolution. The West simply looked on, and neutral nations of the Afro-Asian group, who felt more deeply concerned with the contemporary Anglo-French attack on Egypt, disapproved Russian use of force in Hungary but did not condemn it as vigorously as the West expected. (Further details are given in the next Chapter).

LECH WALESA IN POLAND

What Imre Nagy had failed to do in Hungary and Alexander Dubchek in Czechoslovakia was accomplished by Lech Walesa, a mere working man and a former electrician in a ship-building factory in his country. His name figured in the headlines of the papers on 14 August 1980 as the Chief of Solidarity, the nation-wide organization of ninety-five freedom-seeking workingmen of the country. Wearing a coat with buttons on which were printed the pictures of Virgin Mary, Walesa, the father of four sons and two daughters and a devout Catholic, had had thence many successes and reverses. Bringing solidarity among the Polish workers, and confusion in the ranks of General Jaruzelski's government who, after keeping him interned for eleven months released him in November, 1982, Walesa did achieve a miracle and wrung from the Government rights which were unheard of in a Communist country anywhere.

The Polish government have accepted the demands of the workers to build up their own organizations independent of Government control. Freedom of speech was restored to a great extent as also political rights. Restrictions on the issue of passports were largely reduced. Incredible as it may seem, the Government accepted the workers' demand to be consulted on the actual conduct of business in factories. Working hours were also reduced. To us, Indians,

living in a democratic country, it is difficult to realise the vastness of the achievements of Walesa. In a Communist country, everything from birth to death is controlled by the state which, in its turn, is controlled by the Communist party. By bowing to Walesa's demands, the Government have virtually divested themselves of the agencies by which are controlled the lives of citizens in a communist state.

For us, Indians, a special interest lies in the fact that these successes have been achieved by the method of non-violent non-cooperation, a method largely by the adoption of which we ourselves have won our freedom. The discoverer of the method of warfare by non-violent, non-cooperation which is capable of immobilizing a rich and powerful enemy was Mahatma Gandhi. Before Walesa, Dr. Martin Luther King had successfully used this method and wrested valuable rights for the blacks in America. For this he had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Walesa has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1984. According to many political thinkers, if any significance attaches to the award of the Prize to Walesa it is this—he and his following are soldiers of peace and have demonstrated that soul force is mightier than arms. Distracted by the piling up of weapons of destruction, specially nuclear ones and the none too impossibility of the prospect of a Third World War, in which nuclear weapons may surely be used, the world is seeking for a way of escape from the dreadful possibility of annihilation, and—these observers feel—here it is : non-violent non-cooperation.

Two persons in the Communist world have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1975, this Prize was given to Dr. A. S. Sakharov, the famous scientist and rebel Professor of Soviet Russia. The Soviet government had frowned on this award and declared that it was a deliberate intervention in the internal affairs of their country. One may think this to be a too simple explanation of the action of the Norwegian Nobel Committee in selecting Sakharov. Behind the scientist there was the Israeli world. The Soviet government did not allow Sakharov to go to Stockholm to take the prize but allowed his wife to do so.

And here was a warning for the Polish government. Behind Walesa is the entire Roman Catholic world. The warning became too clear when Pope John Paul II insisted on meeting Walesa.

(This must also have emboldened the Norwegian Nobel Committee in selecting Walesa for the Prize.) Walesa has donated the entire prize money to the church fund for private farmers. Apart from the rosy hopes cherished by optimists, which we have stated above here lies a practical significance for the award of the Prize to Walesa. Though continuing to work as a maintenance electrician, he is now a world figure and in their fight against the Polish Government which still goes on, the Polish workers have received a powerful impetus. The world's eyes are on them.

COMMUNIST RECOVERY

Thus, by the end of the year 1956, the repercussion of the "new course" and de-Stalinization policies of the new leaders of Russia had died down, and Russian control in most of the allied states in Eastern Europe, where it had been threatened, regained. National communism was by no means assured even in Poland. Tito alone maintained his position of independence, and was not quite won back, in spite of efforts by the Russians to placate him, e.g. by dissolving the Cominform in April 1956 and replacing Molotov by Shepilov just before he visited Moscow in June. The relations between him and the Russians became even cooler, especially after a speech at Pula in the middle of November, in which Tito criticized certain aspects of Russia's handling of the Hungarian crisis. But, in spite of their definite retreat from Stalinism, the Russian leaders did not surrender any of the outposts which Stalin's policy had gained for Russia.

During the period, the West had considerably increased its defensive strength in Europe, and any further extension of communist influence in the continent as that won by the coup in Czechoslovakia did not seem likely to happen again. But there was no prospect either of western diplomacy succeeding in bringing about a Russian withdrawal. There were serious divisions in the Western camp: Greece, Turkey and England were involved in the Cyprus dispute; France and Germany looked askance at each other, and the Saarland dispute threatened a fresh crisis in their relations; Iceland was agitated over the retention of American bases there;

the U.S.A. did not see eye to eye with her main allies, England and France, on the Suez issue, while France's policy in Algeria was a definite embarrassment for her chief allies. The two power blocs of the world could perhaps be regarded as well balanced in Europe, but communist strength which had been tremendously increased by the revolution in China was increasing in South and South-East Asia and perhaps also in the Middle East, a fact which threatened to tilt the world balance in its favour.

CRISIS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968

Czechoslovakia was one of the tamest of Soviet satellites, and de-Stalinization was slow. But heavy and uneconomical exploitation of the country's rich productive resources for the benefit of the U.S.S.R. and the international Communist camp, specially after the Communist take-over in 1948, was threatening the country with economic ruin and disturbing the minds of genuine Communists and friends of the Soviet Union. Demands for a higher standard of living, greater personal freedom and an end to the police state grew, rising to a high pitch among writers and students in 1967.

At the beginning of 1968, a progressive faction of the Czech Communist leadership decided that basic changes were required to avoid a general collapse. Alexander Dubchek, a Slovak, became First Secretary of the Czech Communist party, replacing Antonin Novotny, a long-time symbol of rigid, unimaginative Marxism. Thereupon Dubchek initiated a wide-ranging programme to liberalize all democratic aspects of Communism in Czechoslovakia and to gain greater independence of Moscow. The masses of Czechs, Communist and non-Communist, rallied to his support.

Despite assurances that Czechoslovakia would remain Communist and would not leave the Soviet political sphere, the Soviet Union and its other satellites looked with increasing alarm upon the Czech experiment of reconciling Communism with democracy, fearing its contagion in their own domestic affairs. When press attacks, military threats and discussions with the Czech leaders failed, they resorted to force. On 21 August 1968, some half-million troops of the Polish Pact armies swiftly invaded and occupied the country, ostensibly to prevent a revolution backed by "Western imperialist powers." Nation-wide passive resistance and an overwhelmingly

negative reaction to the invasion throughout the rest of the world forced the Soviet to permit Dubchek and his associates to resume their offices. In October, 1968, most of the occupying troops withdrew. Soviet influence continued to be felt in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs, however, and in April, 1969, Dubchek lost his position as First Secretary. He was replaced by Gustav Husak, who attempted to maintain a balance between both liberalization and orthodox Communism. In 1975, Husak was appointed President of the Republic in place of Ludvik Svoboda, who had been in that office since 1968. Husak, however, retained his position as the First Secretary. (It may be mentioned that following upon the invasion, a resolution was introduced in the Security Council asking for the withdrawal of the invading troops—Soviet Russia and Hungary voting against it and India, Pakistan and Algeria abstaining from voting. The resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Mr. Nehru said, in defence of India's abstention, that though India deplored the happening and would work for the withdrawal of the troops, she did not agree with the wording of the resolution and the version by the sponsors of the incident. China strongly denounced Soviet action.)

RISE OF KHRUSHCHEV

When Stalin died, there was none among his associates who could seize the totality of his power, and we have seen that control fell to a group of them who, it is believed, had been drawn together a few weeks before Stalin's death, as never before by mutual fear for their lives in the purge they knew he was planning. These men set themselves up in a committee—"collective leadership"—as they called it and distributed power among themselves. Georgi Malenkov was named premier, Lavrenti P. Beria given charge of the secret and the public police and security, Vyacheslav M. Molotov of foreign affairs, and Nikolai A. Bulganin of the armed forces with Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov as deputy defence minister under him. The prize plum, however, went to Nikita S. Khrushchev, who became the chief of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, traditionally the top executive post in the nation. This was the position from which, Stalin himself had risen to dictatorial power. A few weeks later Malenkov resigned as party secretary, and Khrushchev was appointed to the post. In September 1953

Khrushchev became "First Secretary", but he did not take over Stalin's former title of "General Secretary".

The jockeying for power among these personalities from the very start suggested that "collective leadership" would not last long. In July 1953, a bare four months after Stalin's death, Beria was arrested and liquidated. It was indeed Premier Malenkov whose name was chiefly associated with the "new look" policy, and he also announced its chief features. In August 1953, Malenkov announced Russia's mastery over the Hydrogen bomb, but, when, a month later, Khrushchev received the official title of the First Secretary, he and not Malenkov became the chief spokesman of Soviet policies. In February 1955, Khrushchev sought and obtained Malenkov's ouster as premier in favour of Bulganin. Malenkov's confession on relinquishing office that he was not experienced enough to handle the job and the obviously subordinate role of Bulganin to Khrushchev demonstrated publicly who was who.

It was in May 1957 that Khrushchev's opponents finally got together, among them being Bulganin, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and several others. They carried a majority against Khrushchev in the Presidium, but when the latter convened a special session of the Central Committee itself they were defeated. In June, all Khrushchev's opponents except alone Bulganin were expelled from the leadership in the party and the government. In October 1957, Marshal Zhukov, who had backed Khrushchev against his opponents a few months ago and had been made a full member of the Presidium—the first military man ever to be elevated to this political level—was ousted both from office and membership of the Presidium by Khrushchev, since political power had gone to the General's head and he was feeling himself a rival. After all these happenings, the appointment of Khrushchev as premier in 1958, while retaining the headship of the party, created no surprise.

The full progression of Khrushchev's rise to supreme power in Soviet Russia was a matter of barely five years, and amazing as this story is, his recognition as one of the greatest figures in world politics—his only political peer was the President of the U.S.A.—rivals anything recorded in modern history. His success in rising of the topmost place in the Soviet Government is not difficult to explain. While his comrades under Stalin were confined by the latter to the Kremlin, Khrushchev was busy both in the Ukraine.

and the Moscow region working with local party chieftains. His politics were grass-roots politics. If Stalin was an introvert, a man who, hiding behind the Kremlin walls, governed by intrigue and conspiracy, Khrushchev was an extrovert, who loved to be among the people, to talk to them, and to make a good impression on them. His great gift was that of persuasion. The present writer, who, on the day of Khrushchev's visit to Calcutta in 1955, jumped on to the footboard of an overcrowded bus, in spite of advanced years, and unmindful of his risks, to be able to reach a point in a road through which he passed, from where he could have a good view of him, testifies to his handsome features and magnetic personality, though he had little more than just a glimpse of Khrushchev as he sat in a car facing the cheering crowds of bystanders, who felt intensely delighted to have a look at him, and who made him likewise happy.

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE WEST

Under Stalin, Soviet policy posed a threat to the Western Powers to such an extent that the latter, under the leadership of the U.S.A., practically formed a grand alliance against the U.S.S.R. In Eastern Europe, Stalin's crusade against Tito had backfired against the Soviet Union with dangerous consequences. In nearly all the countries of Eastern Europe the Soviet satellite regimes were kept in power only by the most ruthless police terror and had a very narrow basis of popular support. Russia's relations with Communist China were at a low point. In the field of foreign policy, indeed, Stalin had led the Soviet Union into a blind ally, and, at his death, left it at a position which was well nigh one of isolation from the entire world, communist and non-communist.

Earlier in the chapter we have narrated the measures adopted by the successors of Stalin to improve relations with the outside world, and particularly with non-communist countries. They started with making minor concessions and removed minor irritations—such as providing exit visas to foreign citizens and their Russian wives who had been held in the U.S.S.R. under Stalin. The first major move was to assist in arranging an armistice agreement in Korea in 1953. A second major concession, reached much later only after a lot of difficult negotiations was

the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. (See above, Chapter 15.) A third move which certainly helped to create a more peaceful world situation was Soviet aid in achieving an armistice in Vietnam. And, fourth, in 1955, Khrushchev, shortly before going to the Summit Conference at Geneva, flew to Belgrade in an effort to resolve the differences of the Soviet Union with President Tito—perhaps Stalin's worst legacy. To put it bluntly, Khrushchev delivered to President Tito the humble apologies of the Soviet Union for Stalin's mistaken policy towards him. The apologies were accepted, but Tito stubbornly refused to restore Yugoslavia to the status of a satellite of the U.S.S.R. like Hungary and others. The net result, however, was a considerable improvement in the relations of the two countries.

The path towards a relaxation of tensions had not, however, been a smooth or straight one. Blustering alternated with cordial peace talks and defiant acts with more friendly ones. In 1955 the Soviet Union alarmed the West by showing a renewed interest in the Middle East, wherefrom it had seemed to have withdrawn after the failure of its intervention in Iran shortly after the close of the Second World War. Through the intermediary of Czechoslovakia it sold large quantities of modern arms to Egypt on credit. The arms deal was accompanied by Moscow's decision to back to the hilt, in every possible way, the cause of Arab nationalism against Israel. (See below, Chapter 21.) Then in November 1958, as we have seen (Chapter 16), Khrushchev raised the Berlin issue, which, however, he allowed for the time being to remain a paper crisis. Of equal importance with the Berlin question were the interrelated problems of disarmament and of control over nuclear weapons. France's explosion of her first A-bomb on 13 February which brought the number of powers capable of having nuclear weapons to four, made the problem of finding an agreement on the manufacture, testing and use of nuclear weapons a highly difficult and complicated one. But it gave the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. a common interest in solving the problem, since they had an equal dislike for more nations having this weapon. The talks which were begun at Geneva on bringing about disarmament

and banning tests of nuclear weapons were, however, soon deadlocked on the key question of inspection and control.

Khrushchev broke with the Stalinist tradition conspicuously by undertaking journeys to foreign countries, as also by moving about to and fro within the Soviet Union, instead of being like Stalin immured within the walls of the Kremlin. Since he rose to top position he made official journeys to Communist China, to all the Eastern European countries, to Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, India, Burma, Indonesia, Finland, Britain, the United States, and France. The foundations for the American visit were laid by the First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan during his informal visit to the United States in January, 1959 and by Vice-President Richard M. Nixon during his visit to the Soviet Union in July 1959. Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959 excited international attention. Its chief specific result was Moscow's removal of its deadline on Berlin (Chapter 16) while it led to a general improvement in the relations between the two countries, pointing to the achievement of some results in the talks on disarmament and banning of nuclear testing, which were intermittently going on at Geneva.

THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV

On 13 October 1964, to all outside the Kremlin in Moscow, Nikita S. Khrushchev appeared as sitting secure astride the summit of Soviet power. Actually, on that day, having been summoned from his Black Sea villa to Moscow, he was being pressed to the wall by some of his closest associates in the party Presidium who were demanding that he should surrender the power that he enjoyed so keenly and withdraw into the nullity of retirement. On the following day, he offered his "resignation", which was ratified by the Central Committee of the party, the very body which had upheld him in June 1957 in his struggle against his opponents, led by Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich. Russians held their breath, and the rest of the world was puzzled as to the significance of the revolution in the com-

position of the Soviet Government. It had been known indeed for some time that Khrushchev was disliked by the remnants of the adherents of Stalin, and that his arch-enemy, Chou En-lai, was having a hand in some party manoeuvres in Moscow aimed at bringing about a "Stalinist" counter-revolution. If it was indeed they who had succeeded in their game, what changes in Russia's domestic and foreign policies could it portend ?

No ! It became quickly known that the leader of the revolt against Khrushchev was Leonid I. Brezhnev, his own *alter ego*, one whom he was himself preparing for the Premiership after him, and who now stepped into the place, vacated by him as first secretary. On the 15th another of his erstwhile loyal supporters, Aleksei N. Kosygin, was appointed to succeed him as chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier). A number of his personal supporters, including his son-in-law, Aleksei I, Adzhubei, who was the editor of the *Izvestia*, lost their jobs, and in a few months a few more changes occurred in the personnel of the government, but they were nothing very much out of the way, though some deserve mention. Pyotr E. Shelst and Aleksandr N. Shelepin received the promotions they richly deserved to full membership of the party Presidium ; Vladimir V. Matskevich, an able administrator, who had been dismissed as Minister of Agriculture by Khrushchev, was reinstated in this post. Another former occupant of this thankless job, Ivan A. Benedictov, who had been dismissed by Khrushchev as far back as 1951, was brought back from provincial obscurity to become ambassador in India ; Anastas ; A. Mikoyan gave up the ceremonial post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which was transferred to Nikolai V. Podgorny, but retained his post of influence as member of the Presidium ; and Dimitry S. Polinasky, a member of the Presidium, become first deputy premier. There was no general reversal of Khrushchev's policies, and the new leaders were apparently sincere in describing the change as one of persons, not of basic policy.

The new leaders, while refraining from criticizing Khrushchev directly and by name, accused him by oblique hints of

substituting his "subjective judgment" for a careful examination of the real problems, of "harebrained schemes," and of adventurism". Within a few hours of his downfall Khrushchev became an "unperson", and unable to reply to the charges that were levelled against him. Russians profess great puzzlement over the world's continuing curiosity about his health and whereabouts, but one cannot but feel that he will be remembered in history not only as one who, from humble beginnings, rose within the incredibly short period of about five years, to a position of supreme power in Russia—his only peer as such was the President of the United States—but as one, who, committing some grievous mistakes in both his foreign and domestic policies, gave a good shake-up to the petrified system of government that he had inherited, and who always stood and worked for the peach of the world.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS BEFORE KHRUSHCHEV

There was one conspicuously dark and ever-increasing patch in the otherwise comparatively bright picture of Khrushchevite achievements—relations with Communist China. Sino-Soviet relation, none too happy under Stalin, passed, under Khrushchev, during some years of wordy disputations getting more acrimonious with time, from indirect and oblique to frontal and direct attacks, till the breaking point was reached. It is not a fact that the two nations have no common interests left (both, for instance, have no dearer wish than to expel the U.S.A. from the position of strength she has in Asia); and it would be foolhardy to think that even at present their fellowship in the Communist faith has no significance whatsoever in the matter of their relations with the capitalist world, or that, in certain eventualities, their having to stand by each other in same remove time, if not just at present or in the near future, can be absolutely ruled out. Undeniably, however, the present reality is that the two Communist giants are hostile to each other in virtually every sphere of policy and action, and that they are engaged in a worldwide struggle for extending their

influence in and control over the international Communist movement.

To consider Khrushchev individually or some of his policies as responsible for the present unhappy relations between the two nations is an over-simplification of a complex historical development. Sino-Russian conflicts took place as early as the seventeenth century when Cossack adventurers began to sweep eastwards from the Urals to what are now Soviet Central Asia and the Soviet Far Eastern Maritime Territories. The Tsars thereafter continued to expand into these regions, and in the nineteenth century, joining hands with other European despoilers of China, and otherwise, extorted a number of concessions from the imperial court at Peking. It was thus that Russia built and owned the Chinese Eastern Railway, which gave her a short route from Siberia to the Pacific through Manchuria. She, moreover, annexed large portions of Chinese territory : the entire Soviet Far Eastern Maritime Territory with its capital at Vladivostok as also a good portion of what is now Soviet Central Asia. Nor was this policy entirely reversed with the coming to power of the Bolsheviks : Stalin established effective control over the ostensibly independent first Soviet satellite, Outer Mongolia, which had been a "special territory" of the Chinese empire by detaching it from the sovereignty and control of Peking. Stalin also was responsible for the initial defeats sustained by the Chinese Communists at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek : the risings were premature and had little urban support (they had been planned as Stalin insisted). Only after Stalin had subsequently appointed and removed several heads of the Chinese Communist party did Mao Tse-tung succeed in the early 1930's in taking over its leadership and shifting its emphasis to guerilla war in rural border areas of China. Mao found additional cause for grievance in the arrangements made by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at Yalta in 1945 regarding post-war China.

Even after the Second World War Stalin continued to ridicule Mao's bid for power, and after the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 over Chiang Kai-shek, he still kept a firm grip on the naval base at Darien and on the mineral resources of Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan). Nevertheless, at this time Mao gave public support to the Russian policy and in 1949 (shortly before Chiang Kai-shek was finally driven out) made his famous statement that China must

"lean to one side" in international affairs and unreservedly ally herself with the Soviet Union. On 14 February 1950 the two countries signed a treaty of friendship by which the U.S.S.R. promised to restore to China the Chinese Changchun Railway as well as Port Arthur as soon as a treaty with Japan had been concluded and in any case not later than 1952 and also to consider at the same time the question of the future of Dairen. Russia also agreed by the terms of this treaty to lend China the equivalent of 300 million American dollars over a period of three years. By a Sino-Soviet agreement published on 16 September 1952 it was announced that Russia was taking steps to return to China the Changchun Railway, but that Peiping had "requested" Moscow to delay withdrawing Russian troops from Port Arthur until treaty relations were established between the two countries and Japan. Port Dairen was not mentioned in the agreement, but presumably it was to be left in Russian hands. By a Sino-Soviet accord, published on 12 October 1954 after Stalin's death, the U.S.S.R. agreed to evacuate Port Arthur by 31 May 1955, to provide additional economic aid to China estimated at about \$100 million with a view to speeding her industrialization, and to dissolve four joint Soviet-Chinese stock companies, which represented a form of Soviet imperialism.

THE RIFT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV

During Stalin's life time Sino-Soviet relations were cordial enough, at least on the surface, and Russian help to China was substantial. But the Chinese did not love Stalin, who insisted on all communist nations conforming with the Marxist-Leninist ideology as interpreted by himself (Mao thought he too had made some original contribution to it) and also wanted to direct and control the policy and personnel of their governments. One has to remember also that China received nothing from the Soviet Union as a free gift; she always paid for all aids she received. It is said this was as China wanted to do; in any case that was the way things were, whether China liked it or not. (According to Peking's hints, China had to pay heavily for Soviet arms used in fighting the Korean war.) It was perhaps his growing awareness of this smouldering resentment that induced Stalin to take up a softer line in his dealings with the Chinese Communists in his last days. His successors, Khrushchev among them, hastened to implement this policy: Soviet credits

between 1950-57 totalled \$430 billion, according to the National Planning Association. They did not like China's ambitious plans for collectivizing agriculture and developing large-scale industry; but they knew that if their deliveries were slow or of poor quality, China's industrial planners might long to have a free hand to trade with the "imperialist" world. The Chinese, however, even if they were free to trade with Japan and the West, had to carry on most of their trade with the U.S.S.R. and her East European satellites. That was because with the latter they had long-range contracts which left them little they could sell to the non-communist world. The compelling reason for their "leaning to one side" was perhaps the fact that it was Russian nuclear strength which protected China from being subjected to nuclear bombing by the U.S.A. in case war broke out between the two countries and as, it is said, it did during the Korean War.

Because Stalin had treated them so shabbily, it could be expected that the Chinese would welcome Khrushchev's denunciation of the "personality cult". At first Mao Tse-tung did appear to be inclined to follow Khrushchev in relaxing somewhat the grip of his own dictatorial rule in China. However, his attempt to do so, tentatively in the literary and cultural field, with the slogan, "Let a hundred flowers bloom" (See below, Chapter XXIII), uncovered such a vast area of incipient rebellion among the educated class and even within the party that he quickly abandoned it. He soon saw in de-Stalinization, *a la* Khrushchev, a dangerous form of deviationism, a straying from the principles of Communism as taught by Marx and Lenin, and was ere long to denounce Khrushchev and his associates as "modern revisionists", who were "renegades" to their international Communist duty, and even as "traitors" conspiring with the "imperialist war-mongers of the U.S.A." to overthrow Communism and re-establish Capitalism both in Russia and China! His ideological differences with Khrushchev were perhaps sincere, but, personally, he was embittered to find that the Russians did not give him the recognition that he believed was due to him, after the death of Stalin, as the senior living Marxist-Leninist theoretician. After Khrushchev's "apostacy" Chinese communists were inclined to proclaim a new "apostolic succession"—from Marx to Lenin, Lenin to Stalin and Stalin to Mao Tse-tung. Lenin's mantle having fallen on

him, they claimed, Mao should be recognized as the sole legitimate leader of the Communist forces throughout the world.

More tangible grounds on which to base their complaints against Russia's new leaders were soon found. After having discarded the "hundred flowers"; or more liberal approach, in 1957, Mao Tse-tung rushed to opposite extremes, both in his domestic and foreign policies. Without consulting the Soviet leaders he started in mid-1958 "the great leap forward" (see below Chapter XXIII), which called for large-scale support, through trade and credits, from the U.S.S.R., even if its implementation meant slowing down Russia's own development and tightening Soviet belts. The Soviet response to this was extremely generous, but Moscow demurred when "adventurism" in economic development was compounded by the Chinese attempt to seize the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which were occupied by Nationalist China, to be followed up if successful, by the conquest of Taiwan itself. Either goal ran the risk of bringing the United States directly into the struggle, but the Chinese argued that, having had a sizable pile of nuclear weapons, it should be the U.S.S.R.'s "fraternal Communist duty" to stand by China in a confrontation with the U.S.A. Khrushchev paid a hasty visit to Peking in August 1958, and succeeded in keeping the Mao challenge to Taiwan (and to the U.S.A.) within rigid limits.

By this time Chinese criticisms of the Khrushchevite policies of "de-Stalinization", "liberalization", and "peaceful co-existence" were becoming more strident. According to Chinese poletics which came in a flood after the acute worsening of Sino-Russian relations due to the signing of the Test Ban treaty by Moscow in August 1963, and which may contain considerable truth, the Chinese leaders took serious exception to Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Party Congress of February 1956 outlining his de-Stalinization, liberalization, and peaceful co-existence policies, soon after the session ended. As early as that also they objected to his active policy of aid to and acquisition of influence in the undeveloped countries, and in particular to Soviet aid to India, which they considered not only as one cause of decreased aid to themselves but as inspired by the desire of building up a potential ally against China. The Chinese also claim that when, following Khrushchev's first essays in de-Stalinization, there was unrest in Poland and a revolution in Hungary, they played a decisive role on the Eastern European

political scene—their first-ever intervention in the politics of Communist countries outside Asia. One may doubt that, as the Chinese assert, they “set straight” the Russians, that is, acted as mediators between Moscow and Eastern Europe and defined a reasonable new basis for intrabloc relations (Concretely, they claim to have induced Moscow to accept Wladyslaw Gomulka in Poland and crush Imre Nagy in Hungary.) Probably, the Chinese impact on Russian policy was peripheral, but evidences indicate that Khrushchev, awakening to the danger of an impending split, did make certain concessions to the Chinese. In particular, on 15 October 1957, he promised to provide China with a sample A-bomb and technical data concerning the manufacture of atom bombs.

Even so, soon afterwards, the Chinese shift to a new “hard” line began. As we now know from Chinese sources, the November 1957 Moscow meeting of the 12 ruling Communist parties witnessed the first major direct Sino-Soviet verbal confrontation. A month earlier, the Soviet Union had achieved a strategic guided missile capability and launched its first sputnik (see above, Chapter XX). This seems to have convinced Mao Tse-tung that Soviet military strength had now become so great that the U.S.S.R. should take greater risks vis-a-vis the United States in helping China achieve the goals of her foreign policy—to conquer in the first instance the offshore islands, and Taiwan. In 1958-59 they themselves proceeded to adopt a militant posture on one issue after another e.g., extreme ideological attacks on Yugoslavia, which Khrushchev was attempting to conciliate, an economic embargo against Japan, a militant line on the Iraq crisis, a serious dispute with Indonesia regarding the overseas Chinese, cut-throat economic competition in South-East Asia, a new crisis over Quemoy, support for renewed insurrection in Laos, and a bitter border dispute with India. At the same time, they started to woo a wide variety of Asian nations by stepping up their foreign aid programmes, and also signed new treaties with a number of countries, such as Nepal, Burma, Afghanistan and Indonesia. Further, they attempted to extend their contacts and influence in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

Basically, the differences between the Chinese and Russians, who are equally sincere in their profession of Communism and in their desire to see it triumph in the world, consisted, first, in each other's assesment of the “world balance of forces” that could be exploited

for the furtherance of the goal, and, secondly, in the methods by which it was to be reached. As to the first, the Chinese held firmly to the view that the balance of power between the Communist and Capitalist blocs was at present tilted in favour of the former because of Russia's success in launching the first ICBM and Sputnik. "I consider that the present world situation has reached a new turning point." Mao Tse-tung declared in Moscow in November, 1957. "There are now two winds in the world : the east wind and the west wind. There is a saying in China : 'If the east wind does not prevail over the west wind, then the west wind will prevail over the east wind, I think the characteristic of the current situation is that the east wind prevails over the west wind; that is, the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism.'"

It would be wrong to assume, however, that though the Chinese favoured a high-risk policy vis-a-vis the U.S.A., they were prepared for a major war with the U.S.A. which would involve a thermonuclear showdown between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. What they actually maintained was that (a) the tactics of limited or guerilla war could be successfully adopted and (b) Moscow was wrong in thinking that it might escalate to general or thermonuclear war, since America was a "paper tiger", and could neither win in guerilla warfare nor dare escalate a limited war. (The global strategy of Mao had been recently enunciated in considerable detail by Marshal Lin Piao, Minister of Defence and Vice-Minister of China.) The Russians, who claimed to be more intimately aware of the power of the West and the dangers of nuclear war, maintained that the risks were there and were too great to be undertaken. The "world socialist system", they thought, would be able to defeat "imperialism" primarily through economic competition and other non-violent means. Secondly, they emphasized the importance of Communism in Europe; the Chinese declared that the centre of the world revolutionary struggle was in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thirdly, the controversy had the aspects of a fight between two nations who, having met each other along an extensive land frontier over the last hundred years, had claims against each other in many regions—Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, among others. Fourthly, the Chinese were attempting to destroy Soviet leadership in the international communist movement and eventually to replace it by Chinese leadership,

while the Russians naturally wanted to retain the primacy they had enjoyed since 1917. Finally, as we have seen, the Chinese looked upon the whole of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policies as a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism ; in the eyes of Khrushchev, the Chinese were Stalinists and Troskyites.

In retrospect, 1959 seems to have witnessed the final parting of the ways for Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung. On his side, by this time, Khrushchev seems to have been determined to force the Chinese to conform with Russian policies. He was all the more anxious to do so because the Chinese were showing increasing signs of preparing to use military force for having their way in their border dispute with India, and he himself was planning to go to Camp David for having talks with President Eisenhower. In August of that year some 10,000 Soviet specialists were withdrawn from China, and a few months afterwards Khrushchev cancelled his 1957 commitment (see above) to help China build a nuclear deterrent. In the same year, Mao came to know that Khrushchev had either helped or was at least aware of an attempt by a minority group within the Chinese leadership, headed by Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, to oust him from power. Mao crushed the attempt in August-September, 1959, and over Khrushchev's protests, initiated his first significant border incident in Ladakh, whereupon, over Mao's protests, the Soviet leader publicly indicated Russian neutrality on this issue. The Chinese retaliated by publicizing their disapproval of Khrushchev's Camp David talks, and when Khrushchev visited Peking in September, 1959, the Sino-Soviet controversy over Taiwan and the offshore islands became acute.

In 1960, the dispute moved a step further and developed into as intense and bitter debate ranging over a wide variety of ideological issues. In April, the Chinese published an article, entitled "Long Live Leninism", which contained a drastic attack on Soviet foreign policy positions. In a Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions held at Peking in June, 1960 the Chinese openly lobbied against the Russians. Thereupon Khrushchev used against the Chinese the method that Stalin had unsuccessfully adopted for coercing Yugoslavia : he withdrew all technical experts from China and cut off all economic aid. Mao, however, not only did not crawl on his knees but, on the contrary, so vigorously stood his ground

and convinced his actual and potential supporters that he could continue to do so, that he soon received considerable support both in China and outside. The first to take up the cudgels for him, curiously enough, was the small and poor Communist state of Albania which was viewing with alarm Khrushchev's rapprochement with Yugoslavia, the national enemy, to escape from whom it had, in 1948, sought the protection of Stalin. Viewing with strong disfavour also the de-Stalinization policy of Khrushchev, Albania had, indeed, already opened negotiations with Peking for economic aid, which Khrushchev had stopped and which Peking now rushed to her. At the Bucharest meeting in June, Albania took Peking's side as did many of the East Asian Communist parties. At a meeting of 81 communist parties coming from all over the world, convoked in November, 1960 at the request of the Chinese, the contending sides led by Khrushchev himself on one side and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the general secretary of the Chinese communist party and the Albanian leader Hoxha on the other accused each other of the most heinous crimes against Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. As at Bucharest, most of the East Asian parties, at least in part, supported the Chinese; the veteran Indian Communist leader, Ajoy Ghosh, his party already nearly split by the looming Sino-Indian conflict, was under such heavy strain that, soon after, he suffered a heart attack from which he later died; Hoxha delivered a tirade against Khrushchev marked by unprecedented violence; and Ho Chi-minh, playing the mediator, finally helped in producing a joint declaration based on an uncertain compromise between the two positions.

Soon afterwards the Soviet Government broke off diplomatic relations with Albania, and at the 22nd Soviet Party Congress held at Moscow in the fall of 1961, Khrushchev attempted to bring the entire Communist bloc, including Albania and China, into line by openly attacking the Albanian leaders for opposing his de-Stalinization and co-existence policies. This move was foiled by Chou En-lai, who firmly objected to bringing the quarrels among Socialist parties to an open forum, and expressing his firm support for Albania, walked out before the Congress had ended and departed for home. In the following year (1962) Peking started an all-out campaign to discredit Moscow's leadership and to seize the central role in the Communist movement. The Communist parties of Japan and Indonesia immediately went over to Peking's side. The Communist

Party of India was split down the middle, and two separate parties were formed in 1964. Similar but less important splits were registered in about 40 parties around the world.

The Chinese attack on India's border regions in October, 1962 brought on a new climax of hatred. When Moscow and Washington, each for its own reasons, gave diplomatic and military support to India, China redoubled her propaganda attacks and reminded the Soviet Union about her territorial claims against itself. In August and September, 1965, when Pakistan and India were fighting against each other, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. joined forces in the U.N. to bring about a cease-fire. Premier Kossygin's successful attempt to bring the heads of the two governments together at a conference at Tashkent, U.S.S.R. and sign a joint declaration infuriated Peking who had adopted a hostile posture in India's border during the course of the fighting. In spite of their own economic difficulties, the Chinese were next engaged in a strenuous campaign of economic aid in the newly independent countries of Africa. By comparison, after Khrushchev's abortive attempt to build up a direct influence in Congo in mid-1960, Soviet policy in Africa took a cautious turn.

THE RIFT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL

Peking was delighted at the fall of the "arch-revisionist" Khrushchev and, on receipt of the news, Chou En-lai proceeded posthaste to Moscow, no doubt expecting to receive the humble apologies of the new leaders of Russia. He was sadly disappointed with them and was soon to lead the chorus of disapproval of "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" which he found entrenched in the Kremlin. In view of the growing crisis over Vietnam, Moscow was anxious to patch up its quarrel with Peking, and Khrushchev himself had summoned a conference of Communist leaders of 26 countries with a view to forcing a showdown with Peking. After his fall the preparatory conference, which was due to meet on 10 December 1964 was postponed to 1 March 1965. Only 18 countries sent their representatives, and they issued a mild appeal for unity. Moscow's cautious policy seemed to have paid off so far, and its position was strengthened in Cuba and among the Latin American Communist parties. At a conference held in secret at Havana in late 1964, Castro expressed his support of Moscow's "unity" policy. The cut-

ing back of China's trade with Cuba in late 1965 which forced Castro to halve the rice ration is public proof of worsened Chinese-Cuban relations. The abortive Communist rising in Indonesia of 30 September 1965 followed by anti-Chinese and anti-Communist mob demonstrations brought about a serious decline of Chinese influence in Indonesia.

SINO-RUSSIAN BORDER CLASHES

The Sino-Soviet conflict, which was so far being carried on mainly by words and political manoeuvres as the result of what seemingly was on ideological grounds, erupted into bloody clashes of arms on 2 March 1969. The bone of contention was a small shrub-covered island in the frozen Ussuri river. Whatever the merits of their case against the Russians, in this case the Chinese were the aggressors: in the small hours on 2 March 1969 a contingent of Chinese troops, dressed in white for camouflage, suddenly appeared on the island of Damonsky (or Chenpao), a piece of territory about a mile and a half long by half a mile wide. The Chinese knew the art of timing: they had invaded India on the western and eastern sectors of our frontier when the world was in the grip of a crisis, caused by the location of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Similarly, the incursion into Soviet-held Damonsky took place when an international crisis was brewing over the West German presidential election. From the internal point of view also the timing was important. It might also have been meant to be a grand finale to the Cultural Revolution, or perhaps was a grand overture to the oft-postponed 9th Congress of the Communist Party in China, for which preparations were at the time on foot. Perhaps the Chinese thought that having exposed the U.S. Government as a "paper tiger" in Vietnam, they could debunk the Russians. (In Vietnam, the role of the Chinese was almost nil; it was the heroic Vietnamese people, aided by the Russians, who had pricked the bubble of American might.)

States with common borders—at least those who, like the Chinese and the Russians, have thousands of miles of common border—have disputes over their delineation. Sino-Russian border clashes had occurred much earlier—the most serious among them having taken place in 1962 in the Illi region of Sinkiang, when

several thousand Kazaks fled from the Chinese to the Soviet side where, of course, republics of similar ethnic composition could attract many of Sinkiang's inhabitants. On 29 March 1969, General Anukshin of the Soviet Border Guard troops said that there had been several thousand frontier violations since the sixties. He said, "As the Maoist clique whipped up anti-Soviet moods, so did the number of these violations increase. They began with cattle being driven into Soviet territory and the deliberate emergence of fishermen beyond the frontier line. This was followed by the appearance on Soviet territory of individual servicemen and subsequently of whole units." The Russian contention was that the border incidents constituted a pre-planned Chinese provocation to serve the purposes of whipping up support for the Mao regime at the 9th party congress and a device to distract Chinese people's attention from their allegedly dire straits.

The Chinese, of course, have their own version of the affair. They assert that their present boundaries are all wrong and had resulted from what they call the "unequal treaties" which were imposed on them by rapacious Tsars and Western imperialist powers. There is considerable truth in this version of the case but also much that is inadmissible. The fact is that both the Chinese and Russian empires had been expanding—specially in Central Asia—in the last three centuries. The Chinese empire conquered and annexed in the 17th and 18th centuries much of the territory now claimed by China and some of it already forms part of it. The Manchu conquest of China during this period added fresh territory—that held by the Manchus previously and that annexed after they occupied the Dragon throne in Peking. The Russian march into these territories became very prominent in the late 18th and 19th centuries. The Chinese claim that whatever the Russians had grabbed was illegal, being gains from "unequal treaties" when China was weak and also that whatever the Manchu emperors had ruled over, including territories they had annexed, was legitimate and, so far as possible, must be recovered. There is nothing particularly nationalistic or communist about this: on this boat Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kaishek and Mao Tse-tung would sail together.

As many Indians see it, the clashes on the Sino-Soviet border are a symptom of the basic trait in the Chinese attitude—irredentism. The matter cannot be pursued further here, but it may be mentioned that, in Chinese maps which may still be hanging on the walls of many Chinese homes and offices or are reproduced in books, are to be found shown as Chinese territory whole slices of the U.S.S.R., India, Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, Korea, Thailand Indo-China and Malaya. As their sudden and unprovoked attack on an unsuspecting and unprepared India showed, the Chinese would not hesitate to "recover" their "own territories" by force. Russia, however, was not India, and though—dictated, as we have seen, by reasons of internal party politics, they (the Chinese) did venture to make a surreptitious attack on a small island on a frozen river, it was beyond their purpose to launch a full-scale invasion, as they did in India. The incident was followed by a seige for some days by Chinese demonstrators of the Russian Embassy in Peking as also similar massive demonstrations before the Chinese Embassy in Moscow. After a few more incidents of a minor character took place, Damonsky seemed to be forgotten by the Chinese.

THE RESULT OF THE RIFT

The Moscow-Peking conflict shattered the Communist bloc and split almost every communist party around the world. The Chinese appeared to have the North Koreans firmly in line, but the North Vietnamese continued to cultivate good relations with the Soviet Union, their leader, Dr. Ho Chi-minh being Moscow trained, and in their conflict with the United States they received considerable military and diplomatic support from both Khrushchev and his successors. In Cuba, Dr. Castro was believed to be ideologically nearer to the Chinese, but was persuaded to stick with the Russians, even after his disappointment over their attitude to the missile bases in his country, on account of his dependence on them for economic and military aid. In eastern Europe, the Chinese held a bridgehead in Albania, where the government was rigidly Stalinist and furiously anti-Khrushchev. The other East European countries supported Moscow with varying degrees of fervour, indicating the increased latitude given to the satellites in

the Khrushchev era. Rumania was a doubtful case, because Russia was opposed to her ambitious plans for industrial development. On the whole, the Chinese-Russian rift gave an added stimulus to the desire for autonomy in all the satellite countries for which Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist and liberalization policies had provided the initial incentive. They also succeeded in concluding more equitable terms of trade and substantial credits from the Soviet Union, which was anxious to demonstrate the falsity of Peking's charge that it was exploiting its satellites for its own selfish advantages. The split, however, produced rather disastrous results on communist parties outside the Soviet bloc. As has been said above, communist parties in many of these countries were rent in twain, each now having a right and a left wing, which were composed of the partisans of either China or the U.S.S.R. Meetings of front organizations, such as the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council became open forums for violent polemics between "Muscovites" and "Pekingese".

(It may be news to learn that Russia and China still maintain correct diplomatic relations, and that each has a Chinese-Russian Friendship Society which, in happier days tried to stir up grass-roots enthusiasm among each nation's people for the other. But trade between the two countries began to go down after the rift began. In 1962, for example, it was down almost 67 per cent from the 1959 peak of \$2 billion, and Soviet deliveries of complete factories to China were only one-fortieth of the amount sent two years earlier. The possibility that at some future date Peking and Moscow may draw together again may by no means be ruled out altogether, though at the present moment there are little definite indications of any move in the direction being made from the Chinese side at any rate.)

SINO-SOVIET RAPPROCHMENT

It is fairly evident that the leaders of Chinese foreign policy after Mao have appreciably moved away from the lines laid down by him. In particular, they seem to have attempted to take China out of the isolation to which Mao had deliberately relegated his

nation. These leaders are of opinion that by detaching China from the dynamic world, China of Mao lost more than it gained. Realizing this, the successors of Mao have set out on diplomatic visits to foreign countries lying in all directions of the globe. To give a few examples, the Prime Minister of China, Zhou Ziang, visited eleven African countries and then went to Australia, New Zealand and Japan, in 1982-83. He also visited America and Canada. The Chinese president visited Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey and Nepal. The Chinese Foreign Minister visited Burma, Thailand and Malayasia. He also visited Rumania, Yugoslavia, Austria and France, that is, lands on the borders of the Western camp. Chinese former Prime Minister, Huang-hua paid a visit to India, during which he is believed to have made some tentative proposals for the settlement of the thorny border question. On the other hand, heads of other states like Australia and Japan and, above all, the American President visited China. In 1983, the visiting heads of states included seventy-five Prime Ministers, Kings and Presidents.

Assuming that these visits do indicate some shift in Chinese Foreign policy, the visits to each other of Chinese and Soviet dignitaries may be considered as significant. The Chinese Deputy Prime Minister attended the funeral rites of the Russian President, Yuri Andropov. This was the first visit paid by a Chinese dignitary of the rank to have made to Moscow during the last twenty years. The discussions which were held on the occasion between Andrei Gromyko and the Chinese Deputy Prime Minister led to another meeting on the following day, 23 March 1984, between Gromyko and the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister. On the following day Gromyko declared that these discussions had considerably extended the field of mutual understanding.

On 2 March 1984 Constantine Chernenko, the newly elected Soviet President, declared that the Soviet leadership was very keen on building up normal relations with China. He, however, declared at the same time that the Soviet government would not enter into any agreement with any state which might be detrimental to the interests of any other state. This obviously means that it would not be possible for the Soviet, in the interests of friendship with

China, to accept any of China's demands on itself. The Chinese demands include Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, acceptance of the Chinese position on the subject of withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, withdrawal of Russian forces from the interior and borders of Mongolia, reduction of the pressure of Russian security forces from the Russian-Chinese border and withdrawal of I.C.B.M.'s stationed in Siberia and directed towards China.

It is quite obvious that, at least at this stage, it is not possible for the Soviet to accede to any or most of these demands of the Chinese. Are we then to conclude that the long-standing confrontation between these two Communist giants has undergone no changes whatsoever? A more optimistic view of the matter is possible: it is significant that, after nearly two decades, they are sitting round the conference table.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER KHRUSHCHEV

The Second World War left the Soviet Union as one of the two greatest powers in the world, and, specially after both these powers (Russia and America) were possessed with nuclear weapons, many acute observers began to speak of a bipolar world, in which there were two superpowers, which were heads of rival blocs, to which the rest of the nations, willy-nilly, had to align themselves. As we have seen in a previous chapter this bipolarization was not perfect, and it began to erode as other nations, bent on pursuing an independent role in politics (as in the case of Great Britain and France), or defying the two super-powers (as in the case of China) began to build nuclear weapons of their own. Informed opinion both in the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. became painfully aware of the risks of a nuclear war, in which no victory in the traditional sense could be won by any combatant. Though a major nuclear showdown between the two giants was considered as ruled out, and it was confidently expected that if any such eventuality occurred, either the one or the other would back out (as Khrushchev did over the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962), the possibility remained that either of them might be involved in a "local" or "limited" war in some of the world's

"grey" areas (as the U.S.A. became involved in Vietnam), which might escalate to a general war leading to a nuclear holocaust. Responsible leaders of both the countries, who were fully aware of the risks of a nuclear war, were also found often to flourish the nuclear scimitar, as a means of securing some diplomatic or political end. A former American Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, proclaimed that the U.S.A. would be free to retaliate against any major Communist offensive "at places and with means of its own choosing". During the Suez crisis of 1956-57 Premier Bulganin of the Soviet Union wrote threatening letters to the governments of Great Britain and France in which he asked them how they would like if bombs far more devastating than those they were dropping on Egypt were rained on their own countries. Khrushchev, similarly, looked for political gain—in Berlin, the Middle East, Africa and the Caribbean—that could be chalked up under the protection of his new "nuclear umbrella."

It would be wrong to think that the strategic balance (or, as Churchill called it, the balance of terror), which prevails in the world at present is a stable and permanent one and that it may always be depended upon to prevent war. President Kennedy could take the risk of a nuclear confrontation with the U.S.S.R. during the Cuban crisis because the U.S.A. had at that particular time some advantages, such as geography and the possession of a variety of weapons, based on sea and air power, besides the fact that his demands were moderate, and Moscow could accept them without sacrificing any vital interest. If the danger of nuclear confrontation were to occur again, one or the other side may not possess such advantages, and what may then happen is difficult to foretell. Moreover, the present nuclear stalemate is by no means ever-lasting and a breakthrough is always possible by one side or the other inventing a new weapon, offensive or (at present there is a race going on between American and Russian scientists for perfecting an anti-missile). Again, even without using nuclear weapons, the major powers can wage war with each other (they have other dreadful weapons to choose from) and thereby bring about important changes on the world scene.

The successors of Khrushchev have no love any more than

Khrushchev had for the capitalist West; yet like Khrushchev they genuinely profess the policy of peaceful co-existence and seek a detente with the U.S.A. in whatever sphere this can be achieved without sacrifice of principles. On some issues, e.g. preventing China from inflicting a major defeat on India, Russian and American interests run on parallel lines. On others, which are still too many, e.g. in supporting the Communist cause in Vietnam, in protecting Castro's rule in Cuba, and in seeking to woo the nationalist leaders (they call them "revolutionary democrats") of Asia, Africa and Latin America, they are, and for a predictable period are bound to be, at cross purposes. With respect to all issues, whether of agreement or disagreement with the West, however, Russia acts from her own motives and from her own power bases. She is a mighty country, and has no need, for fear of China, to ally herself with the West and "rejoin Europe" as General de Gaulle predicted she will have to do, or as China asserts she has already done. Similarly, she will not, for fear of the West, be stampeded into a close embrace with China. Above all, it may be safely asserted that under the present leadership, in the same way as she was under Khrushchev, Russia in a great factor of world peace while remaining firm in her communistic faith and determined to pursue her own policies.

However, the present Soviet leaders seem to recognize even more clearly than Khrushchev the perplexities and contradictions that beset a very great power in the nuclear age, and they are less bent on pursuing headlong courses than their impetuous erstwhile leader. The case of Vietnam best illustrates the doubts and uncertainties over the goal to be reached, the means to bring about significant results, and the risks that any conceivable action may entail. The Soviet naturally supported the Communist government of Dr. Ho Chi-minh, and wanted the Vietcong to be victorious in South Vietnam. But an outright communist victory in Vietnam could lead to the establishment of Chinese rather than their own influence in Vietnam in the first instance and in South-East Asia eventually. Chinese preponderance in South-East Asia may alter the balance of world power as it may lead simultaneously or eventually to the elimination of American power in this region, and substitute Chinese for Russian influence in nationalist govern-

ments in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This left the U.S.A. free to pursue the policy she chose to adopt in Vietnam and the stalemate continued.

In the developing countries generally Soviet policy was similarly entangled in a two-front struggle against the "imperialists" and against Peking. The policy of Khrushchev's successors with regard to them was even more cautious than Khrushchev's. In several African states recent attempts to seize power have been attributed to pro-Chinese, not to pro-Moscow followers. Since the abortive communist coup in Indonesia, 30 September 1965, the Soviet press has protested against the persecution of the Communists, but its tone is not half as strident as that of the Chinese. Similarly, Moscow has refrained from making vigorous protests against the persecution of Communist elements in Algeria, Sudan and the U.A.R. by the nationalist governments of these countries, and has, on the contrary, promised large amounts of new aid to Algeria and the U.A.R.

In the days of Stalin and Khrushchev, the Soviet Government usually took an unequivocal stand on political issues in regions where Russia had vital interest. Thus, in 1948, the U.S.S.R. took up an uncompromisingly pro-Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict hoping thereby to replace Soviet by Western influence among the Arabs. It took the side of Afghanistan in her struggle with Pakistan over the Pushtoonistan question and the Indian side in the quarrel over Kashmir. In Cyprus Khrushchev promised his wholehearted support to the Greek inhabitants in what he considered their struggle against "American imperialism". In the past few years, and specially since Khrushchev's downfall the Soviet Government moderated several of these extreme positions. After very small Israeli Communist party had split in 1965 into a pro-Arab and a pro-Israeli one, Moscow, while continuing to be verbally sympathetic to the Arabs, warned that the issue is not one that can be solved by means of arms. On the Afghan-Pakistani dispute about Pushtoonistan Moscow professed its satisfaction with the reconciliation between the two countries that has since taken place.

In January, 1966 Mr. Kosygin acted as mediator between Pakistan and India, after the U. N. had imposed a cease-fire in the war between the two countries but was unable to stop continuing

acts of mutual hostility, so as to lessen the danger of a new round of warfare over the future of Kashmir, an eventuality from which China alone stood to gain. According to some non-official observers, Moscow's attitude to India at the time was not quite as straightforward as it had been in the days of Khrushchev in so far as it now seemed to lay less stress on its previous unequivocal declaration that Kashmir was an integral part of India and more on the maintenance of peace between India and Pakistan, without doubt a desirable goal. Recently, there were some hints about Moscow's readiness to sell arms to Pakistan which, if true, indicated that Russia was worried about Pakistan's growing friendship with China. But the suspicion entertained by some that under the present rulers, there had occurred a definite shift in Russia's policy towards India was unjustified and later developments, such as the conclusion, during a period of unparalleled stress and strain for India, of the Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation on 9 August 1971 (see below) gave the total lie to such a presumption.

CHAPTER XXII

THE HUNGARIAN AND SUEZ CRISES AND THE U.N.

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION, 1956, AND THE U.N.

THE Hungarian revolution came in the wake of the "de-Stalinization" movement, which had been initiated at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 14 February 1956 by a speech by A. I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Premier of the U.S.S.R., and by speeches in secret sessions by Khrushchev who, besides exposing the many evils of the old regime, had admitted that there were different roads to Communism. In the spring and summer of 1956, "de-Stalinization", gained momentum in Eastern Europe, specially in Poland and Hungary where it found expression not only in removal from party and governmental offices of Stalinists and their replacement by and the rehabilitation of popular leaders but in a strong opposition to Soviet dominance of these countries. In Poland, the movement, which was headed by Gomulka, was largely successful but in Hungary, it ended tragically.

The removal from office of the Stalinist Matyas Rokosi, the First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, and the rehabilitation of Rajk (though posthumously) encouraged various political groups led by intellectuals and students to ask for greater freedom, and after 19 October several peaceful demonstrations took place. On 13 October, the Communist Party, acceding to demands from many groups, reinstated in the party Imre Nagy, who had been Premier from 1953 to 1955, and having been associated with Malenkov's New Course, was disgraced after his fall. Into this already tense situation came the news on 19 October of the Polish success in resisting Soviet pressure. In Budapest, students and intellectuals organized demonstrations of sympathy for the Polish cause on the afternoon of Tuesday, 23 October. The demonstrators, who ranged

from army officers and cadets from the military academy to women and children, demanded the installation of Imre Nagy as Premier, the trial of Rakosi and other Stalinists, secret general elections, economic reforms, freedom of expression, and an end to Soviet domination. They then proceeded to the Radio Station, which was guarded by the AVH or State Security Police, and asked that they be permitted to broadcast their demands. While they were waiting there, the AVA men suddenly opened fire on the crowd, killing a number of people and wounding others.

This changed a peaceful demonstration into a violent uprising. By 2 a. m. on the following morning, Soviet tanks appeared in the capital, and fighting spread throughout the country. In an effort to placate the populace, the announcement was made that Imre Nagy had been appointed Prime Minister, but two other announcements which quickly followed, viz. (1) that the government had invoked the Treaty of Warsaw and appealed to the Soviet forces "stationed in Hungary" to assist in quelling the revolt and (2) the imposition of martial law—with the implication that they had the support of Nagy, largely negated the good impression created by the first announcement. It was not till a week later that Nagy denied issuing either of these orders. In any case, till 28 October, he was not a free agent and was in the custody of the AVH. He promised a general amnesty and the opening of negotiations with the Soviet Government for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and for a new relationship assuring Hungary's independence.

SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION

At the request of France, U. K. and U. S. A., an emergency meeting of the U. N. Council was held on 28 October to consider "the situation created in Hungary by the action of foreign military forces in Hungary in violently repressing the rights of the Hungarian people which are secured by the Treaty of Peace". The three powers invoked the provisions of the Charter dealing with the settlement of disputes (Chapter 6), rather than with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chapter 7), in support of their contention. The move for an emergency meeting of the Council was rejected by the Hungarian Government, who argued

that the matter lay within their exclusive "domestic jurisdiction". The Soviet delegate, Mr. Sobolev, strongly supported the attitude of the Hungarian Government, and declared that the move to bring the matter before the Council was designed "to give further encouragement to the armed rebellion", which, he said, had been organized by "criminal elements of a fascist type" in Hungary.

The debate at this first meeting of the Security Council, which lasted six hours, was inconclusive ; no suggestions for any specific action by the Council were forthcoming ; no date was set for the next meeting. The Council, nevertheless, reconvened on 2 November after an urgent appeal for its support in obtaining withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary had been received from Premier Nagy. Meanwhile, events, both in Hungary and elsewhere, had moved with disconcerting swiftness. On 29 October Israeli forces had invaded the Sinai Peninsula, to be followed shortly by a joint Anglo-French military intervention. The revolution in Hungary had achieved some success ; Premier Nagy had succeeded in obtaining compliance with a cease-fire order ; on 30 October the Soviet Government had issued a declaration regretting the bloodshed and announcing its decision to withdraw its troops from Budapest "as soon as this is considered necessary by the Hungarian Government". The Russians effected a partial withdrawal of Soviet troops, and seemed to be ready for a compromise. The hopes aroused by the conciliatory attitude of the Soviet Government, however, were soon proved to be illusory. On 1 November, Mr. Nagy wired to the Secretary-General stating that further Soviet units were entering Hungary, that he had demanded their immediate withdrawal, and that he had informed the Soviet ambassador that his government repudiated the Warsaw Treaty, declared Hungary's neutrality, turned to the United Nations, and asked for the help of the four Great Powers in defending the country's neutrality.

At the meeting of the Security Council on 2 November, Mr. Sobolev denied that any further troop movement had taken place and declared that the Soviet Government had continued to act according to the 30 October declaration. Even as he was speaking, however, a further communication was received from Mr. Nagy stating that at the moment large Soviet military units were entering Hungary and asking the Security Council "to

instruct the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to start negotiations immediately for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops." Despite this appeal the Council adjourned without taking any action, but when it reconvened the next afternoon, there was before it a draft resolution submitted by the United States deploring the use of Soviet military forces to suppress the efforts of the Hungarian people to reassert their rights, and expressing the hope that "the U.S.S.R., under appropriate arrangements with the Government of Hungary, will withdraw Soviet forces from Hungary without delay". Again no action was taken, and the meeting adjourned as the Hungarian representative reported that negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and his government for the withdrawal of troops had already begun and the Soviet representative confirmed his statement.

SECOND INTERVENTION

The meeting rose at 6 p.m. on 3 November after deciding to reconvene on the morning of the 5th, but again events marched more swiftly than anticipated. At day-break on 4 November, the Soviet forces had made an all-out attack on Budapest and other major centres in Hungary, and in the evening Janos Kadar had announced the formation of a rival government, and shortly afterwards Nagy had sought asylum in the Yugoslav embassy. On receipt of the news, the Security Council almost immediately held an emergency meeting, in which the U.S. representative, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, strongly denounced Soviet action and submitted a revised version of the draft resolution proposed by him, on the previous day. The resolution urging the Soviet Union to refrain from sending more troops into Hungary and to withdraw all its forces from the country was vetoed by the U.S.S.R. With the Soviet Union in sole opposition, the Council, thereupon, decided to call an emergency session of the General Assembly under the terms of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION

The Hungarian revolution had already been crushed when the emergency session of the General Assembly met in November. The fear that any effort to extend effective assistance to the Hungarians might lead to a much broader conflict was uppermost in the minds

of those who participated in the debates. Mr. Gunewardene of Ceylon warned that the course adopted in regard to Korea was out of the question in the present instance, since the two cases were dissimilar: in Korea armies were actually marching when the U.N. decided to intervene. India and some other Asian countries adopted an even more cautious attitude, while four Arab states—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria—abstained on every major resolution and did not intervene at any point in the debate. For some time Mr. Nehru had referred to the Hungarian revolt as a “civil conflict” and his government refused to support any of the major resolutions adopted by the General Assembly with the exception of one that India co-sponsored (and related to appointment of observers) and another on relief introduced by Austria. On 16 November, however, speaking in the Lok Sabha, Mr. Nehru revised his attitude and, stating that the story was obscure for some days, declared that India was concerned with the attack on freedom anywhere.

In the course of the Emergency Special Session and the eleventh session of the General Assembly to which it was transferred, fourteen resolutions were adopted on various aspects of the Hungarian question. Four of these related to the intervention of the Soviet forces; five with observation and investigation of the situation within Hungary; three with relief for the Hungarian people; and two with aid to refugees who had fled from Hungary.

Among the resolutions in the first category was one adopted on 4 November, which reaffirmed the Security Council resolution that had been vetoed by the U.S.S.R., and another passed on 12 December condemning the “violation of the Charter” by the U.S.S.R. “in depriving the people of Hungary of their fundamental rights and Hungary of her liberty”. Under the second category, the Secretary-General was asked to investigate the situation and “to observe the situation directly through representatives named by him”. The latter resolution was rejected by the Hungarian Government, as were other resolutions on the same subject, including one of which India was co-sponsor, as contrary to its sovereignty and to the United Nations Charter. Even the efforts of the Secretary-General to obtain personal access to Budapest to discuss relief needs and other United Nations resolutions met with no success, as the Hungarian Govern-

ment made counter-suggestions and evaded fixing a date for the visit.

On 10 January 1957, the Assembly appointed a Special Committee to carry on an investigation, but the latter also was unable to get admittance into Hungary. Nevertheless it went through a vast mass of documents supplied by other governments and heard over one hundred witnesses in New York, Rome, Vienna, London and Geneva. The Committee's report published on 20 June, found that the Hungarian revolution was a genuine national uprising, rejected the Soviet thesis that intervention was justified under the Treaty of Warsaw, or that it had been asked for by the Hungarian Government, viz. the Nagy Government, which was the only legitimate government, and also found evidence to support the charge against the Soviet Government that they were deporting Hungarian citizens to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government denounced the report as "fabricated by false testimonies" and "the first test of a new United States propaganda bomb" but many governments, including India, who had at first adopted a very cautious attitude to the subject, now changed their mind. Mr. Nehru called for "foreign forces" to leave Hungary, and to allow the people of that country to enjoy the rights of self-determination. He termed the Hungarian revolt as a true "national uprising" which came to an unfortunate end because it was "crushed" by Soviet troops.

The Committee's report was considered by the Eleventh Assembly when it met in resumed session on 10 September, one week before the opening of the twelfth session. In the debates, there were three currents of thought: justification of the action of the Hungarian Government on the ground of its sovereign right (advocated by the Eastern European States); condemning the U.S.S.R. for defiance of U.N.; and refraining from further action as it might increase world tension. The Assembly adopted a resolution appointing its President as Special Representative and authorizing him to take such steps as he deemed necessary for implementing the Assembly's resolutions. In the twelfth session, the Assembly received a report from him on his unsuccessful efforts, but took no further action.

On the night of 16 June 1958, Radio Budapest announced that Imre Nagy and three of his associates had been executed. On receipt

of the news, the Special Committee met again and issued a communique deploring the executions, and decided to prepare a special report. On 9 December 1960 the Fourteenth Assembly by a vote of 53 to 10, with 17 abstentions, deplored the "continuous disregard by the U.S.S.R. and the present Hungarian regime of the General Assembly's resolution dealing with the situation in Hungary".

Besides keeping up the issue before the world, the U.N. was able to do little more on the Hungarian issue which involved, according to its own resolutions, naked aggression by armed force on a weak state by a great power and disregard by a government of the fundamental rights of the people. The reason for the failure is not far to seek. As Mr. Nehru said, Hungary, like many other problems, became so much a part of the bigger conflicts and problems that it was difficult to separate it. If there was a general improvement, it would affect Hungary too, said he.

THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1956 AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Opened in 1869, the Suez Canal was operated by a private company, the *Compagnie Universelle du Canal* under a concession granted by Egypt in 1856 which would have expired in 1968-99 years after the opening of the canal—with all rights reverting to Egypt. The canal was operated under a Convention signed at Constantinople in 1888, which provided that the canal "shall always be free and open, in time of war as of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag", and "shall never be subjected to the right of blockade".

The arrangements worked fairly smoothly till the days when Egypt, gradually awakening to consciousness of national rights and honour, came to look upon them as the symbol of colonial domination. The canal vitally affected Egypt in two respects. First, it was a major economic resource located on Egyptian soil and made vital because of the country's strategic geographical position. Yet Egypt derived only a bare minimum profit for the development of this resource. Not only did the canal permanently utilize a strip of Egyptian territory but Egypt herself was a major partner in financing the enterprise. Though not generally known, in addition to the canal shares purchased by the Khedive in 1858-59, Egypt had furnished nearly 50 per cent of the capital used in the original

construction of the waterway. In return for this Egypt was to receive 15 per cent of the net profits from the operation of the canal.

As a matter of fact, from 1880 to 1936, Egypt had not received a penny for the use of her territory or in return for the investment in the capital, Khedive Ismail's financial debacle had robbed Egypt of all the anticipated profits. He had sold his shares to the British Government in 1874, and so Egypt was deprived of the future dividends. He had also ceded the 15 per cent share in canal profits to a French concern as part of an arrangement for the settlement of his debts. In attempts to rectify this situation, the company had made an *ex gratia* payment of £ E300,000 to Egypt in 1936, replacing it by a 7 per cent share in the canal's net profit in 1949. This could hardly satisfy the Egyptians, when they saw their neighbouring Arab countries receiving as much as 50 per cent of the profit derived from foreign exploitation of their resources. The canal being the country's major economic asset, Egypt might rightfully claim a larger participation in it, and this naturally led to one goal—ownership or nationalization. There are good reasons to believe that Egypt would have nationalized the canal before the expiration of the Suez Company's concession in 1968—even without western provocations, which were the immediate, not the root cause, of it.

WHY NASSER ACTED

President Nasser's announcement on 26 July 1956, that his government had nationalized the Suez Canal Company came as a swift and violent reaction to the refusal, after ten months of negotiation, of financial assistance to Egypt in building the High Aswan Dam, by the U.S.A. on 19 July, followed by the U.K. on 20 July and the World Bank on 23 July 1956. Egypt, President Nasser declared in the course of his three-hour-speech before a cheering crowd of thousands of Egyptians at Alexandria on July 26, would build the Aswan Dam from the profits of the company. "This money is ours," he said jubilantly, "and this Canal is the property of Egypt...Today, citizens, when we build the High Dam we are actually building.....to defend our dignity, freedom, and pride, and to eradicate humiliation and submission." He promised compensation to the shareholders in

accordance with the value of the shares on the Paris Exchange on the day preceding the nationalization.

The American decision has some unexplained aspects. The official justification was grounded on financial reasons : Nasser, it was said, had "mortgaged" the country's economy. The reference was presumably to the fact that, about a year ago, in September 1955, Nasser, then Premier, now President, had made a deal by which he was to receive supply of arms from the Soviet bloc in return for long-term exports to them of Egypt's principal export, cotton, over a period of years. He had done that after he had tried in vain to obtain arms from the United States which was willing to sell only a limited amount of arms and that too for dollars which Egypt lacked. The West was certainly shocked at this deal, which brought the U.S.S.R. to a strategic position at Suez, and thus at the entrance to the Mediterranean, which Tsarist Russia had failed to do. As the Soviet-Egyptian deal had been made before, not after, the World Bank as well as the U.S.S.R. and Britain had started serious negotiations about the financing of the dam, it did not represent a new development, and does not explain why the Western offer was withdrawn. Rather it is probable that it was fear of Soviet economic penetration in Egypt which had prompted the western move for financing the dam, and that the West withdrew when, in July, 1956, it became clear that, contrary to Nasser's expectation, the U.S.S.R. was not interested in financing the project.

Several factors which might have influenced Washington's decision were not officially mentioned. Among them was the outspoken opposition of Congressmen from southern cotton-growing states who feared that the dam would increase Egypt's cotton-producing area, thereby creating new competition for the United States; Egypt's recognition of Peiping on 16 May and, probably, some thought—in a Presidential election year—for the pro-Israel vote. Even then, it may be said, they should have spared Nasser the humiliation of a brusque public rejection accompanied by offensive remarks about Egypt's financial weakness which even a less fervent nationalist leader might have resented. "More than the decision," as Mr. Nehru said, "the way it was done hurt Egypt's pride and self-respect and disregarded the people's sentiment."

Some observers have gone further and reached a different conclusion : the Western Powers, and more particularly Britain and

France, whose position and prestige in the Middle East as well as their economies were threatened—France having an additional *casus belli* in the help allegedly being given by Nasser to the Algerian revolutionaries—wanted to humiliate and overthrow the greatest leader of Arab nationalism. At this time the tension between Israel and her Arab neighbours had reached a breaking point, and Israel had decided on an invasion of the Gaza strip. How far France was in collusion with Israel and how far Britain was drawn into the conspiracy to overthrow Nasser, whom Sir Anthony Eden, the British Premier, described as an enemy and Christian Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, as a new Hitler, and how far they kept their plans secret from the U.S.A., it is difficult to say. But if, as it seems to be well nigh certain, they wanted to use the dam project rejection to serve their purpose, viz. committing aggression on Egypt, it is clear they kept on negotiating for a settlement only because their military preparations were not ready, and broke them off as soon as they thought they could embark on war. The U.S.A., neither before, nor during, nor after the Anglo-French-Israeli venture, despite her unequivocal condemnation of it and efforts to bring it to a close, received a clean bill for the way she conducted herself.

TWENTY-TWO-POWER LONDON CONFERENCE

With the Prime Ministers of England and France railing at Nasser with violent words and war looming on the horizon, Mr. Dulles, the American Secretary of State, flew to London. It is believed he had a restraining influence on British and French leaders. As a result of the talks, invitations were sent from London and Paris to the main users of the canal for a conference, and between 16 August and 23 August and twenty-two of the invitees met in the British capital. Egypt refused to attend because it had got abroad that the purpose of the sponsors was to get the conference approval to a predetermined policy, viz. to internationalize the canal. The conference became divided into two groups—the majority, consisting of 18 states, who wanted to have the canal operated as an international highway by a board, and the minority consisting of India, Ceylon, Indonesia, and the U.S.S.R. who held that Egypt was legally entitled to nationalize the canal, which should be operated by Egypt subject to an annual report to U.N. The majority despatched a five-member

committee, led by Menzies, to Cairo for talks with Nasser, which led to no results.

SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION

On the failure of the Menzies mission, the Western Powers, with Mr. Dulles as the prime mover, announced their plan of setting up a Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA), which was to engage pilots, collect dues, etc. and so, by securing control of the operations, services, and dues, force Nasser economically to his knees. On 21 September, SCUA was formally brought into being.

On 23 September the British and the French Governments, discouraged by the failure of direct negotiations, and the refusal of Mr. Dulles to "shoot a way through the Canal", asked the Security Council to take up the Suez question. The debate began on 5 October. The Anglo-French proposals asked the Security Council to condemn Egypt for nationalizing the canal and to ask her to negotiate on the basis of the London proposals for international control and meanwhile to co-operate with SCUA. After lively exchanges between the two sides and discussions in secret sessions, the Western proposals were put to the Council in two parts—the first, which contained a set of six principles, which was unanimously accepted, and the second, which related to the London plan (SCUA) and the rest which were voted against by the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. Since the Russian vote operated as a veto the resolution was lost.

Meanwhile, the Middle East crisis was coming to a head, and on 29 October Israel invaded Egypt. At the request of the U.S.A., the Security Council met on the 30th and considered a resolution sponsored by it requiring the Israelis to go back to their borders and everybody else to refrain from using force. The divergence of views between America and her principal allies, England and France, was now complete, and, as the resolution was being debated on, the U.S.S.R. representative called the attention of the Council to an Associated Press Report from London to the effect that Britain and France had given an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel asking them to effect a cease-fire "and to withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal"—in effect inviting Israel to advance 100 miles into Egyptian territory—and asking Egypt to "agree that Anglo-French forces should move

temporarily into key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez'', military action being threatened in case of non-compliance at the expiry of twelve hours. The U.S. representative nevertheless called for the prompt approval of his government's resolution, which, put to the vote, had seven in favour, two permanent members, England and France, against, while two Australia and Belgium, abstained. Anglo-French attacks on Egypt began the next day, and at dawn five days later paratroops were landed on Port Said.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION

By an irony of fate, the Uniting for Peace Resolution which had been designed by the West as a barrier against communist aggression, was now and for the first time invoked by a communist nation, Yugoslavia, with the support of the U.S.S.R. to resist western aggression against a non-committed nation. On 1 November, accordingly, the First Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly convened. In the early hours of 2 November a United States resolution urging an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian forces behind their borders, and the halting of military forces and arms into the area was adopted by 64 to 5 (Australia and New Zealand ranging themselves with Britain, France and Israel). On the next day (3rd) Britain and France announced that they would continue military operations until a U.N. force (as suggested by the Canadian delegate during the debates in the Assembly) was sent to the area to keep peace. On the 5th their forces captured Port Said with heavy casualties on the Egyptian side but with the canal blocked, and Britain's economic position nearing a collapse they had to come down. The voice of the whole world was against them, and was expressed in the United Nations; the Americans showed no sympathy for their plight, and were privately threatening economic sanctions; on 2 November, Richard Nixon, the American Vice-President, cheered the development as American "independence" from their allies; the Russians were threatening to shoot rockets on the western capitals. The British and French Governments agreed to stop fighting.

THE SEQUEL

A United Nations Emergency Force (U.N.E.F.) was quickly formed to take over from them and before the end of the year the British and French forces were withdrawn ; it took longer to secure the compliance of Israel.

"The Suez venture is one of those episodes which made an indelible mark on the course of events ; it will always have a chapter in history books." (Guy Wint and Peter Calvocoressi, *Middle East Crisis* p. 89.) The main motive with which Britain and France set forth in their Suez venture was to crush Nasser, in whom they had found their strongest opponent in the maintenance of their position in the Middle East, which was rapidly declining and, for various causes, proving to be quite unsustainable. From available evidences, it is clear that the French were in collusion with Israel, and that Britain had been drawn into the conspiracy, though how far this was so is difficult to ascertain. The Anglo-French scheme to use Israel as a bridgehead for attack on Egypt had disastrous results. The Arab States rallied round Nasser, and meeting at Beirut on 13 November, demanded the withdrawal of troops under the threat of economic sanctions. Saudi Arabia and Syria broke off diplomatic relations, while Jordan notified Britain that air bases in her territory were not available for British use and later denounced the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. Iraq, though jealous of Egyptian leadership, was forced into the united Arab camp, because she could not rise in Arab esteem by siding with Britain in a direct attack on Egypt and nowhere was anti-Israeli feeling stronger than in Iraq. In spite of his military reverses, therefore, Nasser's stature as the leader of Arab national cause rose, and he became a greater hero than before. The canal remained nationalized, and the success with which Egyptians managed such a complex operation in spite of the withdrawal of French and British pilots confounded westerners.

"Nasser's ambitions were not only ones to be advanced. The Russians too were given an opportunity." (*Ibid.*, p. 92). The Anglo-French debacle allowed the Soviet Union to break through the barrier which for centuries had held back the expansion of Russian influence in the Middle East. Russia now, like the West before it, had positive stakes to defend in countries like Iraq and Egypt, and

her position in the area became simultaneously more formidable and more complex. So far as the western position in the Middle East was concerned, the only saving feature was the respect which their disapproval of the Anglo-French action had gained for the Americans. But the man in the street in Arab countries continued to look on the U.S.A. as the ally of western colonial nations, with considerable suspicion. Moreover, the task which now developed on the U.S.A., viz. guarding western interests and resisting the advance of Russian influence in the Middle East, and which prompted her to follow such policies as were enunciated as the Eisenhower Doctrine, made her liable to the accusation that she fomented, enhanced, and perpetuated disunity in the Arab world. (On 5 January, 1957, President Eisenhower delivered an address to Congress, in the course of which he denounced what he called the attempts made by the Soviet rulers to dominate the Middle East, and asked for authority (1) to assist any nation or group of nations in the area "in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence" ; (2) to undertake "programmes of military assistance" where desired ; and (3) to use American armed forces, when requested, "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." This was construed as a bid for "more containment and more armed pressure on the communist world," besides threatening to create rifts among the Arab nations.) The western position in the Middle East was much weakened by the clash of interests and rival policies of the western nations themselves. In Europe, the Suez episode had its repercussions on western alliances, such as NATO, and strengthened the movement for European integration in directions, such as the formation of the European Common Market, the West European Union, etc. where American domination was on principle sought to be avoided or minimized. The disturbance caused to the supply of Middle East oil to European countries during the Suez crisis imposed heavy losses on the industry, and even the normal daily business of the people, in these countries. They were taught lessons, which helped the formation of the Euratom and the search for oil from sources which were more dependable than the Middle East, e.g. the Sahara. The West is still suffering from the effects of the Suez debacle. Only Russia has gained from it.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN CHINA

CHINA TURNS RED

THE success of the communists in driving out Chiang Kai-shek from the Chinese mainland in the fall of 1949 was one of the most important events in world history in post-war years. This led to the retreat of Chiang to the nearby island of Taiwan or Formosa, and establishment there of the Nationalist Government as an ally of the West and the setting up by the Chinese Communists headed by Mao Tse-tung of the People's Republic as the ally of the U.S.S.R. The emergence in China of a powerful government owning the allegiance of the vast population of the whole of mainland China, approximating to one-fourth of the number of the world's inhabitants, after nearly a century of internal dissensions and national weakness, excited the sympathy and admiration (if also some apprehension) of fellow-Asian nations, themselves till recently sufferers from and, in many cases, victims of western imperialism.

The adhesion of the Chinese to the ideology of World Communism, however, created serious problems not only for the principal nations of the West who under the leadership of the U.S.A. formed an anti-communistic bloc but also for those nations of Asia, who were not committed to either of the two blocs, such as India, Indonesia, Burma, etc. (The aggressions of the Chinese on the Indian border, as also the policy pursued by them towards Tibet, produced uneasiness in India.) The Sino-Soviet alliance upset the power order in the Western Pacific and jeopardized the strategic interests of the U.S.A., with results, such as the setting up of military blocs like SEATO and a virtual American protectorate in Formosa, that threatened the peace of at least the whole of South and South-East Asia. This tended to increase the area under the Cold War and decrease that sought to be shielded from it by uncommitted nations like India.

COMMUNIST CHINA—THE INTERNAL SYSTEM

On 1 October 1949, Mao Tse-tung officially proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Under the firm direction of the Communist party, the state, said he, was to practise "democracy" among its friends and outright dictatorship over all others. The former were listed as workers, peasants, small businessmen and some patriotic capitalists. In 1950, a constitution was provided for the state and a system of legislatures ("people's congresses") was established. In 1958, with the inception of the "great leap forward," political institutions were fundamentally modified by integrating them with "the communes" (to be described below) and party cadres were given a more direct role in the life of the peasantry. These cadres, who lived up to the requirements set up by the party, were somewhat equivalent to the civil service ratings of Western bureaucracies. The party has its ramifications all over the state—with more than a million branches in schools, factories, villages, army units, etc. It determines the "proper" quality of life in its branches and judges the performance of an individual against that quality on any basis that it sees fit. At the apex of the party's institutional hierarchy (at country, province and national levels) stands the National Party Congress, a principal duty of which is the election of the Central Committee. The main functions of the latter are to elect a Political Bureau, a Secretariat, and a Central Control Commission.

Since 1962 the principal responsibility for the leadership of China has lain on the permanent bureaucratic system under the Political Bureau, and the Central Control Commission. Within the Political Bureau is a Standing Committee comprising the seven most powerful men in China. Its chairman was Mao who, though consulting his colleagues, directed the nation's policies, internal and external. In 1959, he turned over the state functions to his second in command, Li Shao-chi, who was later removed from all his positions. Mao, whose every word was likened to scriptural revelation, withdrew from time to time from active political life, but nevertheless held all the reins of powers in his hands till his death in 1976. Chou En-lai who until 1959 was foreign minister was concurrently a member of the Standing Committee and remained so till his death. Other members of the Standing Committee included Chu Teh who

was China's principal military leader in the revolutionary wars. Chen Yun, a specialist in economic matters and Lin Piao who had been designated as Mao's potential successor but was reported killed in 1971 after leading an abortive coup against Mao.

THE STRUGGLE FOR MODERNIZATION

When after chasing out Chiang Kaishek, Mao took over China and declared his resolve to establish a modernized industrial, albeit a Communist state, the entire country was in shambles and the difficulties seemed to be insurmountable. But he and his colleagues had a supreme faith in their mission which they believed could be carried out by determination, together with organization and sweat. At the heart of the difficulties remained the intractable problem of overpopulation in a poor land, which had to be fed. The Communists had to redeem the pledge they had given to the peasants, viz., to redistribute the "estates" of the landowners, and they honoured it by widespread confiscations of land in the so-called "land reform" movement of 1949-1950. They knew, however, that this policy, though politically persuasive, ran counter to the economic requirements for increased production and that the problem could be solved by gradually taking the land back from them.

To do this the leaders adopted a staged programme of collectivization, which gradually divested the richer elements of the society of their holdings while granting privileges to the poorest. Between 1951 and 1956 there were three stages in the nation-wide collectivization movement: (1) the movement toward the establishment of "mutual aid teams" (1951-1953); (2) the transformation of these teams into "lower level agricultural producers' co-operatives" (APC); and (3) the combination of these lower level APC's into "higher level" APC's. The mutual aid teams brought together small numbers of villagers in a co-operative endeavour to share their labour, farm instruments and limited capital resources. Whereas the earlier "land reform" movement had been designed to wipe out the "landlord" class, the mutual aid teams gave advantages to the poorer classes at the expense of the so-called "rich peasants". Under the circumstances, those who had joined the mutual aid teams could be easily persuaded to pool their lands into lower level APC's. Although farms were worked in common, payment was made on

the basis of the amount of land delivered by each family to the collective at the time of its formation and according to the family's subsequent input.

In their operation, however, the first two stages of collectivization had varying successes. There were fairly good results in areas which had attained only a modest level of agricultural and commercial development. In the areas where little development had taken place, specially in places where few commercial markets existed, peasants resisted or held back from plans to enter mutual aid teams. On the other hand, in areas where a considerable development had already taken place, peasants were unwilling to join a system which asked them to adopt more rudimentary farming institutions. Under the circumstances, the lower level APC's failed to bring into their fold the vast mass of landless peasants. Another difficulty was that the lack of distribution facilities led the peasants to consume most of their produce. Hence, the hope entertained by party leaders that the plans would enable them to extract substantial surpluses that would enable them to purchase the plants and equipment needed for China's industrialization and feeding the workers moving into the cities to man the industries which were being built seemed to be frustrated.

In order to correct these "deficiencies", the planners put into operation the next state of their collectivization programme, which coincided with the programme to nationalize industries and business in the urban areas. The form chosen for China's countryside was the higher level agricultural producers' cooperative, which combined several lower level APC's into units comprising about 160 households (the lower level ones had comprised an average of 36 households only). The operation of these cooperatives was placed under the leadership of the local party committee, thus enabling Peking to exercise control over all rural areas. These moves produced a hostile reaction among the peasantry who resorted to sabotage, entailing loss of livestock and agricultural capital goods. In general the new APC's did augment community cooperation but the scarcity of qualified cadres from outside the local areas made it possible for many communities to reassert more traditional forms of leadership which reinfused the entire local apparatus with a highly parochial spirit. This coincided with an amazing development—the emergence of nonrevolutionary sentiments among the party youth and intellec-

tuals and the impact of "revisionary" doctrine from the Soviet Union.

The Great Leap Forward—To combat these trends Mao ordered more nonlocal and senior cadres to the villages for purposes of control and to counteract localism. He chose to depart even more sharply from gradualist programmes for collectivization and modernization. Thus began during the winter of 1957-1958, the new "general line of socialist construction" that led to what is known as the Great Leap Forward. The great purpose was to substitute the use of China's gigantic human resources for its meagre investment capital and to prepare the way for China to usher in the stage of "communism". The cautious approach lost out—the original plans for 1958 and indeed for the entire second plan period was torn into shreds. The new slogan was "it is not technique but man that counts". To speed up the process of growth, the entire population, male and female, would be mobilized, recharged with ideological fervour and set to work on new tasks developing both agriculture and small-scale industries (the latter to supplement, not replace continued construction of large-scale modern industry). The important thing would be manpower and morale, not technique and material incentives.

The regime projected unprecedented growth rates, and set literally fantastic targets. A startling new programme was pushed to construct small-scale industries throughout rural China—industries using maximum labour and minimum capital. "Backyard steel furnaces" sprouted everywhere. Even Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Republic, was reported puddling pig iron in a back-yard smelter. In the fall of 1958, only a few weeks after the first experimental commune was established the entire countryside was quickly communized during a hectic campaign in which the collectives were merged into about 26,000 communes. These new units took over the functions of local government, mobilized and allocated labour like military command posts giving orders for the day, and undertake to manage every conceivable activity within their respective areas—not only agriculture, but also local industry, commerce, finance, education and military affairs. A big push was made to promote communal living, partly to make a rapid stride towards the ultimate goals of communism, partly to release more man-power and women-power for production. Common

mess-halls, nurseries, old people's homes, and service industries were established to release women from household duties.

The failure of the Great Leap—From one point of view, the Great Leap had been aimed at remoulding Chinese society—ranging from the highly industrialized North to the primitive mountainous areas inhabited by tribal minorities—into a uniform mould. The rural commune was intended to be the trial instrument for the creation of this uniformity and, when perfected, was to be extended to the cities. The communes, however, failed to be working propositions even in the rural areas, let alone achieve their primary goals. They aggravated, if they did not cause, the social breakdown and widespread starvation that occurred during the “three hard years (1959-1961)”. The back-yard steel furnaces were a notable failure; most of their output was unusable. Close-planting and deep-ploughing proved to be no panacea; in some instances, in fact, their effects were harmful. The transportation system, overloaded and disorganized, developed crippling backwards. The peasants, treated like conscripts in a production army and deprived of almost all material incentives, had no heart in their work. And despite the huge engineering works constructed along the Huai river (one of the show-pieces for China's visitors), the country experienced its most extensive flood in 1954. Weather struck once again with natural disasters in 1959 and three succeeding years. (Food shortage was ascribed by the leaders partly to the process of translating food into steel, the linchpin of industry. A spokesman observed, “We can obtain plates ten tons of thick steel, by exporting one ton of tea...five tons from one ton of pork... 19,000 tons of shelled peanuts will buy an electric plant...and one ton of rawsilk will bring in enough steel rail to lay one kilometer of railways”. (The purchases were from Russia.)

Nothing highlights the successes and failures more clearly than the results achieved in two key commodities—steel and grain. While steel output rose from 3.35 million tons in 1957 to a claimed 18.45 million in 1960, grain output rose from 185 million tons in 1957 to perhaps 200 or 210 million tons in 1958—to drop again to 190 million in 1959, and to nearly 185 million in 1960. All in all, therefore, China's great leap carried it about where it had started, while in the meantime, the population had grown by perhaps as much as 35 or 40 million. Overall growth, as measured in GNP, followed a similar pattern. According to a Western

estimate, China's annual rate of growth in GNP skyrocketed from about 5 per cent in 1957 to about 17 or 18 per cent in 1958, dropped to about 12 per cent in 1959, and still further to about 5 per cent in 1959 and during 1960 was very low indeed. In 1960, China incurred a deficit of over \$300 million in its balance of payments with the U.S.S.R.

Mao and his associates blamed the Russians for their part in the economic collapse of 1960. As they viewed it, the Russians pulled out their technicians and advisers—deliberately—at a crucial point, with the purpose of sabotaging the faltering economy of their Chinese comrades. As a matter of fact the two great Communist giants had been differing from each other, specially since the advent of Khrushchev, and the Chinese leaders had almost come to regard him as Public Enemy No. 1. The sharpest of these differences was with regard to their respective foreign policies (for which see below) where, besides ideology, the national interests of the two countries played a very important role. When the Russians left in 1960, the Chinese still had hopes of making some adjustments necessary to stabilize the economy and were actually emphasizing a great leap in the industrial sector. As these failed to halt the decline, and the economy plummeted into chaos, a reappraisal was found to be necessary and the so-called "Cultural Revolution" was the outcome.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. At a top-level military meeting in late 1960, and at one of the rare plenary sessions of the party's Central Committee in early 1960, Mao and his associates laid out the broad outlines of their new policy. It was decided first to gain effective control of the army and thence to re-establish political orthodoxy. People had to measure their lives against "the thought of Mao". Emphasis had to be laid on the need to read Mao's works and to remember the past glories of the party's revolutionary struggle: The future generations, who were the potential heirs, were to be left in no uncertainty as to what had been done by the present generation. In short, there was to be a cultural revolution, whose main task was to hold high the red banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas. "The reactionary thought of the bourgeoisie" was to be eradicated and, to accompany it, there was

to be a "bloodless" purge of the bureaucratic power-centres—the party and thence the army, the two bulwarks of his dictatorship. In Mao's view, this purge would reactivate the rigid apparatus of China and reopen policy and administrative channels for doctrine to flow to the people. Eventually, as things developed, this would pave the way for a final stage—a mass campaign and perhaps even a renewal of the great leap forward in the economy.

The first victim of the purge was Wu Han, vice-mayor of Peking, against whom a prominent Shanghai newspaper had brought the charge of having committed "errors" in an historical drama he had written. Many of the dominant figures thereupon began promptly to drop out of sight. In the early months of 1966, the *Liberation Army Daily* stepped up the tempo of accusations against not only the Peking vice-mayor (who had confessed his sin) but also his alleged associates in a "black gang" of writers and other intellectuals, who were attempting to corrupt the army which had been and was the soul of the revolution. As vigorous attempts were carried on to ferret out members of "the black gang", many key men among the cadres disappeared. The purge next struck at China's major universities—the Defence Minister, Lin Piao, taking the lead in the movement. On 1 August 1966, China's Army Day, the whole country was told to become "a great school in Mao's thought and to learn from the PLA, which was a great school in its own right." The press proclaimed—in the language of the great leap forward of 1959—that soldiers "should learn politics, military affairs, and culture." They should engage in agricultural production, run medium or small factories, manufacture a number of products to meet their own needs as also do mass work and take part in the socialist education movement in the factories and villages. The spearhead of the movement was the "Red Guards" who, organized in bands, began to invade churches, schools and, with official encouragement, made a clean sweep of the names of many places, shop signs, books, attires, habits and bad practices that represented the ideology of feudalism, capitalism and revisionism. Many Chinese officials associated with the India-China Friendship Society too were not spared. The Red Guards even raided the Indian embassy in Peking and forced its staff to move out into another area.

Mao—the last years—In his all-out assault on what he termed “revisionism”, Mao was able to oust many leading key men from their positions. The list of those thus purged included Chou Yang, the deputy director of the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department, who was designated as the Leader of the black gang; Lu-Ting-yi, the head of the Propaganda Department; Lo Juich’ing, the army’s chief of staff, Shang-k’un, the Director of the General Office of the Central Committee Secretariat; as well as most of the party committee of Peking and a wide range of state officials and their deputies. Mao was also able to remove many of his opponents, including Liu Shaochi. Lin Piao, who had taken a principal part in this phase of Chinese’s history was designated as his potential successor but, as we have stated above, was reported killed in 1971 after leading an abortive coup against Mao. In 1974, Lin and Confucius were linked as abettors of individualism and bureaucratism and a campaign was launched against them on a large scale.

By cautious moves and by dint of the labour of the Chinese people the economy gradually moved on to the path of recovery. There was progress in all fields of human undertaking—agriculture, industry, education, technology—which astounded the world. In 1967, China exploded its first hydrogen bomb and in 1970 it orbited its first space satellite. Actually, China became a super-power, though she declined to be reckoned as such. Tension between China and America lessened as American forces were withdrawn from Vietnam. In 1972, President Nixon visited China, a fact unprecedented in American history. Mao, Chou and Nixon toasted each other—a sight for the gods to see. Eyebrows were raised all over the world at what seemed to be a revolution in Sino-American foreign policies but, as we shall see later (Chapters XVI and XVII), this resulted from developments which were heading towards it for long—the intensification of Sino-Russian enmity. America’s unsuccessful involvement in Indonesia, China’s own hegemonistic ambitions in Southeast and South Asia, the Indo-Russian treaty of 1971, the unsettled conditions in Pakistan, etc. The Nixon visit was given the widest publicity in the American press which had

some influences on public behaviour. News-casters learned to use Peking's own terminology, now saying People's Republic of China (instead of Red China, or Mainland China) and Americans developed a new fascination with China—with acupuncture, with Chinese clothing, etc. But, though the visit was capped by the Shanghai communique of the following year, the "liaison offices" established thereby in both capitals in 1973 were not full-fledged diplomatic missions. The U.S. still retained its defence treaty with Taiwan, American troops still remained in South Korea in potential conflict with Chinese and Soviet-supported military forces in North Korea, while the formidable Seventh Fleet still guarded the approaches of Formosa (Taiwan) and the off-shore island of Quemoy. But China did gain an advantage out of the new turn in its relations with America: she could now play military forces of the West against the military forces of the revisionist Soviet Union, thus "using barbarians to control barbarians". The Americans also derived a great advantage out of the business: the sharp strategic tension of the Korean war now gave place to decline in anxiety over Chinese "expansionism". Perhaps Mao's and Chou's declining health with the consequent intensification of succession politics in Peking and, on the American side, Nixon's difficulties relating to the Watergate scandal retarded progress in the direction of further cementing of Sino-American friendship.

In 1973, China normalized its relations with Japan and in 1978 signed a treaty of peace and friendship. Meanwhile Chou En-lai died in 1976 followed by Chu Teh and then Mao himself. A struggle for the succession ensued, out of which former deputy premier, Teng Hsiao-ping (the name now spelt as Deng Xiaoping), who had been purged after Chou's death and was now rehabilitated, emerged as the strong man. Mr. Hua Guofeng was first appointed Premier and party chairman, and then ousted from both positions and substituted by Zhou Ziang, who was handpicked by Deng for occupying the positions. Mr. Huang Hua became Foreign Minister. Mao's widow, Chiang Ching, and three other leftist leaders, (the so-called Gang of Four) were arrested. In 1978 a new constitution incorporated features of an economic programme designed to make China a modern country by 2000.

CHINA AFTER MAO

Mao's death was immediately followed, as we have seen above, by a struggle for succession, the details of which are not known and even the nature not quite clear. There was, rather strangely, a process of de-Maoization, somewhat similar to de-Stalinization after the death of Stalin. The process, however, was not so rapid and the intensity as great as de-Stalinization had been under Khrushchev and his associates. The principal aim of the planners of this change is said to be not de-Maoization so much as non-deification. Perhaps they are aware that Mao is too deeply entrenched in the hearts of the Chinese for any such attempt. Towards this end, it is said, the new Chinese leaders undergo even self-effacement and do not allow a display of their own pictures or erection of their statues. They are firmly opposed to any personality-cult, as there had been one under Mao. The new rulers are anxious to normalize life in China by putting an end to the state of political trauma in which the country had been plunged during the cultural revolution. Like Deng, the present-day strongman of China, many other leaders who had fought shoulder to shoulder during the revolutionary wars and had either dropped out or been thrown into the dung-heap, as also lesser men—intellectuals, writers and cultural men—have come up on the surface. Whereas, as we have seen, Madame Chiang Ching's Red Guards, acting as storm-troopers, had raided and ill-treated the members of the Indian Embassy at Peking, the Indian delegation to the Asian Parliamentary Conference who visited China in October-November 1981, were shown remarkable traditional courtesy. Members of the delegation were drive through the streets of Old Peking which had some dingy hovels (as in all our cities) which, however, were kept neat and clean. Two members of the delegation and a woman journalist were permitted to travel to the interior to get a deeper acquaintance with the life of the people.

On the economic field, there has been a reversal from the pursuit of previous policies of State-owned economy and emphasis on heavy industry, to mention a few, which had produced large-scale unemployment. Under the new regime, these imbalances are being corrected. About 2300 labour service companies have been

formed throughout the country and 3200 collectively owned enterprises set up in relieving unemployment. Municipalities and the autonomous regions have also been asked to step in. All of them have been given tax exemption for the initial period and low interest loans. As a result, it is claimed that 29 million people have been given jobs between 1977 and 1980. Chinese experts affirm that all the modifications in the policies of Maoist days are subject to social economy to which the country remains as firmly wedded as before.

On the social side, one misses, agreeably, the glitter and dazzle of acquisitive societies. But the Spartan simplicity of their lives wedded to high ideals impresses the visitor. Men and women wear the same coarse costumes—pant and coat in winter. In summer, women appear in skirts and shirts. Wanting to look their natural best they wear no silver or gold ornaments, nor apply cosmetics, not even lipstick. The dowry system, the curse of Indian society is totally absent. The Communist party has advised that even marriage feasts should be on a modest scale. Casteism, or religious bigotry are unknown with the State itself being atheistic. Recently Christian churches are said to have been permitted to be opened, but not Buddhist temples. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness is recently said to have sent 5000 copies of the Bhagavad Gita, translated into Chinese, to China.

As regards foreign policy, there, seems to have been no marked departure from the policies pursued by Mao in his later days. The friendship with America seems to have become tighter as China's animosity towards Russia becomes more bitter. The American Secretary of State, General Haig, said at a banquet given in his honour recently at Beijing (Peking), "Our objectives in every part of the world are similar, if not identical," and in pursuance of these objectives, the U.S.A. has decided to sell sophisticated weapons to China. There seem to be some indications that China wants to improve its relations with India and many friends of China in India who are critical of the Soviet-India treaty of 1971, seem to be ready to go any lengths to bring about this consummation. In June, 1980, Huang Hua, the Chinese Foreign Minister, visited New Delhi, and on 21 October 1981, while both attending

the Cancun Conference, Mr. Zhao Ziang and Mrs. Gandhi met and talked with each other. There does not seem to have come up any formula for solving the thorny border question. The problem of mending fences with India seems to be a very difficult one, specially in view of China's commitments to Pakistan and its newly formed friendship with America.

A significant evidence of the growth of Sino-American friendship was the visit paid by Mr. Zhou Ziang, the Chinese Prime Minister, to America in January 1948. Altogether he spent nine days in that country—three at Washington. He had a number of meetings with Mr. Regan as the result of which two important agreements were signed between the two countries. As even these did not exhaust the list of matters for discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Regan would visit China after three months. In particular, supply of war materials, technological assistance and Taiwan were left to be further discussed. In a talk on T.V. at Washington on 12 January 1984, Mr. Ziang said that in the interests of China's rapid development and modernization all-round aid and economic co-operation between the two countries in trade and commerce were necessary.

Mr. Ziang, of course, did not fail to warn Washington that economic co-operation and political issues are inseparable. He asserted that American-Taiwan relationship was the chief obstacle to Sino-American closer co-operation. This obstacle must be removed, said he, and in the interests of this, he made certain proposals which could be considered as unthinkable even a few years ago. He said that China was prepared to recognize Taiwan's capitalist economy, and its own defence organisation if only Taiwan recognised the sovereignty of China. He declared further that America must reduce its military help to Taiwan. On these protestations of Mr. Ziang, however, one comment is called for. It is that the more that China and America would woo each other, the relations of America with Japan, South Korea, and the Asian group of nations would become more and more difficult. Also, in view of China's friendship with Pakistan, the growth of Sino-American friendship would create further problems for India. (This aspect of the matter has been fully discussed in the chapter on India's Foreign Policy.)

CHINA AND HER ASIAN NEIGHBOURS

The establishment of a strong central, albeit communist, government in China was generally welcomed in Asia, as has been said above. Non-communist and uncommitted nations were not without qualms but they hardly subscribed to the view, often expressed in the West, that a communist nation was aggressive by its very nature and, even when China was accused of aggressive intervention in the Korean dispute, accepted her own contention that her action was purely defensive. India and the uncommitted nations supported the Russian move to have the communist government admitted into U.N. India's apprehensions of China's expansionist aims and their bearings on the security of her more than 2000 miles of common border with China in the north had, however, been already aroused with China's invasion of Tibet in 1950 and the imposition on 23 May 1951 on the government of the Dalai Lama of a 17-article treaty, whereby China's shadowy suzerainty over Tibet had been converted into a full-fledged sovereignty. China had at the same time begun to put indirect pressure on the border States of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, as also on Ladakh, which was Indian territory. She also began what has been called a "cartographic invasion" of India by publishing maps showing some large areas to the south of the Macmahon Line, claimed by India to mark her border, as forming parts of China.

An era of goodwill between Communist China and her non-communist Asian neighbours was inaugurated in 1954-1955, when, following the conclusion on 29 April 1954 of a Sino-Indian trade and intercourse agreement that, incidentally, embodied the famous *Pancha Sheel* and the visit of Mr. Chou Enlai to New Delhi, intimate contacts were established between the latter and the leaders of all Asia and most of Africa at the Bandung Conference, 1955. (The five principles embodied in *Pancha Sheel* were accepted at the Bandung Conference. They are "mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.") In October, 1954, Mr. Nehru paid a visit to China and received an effusive welcome, though he obtained little concrete satisfaction with regard to the matters in dispute between India and China.

The Bandung Conference, however, unexpectedly turned out to be a great personal success for Chou-En-lai and also a demonstration of the great influence that was possessed by China as a great Asian power. It also opened the floodgates of diplomatic visits to and from Peking by the Asian leaders. The Premiers of Asian nations ranging from Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos to Suhrawardy of Pakistan visited Peiping affirming the five principles of co-existence and seeking trade and cultural exchanges. Madam Sun Yat-sen toured South and South-East Asian capitals on behalf of the communist government. A first trade and cultural exchange agreement was concluded with Japan. In December, Mr. Chou En-lai visited North Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, India and Pakistan. The result of these contacts was to allay apprehensions among non-communist states on China's periphery as to her aggressive intentions and to arouse interest amounting to enthusiasm about the Chinese achievement in internal reconstruction.

This view of Communist China's internal and external policies, however, did not last long. Peiping's fulsome appreciation of the bloody suppression by the Soviet government of the uprising in Hungary in October, 1956 gave the first jolt. Appreciation of the domestic achievements of Communist China suffered a decline as, with the exposure by mainland Chinese themselves of the harshness of communist regime and the purging of its critics by the communists, Mao Tse-tung's declaration, "Let a thousand flowers bloom", was found out to be a hollow one. The regimentation of the communes in their severe earlier phase in 1958 shocked a wide section of opinion in non-communist Asia. The dumping of exports, the abrupt severance of trade relations with Japan in an attempt to influence elections in that country and a general display of chauvinism added to the unfavourable impressions.

The year 1959 witnessed a further deterioration in the relations between China and her Asian neighbours, particularly India. The rebellion of the Tibetans against the oppressive Chinese rule, its bloody suppression by the Chinese, the flight of the Dalai Lama to India and, above all, the intrusion of the Chinese into the bordering Indian territory and the first armed clashes between Indian and Chinese troops, however minor in importance, together with the fierce propaganda, supported by the government, in China

against India and the virtual repudiation by Chou En-lai of the Macmahon Line, albeit accompanied with an appeal for settlement of disputes by friendly negotiations, brought on a crisis in Sino-Indian relations. Laos complained of indirect aggression through the instrumentality of North Vietnam and incitement of subversive national communist movements by the Chinese Communists. Indonesia, which had a powerful legal communist movement was nevertheless perturbed by the recent developments, as was shown by the fact that General Naustion, the Army Chief of Staff, ordered the postponement of the national congress of the Indonesian Communist Party in August, 1959. Japan reacted to the developments by increasing her contacts with the West. Burma, though maintaining correct official relations, felt equally menaced, and took more definite action than India against the communists. Even Cambodia shifted slightly away from the warmth towards Peiping displayed in the previous year. Premier Prince Norodom Sihanouk gave evidence of this in August, 1959 by visiting Saigon and reaching a new basis of understanding with anti-communist South Vietnam.

In spite of the shift in viewpoint, India and the rest of non-communist and uncommitted Asia avoided any break in friendly relations with China, and continued to pin their faith on peaceful negotiations. They did not budge an inch from their policy of non-involvement, and the western expectations that the crisis in their relations with Communist China would draw them near to their fold was belied. Pakistan showed some slight inclinations to improve her relations with India, as was evidenced by the meeting between Premier Nehru and President Ayub Khan during a "fuel-halt" at Palam airport on the latter's way to Dacca. But India turned down the suggestion that the two countries should have joint military talks for a common defence against Chinese aggression. (For further developments of Indo-Chinese relations, see Chapter 27.)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Chinese foreign policy has developed in a series of stages from 1949 to the late sixties which may be broadly characterized as follows : (1) 1949-1953, the "Mao Liu-line", named after Mao Tse-tung and Liu-Shao-chi ; (2) 1953-1957, the "Bandung line" ; (3) 1957-1962,

the "east-wind line" ; and (4) 1962-1966, the "third world (under-developed countries) line". As we shall see, the "third world line" began to be re-assessed in mid-1965.

The first stage was marked by a "hard-line" policy, which was, in fact, a reiteration of the doctrines that had been developed during the years of the Communists' struggle for mastership of China rather than a blue-print for global action. During this period, Peking trumpeted the call for "national liberation" struggles, and out of ideological sympathy (as also the interests of national security) entered into the Korean war. It stigmatized nationalist leaders like Nehru as imperialist stooges. Peking revised its view about them as it became convinced in the later stages of the Korean war that they were far from playing the imperialist game, and reappraised its outlook on violence as communist-inspired insurrections in such countries as India, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia met with failure.

The result was the beginning of a "soft-line policy" first indicated by Chinese acceptance in 1954 of the temporary partition of Vietnam and the principle of neutralization for all of Indo-China, implied by the Geneva agreements, and above all by the lead taken at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April, 1955 in accepting the principle of *Pancha-sheel* and offering to compromise on all outstanding differences between them and other nations, including the United States. Although at this time China had, rather surreptitiously, begun to prowl at India's northwestern borders, Mr. Chou-En-lai visited India and Mr. Nehru returned the visit, while a Sino-Indian trade and intercourse agreement was signed between the two countries (see above—Red China and Her Asian Neighbours). The Chinese also made every effort to convince the leaders of South-East Asia that they would not manipulate overseas Chinese populations as tools for subversion. At home, the Chinese were preoccupied with their first five-year plan for which they sought and received large-scale Soviet assistance.

In 1957, however, Peking gradually began to change its mind about the wisdom of indefinitely pursuing the Bandung line. It began to suspect that Moscow was working for a *detente* with the U.S.A., and to grumble about the former's virtual refusal to help it realize the chief aims of its own foreign policy (conquest of the off-shore islands and Taiwan), and adequately support its industrialization

plans (see above, Chapter XXI—Rift Since Khrushchev). Mao was persuaded to believe that the Bandung line was ineffective and formulated a new one, called the “east-wind line” which he explained in his famous speech in Moscow in November 1957 (*Ibid*). The east-wind line combined earlier doctrine statements with recent foreign policy experiences. In the pursuit of this line Chinese positions conflicted directly with those of Moscow. The most dramatic reflection of Sino-Soviet differences came at the time of the Cuban missile crisis (see below, Chapter XXIX) and the Chinese aggression on the Indian frontier in September-October, 1962. Though urging Moscow to take up an extremist position. China, nevertheless, was loth to force a showdown with the U.S.A. and she “voluntarily” withdrew from some occupied Indian territory after her successful exploits on the Indian border in 1962

The “third-world line” is really a continuation of the “east-wind line” with certain changes made in it on account of the intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict and lessons drawn therefrom. The Chinese leaders were now resolved to bear the cross solely on their own shoulders (the Russians having refused to lend them also theirs), and they were persuaded to believe that this would require that they should reduce the geographical scope of the former (east-wind) world line making it applicable henceforth primarily to the “third world”. They subscribed to the thesis first put forward by the Indonesian communists that the world was divided into two parts : the under-developed nations, which could be viewed as the “countryside” of the world, and the industrialized states of North America and Western Europe, which could be seen as the world’s “cities”. Arguing by analogy to the history of the conquest of the whole of China by the Communists they declared that the cities could be surrounded by the countryside and gradually conquered.

In pursuance of these tactics the Chinese began to busy themselves fomenting anti-western “national liberation” struggles in the third-world, giving their special attention to S. Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai undertook many trips abroad, which were timed to strengthen China’s image as a world power. (Liu Shao-chi was receiving ovations at Rawalpindi in March 1966 when he should have been at Moscow attending the 23rd Congress). Arms aid was given to some leaders in Africa and

Asia in support of revolutions, and abuses were hurled at western policies and leaders through the medium of the press and from the platform. Out of very complex motives arms were supplied to Pakistan and Chinese tanks and MIGs were paraded when Mrs. Indira Gandhi was on a visit to Washington.

The "third-world" line policy was not quite so successful as it was confidently expected to be. The new leaders of Asia and Africa who received aid from China did not seem to be overanxious for surrounding the "cities", having had their own internal troubles to keep them back from adventures, however promising they seemed to be. The Chinese found themselves accused of instigating rebellions, coups, and assassinations in every corner of the world. From Cuba to Tunisia and Indonesia (after the abortive communist coup), they became the universal scape-goats, charged with all manner of illegal activities. A policy which at its inauguration promised at least minimal payoffs with the least possible danger proved to involve substantial risks. The recent deterioration of China's relations with North Korea demonstrated that Peking's assessment of the "revolutionary situation" elsewhere was not cent percent correct. Thus it was that in 1965 Peking began a reappraisal of the "third-world line" of 1963-1965, the result of which it was not possible just then to appreciate. It may have produced tensions which, along with others spring from diverse factors, were possibly responsible for the call given by Mao Tse-tung for the so-called cultural revolution which was currently convulsing China.

CHINA AND THE ATOM BOMB

On 17 October 1964 China banged into the world's nuclear club, her claims to which rested on her being a Great Power, or even a superpower, by detonating a low-yield atomic device in her western region. While the moral argument against the manufacture and stockpiling of a weapon of mass destruction is valid in relation to all the five powers who now possess the nuclear weapon, the case against a fresh entrant into the field, for political, strategic, besides moral reasons, seems to be overwhelmingly strong. It is of little practical avail that China has declared that she will not be the first to use the atom bomb and, similarly, her call for a summit conference on disarmament was not likely to

meet with effective response. She had acted exactly like this when she refused to sign the Moscow test ban treaty, and it had no results. True to Gandhian traditions, India has reaffirmed her resolve not to manufacture an atom bomb, though she can easily do so. Japan has taken up the same attitude. President Johnson has declared that China's possession of nuclear weapons—she will take some time yet to have an effective stockpile or the means of delivery—will not deter the U.S.A. from responding to any requests from countries that lacked nuclear weapons for help against Chinese aggression. It is feared, nevertheless, that China may now add nuclear blackmail to other factors already in her favour to bring pressure to bear on South-East Asia, and even on India and Japan.

THE QUESTION OF RED CHINA'S ADMISSION TO THE U.N.

For all that the world can see or ever matters Red China is China, for the Reds drove out the so-called Nationalists from the Chinese mainland as far back as 1949 and their government is in effective possession of the great country historically known as China, over the entire length and breadth of which their writ runs—more fully perhaps than that of any government which claimed to rule China in the past. After the collapse of their armies the Nationalist government of Ching Kai-shek fled to the offshore island of Taiwan (Formosa), where they established themselves in power and which they continued to rule as a satellite of the U.S.A., whose mighty Seventh Fleet stood guard for them in the neighbouring Formosa Bay. They still, however, styled themselves as the Republic of China and continued to be a member of the U.N. with a permanent seat in the Security Council, the Republic of China having had membership of the world body from the latter's very birth. In the early years of their existence they frequently vaunted about their ability to reconquer their lost possessions, but never hazarded an attempt to do so, and, according to the rules of international law, had long lost the claim to be recognized as the government of the State of China. The fact was accepted by most nations of the world who accorded either *de jure* or *de facto* recognition to Red China, who had proclaimed her unalterable resolve to recover her own territory of Taiwan as early as she could do so, even if this involved her in war with the U.S.A. The latter was equally firm in her resolve to keep

the Nationalists in power in Taiwan—in the vital interests of her own security, as she understood them.

It should be clear that the question of admitting Red China to the U.N., which was one of the most important questions that faced the world body for long, was not that of admitting a new state to its membership, China being a charter member, but meant really the diplomatic acceptance of the reality that the Peking government was the *de facto* government of present day China. To recognize Peking would be derecognize Taiwan, with the practical consequence that it would be the representatives of Mao Tse-tung and not of Chiang-Kaishek who would fill the seats belonging to China in the various bodies of the U.N., including the Security Council, where China has a veto. Over the years the U.S.S.R. was a stout champion of the idea of granting recognition to Red China and, year after year, introduced resolutions in the General Assembly advocating it, but failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in support of her resolutions, principally because of the U.S.A.'s implicable hostility to the proposition. All the communist and many non-communist nations, among the latter India who was and continued to be, even after China's aggression on her borders in 1962, one of the staunchest advocates, supported the U.S.S.R. in her efforts to get Red China recognized in the U.N. In pursuing her course in the matter the U.S.A. gradually lost ground, many of her allies and specially Britain holding a contrary opinion on the subject. To make a long story short, on 28 October, 1971, the General Assembly passed, by the requisite two-thirds majority, a resolution admitting Red China to the membership of the United Nations. The wrong that had been done to China was, at long last, thus undone and also she, *inter alia* occupied her seat in the Security Council as a permanent member. It should be remembered in this connection that the U.S.A. had not yet accorded recognition to Red China, but that was a question different from that of U.N. recognition of Red China. The recognition came in 1979 (see above).

CHAPTER XXIV

THE WAR IN KOREA

KOREA IN THE COLD WAR

Korea, known formerly as the Hermit Kingdom, has a recorded history since 57 B.C., and enjoyed a secluded national existence, some time in independence, and in others owning the nominal suzerainty of China, till almost the close of the nineteenth century. Since then she has had a most unhappy national life, as her unfortunate geographical position—a peninsula jutting out into the Pacific Ocean from the Asian continent in close proximity to Japan as “a dagger pointed to the latter’s heart”—made her an innocent victim of great power conflicts and ambitions. With the expansion of the Russian empire in the east and the continued disintegration of the Chinese empire, Korea appeared in a new light before the Japanese, who were anxious not only to prevent Russian penetration there in the interest of their own security but found the country a suitable field for their economic and imperialist advance.

As a prelude to her eventual conquest of the kingdom, Japan compelled China, after the latter’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, to recognize her independence. This helped bring on the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, in the course of which Japan occupied Korea, and after the Russian defeat, compelled the Tsarist Government to recognize her paramount interest in the Kingdom. This was followed immediately by the establishment of a Japanese protectorate and in 1910 by outright annexation, which went unchallenged by the other great powers till Pearl Harbour and Japan’s lining up with the Axis Powers in the Second World War. At a Conference at Cairo (November, 1943), President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, with the principles of the Atlantic Charter in their minds, agreed that Korea should be “free and independent” “in due course”. The Soviet Union publicly acceded to the principle when it entered the war against Japan in August, 1945.

Unfortunately, as the Second World War came finally to a close with the downfall of Japan and in the midst of growing divergences of opinion between Russia and her quondam allies of the West the chances of reaching an agreement for the implementation of the Cairo declaration became increasingly more slender, till it became the scene of what ostensibly was a civil war but really a dangerous clash in arms between East and West, though officially styled the United Nations War to resist aggression. (It may be mentioned here that in its most dangerous phase, the conflict was between Communist China, apparently bent on re-entering a field once occupied by old China, with Russia lurking in the background, and the United States playing the role once belonging to Japan which was now under her occupation.)

Under the pressure of power politics, it was decided at the Potsdam Conference, July 1945, to split Korea into two parts—the one to the north of the 38th parallel to be occupied by the Russians and the other to its south by the Americans. The Russians, who appeared in Korea on 8 August, quickly liquidated the Japanese regime, took over the Korean people's committees, and busied themselves in setting up a puppet provincial government. A week later American troops entered Korea, and, refusing to recognize the Soviet-controlled government, superimposed American Military Government upon the structure of the previous Japanese administration. The result of the Russo-American wrangle in Korea was immediately to split the Korean nation in two, to strangle it economically, to thrust it into a violent ideological warfare, and to deny it the reality of national existence and dignity.

Although, at a Foreign Ministers' conference at Moscow, December, 1945, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union agreed to a joint trusteeship for Korea, they failed to carry it into effect. After fruitless negotiations, the U.S.A. submitted the problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September, 1947. The Russians denied the right of the Assembly to deal with the problem, and refused to admit a commission appointed by the U.N. to supervise elections in Korea in December, 1948 to North Korea. Elections were held in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the commission and in which the inhabitants constitute approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea. The Korean National Assembly thus.

ected proceeded to draft a constitution and organize a government. This government was recognized by the General Assembly of the U.N. (and by the U.S.A.) as the government of Korea, although it was never recognized by the Soviet group as such, and although its effective control was limited to South Korea. It was named as the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) with its capital at Seoul, and was headed by a veteran ultra-right nationalist, Dr. Syngman Rhee. On 1 May 1948, the communists formed the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in North Korea with the capital at Pyongyang, and headed by Kim Il Sung, a former guerilla leader, who was called the "hero of the nationalist-liberation movement". (Born Kim Sung Chu, Kim had served under the legendary Kim Il Sung in the guerilla war that the Koreans waged against the Japanese for years before the latter were defeated in the Second World War. The younger man had a good record as a guerilla leader, and took the name of his commander. It was "good politics" because the name Kim Il Sung was revered by every Korean.)

Both Korean authorities claimed to be the only legitimate government of all Korea, and, counting upon the support of one of the two major powers, each of them expected to make good the claim by unifying the whole of Korea under its banner. By the end of June, 1949, the U.S., obviously considering Korea as lying outside her own security zone, withdrew her troops, leaving behind a Korean constabulary trained to keep order but not to fight. By the end of the same year, the Russians withdrew, leaving behind a fully equipped army of peasants and workers. While the two Korean Governments were involved in a mounting conflict with each other, the relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. continued to degenerate with the progress of the Cold War. While the General Assembly confined its action in Korea to passing resolutions, none heeded the alarming signs of impending civil war or lifted one's little finger for any effort to alleviate the intolerable economic plight of the Korean people.

THE NORTH KOREAN INVASION AND U.N.

On 25 June 1950, over 600,000 North Korean troops, spear-headed by 100 Russian-built tanks, invaded the south and overran the R.O.K. units, who fought "pretty much with their bare hands". The U.S.A. immediately submitted the matter to the Security Council which, at

emergency meeting held the same afternoon at 2 p.m., adopted a resolution determining that the North Korean action constituted a breach of the peace, calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities, and calling upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel. On 27 June President Truman announced that since North Korea had defied the Security Council and in furtherance of the latter's resolution he had ordered the United States naval and air forces to give assistance to the Republic of Korea, that he had also ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa and all air and sea operations against the mainland. Several hours later the Security Council met again and adopted a resolution recommending that members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area". On 7 July the Security Council took another decisive step, authorizing the creation of a unified command under the United Nations flag and requesting the United States to designate its commander. The President designated General MacArthur (8 July).

These resolutions of the Security Council were made possible by the absence of the Russian delegate, who had staged a walkout on 13 January last after having failed to secure the exclusion of the representative of Nationalist China from the meeting of the Council and by the subsequent decision and declaration of the U.S.S.R. to boycott any of the bodies of the U.N. in which the latter was seated. The Russian representative returned on 1 August and blocked any further action by the Security Council to deal with the situation in Korea. The difficulty was surmounted by the Korean problem being transferred to the General Assembly which authorized further action. Later on, a resolution was passed providing for similar action in the event of a stalemate in the Security Council—the Uniting For Peace Resolution. (3 November 1950.)

Thus for the first time in history war was declared and waged by members of an international organization pledged to maintain international peace and security and in the name and under the authority of that body—the United Nations—for the declared purpose of fulfilling their obligations of its membership. Certain legal and political questions connected with this action have,

however, been urged by many members of the United Nations, including some whose devotion to the aims of the United Nations is generally recognized, which may put a different construction on the entire episode. The Russian contention that it was South Korea which was the real aggressor does not need detailed consideration for, though it may be quite correct that both the governments in Korea meditated an attack on the other, in actual fact the 38th parallel was crossed by the North Korean forces. The fact that the South Koreans went down and the North Koreans won an immediate and sweeping initial victory goes to confirm the view that the attack was a premeditated and well-organized one. More difficult to dispose of is the contention that was made by the U.S.S.R. that the resolutions of the Security Council dated 25 June, 27 June, and 7 July, passed in the absence of the representative of one of the permanent members, namely itself, was illegal in view of Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, which requires that all non-procedural matters must be decided "by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurrent votes of the permanent members".

Now, it had been already established in Council practice that the abstention from voting of a permanent member did not constitute a veto, or invalidate a decision. But the Soviet Union urged that it had never agreed that the same rule applied to absence. Another, and perhaps more basic, point concerns Article 28, which provides that the "Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously", and, obviously, if Article 28 is taken literally, the Council cannot possibly "function continuously" if a permanent member absents itself. It has also been argued that the Council resolution of 25 June had not explicitly committed the United Nations to the taking of collective measures (and, in particular, military action), and had rather recommended measures of the type envisaged under Article 40, viz provisional measures intended to create conditions favourable to action by the Council itself. In this view of the case, the action taken by the United States, in advance of further consideration of the matter by the Council, left no other line of action open to that body except merely endorsing U.S. action, which was what it actually did.

Even this may, perhaps, be overlooked, or considered as little

more than a technical objection, but the "neutralizing" of Formosa by the President of the U.S.A. was a serious matter. Obviously this action was not directed against the North Korean attack, and it was thus not undertaken in the implementation of the Council resolution of 25 June. It could not be held to be of as urgent a nature as the rendering of assistance to South Korea except under the assumption, which the Security Council had not yet come to accept, that it was not just North Korea but World Communism which was the real aggressor. It linked the Korean War to the unfinished struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists; in other words, it was an intervention in the civil war in China, and was, of course, denounced by the Peiping Government as an act of aggression. Obviously inspired by the interests of American security and far off from the immediate purpose of the U.N. viz. resistance of North Korean aggression, it definitely impaired the United Nations character of the war. The result was that it dissuaded many members of the United Nations, particularly those belonging to Asia and Africa, who were otherwise strong champions of collective security from wholeheartedly associating themselves with the Korean War. Recalling also the fact that no such strong action had been taken by the United Nations in similar cases, e.g. when the Dutch carried on war in Indonesia for extended periods at two different times, or when India charged Pakistan with aggression in Kashmir, etc., or by the League of Nations in the Manchurian and Abyssinian cases, they felt the Korean War to be essentially a great power conflict with imperialistic motivation.

Of the 59 nations who at the time were members of the United Nations and to whom the Council resolution of 27 June was transmitted by the Secretary-General, 53 members responded with expressions of support of collective security though many of the replies were extremely non-committal with regard to specific actions that they were prepared to take. Only fourteen members actually contributed or offered to contribute ground forces, and even these were little more than token contributions. The U.S.A. and the Republic of Korea together contributed about 90 per cent of the military forces, the U.S.A. alone 85.89 per cent of the naval forces, and 93.38 per cent of the air forces. The casualties

sustained by the American forces were 140,000, including 35,000 dead.

THE KOREAN WAR

The Korean War had three phases. In the beginning of the first phase the North Koreans carried everything before them, captured Seoul and pushed the United Nations forces to the South as far down as Pusan Beachhead. The drive, however, was checked and, specially after a brilliant landing by U.S. marines of Inchon on 15 September 1950, the North Koreans were quickly driven back to the 38th parallel. With this done, India and a minority of the members of U.N., thought that the purpose of the Security Council resolution of 27 June had been fulfilled, and they cautioned against any hasty action which might extend the area of the conflict. The United States, however, relying on a recommendation by the General Assembly to the effect that "all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea", and interpreting it as an authorization for pushing ahead into North Korea, directed the Unified Command to advance further. On 20 October Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, was captured, and on 20 November the U.S. 7th division reached the Manchurian border.

As the United Nations forces advanced towards the Yalu river, which separates Korea from Manchuria, there were loud complaints from the People's Republic of China of violations of the Manchurian border by American aircraft. The Chinese Foreign Minister conveyed through India's ambassador, K.M. Panikkar, a clear warning that if the U.N. armies continued to push towards the Chinese frontier, China would feel obliged to enter the war. Mr. Truman in his memoirs comments that Panikkar had been "playing the game of the Communists"—a strange appraisal of the realities of Asian politics by the then President of the United States. In any case a new phase in the war was inaugurated with a counter-attack by 200,000 Chinese Communist "volunteers" who crossed the Yalu river on 26 November and forced the evacuation of 105,000 U.N. troops and 91,000 Korean civilians at Hungnam on 24 December. The Chinese pushed across the 38th parallel,

and drove 70 miles into South Korea. The U.S.A., thereupon, urged the General Assembly to brand Communist China as an aggressor and affirmed the determination of U.N. to continue its efforts to resist aggression in Korea.

The American move was opposed by India as likely to extend the fighting into a major war or even into the Third World War, and she sponsored a resolution in the name of 12 Asian countries asking for the setting up of a Cease-Fire Group and the summoning of a conference for solving all Far Eastern problems. This view received a considerable support in the General Assembly in view of the fact that American military authorities had already been urging their government, if they really wanted to win the war, to carry it into mainland China, and even to use the atom bomb. (General Mark Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 13.) After long and bitter debates, on 1 February 1951, a slightly amended version of the American resolution—which, instead of stating that the People's Republic had rejected all U.N. peace proposals merely said that they had not accepted them—was adopted by a vote of 44 to 7—India and Burma being among those who opposed it and nine nations, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan, abstaining

THE KOREAN TRUCE

The third phase of the conflict began with the removal of General MacArthur from all Far East Commands (11 April 1951). General MacArthur wanted to pursue the Chinese across the Yalu to their air depots in Manchuria and, on 25 March, had threatened Communist China with air and naval attack. He had been warned to clear all announcements of policy through Washington. The President opposed his views. A Senate enquiry found that MacArthur was not charged with insubordination but had disregarded to clear policy statements through the Defence Department. His dismissal was followed by the starting of negotiations for a truce along the 38th parallel, close to which the battle-line had by the time become more or less static. The talks began at Kaseong on 10 July, and when this proved unsatisfactory (being in communist-held territory) were resumed at Panmunjom on 25 October. It was not, however, till nearly two years had passed that an armistice

was actually signed on 27 July 1953. Negotiations repeatedly broke down on the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war. The fact was that a large number of Chinese and North Koreans who had been taken captive by the Unified Command and many western and South Korean prisoners in Chinese hands had refused to return home. On each side, evidently there was a lot of propaganda to win over the POW's (prisoners of war). In the United Nations prison camps the communist POW's used intimidation and violence against those who refused to be repatriated. The United Nations refused, on humanitarian grounds, to send back prisoners against their will, whatever the precedents in international law. The deadlock in the truce negotiations was resolved only after Stalin's death by his "new look" successors in office. Meanwhile, the mounting American casualties caused uneasiness in America, and, in the presidential elections, the Republican candidate, General Eisenhower, promised, in the event of his success, to bring the war to an end.

THE QUESTION OF THE POW'S

At long last, a solution was found by setting up a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, consisting of representatives from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India, and with the last-named as the chairman, to have custody of the POW's who still refused to be repatriated after two months of an armistice having been signed. The question of such prisoners, i.e. those who had not been repatriated at the end of this period, was to be referred to a political conference to be convened under the draft armistice agreement. Within thirty days of this conference being called, i.e., within six months of an armistice agreement, any prisoners still refusing repatriation would receive civilian status and be assisted to go to neutral countries. Syngman Rhee, however, refused to accept these terms and, indeed, the very idea of a compromise with the enemy; and, just to embarrass his allies, allowed 25,000 POW's to escape. While his sense of frustration at the failure of his hopes for the unification of Korea was understandable, his western allies were considerably perturbed at the way he had broken up the National Assembly by direct police action, including mass arrests of his political opponents, and established a dictatorship. Dr. Rhee, apparently, was most bitter at the criticisms of his undemocratic

actions in India, and poured out the whole vial of his wrath in his denunciations of the Indians, and, in particular, Mr. Nehru.

India, as the chairman of the Repatriation Commission, had to perform a very delicate feat of tight-rope walking, having had to please at one and the same time the United Nations, the United States, the U.S.S.R., Communist China, and Syngman Rhee. When the U.S.A. concluded a mutual security pact with South Korea (8 August), many non-communist Indians asked whether the U.S.A. was "conniving with Rhee" to sabotage the truce. At the special session of the General Assembly held later in the same month, the U.S.A. opposed the inclusion of India in the proposed political conference. It took the view that the conference should deal with only the problems of Korea and not, as India wanted (and as had been envisaged in the truce terms), such questions as the admission of China into U.N., Indo-China, etc. India was backed by Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as also the Philippines, and the disagreement between the U.S.A. and her major western allies on this issue was embarrassing to all concerned in the matter.

In the end, the political conference was not held at all, chiefly because of disagreement as to the role that Russia was to play in it—neutral or a member on the communist side. Meanwhile, the work of repatriation of the POW's who still refused repatriation the Indian Chairman of the Repatriation Commission was going on. As to POW's who still refused repatriation, the Indian Chairman of the Repatriation Commission announced that all prisoners would be released on 20 January 1954. The Chinese prisoners were sent to Formosa and the Koreans handed over to the South Korean Government. After further discussions it was decided to put the question of the political settlement on the agenda of the Geneva conference meeting in April, 1954, along with that of the Indochina war. No settlement was found for the Korean question even at this conference, but it ceased to attract much attention as other more serious problems affecting East-West relations soon cropped up.

THE QUESTION OF KOREAN RE-UNIFICATION

The armistice signed in July 1953 left Korea divided into two parts along the 38th parallel where the battle line lay at the time. The

dream of ardent Korean patriots of the emergence of a unified and independent Korean state was thus unrealized, through proposals for it continued to come both from the north and south. The last such had come from Park-chung-hi, the President of South Korea. Before him, from North Korea, Kim II Sung had submitted to the American government a proposal to the same effect. In both his own proposals and in reply to those of the South Korean President, however, Kim II Sung had laid down two conditions. Firstly, before the negotiations could begin, forty thousand American troops must be called back to their own country and, secondly, South Korea must not be allowed to take part in them. In spite of this difference of opinion between North and South, talks on the subject continued to be held informally between some representatives of the two states. These proposals and counter-proposals came to an end with the assassination of President Park in October, 1979.

At one stage of the negotiations, however, President Jimmy Carter had hinted that American troops might be gradually withdrawn from South Korea. More important is the fact that Kim II Sung, in his present proposals, has invited South Korea to take part in the Conference table. In the proposals which he has now sent to President Regan, he has agreed also to sign an agreement for the preservation of peace. Washington, however, wants that China must be represented at the conference table, since in its opinion, if North Korea violates the agreement, only China can restrain it. In view of these proposals, Japan has come forward with the demand that Russia must be present of the peace conference. The new proposals of Kim II Sung, therefore, seem to be getting into difficulties but acute observers are of opinion that he definitely wants to get out of his isolation and does want a settlement with America. The future lies in the laps of the gods, but there are reasons to be optimistic.

CHAPTER XXV

JAPAN AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

THE OCCUPATION

Japan's surrender to the Allies, which was effected on 2 September 1945 by her representatives signing the Instrument of Surrender aboard the *U.S.S. Missouri* in Tokyo Bay, ended the epic of an Asian nation's rise in an incredibly short time from its position as a small obscure kingdom to that of a powerful empire rivalling the historic Great Powers of the West in strength, culture, and living standards of the people. The surrender was the result of a defeat, which was as complete as it was catastrophic. It involved the immediate occupation of the country by the victors, who remained in complete control of the government for seven years' leaving only when they chose to do so. Never in history had the Land of the Rising Sun sustained such a reverse in war, and never in her recorded history had any number of enemy forces (with the doubtful exception of a few of Kublai Khan's troops who may have escaped the typhoon in 1281) had effected a landing on Japanese soil.

The occupation of Japan by the Allies differed from that of Germany ; it was not their joint business, but was done by the United States alone. Japan, consequently, was not cut up, like defeated Germany, into occupation zones of the major allies ; the U. S. A. administered the entire country. This was considered by the Americans as just natural ; theirs were the Allied forces which were available at the moment for the war ; and it was they who had made the overwhelming contribution to victory. Soon after Japan's surrender, the U.S.A. indicated that she would consider the wishes of the principal Allied Powers as to occupation policies, but that if they disagreed the decisions shall rest with herself. In December, 1954, however, the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., created a Far Eastern

Commission and Allied Council for Japan. These bodies only theoretically limited the freedom of the U.S.A. to make decisions on occupation policies. But they did not limit the power of the Supreme Commander, the American General, MacArthur, to act on the basis of the United States policy decisions. The Occupation remained actually in the hands of the Americans.

The disposition of Japan's overseas territories after she had been defeated had been determined at various conferences of the heads of the Great Powers. (See Chapter 16). At the end of the hostilities the victors proceeded immediately to take possession of the territories which had been allotted to them at these conferences or to which they thought they had a right. Chiang Kai-shek's forces occupied Formosa, the Pescadores and part of Manchuria. The Soviet Union took possession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The United States held the Mariana, Caroline, Marshall and Ryukyu islands. From the close of the war to the end of 1947 Japan was forced to receive over 5 million overseas Japanese, soldiers and civilians.

Japan's surrender was unconditional, and General MacArthur, appointed on 14 August as Supreme Commander, had been told by the United States Joint Chiefs of staff that there was no element of contract or of negotiated surrender in the status of Japan, but that every governmental agency, including the Emperor, was at his command. Yet President Truman, on 8 May, had assured Japan that, while unconditional surrender was imperative, enslavement was not envisaged. It was decided that Japan would not be administered only by the Americans, but that existing Japanese would be used as much as possible. No large military government would be created as in Germany; instead, a small organization of staff sections would plan the occupation policy to be implemented by the existing Japanese government. The Occupation authorities would deal with the Japanese Government and issue instructions to it. The individual Japanese would act on instructions from his own government rather than from the Occupation authorities. Japan's peacefulness when the foreign occupation started took everyone by surprise. The press distinguished itself by its campaign for friendliness.

The ultimate objectives of the United States with regard to Japan were stated in the "United States Initial Post-War Surrender Policy for Japan", approved by President Truman on 6 September 1945,

and included in the instructions issued on that date to General MacArthur, Supreme Commande of the Allied Powers.

These instructions were :

(a) to ensure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace of the world ;

(b) to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the principles and the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to the principles of democratic government, but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.

The Far Eastern Commission, which had its headquarters in Washington and was composed of eleven nations including India, issued a statement of "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan", which was consistent with the earlier United States "initial" policy and with the directive given to General MacArthur by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. All these conformed to the intentions expressed in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945. Briefly, they required, first of all that Japan be stripped of all her overseas acquisitions since the Meiji Restoration ; that Japan be demilitarized through the abolition of the armed establishment and the exclusion of the militarists from all government positions ; and that Japan be given the opportunity to build an economy that would meet the peace-time needs of her people. The Supreme Commander was to use the Japanese Government, not necessarily always to support it.

To achieve her objectives, the U.S.A. set up the office of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), which combined military authority with the executive authority to direct policy regarding economic, political and social reforms in Japan. Meanwhile, the Pentagon had trained hundreds of picked servicemen, who could be appointed to specific posts to start the Operation machinery. These men were now flown to Japan to assist MacArthur in his monumental task of administering an empire of 74,000,000 people. Plans for the administration of occupied Japan had also been prepared by various institutions, and specially by a Japan

crowd-clustering round former Ambassador Joseph Clark Grew. MacArthur personally cared little for Old Japan Hands and told a newsman that he had but two advisers, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. The Occupation plans did not spring full-blown from MacArthur's head, but it is a fact that throughout the entire Occupation both the Occupation staff and the Japanese Government felt the influence of MacArthur. His was a stabilising influence in war-shattered Japan.

DEMILITARIZATION AND REARMAMENT

The objective of demilitarization included both the destruction of the machinery for war and of the intellectual and spiritual cause of militarism. The army was abolished, and the war-material productive plant was destroyed. Japanese military leaders were excluded from participation in public life. Major "war criminals" were tried and convicted by an international military tribunal set up for the purpose (See below.) Aircraft, synthetic oil and synthetic rubber industries, war industries, were destroyed. The steel, chemical, and machine tool industries were curtailed but not eliminated. Originally, it had been decided that the industrial plant should be dismantled to be used in payment for reparation; but little actual dismantling took place because the Allies could not agree as to the share each was to get.

The progress of the Cold War, the establishment of a communist government in China, and the outbreak of the war in Korea brought about a complete change in the political situation in the Far East. The U.S.A. now began to place a new value on Japan, and was anxious to secure her as an ally against World Communism and, concretely, against Red China and the Soviet Union, as, under like circumstances, the Allies had changed their policy with respect to West Germany. The diversion of a large part of the Occupation forces to Korea and the use of Japan as a base of operations for carrying on the war there raised the question of Japan's own security which was jeopardized to a further extent when Red China entered the war. Before, therefore, demilitarization could be fully accomplished, the process was reversed, and the U.S.A. wanted to build up both Japanese industries and military strength, making Japan an ally against her communist enemies.

In 1950, General MacArthur "advised" the Japanese Government to establish what was called a National Police Reserve, which the Americans would help train and equip and in the following year, General Ridgeway gave them the authority to revise, if need be, all Occupation-sponsored legislation. This force was created, and 75,000 men were recruited for a two-year period. It was quickly increased to number 200,000 men, with separate ground troops, air force and navy, and was renamed the Self-Defence Forces. The cost of the Japanese forces was largely underwritten by American funds, an item of about \$ 150 million a year. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, national opinion in Japan is opposed to rearmament. The present "defensive force" is not too large for a nation of 74 million, and is not particularly expensive (less than 3 per cent of the national income). The Japanese Government still contends that it is too great a strain on the national economy and that at any rate a higher defensive expenditure, which the U.S.A. has been insisting on, would meet with greater national opposition.

It is widely held in Japan that her rearmament was effected by the U.S.A. less for the sake of her own defence than for converting her into a bastion of American power in the Pacific and that it made an enemy of the Soviet Union, thus exposing her to aggressive attack from that power or from the People's Republic of China, and that in any case she runs the risk of becoming a battle-ground in a coming war between the U.S.A. and her enemies in the Far East. It is also pointed out that in view of the developments in the manufacture of I.R.B.M.'s and I.C.B.M.'s in both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., rearmament on conventional lines, save for the purpose of internal order, is fruitless. Japanese public opinion is, of course, totally opposed to the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in Japan, or the establishment of missile-launching bases in the military bases, which the Americans have in the country. With the never-to-be-forgotten lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese are understandably hyper-sensitive on the subject of nuclear weapons and in every addition to military establishment in Japan they see the spectre of nuclear devastation advancing towards them. There is another difficulty in the way of the U.S. plan to rearm Japan further : Article 9 of the Constitution declares ; "... .. the Japanese people for ever renounce war as a sovereign right of the

mation...land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained".

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

A number of changes were made in the administration of Japan by the Japanese Government in fulfilment of SCAP directives. These were accomplished within the terms of the Meiji constitution, and drastic changes were eschewed by them till, prodded by MacArthur, a draft constitution was prepared and proclaimed by the Emperor on 3 May 1947. For the Japanese it was nothing sort of a revolutionary document. It removed the Emperor from his pedestal of sacrosanct divinity and reduced him to a mere symbol of state. The revolutionary break with tradition was exemplified by the betrothal of Crown Prince Akihito to a commoner, Miss Michiko Shoda, daughter of a leading Japanese industrialist. Sovereignty was declared to rest with the people, and it was elaborately defined in a bill of rights.

Under the constitution, legislative power is in the hands of a bi-cameral Diet, with its powerful House of Representatives and the somewhat less important House of Councillors. The chief executive, the prime minister, is selected by the Diet and is responsible to it, and a majority of his cabinet must be Diet members. Following the English system so far, the constitution, as in the United States, creates an independent judiciary, with power to pass upon the constitutionality of law and of administrative action. It provides for the popular election of chief local officials, drastically curbs the power of the police, and to a certain extent decentralizes government operations.

SOCIAL CHANGES

For the first time in Japanese history women acquired equal legal rights with men in the fields of education and politics. The Occupation policies encouraged the development of individualism. In the early days of the Occupation, efforts were made to terminate the high concentration of wealth held by a few "families" (zaibatsu), to break up combines, and to encourage a wider and more general distribution of income and of the ownership of production. The zaibatsu leaders and their lieutenants were forbidden to

participate either in business or in politics. The Occupation, however, retreated from these policies when, with the establishment of a communist government in China and the lessons derived from the Korean War, the U.S.A. changed her policy with regard to Japan's military position.

The Occupation also made possible the development of Japan's free labour movement. The right of collective bargaining was recognized. Unions were permitted, and many were quickly organized and grew at phenomenal speed. Agriculture received due attention, and one of the most striking among the reforms carried out by the Occupation was the redistribution of agricultural land. Absentee landlords were compelled to sell all their land to the government, who resold it to former tenants who had cultivated them. By 1952, 90 per cent of all cultivated land had been acquired by those who worked it.

Educational reform was carried out by SCAP on a broad scale. The period of compulsory education was extended from six to nine years. The pre-war system was replaced by the American pattern of six-year elementary schools, three-year high schools, and four-year colleges. Textbooks were rewritten, modern teaching methods were introduced, and the centralized control of the Ministry of Education was greatly modified.

AN APPRAISAL OF OCCUPATION BENEFITS

During 1947-52, Japan underwent a revolution in government, society and economic organization, which is still too recent to permit a real evaluation. Certain criticisms are obvious; the changes which were often too sweeping were brought about from above, by an alien and military authority, and involved transplantation of foreign ideas and institutions. No doubt, the Japanese were receptive to new ideas, and never objected to western science and ways of life being introduced into their country, since they had appeared to them to be conducive to progress. Japan, in fact, had become a great nation by mastering western science and technique. So far, however, the choice had been voluntary, and the acceptance of reforms was wholehearted. Time alone will show if MacArthur's reforms will strike roots. The efforts to make the Japanese really democratic have been found to be only partly successful: Japanese politics are already on the old ruts. But certain victories stand

forth; the individual in Japan today has rare freedoms; freedom of speech, assembly, press and association. Unfortunately, however, freedom has already shown to be inclining towards licence: the social fabric is notably weakened, and for the first time Japan faces the problem of juvenile delinquency.

THE TOKYO TRIAL

The punishment, through the channel of organized justice, of "war criminals" was, quite early in the Second World War, proclaimed to be one of the war aims of the Allied Powers. The Tokyo trial followed the basic pattern for the trial of the European Axis "war criminals". In accordance with the directives he received on the subject, the Supreme Commander issued on 19 January 1946 a proclamation establishing the International Military Tribunal for the Far East to hold the trial. Exactly a month later, he appointed the members of the Tribunal from among the names designated by the nations composing the Far Eastern Commission. They were eleven in number, and included Dr. Radha Binode Pal, an eminent jurist, and, at the time of his appointment, a judge of the Calcutta High Court.

As many as 28 persons, including four former Prime Ministers of Japan, Hirota, Hiranuma, Tojo, and Koiso, Chiefs of the Army General Staff, former Ambassadors, such as Oshima, Shiratori, Shigemitsu, and Togo, were hauled up before the Tribunal to stand their trial. The crimes for which they were—individually or collectively or both ways—charged were listed under three categories, viz. (i) crimes against peace, (ii) conventional war crimes, and (iii) crimes against humanity. The prosecution undertook to establish the following facts:

Between 1928 and 1945 certain individuals, including the defendants, entered into a common plan whereby, under the pretext of an incident to be created, Japan would invade, conquer and enslave, and exploit Manchuria, with the object and purpose of using it as a springboard and a base for securing complete domination and control of East Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. To effectuate this plan, the conspirators were to seize control of the government of Japan either through a *coup d'état* or through the gradual infiltration of their members throughout all the high posts in Japan's political

structure. The plan was to be accomplished through wars of aggression against any nation which stood in the way of the accomplishment of its objects and purposes.

Pursuant to the common plan, certain of the conspirators created in September 1931 the requisite incident and proceeded to put the entire project into operation step by step. As the execution of the plan progressed, government acquiescence and co-operation were obtained through *coups d'etas*, assassination and infiltration bringing into power those favouring the acts of aggression. By 1936, the conspirators had so infiltrated the government and had become so powerful that their entire plan was adopted as the national policy of Japan.

Once in control of government they accelerated their programme of preparing Japan militarily, politically and economically for war and planned, prepared, launched and waged aggressive wars not only against China, but all the other prosecuting powers and Thailand and the Mongolian People's Republic. In the course of execution of their plan, they ordered or permitted to be committed innumerable atrocities against prisoners of war and civilian internees and against civilian populations in occupied areas.

THE DEFENCE ARGUMENTS

The defendants' conflicting interests militated against a unified and integrated presentation, but their major contention which all of them urged was that their acts were justified as acts of self-defence. They had all believed, they said, that Japan's existence as a nation was threatened by the menace of communism and disorder in China, by the Soviet Union and by the concerted actions of the Western Powers. They contended that as the duly constituted officials of the Japanese Government, they had to provide for the defence of Japan to promote the welfare of the Japanese people. They had always tried to obtain the materials and security essential to the defence and survival of Japan, without resorting to armed conflict. But when these efforts failed and Japan's national existence was threatened, they had no alternative but to go to war. They sought to rebut every charge made against them, and produced a vast mass of materials and numerous defence witnesses in support of their arguments.

Defence witnesses maintained, *inter alia*, that the phrases "Hakko-Ichiu", "New Order in East Asia", and "Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere" had been distorted and misconstrued and that they had no malicious or criminal implications involving military aggression. "Hakko-Ichiu" for more than two thousand years had meant only "universal brotherhood" and not world dominion by Japan. The "New Order in East Asia" carried this idea forward for the improvement and development of all the Asiatic peoples so that they might be independent and have their just share in the world's goods. Japan had not imposed the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" but the other Asian peoples had voluntarily entered into it to obtain independence and to improve their fortunes.

THE JUDGMENT

The prosecution case opened on 13 June, and, after the Tribunal had conducted 818 sessions, orally examined 419 witnesses, and received affidavits and depositions from 779 other witnesses, delivered their judgment on 4 November 1948. Of the 11 judges, 8 fully supported the judgment and the verdicts, one, viz. Justice Roling of Netherlands concurred in part and dissented in part, and only one, Justice Pal, filed a completely dissenting opinion as lengthy as the majority judgment. The Tribunal (by a majority) sentenced Dohinara, Hirota, Itagaki, Kimura, Matsui, Muto, and Tojo to death by hanging and the other defendants to various terms of imprisonment. Justices Pal and Bernard would have acquitted all of the defendants of all the charges. The sentences were carried out. (For Justice Pal's judgment, see *International Military Tribunal for the Far East—Dissentient Judgment of Justice R.B. Pal, M.A. LL D.*).

THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

The question of concluding a peace treaty with Japan was bedeviled with Cold War problems, and, concretely, Soviet opposition to what appeared to be the U.S. resolve to make Japan her militarily ally against the communist bloc in the Far East. In 1950, the U.S.A. decided to go ahead with her plan—without Soviet agreement if necessary—and published a memorandum containing a general

statement of the type of treaty she envisaged. Red China at once warned that she would regard as illegal any treaty with Japan which was concluded without her participation. She declared that the published terms utterly disregarded the interests of the Chinese people. Britain and other allies of the U.S.A. had their differences with the U.S.A. on the proposals, but these were resolved and an Anglo-American draft treaty was prepared. India generally supported the position taken up by the Soviet Union and Red China, and was strongly criticized by America for her attitude. The Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida accepted the proposed terms, but they were widely criticized in Japan.

The treaty was signed at a conference at San Francisco on 8 September 1951. Neither the Chinese Nationalist Government nor the People's Republic was invited to attend, because the sponsoring powers could not agree on which government should represent China. Nor was Italy invited, again because of disagreement among the sponsors. India, Burma, and Yugoslavia declined to attend. The Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia came but did not sign the treaty. In all, 51 states were present at the conference and 48 signed. The treaty became effective upon the deposit of ratifications on 28 April 1952, and on that date the Occupation came to an end. India signed a separate peace treaty with Japan on 9 June 1952.

The treaty restored full sovereignty to Japan. It limited Japanese territory to the four main islands and some adjacent minor islands. It stipulated that Japan would concur in any United States proposal to place the Ryukyu, Bonin and Volcano islands under American trusteeship. (No such proposal has been made so far and the U.S., under the terms of the treaty, retains absolute control.) The treaty provided that Japan should pay reparations, but it was expected that the war-ravaged territories, e.g. the Philippines, may send raw materials to Japan for processing, and that the resulting manufactures should be regarded as reparations.

On the same day that the peace treaty was signed, Japan and the United States signed a security pact, under which Japan granted the latter the right to station land, sea and air forces on Japanese territory. Japan bound herself not to grant similar rights to other

nations without the consent of the United States. An administrative agreement signed by Japan and the United States on 28 February 1952 implemented the security treaty and set forth the arrangements under which the U.S.A. was to maintain bases in Japan. Jurisdiction over American armed forces was reserved to the United States. The security treaty and the administrative agreement meant that independent Japan would serve as a military, naval and air base for the United States in much the same manner as had Occupied Japan. The three agreements were not concluded without causing pain for the Japanese people. The grant of blanket extra-territoriality to the United States military personnel, to civilian components, and to the families of both groups was a particularly bitter pill to swallow. It was widely denounced as "shameful, dishonourable, tantamount to reducing the country to a colonial status".

The recovery of independence was followed by the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with virtually every country in the world, including the U.S.S.R. In 1956, the U.S.S.R. having decided to refrain from exercising her veto, Japan also gained admission to the United Nations. In December, 1957, she was elected to membership in the U.N. Security Council to begin her term on 1 January 1958.

PROBLEMS OF THE NEW JAPAN

"Too many people, too little space, too few resources" continue to be Japan's main problems, and, in a number of respects, they have been accentuated on account of her present position of alignment to one of the world's power blocs, which further threatens to make her an "orphan in Asia". The alliance with the U.S.A., which was further cemented by the signing in March, 1954 of the Mutual Defence Association Agreement, which forged more military ties between the two countries, gave her security against communist pressures. It brought American economic aid, credits and an active expanding trade with the United States. There is, however, a growing imbalance in American-Japanese trade relations, resulting in a huge "dollar gap", which Japan finds it more and more difficult to eliminate. If she tried to solve the problem by curbing drastically her purchases in America, she would have to turn to the communist bloc countries, whose

capacity to fulfil her requirements is open to doubt. Due to political reasons, and, as an ally of the United States Japan imposed security export controls on her trade with mainland China. The restrictions resulted in virtual cessation of trade between the two countries, causing a heavy loss of Japan's traditional markets and sources of raw materials. Any attempt to expand her exports to the United States, which may have provided another way out of her difficulties, is barred by the fact that American manufacturers affected by such a Japanese trade drive are opposed to it. This has been grist for the mills of Japanese socialists and others who advocate a shift towards a neutralist position and close economic and political relations with Red China and other communist-bloc countries.

ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING IN JAPAN

Apart from the fact that a proud nation like the Japanese, who not long ago were counted among the Great Powers of the world, cannot feel happy at their present position of dependence on their late enemy, who wrought nuclear destruction on two of their greatest cities, there are a number of concrete issues on which Japanese public opinion is hostile to the Americans. The sorest one is the continuance of American troops on Japanese soil, and though American military installations were reduced from 1,407 at the time of the peace treaty to 369 two years later, they cause resentment and, occasionally, ugly incidents happen. The case, in 1957, of a United States soldier, William S. Girard, who fired a shot that killed a Japanese woman, is still fresh in the minds of the Japanese. Again, military bases, which under present-day military needs, occupy a large area of flat land, are anathema in a country like Japan where every acre diverted from cultivation is a loss. Above all, Japan, incessantly threatened by the Russians with total destruction for "offering her soil to the United States for aggressive purposes", and with the nightmarish vision of the Japanese islands as an atomic battlefield, naturally yearns for a release from her military tie with the U.S.A.

Closely related to this issue is the Japanese concern over the holding by the U.S.A. of nuclear tests in the Pacific, which reduces

her Pacific fishing grounds, and endangers the safety of Japanese fishermen engaged in fishing operations there for a livelihood. The incident of the Japanese tuna boat, the *Lucky Dragon*, which was caught in atomic fallout near Bikini Atoll, where the Americans performed a nuclear test in the spring of 1954, seriously affected Japanese-American relations. More serious still, there is the Japanese objection to the stockpiling by the Americans of atomic weapons on Japanese soil. United States forces in Okinawa are believed to possess atomic weapons. The Japanese argue that an enemy making an atomic attack on Okinawa may not spare Japan proper since the American military bases in Okinawa and in Japan are parts of one system.

Okinawa, which is strategically situated almost equidistant from Japan, South Korea, Mainland China, and Taiwan (Formosa), is a part of the Ryukyu Islands, which Japan lost on account of her defeat in the Second World War. The U.S.A. recognized Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the island, but has no intention of withdrawing from there, or even sharing her administration with Japan. There is a strong irredentist movement in Okinawa, which draws its inspiration from hatred of American military rule there together with resentment at the unusual size of the military establishment and the American insistence on requisitioning farm land in exchange for lump sum payment rather than annual rental. In 1956, there were anti-American demonstrations in the island involving as much as one-fourth of the island's total population and the election of a communist mayor in the capital of Naha.

In 1956, Anti-American feeling ran so high at Sunakawa, a village near the United States military base of Tachikawa in the vicinity of Tokyo, that there were serious clashes between the police and the villagers, who were aroused by the announcement that the Americans were about to expand their air-strips, and were joined by workers, students and pacifists from Tokyo. Some 800 persons were injured and there were many arrests.

The security treaty was both a foreign policy and a domestic issue. It was an important plank in the programme of the Socialist Party, which fights government on such basic issues as capitalism

versus socialism, disarmament versus rearmament, etc. The socialists are uncompromising in their opposition to the American alignment, and consider that Japan cannot become really independent without tearing up the security pact. They advocate closer contacts with Asia and neutralism in foreign policy.

REVISION OF THE SECURITY TREATY

With a view to getting some of the unequal aspects of the Security Treaty redressed, Prime Minister Nobusuko Kishi proposed its revision in 1958. This led in 1960 to the greatest upheaval in Japan since the occupation. A peculiar combination of circumstances—the shooting down of an American U-2 plane over Russia, the proposal for a visit to Japan by President Eisenhower—inflamed public feeling producing violent riots in Tokyo, and compelled the Kishi government to resign, not, however, before a revised security treaty had been signed and ratified by the Diet. Under the new treaty, the U.S.A. must consult with the Japanese Government if she wishes to make any substantial change in the status of her forces in Japan, i.e., if any sizeable amount of men or material is to be moved into or out of the country. It also forbids the use of her bases in Japan proper for eaches of nuclear weapons and for the deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft. The treaty incidentally has the undesired effect of making the U.S.A. cling all the more tenaciously to its position in Okinawa, which every Japanese wants to be restored to Japan, since the restriction about nuclear weapons does not apply to U.S.A. military bases in that island. Japanese are unhappy over the fact that the retrocession of Okinawa can be negotiated only at a price which they do not want to pay: they will have to take on a responsibility for the U.S. nuclear presence on Okinawa which now rests solely with the U.S.A. After the new treaty has been in force for ten years from 1960, either side can give one year's notice to terminate.

JAPAN AND CHINA

Despite some anxiety about the growing nuclear power of China, the pervasive note remains in Japan that China does not pose a

direct military threat to herself and that she should seek to avoid giving provocation to China through excessive hospitality to the U.S. nuclear presence. Many Japanese think that in spite of her security pact with the U.S.A. it is possible for Japan to improve her relations stage by stage with both the Soviet Union and Communist China. In contrast with the coldness of Japanese attitudes to the Soviet Union, and the calculating manner in which the objective of improving relations with Moscow is approached, the impulse to "normalize" relations with China has an imponderable emotional approach. "Japanese attitudes towards China are a complex amalgam of pragmatic factors overlain with a compulsion for a closer relationship consistent with the national sense of historic cultural kinship." Japan and China will some day resume official relations ; until then, economic contacts are being pursued. This policy is described by the Japanese Government as the "separation of economics from politics." Sino-Japanese trade is still small, but China has already become Japan's fifth most important trading partner, after the U.S.A., Australia, Canada and the Philippines. Japanese find their present policy of "sticking to the United States and trading with everybody" quite a profitable one. Peking castigates the Sato government as an American puppet, but goes on expanding its imports. Japanese endorsement of American policy in Vietnam, however, remains a sore point with Communist China.

JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R.

There is frankly little love lost between Japan and the U.S.S.R. The Japanese find it hard to forget the latter's sudden unprovoked attack on them towards the close of the Second World War, when they were desperately defending themselves against devastating U.S.A. attacks from the air. Their past relations with Tsarist Russia also were almost uniformly unpleasant. On their side, the Russians consider their humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War as an indelible stain on their national history. The communist masters of Russia, who look upon the U.S.A. as their Public Enemy No. 1, cannot, of course, tolerate Japan's military ties with the latter, and it is the prime objectives of their foreign policy to remove U.S. bases from Japan, to separate Japan from her

American ally and to induce Japan to adopt a position of neutralism towards the communist bloc.

With so much anti-American feeling existing in Japan, however, it is not possible that Soviet propaganda against "American war-mongers" and in advocacy of the prohibition of nuclear test, etc. could fail to make some impression on the masses in Japan. The Soviet can alternate soft peace tunes with war blasts too; and at times when the Washington-Peiping tension in the Taiwan Strait is particularly intense, they remind the Japanese about the existence of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 14 February 1950, directed against Japan and her allies. Under the circumstances, Premier Khrushchev's suggestion to cancel both the U.S.—Japanese and Sino-Soviet military alliances and to substitute them for one Asian great-power security pact was not without appeal in Japan. At least the Socialist Party reacted favourably to the idea.

There are a number of concrete issues on which the U.S.S.R. and Japan are constantly wrangling with each other. First, there is the fisheries dispute. Before the war, much of the Japanese catch used to come from the areas north of Hokkaido—the Kuriles, Sakhalin and Soviet territorial waters. On account of the occupation of the Kuriles and the Japanese half of Sakhalin by the Soviet after the war, Japan has lost much of her former fishery bases, which are now in Soviet territory. Japanese fishing boats caught in Soviet waters are detained in Soviet ports and Japan has on this account become very dependent on Soviet goodwill. In 1955, Japan and the U.S.S.R. resumed diplomatic relations with each other, and this somewhat eased the fisheries issue. But as Moscow refused to return Etorofu and Kunashiri, the two southernmost islands of the Kuriles, which Japan considers as integral parts of her territory, and as it agreed to return the Habomais and Shikotan, small islands off Hokkaido, only in exchange for Japan's signing a peace treaty, the Tokyo Government, backed by Japanese public opinion, has refused to give up its claims, and no peace treaty has been signed so far between the two governments. Another cause of ill-feeling between the two countries is the refusal of the Soviet Government to repatriate some 10,000 prisoners of war, who are, according to the Japanese

Government, still detained in the Soviet Union. Moscow denies the existence of any unrepatriated Japanese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union or any territories under its control.

Of late, however and chiefly as the result of her growing discord with Communist China, the U.S.S.R. has been induced to adopt a softer tune in her diplomatic relations with Japan. The two communist giants are, indeed, at present engaged in competing with each other in establishing their influence in Japan. In May 1964, the People's Republic of China sent a trade fair to tour major Japanese cities, and display a variety of industrial goods—from transistor radios to a giant turbine—with a view to impressing the Japanese people with the scientific and industrial advance and power of new China. In the same month, Anastas I. Mikoyan, then First Deputy Premier and later President of the U.S.S.R., paid a surprise visit to Japan and held talks with the business magnets of the country on trade prospects. The bait he dangled before them is said to be large-scale Japanese participation in the industrialization of Siberia, though his concrete proposals were limited to the conventional type of credits and purchases. In September, 1964, Mr. Khrushchev told a member of the Japanese socialist parliamentaries team, touring the U.S.S.R., at Moscow that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to return to Japan the two "tiny islands" she held since the Second World War if the U.S.A. relinquished Okinawa. "If the U.S.A. returned Okinawa to Japan," he added, "then we will begin to trust Japan." This was obviously talking in Cold War language, and was a further revelation of the underlying purpose of communist wooing of Japan—to dislodge the U.S.A. from her position of vantage in the Far East. The recent developments, nevertheless, indicate a significant change in the U.S.S.R. attitude towards Japan.

NET TRENDS IN JAPAN'S POLICY "—ASIAN DIPLOMACY"

Japan's present position is admittedly difficult as well as insecure. Poised unevenly between East and West (as she is at present) she may go down if anything happens to intensify the current cold war, or, if a hot war should break out. It seems, being fully aware of this, Japan is working towards a readjustment of her relations

with the two blocs, and is re examining the question of her security in a divided world. She has made significant attempts to remove the scars which the wounds inflicted by her invading hordes caused in many countries she had occupied during the war. Beginning with a reparations agreement with Burma in 1954, Japan has settled her war-time accounts with her neighbours in the south at the cost of \$1 billion, to be paid in goods and services over the next decade or two. In cooperation with the United States, she is granting increasing amounts of credits and loans to Asian nations with a view to building up their industries. The best instance of this kind of three-party agreements is the agreement reached by Japan, the U.S.A. and India in March 1954, for the development of the Rourkela iron mines in India. Japan has agreed to contribute to this cooperative venture an \$8 million loan for the purchase of rolling stock, mining machinery and harbour facilities. She has sought in various ways to strengthen her economic and cultural bonds with South-East Asia.

As the result of these activities, Japan has come forward in a new role in world politics, the chief trend of which is variously being called "economic diplomacy" or "Asian diplomacy" and by some has been described as a new form of "neutralism". She seems determined to avoid the mistakes of the past to have abandoned any thought of political domination by herself of fellow-Asian nations. With their discipline, their industriousness and their dynamic purposefulness, as well as their mastery of western science and technology, the Japanese people are singularly fitted to play this new role in Asia and the world and thus to acquire for themselves, also, though in a sense different from what they had aimed at it in the past, the status of a Great Power.

CHAPTER XXVI

NEW NATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

AN AVERAGE Indian, before the Second World War, found little to interest him in the land or affairs of South-East Asia, and this information about them hardly went beyond the temples of Angkor Vat and Borobudur, and Balinese dancers, and their natural resources such as tin, rubber and quinine. Most of the people of South-East Asia, indeed figured little in history, as they were for centuries living in a state of colonial slavery under the British, the Dutch and the French, and it was the latter's staggering defeat at the hands of the Japanese during the conflict that first drew world attention to the countries of South-East Asia and their various problems, political, economic, and strategic. South-East Asia—a loosely defined area—refers here to six countries—Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China (split up into North Vietnam or Vietminh, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos), Malaya and Burma. The last four lie within the peninsula that forms the South-eastern extremity of continental Asia, and the first-named, Indonesia, is an adjacent chain of islands scattered across an area of some 4,000 miles along the equator or one-seventh of the way around the earth.


Freed from the yoke of western colonialism, the countries of South-East Asia are attempting to form stable systems of government and to build up under-developed economies with a view to providing higher standards of living and modern facilities for their fast-growing, impoverished, and discontented peoples totalling 250,000,000. Their recent history and strategic location, however have drawn them into the vortex of world politics, an outstanding feature of which is the Cold War. South-East Asia is the strategic crossroads between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, between East and South Asia. It lies beneath the underbelly of Red China, whose emigrant people and new, dynamic system of government have spread their impact among the peoples of the area. Militarily and politically weak, South-East Asia is caught and pulled by the rival economic,

military and political forces of the communist and democratic blocs. At present it is a major storm-centre of world politics.

INDONESIA

Indonesia's 3,000 and odd volcanic and coral islands have a population of about 96 million, which is very disproportionately distributed, and range from the ex-head-hunting Dyaks of Borneo to Japanese ex-Sultans. The land area is about 20 per cent developed and overpopulated, and about 80 per cent wild and empty. Java, alone, which has 9 per cent of Indonesia's land area, contains 61.5 million inhabitants. It consumes far more rice than it produces, drains revenues from other areas, and dominates the government of the nation in a way that leads to complaints of "Javanese colonialism" by "brown Dutchmen". The immense island of Sumatra, where 16 per cent of the nation's population occupies 32 per cent of its land and produces 70 per cent by value of the nation's exports, considers itself neglected and exploited and was recently rebellious. The tiny island of Bali, separated from Java by two miles of shark infested ocean and by six centuries of magically preserved Hindu art and culture, is a microcosm of the grace and beauty of Indonesia's medieval past. The Balinese, however, find that stretches of blue, sunswept water and beaches of gold sand ringed by reefs of coral are no longer defences against the outside world but sea-lanes through which it enters.

Under the impact, their simple, rice-based economy, the ancient Hindu beliefs, the village-centred politics, the temple-centred life, the lovely old individualized handicrafts are gradually—sometimes almost imperceptively—giving way. The dreamland is vanishing, and they themselves do not desire to cling to it; but they complain that the government is doing too little to ease their passage towards and entry into the realities of modern life. Kalimantan, or Indonesian Borneo is a vast equatorial westland, very scantily populated, predominantly rural and agrarian like the rest of the country, and with a townspeople clustering about the coastal oil installations. The Moluccas, still producing spices as in the days they first drew European explorers to the Indies, have in the last decade produced insurrection in as great abundance and at less profit. All in all, the new Indonesian nation, with all its



diversities, anomalies, anachronisms, and mild strifes, is full of optimism with regard to its future, and determination to uphold their national motto, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in diversity). Indonesia is the third richest nation in the world in raw materials after the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and is the Far East's leading oil producer.

BIRTH OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM

The Indonesian nationalist movement has been traced to the early years of the present century, the first to dream of their country's freedom being a group of young boys—among them being found the country's later-day heroes, Sukarno, Hatta, Sjarir—who clustered round one H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto and were banded in a league known as the *Serikat Islam*. They spanned the political spectrum from the Quoran to Marx, were proficient in Dutch, English, French, German, Arabic, discussed Voltaire and Rousseau, Hume, and Locke, Hegel and Kant, Jefferson and Lincoln, Marx and Lenin, the Quoran, the Bible and the Mahabharata, and explored the significance of the Meiji restoration in Japan, the revolution in China, the Muslim revival, Indian nationalism, the Philippine revolt, and more and more, after the First World War, the communist revolution in Russia. The *Serikat Islam* managed till about 1923 to maintain harmonious coexistence of apparently conflicting personalities and ideologies. In that year, however, the Marxists, after attempting unsuccessfully to usurp control, split off, and most of their leaders, after heading public disorders in 1926, went to jail or exile. The nationalists, thereupon, assumed leadership, and many of their leaders too went the way of those of the communists.

Since 1927, the greatest leader of the Indonesian revolutionary movement has been 'Bung Karno, that is, Brother, Friend, or Comrade (Su) Karno. Heir to the Tjokroaminoto tradition of "One Happy Family", he has been the greatest upholder of "Merdeka" (Freedom) through *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). In the Second World War, Sukarno and his comrades found their opportunity to realize the ideal. Ironically enough, the Dutch masters themselves had prepared for them a fertile ground on which they could sow their revolutionary seeds. Whatever their faults, which were many, the Dutch during the three centuries of their rule of the

islands, improved public health and thus fostered population pressures and unrest. They developed economic resources and thus fostered demands for modern economic benefits. They established an educational system for a select minority and thus trained an intellectual elite who promptly became nationalists and revolutionary leaders. When the Japanese defeated the Dutch in early 1942, they found and recognized the revolutionary movement that was under way in Indonesia and installed Sukarno as the top Indonesian official, Muhammad Hatta as his first assistant, and other Indonesians as their associates.

The Indonesians owe more to the Land of the Rising Sun for the independence they now enjoy than they are perhaps willing to admit. The Japanese without doubt ruthlessly exploited them for sinews of war, but they provided them with arms and military training against a possible Allied invasion, and more and more as the prospects of their victory receded—with a view to whipping up their enthusiasm for a share in the benefits of partnership in their 'Co-Prosperity Sphere for East Asia—turned over the internal administration to them, and even issued a promise of independence late in 1944. They gave direct impetus to nationalist feeling by stressing Indonesia's culture and language in hopes of lessening the lure of western civilization. All these stood Sukarno, Hatta, and other leaders in good stead when, two days after the Japanese surrender—on 17 August 1945—they declared Indonesia's independence. Presently British troops landed in Java ostensibly to round up and disarm the Japanese, and in their wake, Dutch troops and officials, who refused to recognize the Republic. In early 1946, the British, to their ever-lasting discredit, began to use Japanese troops as auxiliaries against the Indonesians, and gave Russia and the Ukraine an opportunity to bring the Indonesian question to the attention of the U.N. in January, 1946.

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

Between 1945 and 1950, the Indonesian Republic was thrice engaged in prolonged conflicts with the Dutch, and thrice in prolonged negotiations. The first conflicts with the Dutch forces—also the British and Japanese—occurred in late 1945 and early 1946. In the midst of the savage warfare, the British commander, General

Christion, managed to bring the parties together for informal discussion. Presently the Republican leaders accepted the Linggadjati Agreement (15 November 1946), according to which Indonesia was partitioned into Dutch and Republican areas and pledged to permanent co-operation in a Netherlands-Indonesian federal union. The agreement was promptly sabotaged by both Dutch reactionaries and Indonesian extremists. The Dutch resorted to economic measures which practically constituted a blockade of all Republican ports, and also, following the old imperialist game of "divide and rule" fomented the resentment felt by other islanders against Java's assumption of leadership, and actually set up a number of states which were to come into the United States of Indonesia, and thus outweigh the Republic's voice in the proposed federation. On 21 July 1947, they launched what is known in history as their "first police action" against the Republic and, employing the full might of armoured and mechanized equipment and co-ordinating land, air, and amphibious operations, occupied all of the main points in western, eastern, and a large part of central Java.

The Dutch "police action" had immediate and far-reaching reaction in the western countries and in India. On 24 July, Prime Minister Nehru issued a statement which has come to be called the Asian "Monroe Doctrine". "No European country, whatever it may be", said he, "has the right to set its army in Asia against the people of Asia. When it does, Asia will not tolerate it...The mere fact that foreign armies are fighting on Asian soil is a great insult to Asia". Meanwhile, the U.N. which, as we have seen, had already been seized of the Indonesian question, exhibited once more its failure to discuss any international affair except as an issue in the Cold War. India and Australia, for different reasons, joined the Soviet Union in supporting the Republic, but the attitude of the U.S.A. and China to the question was so non-committal as to amount to support of Dutch action. However, in October, 1947, the U.N. sent to Indonesia a Commission of Good Offices, which managed to bring about a precarious cease-fire and the revival of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations. But the resulting Renville Agreement of January, 1948, which reverted in effect to the Linggadjati-Agreement, still left the Dutch in possession of their recent territorial gains at the expense of the Republic and in a position to carry on their mischievous game of attempting to splinter the Republic.

Eight months later, the Dutch machinations seemed to have had their desired results, as the Indonesian extremists, led by the communists, broke out into the bloody Madiun insurrection of 18 September 1948. The revolt was firmly suppressed by the Sukarno-Hatta Government, and seemed to have produced one conspicuous result in frightening the U.S.A. about Communism in South-East Asia and strengthening international support of the middle-of-the-road Republican government. It, however, emboldened the Dutch who by the time had consolidated their positions, to launch their "second police action". On 19 December 1948 Dutch forces captured the Republican capital and the Republican leaders. The Republic, however, refused to admit defeat, and won the support of Indonesian federalists; some Republican officials set up an emergency government in a remote part of Sumatra, and guerilla warfare against the Dutch was intensified. The U.N. once more demonstrated its utter failure to deal with a colonial issue, and a resolution passed by the Security Council was watered down to little more than reproaches to the Dutch and vague suggestions that a truce be re-established. India's Prime Minister summoned a conference at New Delhi with a view to enlisting Asian opposition to the Dutch but it failed to take the strong stand hoped for by the Republic. It was the impact of world censure that forced the Dutch to climb down—not to mention the guerilla operations in Java and Sumatra. Under U.N. sponsorship an agreement was initialled in May, 1949 by Dutch officials and the interned Republican leaders. Under its terms the Republican government was soon afterwards re-established within the limits of the Sultanate of Jogjakarta in central Java, and the Republic participated, along with the Federated Indonesian States and the Netherlands, in a round table conference which convened at the Hague in August, 1949. The labours of this conference resulted in the adoption of a new constitution for the Republic of United Indonesia on 29 October and the signing of an agreement on 2 November transferring sovereignty to the new state.

FROM FEDERATED UNION TO REPUBLIC

The Dutch transferred sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia on 27 December 1949, the latter being formed of the union of the 15 Dutch-created states plus the Republic. The status of West New

Guinea (West Irian) was left to be decided later. On 17 August 1950, however, the Republic, by unilateral action, converted the Federation into the present centralized state of the Republic of Indonesia. The new state remained a partner in an inoperative Dutch-Indonesian Union until that arrangement, too, was unilaterally revoked in 1956. All remaining commitments to the Netherlands, including financial obligations, were then, or later, renounced.

Dutch-Indonesian relations continued to be strained on the issue of West Irian, where Dutch colonial presence was branded by Indonesian leaders as an "intolerable imperialist provocation" within Indonesian national waters. The Dutch Government eventually proposed to transfer to the U.N. all authority over West New Guinea. Indonesia promptly rejected the proposal, but as the result of U.N. mediation, a pact was signed between the two governments, whereby the territory should be transferred to Indonesia in May 1963 and a vote be taken in 1969 by which West Irian should finally decide whether they wished to be independent or remain permanently Indonesian. The territory was actually incorporated in 1963. (The eastern half of the island is administered by Australia and is not in dispute.)

MYSTIQUE OF SUKARNOISM

Before the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, Sukarno and Hatta had co-operated, though not without friction, in the Indonesian nationalist movement. They had both been exiled, and, when the Dutch authority in Indonesia suffered eclipse during the Japanese occupation, Sukarno, as the top Indonesian leader, co-operated with the Japanese, while Hatta as the second man served as the link between him and the anti-Japanese underground. After independence they created the legend of the *Dwitunggal*, that is, the joint headship of state. As president, Sukarno spent his time between public pageantry and private intrigue and stood apart from the actual conduct of administration, which fell to Hatta as Vice-President. Sukarno gradually disregarded Hatta's advice and demeaned his position. In 1956 the latter finally broke with Sukarno and went into voluntary exile.

Sukarno's path has not been strewn with roses : after the nationally agreed upon goal of independence had been achieved,

the more difficult task remained of determining what sort of limitations the people must place upon themselves. In attempting to perform it, Sukarno had to face considerable opposition and was subject to attacks from many quarters. Ever since the national awakening, it was he who had formulated ideologies; in 1927 he had pronounced the philosophy of "Marhaenism", which he described as "Indonesian Marxism", though the class struggle of Marxism had become in his philosophy the struggle of the colonized versus the colonizing nations. In 1945, just before the Japanese defeat, Sukarno had adjusted Marhaenism to the new world order by formulating the *Pantjasila*, the Five Principles of the new Indonesian nation: Nationalism, Internationalism, Democracy, Social Justice, and Belief in God. In 1947, charging the counter-revolutionaries with betraying the Marhaen, Sukarno announced that he had conceived a *Konsepsi*, i.e., a way out of Indonesia's incessant crises. The concept was henceforth propounded in "MANIPOL" or the Political Manifesto of Sukarno's 1959 Independence Day Oration. USDEK is an acronym formed by the initial letters of five key policies and stands for the 1945 constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and Indonesian Identity.

INDONESIAN POLITICS

In 1950 Indonesia's Government reflected the nation's divisions and conflicts. The cabinet was formed of representatives of 30 warring political parties, among whom four ran almost neck and neck in the 1955 elections and in parliamentary composition. The latter were—the Nationalists (PNI), the Masjumi (liberal Muslims), the Nahdatul Ulama (NU, the conservative Muslims) and the Communists (PKI). In conceiving his concept of the "wayout", Sukarno started from one basic premise—no stability was possible as long as the PNI, the Masjumi, and the NU played musical chairs with offices, and combined to keep out the PKI. "I can't and I won't" he said, "ride a three-legged horse." He determined to unite or to "bury" the parties and instal the communists as equal partners in government. The result was protests from all parties excepting the communists, and rebellions in many islands, specially in Sumatra. The government eventually crushed the revolts, but by, internally and externally, moving closer to the communist bloc (1958).

Later, Sukarno adopted strong measures to implement his conception of USDEK. He created a set of consultative bodies, dissolved the Constituent Assembly (5 July 1959)—reverting by decree to the authoritarian 1945 constitution—and dissolved the elected parliament (5 March 1960). He named a new and enlarged presidential '*gotong-rojong*' (mutual help) cabinet, presumably divorced from the parties, but including crypto-communists. He governed as president and prime minister, advised by an appointive non-voting Provisional People's Congress of 609 members, which included the 283 members of an appointive, non-voting "mutual help" parliament.

Sukarno's political reorientation of the nation resulted in the dissolution of all opposition parties, and the existence of only pro-USDEK parties one of them being the PKI. Three major factions now grouped themselves about Sukarno: (1) the palace clique consisting of mainly the so-called "Generation of 45", the younger leaders of the revolutionary times, (2) the PKI, or communists, (3) military leaders, prominent among whom were first and foremost, General Naustion, an enigmatic figure "conflictively rumoured to be on the verge of deposing Sukarno or of being himself deposed by his own subordinates, to be about to take strong action against the Communists or shortly to become their captive", and next in importance, Chairul Saleh, who had kidnapped Sukarno in 1945, was his chief activist organizer in 1957, and later Minister of Reconstruction and Development.

FOREIGN POLICY

Indonesia's foreign policy and foreign relations are conditioned by four objectives, which are not entirely compatible with each other. They are : (1) Stress on anti-colonialism, (2) Predilection to Marxism, (3) Non-involvement and freedom of manoeuvre, and (4) Desire of establishing Indonesian leadership in an Afro-Asian bloc of similarly non-involved nations. Sukarno sought to achieve these aims of his foreign policy by what have been called "travelling summitry", or "peripatetic statesmanship." Starting in 1956, he in recent years made annual visits to the U.S.A., China etc., of which a virtually obligatory feature was a joint communique on international problems, dramatizing the dilemma of the western world and the advantage of the communist world, in dealing with Indonesia.

He repeatedly stressed Indonesia's claims on New Guinea, and gave general support to Khrushchev's "troika" proposal for recognizing the U.N. Secretariat by dividing the position and authority of the Secretary-General among the communist, "capitalist" and "neutralist" blocs. Indonesia, second only to India in importance among the non-involved nations and her rival in international councils as the most outspoken critic of the Great Powers, would of course, gain considerably in any such reorganization of U.N. A method frequently employed by President Sukarno for bringing himself and his country to limelight was by organizing such meetings as the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955, or "prestige" projects such as holding the Asian Games at Djakarta in 1962.

Sukarno and Chou En-lai repeatedly protested mutual friendship, and if any Asian leader personally benefited by participation in the Bandung Conference, it was Chou En-lai, who practically "came and saw and conquered". The relations deteriorated in 1958 and early 1959 when Indonesia expelled communist Chinese residents from the rural areas and seized their properties. The crises aroused Indonesian concern over China's potentially aggressive designs against Indonesia and South-East Asia as a whole. Indonesia's relations with Russia were bad in 1950 when Stalin insulted the first Indonesian mission to Moscow by showing himself ill-informed and ill-mannered. Despite public shows of affability, Khrushchev and Sukarno did not regard each other highly, but Indonesia received considerable Russian aid, specially with regard to military equipment in times of Indonesia's greatest need, viz. during 1956-58, when there were rebellions.

As regards non-communist or neutralist Asian nations, Indonesia followed a policy of opportunism. Her admiration of India was tempered by rivalry, and an ambivalent stand on the issue of Kashmir. Indonesia, however, was one of the so-called "Colombo Powers" who, under the presidentship of Mrs. Bandaranaike, the premier of Ceylon, met and framed a plan for easing relations between India and China but the part she played in the negotiations was weak and half-hearted. Indonesia disapproved of SEATO as a western dominated military alliance which created tensions in the area, and regretted that Asian nations, such as Thailand, Philippines, and Pakistan took part in it. She oppos-

ed what she called the unnatural partition of Indo-China and deplored foreign, particularly western, manoeuvres anywhere in the regions. She was inimical to Chinese nationalist regime in Taiwan. She was eager to have the best of relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East and Africa, and any independence movements anywhere, whether in Africa or Cuba irrespective of the fact whether she had much knowledge of or contact with them, have her sympathy.

THE ABORTIVE COUP IN INDONESIA, 1 OCTOBER 1965

An attempt to overthrow President Sukarno's Government was made on 1 October 1965 allegedly by Communist officers and men in the army. For days all communications were cut off between Indonesia and the rest of the world so that who the rebels actually were and how far the rebellion had spread were not known. Six generals, including the Army Chief of Staff, General Ahmed Yani, were, however, definitely known to have been killed. At one time the news came, later ascertained to be incorrect, that President Sukarno himself was either killed or in risk of losing his life. By mid-October, it was clear that the coup was in large part attributable to the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.), and that while it had been definitely crushed, the Communists were attempting to organize resistance to the Government in central and eastern Java. The Communist leader, Mr. D.N. Aidit, was said to be the chief mischief-maker and his whereabouts were not known.

There have been many insurrections and attempted coups in Indonesia since independence and also many attempts to murder President Sukarno. They had little political consequences of importance, whether for home affairs or foreign relations. The coup of October was believed to be the work of an influential political party—one, moreover, which was a main prop of President Sukarno's rule in Indonesia. What the communists expected to gain by overthrowing President Sukarno who had, to say the least befriended them, is not clear. But the failure of the coup in which as a party they were heavily involved was a great blow to them. Mass arrests of Communists were carried out by the military authorities and communist property burned by infuriated mobs in Jakarta and elsewhere. Instead of being the leaders of Indo-

nesian crowds attacking Indian or American embassies they were now hunted down by mobs led by their political rivals.

The abortive coup seems to have had far-reaching consequences for Indonesia's relations with China and communist countries following the latter's leadership. Mob demonstrations in Indonesia now assumed an anti-Chinese as also an anti-communist character. On 15 October the Indonesian Government sent notes to the Chinese and Cuban embassies in Jakarta reprimanding them for failing to fly their flags at half-mast during the funeral of the six generals killed in the coup. Three days later China sent a strong protest to Indonesia complaining about "the lies and slanders and anti-Chinese outcries" in Indonesia, and demanding an apology and the punishment of those responsible. The protest did nothing to improve China's image in Indonesia. On 3 November a mob of about 100,000 Moslem and other anti-Communist demonstrators attacked the Chinese Consulate at Medan and tore down the Chinese flag, the demonstration being the biggest ever seen in the town, and far surpassing previous anti-American manifestations.

THE AFTERMATH

The abortive coup was followed by further mass-killings of Communists and Communist supporters and attacks on Chinese nationals at Bali as well as raids on Chinese embassies at several places, including the one at Medan in Sumatra. On 29 November 1965 it was reported that Mr. D.N. Aidit, leader of the Indonesian Communists was shot dead by an Indonesian army guard while trying to escape from a prison in Central Java. In February, 1966 following an attempt by President Sukarno to reorganize his government, involving *inter alia* the dismissal of General Naustion, the Defence Minister, there were continuous and violent students riots on a scale never before seen in Indonesia. The students demanded not only the reinstatement of General Naustion but the dismissal of all ministers alleged to be pro-communists, and specially of Dr. Subandrio, the Foreign Minister. Eventually, after three weeks' violent rioting, order was restored with General Soeharto, the Army Ministry Chief of Staff emerging as Indonesia's new strong man. On 27 March President Sukarno recognised the government,

which virtually became a triumvirate consisting of General Soeharto as First Minister of Defence and Security, Mr. Adam Malik as First Minister of Political Affairs and the Sultan of Jogjakarta as First Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs, and from which 15 ministers, including Dr. Subandrio (who were placed under "protective custody") were excluded. The position of Dr. Sukarno remained unclear for some time but on 5 July 1965 he was deprived of his title of Life President of Indonesia.

The present rulers of Indonesia reversed some of the trends of Presidents Sukarno's later policies, domestic and foreign. They promptly banned the Indonesian Communist Party, and opened negotiations with Malayasia with a view to bringing the three-year old "confrontation" to an end. On 11 August 1966, an agreement was signed between the two countries at Jakarta bringing the "confrontation" to an end. On 28 September Indonesia resumed her seat in the United Nations General Assembly after an absence of nineteen months and following the Indonesian government's announcement on 19 September of their decision "to resume full co-operation with the U.N. and to resume participation in its activities". The new rulers also sought to normalize relations with India which had been badly strained by Sukarno's pro-Pakistan attitude during the late Indo-Pakistani conflict, and the Foreign Ministers of the two countries exchanged visits. On 12 March 1967, President Sukarno was stripped of all his powers and replaced by General Soeharto, who would act, as president. Sukarno was also relieved of his most cherished title, "Great leader of the Indonesian Revolution."

FROM SUKARNO TO SOEHARTO—INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL POLICY

Rarely has a country gone through such radical changes in its foreign policy as Indonesia has done since Soeharto came to power in 1966. Even during the period of Sukarno's leadership, Indonesia was faced with a dilemma in its pursuit of foreign policy—whether to place a greater emphasis on the country's economic development or on its independence. During the struggle for freedom all sections of Indonesian society—the political parties, the army, the civil services, the landed elite (there being hardly any industrial elite in the country)—

had the desire for independence uppermost in their mind. With their bitter experience of Dutch colonialism, followed by a brief spurt of Japanese colonialism they had looked at all foreign powers with deep suspicion. The major factors Sukarno had to contend with were the existence in Indonesia of two strong political forces—the PKI, the first Communist Party to come into existence outside the Soviet Union, and the army, building up a strong position for itself during the period of the nation's struggle which in Indonesia, unlike most other European colonies, had been fought by violent means. Given its natural resources and military capabilities, Sukarno, with his oratorical skill and charisma, flamboyance and unpredictability, had maintained a balance between the PKI and the army—one ideologically inclined towards the Soviet Union and the other towards the West—something which could be possible only under the charismatic leadership of a person of Sukarno's stature as a nationalist leader. Given its natural resources and military capabilities, foreign aid have been of great assistance to Indonesia in its development, particularly at a time when the country's governmental and economic capacity was comparatively limited. But Sukarno continued to insist on a policy of independence from major powers on account of the fear that dependence on the Western world could have strengthened the army as against the PKI and on the Communist world the PKI as against the army.

What accounts for such a radical change in country's foreign policy in 1966? The world view of the Indonesian leaders, civilian as well as military, had not undergone any serious change. The international system still continued to be regarded with suspicion and hostility. It was, however, change of domestic circumstances which made the change in foreign policy not only possible but inevitable. It may, therefore, be necessary to have a look at the development in the country which brought about this change. One may have to go back to March, 1957. With the discovery of number of leaders of the other political parties being in complicity with the leaders of the rebellion breaking out in the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1957, the PKI considerably strengthened its position. Though the PKI continued to be the strongest political party, the army also was able to increase its influence. Balancing the influence of the PKI and

the army, Sukarno enhanced his own position, declared martial law and a state of emergency in the country. This was the beginning of Guided Democracy in Indonesia. During the period of the Guided Democracy both the army leadership and the Communist Party of the country were interested in maintaining Sukarno as the unchallenged leader of the country, a situation which Sukarno continued to exploit with all his political finesse and manipulative skill.

Taking advantage of the military capability built up during the freedom struggle, Indonesia was able to resolve the West Irian question militarily, in defiance of the opposition from the West, and to its full satisfaction in 1963 and the United States abandoning its pro-Dutch neutrality policy, pressed the Dutch to transfer the control of the disputed territory to Indonesia and showed its willingness to extend foreign aid to the country, which both Sukarno and army leaders needed badly. In late May, 1963, Sukarno seems to have agreed to what was known as "an economic stabilization plan" for the country and under which the United States and the International Monetary Fund agreed to offer foreign aid to Indonesia to improve the living conditions of her people. Since the announcement of the plan was preceded by certain rigorous anti-inflationary measures, which were supposed by the Indonesian people to have been a condition preceding the sanction of the aid, there was a great upsurge of nationalist sentiments in the country, which induced the PKI to build up its strength further and forced the army leaders to join the agitation, at which Sukarno dropped the plan like a hot brick. It is difficult to understand Sukarno's motivations in accepting it in the first instance. Taking advantage of the anti-imperialist wave in the country, following the success of the West Irian crisis, Sukarno planned to organize a "confrontasi", or confrontation with Malaya. Preparations for the "Crush Malaya" campaign, as it is called, led to a further increase in the powers of the military leaders.

By September, 1965, however, the political competition between the PKI and the army had exploded into an armed conflict, which gradually took the shape of a death-struggle between the two. A coup was attempted by the army on 30 September 1965 which involved the murder of six army generals, following which most of the

PKI's top leaders, along with hundreds of thousands of alleged communists, were slaughtered or arrested. With the rise of the army, General Soeharto was able to step into Sukarno's shoes, though Sukarno continued to be the nominal president of the country, till early 1967. Soeharto was a comparatively weak and colourless leader. He lacked the charisma which Sukarno had built up. But the political competitiveness in the country also had lost its intensity, and the army was now able to assert its position. With the dominant personality of Sukarno no longer being there, and the lessening of political tensions in the country, the various inhibitions on Indonesia's accepting foreign aid were removed.

By 1966, economic conditions in Indonesia had completely deteriorated. The failures of the Guided Democracy period and the resultant frustrations were now all manifest. The disastrous condition of the Indonesian economy and the inability of the political leaders to carry out the kind of mobilization of indigenous resources that could have enabled Indonesia to alleviate its pressing economic needs made it all the more necessary for them to lean on the Western support. Sukarno's policies had strengthened the sense of pride and independence in the common man, but it had been built up at the cost of grinding poverty. Moreover, the confrontation foreign policy of Sukarno had taken a high toll of emotional energy, and people were tired of the seemingly endless struggle for independence. There was now a wide-spread desire to make life a little more comfortable, even if it meant some compromise of the nation's independence. With Sukarno gone and the PKI's strength severely curtailed, the army leaders were now in a position to move openly towards the West. The new leadership gave a new slogan to the people. If Sukarno had emphasized the primacy of independence over economic development, Soeharto tried to represent himself as one who was committed to the economic development of the country, and the acquisition of a large amount of foreign aid was seen as the only way to make that promise of development appear credible. Incidentally, this also gave legitimacy to the predominance of the army.

The army was clearly interested in the restoration of friendly relations with the West, with the help of which it could have assured

supply of modern military equipment and training. Not that the new policy did not evoke public criticism but, with political institutions being in a state of continuous disarray and atrophy during Sukarno's as well as Soeharto's rules and the PKI having lost its influence in the country, there could not be enough political resistance. The first casualty of the new orientation in Indonesia's foreign policy was the policy of confrontation with Malayasia. In June, 1966, a meeting of Indonesia's foreign Minister with Malayasian representatives in Bangkok culminated in a formal agreement for the normalization of relations between the two countries. By October, 1966, the adoption and implementation of the economic strategy based on the acceptance of the attendant relationship with the IMF made the change in the direction of the foreign policy complete. As in 1963, the U.S. officials had clearly informed Indonesians that aid was contingent on Jakarta's adoption of an economic stabilization programme acceptable of the IMF. The execution in October, 1968, of two Indonesian marines convicted of sabotage activities in Singapore in complete rejection of Soeharto's plea for clemency, made Indonesia's dependence on the West quite clear. Some efforts were made by the new government, particularly after 1969, to balance its dependence on the West by attempts to distribute the burden of aid more evenly among the Western nations, on the one side, and repair economic relations with the communist nations on the other. But they have proved to be feeble efforts.

Indonesia has developed under Soeharto, a largely development-oriented, technocratic administration with government economic bodies controlled by military advisers and political participation being peripheral. There has been a heavy dependence on foreign aid, with over 80 per cent of its development financing coming from abroad. Between 1974-1979 seventeen companies of the giant Japanese cartel; the Mitsui alone had invested one billion dollars in Indonesia in fertilizer, cement, ship-building, petrochemicals' textiles and soyabean cultivation. With the help of soft loans from the U.S.A. and Japan, Indonesia has succeeded in promoting exports, reducing imports and generally improving its economic condition. Oil exploitation has also grown considerably, accounting for about 40% of its total revenue.


The tragedy of the situation, however, is that, despite foreign aid, Indonesians, like people in other developing countries, have been facing worsening economic conditions. With approximately five billion dollars in foreign aid and nearly four billion dollars in foreign investment between 1966 and 1974, Indonesians had been worse off in 1974 than they had been in colonial days. In fact, it was a vicious circle. The more aid Indonesia received from the Western countries, the more dependent it became on them, and the more dependent it became the greater was the necessity to obtain foreign aid, leading to greater dependence on foreign countries. Foreign aid encouraged extravagant international standards of consumption. Whatever economic advantages were gained by the country went mostly to the wealthy—a situation described as “neocolonialism *via* economic sector.” The gulf between the rich and the poor grew. With over 80% of its development financing coming from abroad, mainly from the U.S.A. and Japan, Indonesia’s ties with China, the Soviet Union, North Korea and North Vietnam have become growing weak. Heavy financial dependence on Western powers has also severely affected Indonesia’s ambition of regional leadership.

INDO-CHINA

Geographically, Indo-China comprises five territories—Tonkin, Annam and Cochin-China, running from north to south on the South China Sea and Laos and Cambodia, bordering on Thailand to the west. Its population of more than 25 million people is composed of many ethnic groups, of which the largest, the Annamese or Annamites, now known as the Vietnamese, constitute 70 per cent of the population and live not only in Annam but in Tonkin and Cochin-China. The southern part of North Vietnam and the whole of South Vietnam once comprised the Hindu colony of Champa, which ruled over by powerful kings, flourished for more than a thousand years (from about the first century A.D. to about the fifteenth century A.D.), while Cambodia and Laos are deeply influenced by Indian culture, the former containing the ruins of the famous city of Angkor. In 1859 the French occupied Saigon in Cochin-China and followed up their aggression in this Asian land rapidly with converting Cambodia

into a protectorate, occupying the western provinces of Cochin-China, and finally, in 1864, compelling Annam itself to accept French suzerainty. French troops drove the Chinese out of Tonkin in 1884, and by a treaty signed in Peking the Chinese Government was constrained to recognize the status of the French in Indo-China. The last of France's Indo-China possessions was acquired in 1893 when Laos was ceded by Siam (Thiland).

The French did nothing to unify the land, besides giving it one colour on the map. The administration was headed by a governor-



general closely controlled by Paris and run by purely French civil servants except in the lowest posts. Cochir-China was an outright colony; Annam, Laos and Cambodia were protectorates nominally under their own rulers, and Tonkin was a mixture of the two. The country's few industries were almost wholly French; its middlemen and mercantile community were Chinese; and the labouring classes, both agricultural and industrial, were indigenous. French economic exploitation in this "balcony on the Pacific" was maximum in underpopulated Cochin-China, one of the greatest rice-producing areas in the world, and the site of a sizable French rubber plantation industry. It was the least in the provinces, and Tonkin represented a middling position—having its own peculiar problems. Tonkin had a dense population: it produced little rice, and hence migrants from the region moved to the plantations of the south or to the mining industries of its own mountainous areas where the population was sparse. On account of its industrial potentialities and its strategic position on the border of China, the French had to construct some roads and railways as also a few good hospitals and educational institutions. French culture permeated but little the few educated people in Indo-China, and hardly touched the masses. The nationalist agitation fed on the poverty of the masses, the denial of opportunity by their masters to the small educated class of any position of eminence in the life of the country, and on the sharp contrast between white and brown skins presented by French colonial rule. The French forbade political parties and made no attempt to give the people a training in the art of self-government.

Yet nationalism persisted; in the absence of party outlets it expressed itself in a series of revolts. A communist party—the Indo-Chinese Communist party—was formed in 1930, and worked underground. It led a widespread revolt of starving peasants, who were crushed by the French authorities with savage brutality. During the Second World War it developed into the Vietminh (abbreviation for Viet Nam DocLap Dos Minh Hoi or League for the Independence of Vietnam) in 1951, and from China was led by Dr. Ho Chi Minh. Meanwhile, the Japanese had occupied Indo-China though, in view of the Vichy Government's collaboration with the Axis, they left the administration to the French officials. The Vietminh, who moved its headquarters from China to Tonkin, fought both "French and

Japanese fascism and imperialism". After the disappearance of Vichy France, the Japanese overthrew the French administration in Indo-China and set up nominally independent states under the Annamese Emperor Bao Dai in Vietnam, King Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia and King Sisavong Vong in Laos, pledging them to participate in their "Co-prosperity" policies.

The Vietminh, who were biding their time, seized the opportunity presented by the Japanese surrender to order a general insurrection, and seized Hanoi, the capital of Tonkin. Their leader, Dr. Ho Chi Minh, whose reputation as a national leader was untarnished by collaboration with either the French or the Japanese, stepped into the vacuum created by the collapse of Japanese authority, and gained control of the whole of Vietnam in a few weeks. But a new turn was given to the course of events in Indo-China, because at the Potsdam Conference the Allied leaders decided that in the south of the country the British forces should receive the Japanese surrender and in the north Chinese Nationalist forces should do so and that the way should thus be prepared for the return of the French. The whole of Vietnam revolted against the idea of a return to colonial rule and Dr. Ho Chi Minh appealed to the United Nations for support. The failure of the latter to come to the assistance of his people convinced Dr. Ho Chi Minh that he must negotiate with the French who on their side had realized that a new condition had arisen. In March, 1946, an agreement was signed between the two parties, whereby Vietnam, consisting of Tonkin and Annam was to be recognized as an autonomous unit, and the question of the accession of Cochin-China was to be settled later by a plebiscite. As part of the settlement, Dr. Ho Chi Minh agreed to allow the return of French troops throughout the country for a period not exceeding five years.

DR. HO CHI MINH

Dr. Ho Chi Minh's moderation raised a speculation concerning his real political complexion and his personality, and the belief persists that the French could have, if they were sincere, negotiated a settlement with him on lines on which Britain granted independence to India. It has been thought that thus Vietnam could have been

spared the many miseries that befell her as also found a place outside the scope of the Cold War, like Burma, Indonesia and some other South-East Asian countries. Dr. Ho Chi Minh no doubt was a communist agent in pre-war years, Moscow-trained and an assistant to Borodin in China. But before he journeyed to Moscow, he had lived in London as a waiter, so they say, at the Carlton Restaurant, and had then lived in a garret at Paris, eking out a living as a photographer's retoucher, and in the *Club du Fauborg* and the leftist political and literary circles where he frequented, had been known as "le petit Monsieur Ferdinand", a friend of Leon Blum, and editor, among other things, of *Le Paria* (*The Outcast*), a journal designed to rally the oppressed millions of the French colonial empire. M. Ferdinand, who had first come to the notice of the Paris police for presenting to the Peace Conference a petition on behalf of the down-trodden Vietnamese people, had, a little earlier, been present at the French Socialist Party's historic congress at Tours, and became a communist. He was already known as Nguyen ai-Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot), and commenced on his fantastic, wandering, dedicated life of the international revolutionary to whom nationalism did not appear as irreconcilable with Communism, and vice versa. "Had France relinquished her hold on Indo-China", says Mr. Frank Moraes, "Ho Chi Minh might today have been the leader of a democratic Vietnam." (Frank Moraes, *Report on Mao's China*.)

This view is supported not only by the liberal nature of the constitution which he established, with its private property rights and religious freedom, but by the fact that he took severe steps against some extremists in his own party who wanted no truck at all with the French. Unfortunately, his visit to Paris in 1946 to settle details of his agreement (known as the *modus vivendi* agreement) had little result except keeping negotiations still open, and after he had returned to his own country and formed a government in which he became president and foreign minister, Franco-Vietnamese relations rapidly deteriorated. The French High Commissioner convinced himself that "the Vietminh and Ho Chi Minh were no more than pawns in Moscow's struggle for global supremacy", and set about attempting to disrupt Vietnamese unity by fostering a

separatist movement in Cochín-China, where they had the bulk of their investments. On 19 December 1946, Dr. Ho Chi Minh, now under severe pressure from his extremist followers, openly revolted against the French. He raised a force of 10,000 guerillas and placed it under a young teacher and Doctor of Law, Vo Nguyen Giap, who had spent many years in French prisons, and was soon to distinguish himself in the ensuing war.

VIETNAM IN THE COLD WAR

To the Vietnamese Dr. Ho Chi Minh and his supporters, even though they might be communists, were the spearhead of a nationalist movement aiming at the country's freedom. To the French it was a fight to preserve their empire in Asia—their precious "balcony on the Pacific"—and to maintain their position as one of the Great Powers. But, after the success of the Reds in establishing the People's Republic, it was looked upon by several western nations, including Britain and the United States, as an important phase in the Cold War they were at this time engaged in fighting. Whatever might be the real character of the Vietnamese struggle, it posed a danger to the position of the "democratic" nations of the world, because the frontiers of China, which was now a communist country now ran along those of Tonkin, the stronghold of Dr. Ho Chi Minh. In March, 1949, the French signed an agreement with Bao Dai, the ex-emperor of Annam, whom some described as a playboy and others as an enlightened and democratic figure, by which they recognized him as head of the state with greater powers—Bao Dai would take nothing less—than they were prepared three years earlier to give to Dr. Ho Chi Minh.

The war which began as a guerilla fight developed into a trial of strength between two nations in which large forces were engaged on each side and which produced at least one great general on each side, viz. General Giap, the Vietnamese commander who must rank as one among the greatest popular generals of the world, and General de Lattre de Tassigny, whose arrival on the scene in 1950 led to a vigorous but short-lived revival of French power, and whose untimely death in 1952 was nothing short of a disaster for the French. The war reached a critical stage early in 1954 with General Giap's

veteran divisions closely investing Dien Bien Phu, an outpost occupied by French parachute troops in 1953. At this time the French were making a great use of air power, most of which came from America, which was now contributing about 10 per cent of the France's Indo-Chinese war. The American Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, persuaded himself to believe that a French victory in Vietnam was important "not only to France and the Associated States but to the United States and the whole free world". However on 7 May 1954, after holding out for fifty-five days Dien Bien Phu fell to General Giap, and the Vietnamese had scored their most spectacular victory.

THE AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

After seven years of ceaseless battling against the Communist forces of the Vietminh, in rebellion against the puppet government set up by them at Saigon, the French were desperately anxious to bring their undertaking in Vietnam to an end. During these years, defeats had come upon defeats, they had suffered staggering losses of men and money, and they clearly realized that their colonial mastery of Indo-China must now end. Fortunately for themselves, a Foreign Ministers' Conference had assembled at Berlin in February, 1954 to explore the possibilities of concluding peace treaties with Austria and Germany. The Conference had failed to realize its main objective, but in the course of the discussions there it had been agreed that another and bigger Conference, to which Communist China would be invited, should meet at Geneva in the following May for considering the problems of eastern Asia. The French anxiety to get as quickly as possible away from their ruinous venture in Vietnam was not sympathized with (to say the least) by the Americans, who considered Indo-China to be the key to South-East Asia, the strategic position of which was immensely significant in terms of the policy of "containment" of World Communism which was now the cardinal creed of American foreign policy. His allies, France and England, refusing to join America in continuing the fight in Vietnam, Mr. Dulles, the new American Secretary of State stayed sulkily away while the proposed Conference duly met in Geneva and drew up a truce agreement and a declaration which together came to be known as the Geneva Agreements, July 21, 1954 and brought immediate

peace to Vietnam and hopes for a permanent solution of the Vietnam issue.

THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS, 1954

The Agreements consisted, essentially, of two documents. One was a cease-fire signed by representatives of the French and Vietminh armies. The other was a "declaration" of the Conference taking note of political arrangement for Vietnam. The truce agreement and declaration included three main points : (1) Division of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel into a Communist-controlled north and anti-Communist south, pending general elections in July, 1956, designed to bring about unification ; (2) A ban on introduction of fresh troops and arms, on new foreign military bases, and on Vietnamese membership in any military alliance ; (3) Establishment of an International Control Commission—composed of Canada, India and Poland, with India as Chairman—to police the truce. Further, Laos and Cambodia were left as neutral territories, and to be free of Vietminh and French troops. The U.S.A. refused to be a party to the Agreements but on 21 July President Eisenhower declared that the U.S.A. would "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Agreements, while it would view "any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security". That the U.S.A.'s acquiescence in the *fait accompli* in Vietnam did not mean any change in its attitude to the problems of South-East Asia was soon indicated by the creation of a South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), on 8 September 1954, as a bulwark of defence of this part of the world against World Communism. The policy of "containment" initiated by the Truman administration was still in high tide, and Mr. Dulles, who had lately announced an "agonizing reappraisal" of the entire foreign policy and thereby alarmed his own allies more than Soviet Russia, believed in keeping up rather than reducing world tensions ("brinkmanship").

Under the circumstances any hope that ever existed that the Geneva Agreements would be faithfully implemented and the country united by free elections in 1956 receded further and further. Whatever their professions, the United States Government were bent upon

following their own Cold War policies, which required that Vietnam should remain divided, and in any case that the Communists of North Vietnam must not take over the South. President Eisenhower openly subscribed to the "falling dominoes" theory—the belief that Communist conquest of South Vietnam would lead to the toppling of neighbouring nations. His policy was to create a strong, anti-communist, nationalist government in South Vietnam, and to provide it every aid and military "advice" in its fight against Vietcong (South Vietnamese Communist) guerilla forces and to prevent North Vietnam from supporting the "falling dominoes" theory. His policy was to create a strong, anti-communist, nationalist government in South Vietnam, and to provide it every aid and military "advice" in its fight against Vietcong (South Vietnamese Communist) guerilla forces and to prevent North Vietnam from supporting the latter. The danger of the course he initiated lay in the fact that "assistance" might sooner or later lead to direct American participation in the civil war in Vietnam and that, if Russia, or China, or both intervened, as they were quite likely to do, it might spark off a world war.

THE U.S.A. STEPS IN

An important shift of power which took place in South Vietnam facilitated the implementation of this policy. On 16 June 1954, apparently on American insistence, Ngo Dinh Diem, an opponent of Bao Dai, known as a French Government playboy, and through whom the French hoped to maintain an influence in Vietnam, was appointed Premier. In the following year Diem asked the South Vietnamese to choose between himself and Bao Dai, and after an overwhelming majority of the people had voted in his favour, declared South Vietnam to be a republic and himself the first president (26 October 1955). He declared that his government was not bound by the Agreement of 1954 on the ground that they were made by a foreign military command (the French) "in contempt of Vietnamese national interests". Both Saigon and Washington accused the Communists of building up their military strength, and thus

violating the Geneva Agreements. In turn, Hanoi charged that Saigon was ignoring the accords by refusing to hold elections and to normalize economic and postal relations. As soon as the deadline for elections passed, the Vietcong embarked on a guerilla insurrection aimed at taking over South Vietnam. "At the request" of the South Vietnamese government, the U.S.A. rushed aid and military "advisers" to the country. This was the beginning of an American involvement which, since a major buildup started in 1961, grew in its latest stage to involvement of more than 1,25,000 U.S. servicemen and jet-bombing raids on North Vietnam which, Washington contended, was supplying the Vietcong campaign.

AMERICAN AIR RAIDS ON NORTH VIETNAM

The involvement entered into its heavy phase in 1961 because at the time South Vietnam found itself on the verge of succumbing to the Vietcong and it sent an SOS to President Kennedy who responded by immediately strengthening the "advisory" group to 3000 men. At the same time American helicopters began flying South Vietnamese troops into battle, and a four-star general took command of the military operation. In 1962 a new agreement was entered into on Laos (see below), through which North Vietnam was believed to be sending supplies to the Vietcong. Washington charged that though it withdrew its military personnel from Laos in accordance with the agreement, North Vietnamese battalions continued to be there. The tempo of escalation on both sides vastly increased since then, and, besides the American bombing raids on North Vietnam, which became increasingly frequent, longer in range, and directed against roads and railways and bridges as well as against purely military targets, there were regular engagements between the disciplined ranks of both sides.

The worst sufferers from the military operations in Vietnam were in their thousands the common folk, specially in the villages, who for military reasons were subjected to attacks by both sides in the shape of bombings (the Americans are known to have used napalm bombs), raids, counter-raids, etc. Their cries of anguish were loud and prolonged and reached every nook and corner on earth. What caused the greatest horror and alarm were, however, the bombing

raids of the Americans on North Vietnam, against which almost all governments in the world, including Russia and China, strongly protested. The first such raid occurred in August, 1964 when, in retaliation against alleged attacks by North Vietnamese PT boats on American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin, President Johnson felt forced to adopt a major change of tactics. Nevertheless the Vietcong pressed ahead on several fronts and on 7 February 1965 they infiltrated a U.S. airbase at Pleiku in the heart of the plateau of Central Vietnam, and blasted it with mortars. President Johnson, who up to then, sided more with the "doves" than with the "hawks" in the administration, seemed after this attack, to have given in unreservedly to the latter. From 7 February 1965 onwards, except for temporary pauses now and then, including a 37-day pause which commenced on Christmas Eve, 1965, the air raids came in a continuing series, and American combat forces were also vastly increased.

WARNING FROM MOSCOW AND PEKING

Warnings against the continuance of the air raids and appeals for their cessation poured to Washington from every quarter of the globe. Within a few hours of the 7-February raid Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. warned that its continuance would lead to worsening of Soviet-American relations. It was announced on February 10 that Moscow and Hanoi had reached agreements for increasing the latter's defence potential. On 13 March Premier Kosygin indicated in a speech that Russia might send "volunteers" to North Vietnam. Russian MiG aircrafts, said to be supplied by China, were already being used by North Vietnam. On 8 February Communist China had sent the warning, which was repeated in increasingly violent language, that she would not "stand idly by" if the U.S. air raids continued. The admission of the U.S. Government that they were using gas—it was of a non-lethal variety, similar to the one used in mob control, they said—evoked further protests and appeals. The Vietnam policy of the Administration evoked some protests even in America and there were many demonstrations in that country against the air raids in particular and American foreign policy in South-East Asia in

general. A number of influential Senators and Representatives were highly critical of the policy being pursued by their Government in Vietnam.

"PRESIDENT JOHNSON OFFERS UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS"

Till 7 April 1965, when President Johnson made a peace bid, both sides had taken positions which, in effect, called for unconditional surrender as a condition for opening negotiations. Responding presumably to an appeal addressed by 17 non-aligned nations to the two parties to cease hostilities, 1 April, the President, speaking to the student body and faculty of the Johns Hopkins University at Baltimore, declared that the U.S. objective in Vietnam was an independent South Vietnam free from outside interference and attack — "tied to no alliance, a military base for no country". "And we remain ready, with this purpose for unconditional discussions," said he. Hanoi quickly responded with an enunciation of a four-point peace formula as the basis for an international conference (characterizing Mr. Johnson's offer at the same time as "hypocrisy"). These point were : (1) Recognition of the territorial integrity of all Vietnam, U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, and an end of attacks on North Vietnam ; (2) Pending peaceful reunification of North and South, a return to the "military provisions" of the 1954 Agreements barring foreign troops from Vietnam ; (3) A settling of the South's internal affairs by the South Vietnamese themselves "in accordance" with the programme of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong ; (4) Peaceful reunification of Vietnam "without any foreign interference".

The U.S. and North Vietnamese terms did not appear to differ widely and both seemed to center on the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Peace, however, did not come out of them, and war continued to rage fiercely in Vietnam, the main stumbling block being that each side insisted on its proposals being accepted as preconditions for getting talks going. As for Vietcong participation in the peace talks, President Johnson conceded that it was not, an insurmountable proposition". Americans surmised that the Communists were convinced that they would win, and hence saw no

reason to talk, at least for the present ; conversely, that peace would come if they were defeated. So the war continued.

WAR AND LIBERATION

As the influence of the National Liberation Front grew, the U.S. intervention in Vietnam increased. While, in 1964, the number of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam was 25,000, by 1967 it had increased to 4.50 lakhs and the U.S. Commander General Westmoreland was still asking for another 2.50 lakhs. Alleging that North Vietnam had attacked a U.S. warship stationed in the Bay of Tonkin, the U.S. planes started bombing the military and industrial centres in North Vietnam. Bombing continued to increase along with the will of the Vietnamese people to fight back. With its 4.50 lakhs South Vietnamese soldiers and 56,000 South Korean and Australian soldiers, the U.S. forces were not able to defeat the 30,000 strong army of the NLF in South Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson, the U.S. President, justified the intensive bombing of North Vietnam and the destruction of the NLF forces in South Vietnam in the name of stopping the North Vietnamese armies, allegedly supported by the Soviet Union and China, from "interfering" in South Vietnam. Between 1964, when the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had been intensified, and the end of 1967, some 18.40 lakh tons of bombs had been dropped on the whole of Vietnam, of which 6.50 lakh tons were on North Vietnam, whereas the total tonnage of bombs dropped in Europe during World War II was 15.45 lakhs.

In the last days of January, 1966, on the eve of the Vietnamese lunar new year—the Tet festival—the People's Liberation armed forces (PLA) launched a country-wide offensive from Cap Ca Mau on the Southern tip of South Vietnam to the 17th parallel in the north. Backed up by uprisings of the local population in parts of South Vietnam, they attacked Saigon, Hue and other major towns, blockaded a military base at Khe Sanh with a garrison of over 6,000 U.S. marines, and succeeded in the liberation of the entire countryside and in limiting the U.S. control only to urban centres. The Tet offensive, as it was known, forced President Johnson to order cessation of bombing

of North Vietnam on 31 March 1968, and made him agree to enter into peace negotiations with North Vietnam. Averell Harriman was appointed as the President's representative to hold peace talks with North Vietnam and, while the U.S. offensive as well as the Vietnamese resistance continued, talks were started between Washington and Hanoi in Paris on 31 May 1968.

In the meantime, the U.S. policy of intervention in Vietnam was being criticized more and more not only by most countries of the world but also by perceptive observers inside the U.S., like Walter Lippman and Hans Morgenthau. The international system was also changing in character. Bipolarity was being gradually replaced by a multipolar system. The NATO allies of the U.S. were no longer prepared to support the U.S. either militarily or diplomatically. The U.S. argument that the withdrawal of the U.S. in Southeast Asia would open the doors of the whole of Asia for Communist expansion, no longer cut much ice. Relations between the Soviet Union and China were deteriorating. France was struggling to evolve an independent position for itself. De Gaulle demanded the "neutralization" of Southeast Asia, which involved the cessation of hostilities in South Vietnam and the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including the Americans, from there. Great Britain was interested in strengthening the detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. None of these policies was in harmony with U.S. attitudes. Non-aligned countries also supported the cause of the Vietnamese people and were arguing in various international conferences that the Vietnamese problem could be resolved not by military means but only by diplomatic negotiations. The public opinion in U.S. against the government policies had, in fact, become so strong that President Johnson had to declare, along with his proposal to start new negotiations, that he would not be a candidate for the 1968 Presidential elections.

Following the Presidential elections of 1968, Nixon replaced Lyndon Johnson. Nixon had already declared during his election campaign that he would do his maximum to stop hostilities in Vietnam and withdraw the U.S. armies from Southeast Asia. He now replaced Averell Harriman with Henry Kissinger as the U.S. representative in the Paris Peace Conference. Based on a phased withdrawal of the major portion of the U.S. troops over a period of twelve months after the signing of an agreement between the

two sides, the moving of the remaining U.S. and the allied forces into designated base areas at the end of the 12-month period, the remaining U.S. and allied forces withdrawing only when the North Vietnamese forces had completely withdrawn from South Vietnam and an international supervisory body acceptable to both sides being created for the purpose of verifying withdrawals, supervising the cease-fire and for any other purpose agreed upon between the two sides, and undertaking not to engage in any combat operations, Nixon put forward the 8-point peace proposal before the Paris Peace Conference. The proposals further envisaged the early holding of elections under agreed procedures under the supervision of an international body, exchange of prisoners of war on both sides as early as possible and an undertaking, on the part of all sides, to observe the Geneva protocols of 1954 and the 1962 accord on Laos.

The N.L.F. did not react favourably to the Nixon proposals and instead emphasized its own 10-points solution according to which the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Vietnam was a precondition to any negotiated settlement, since, in its view, the proposal for withdrawal of troops involved placing "the aggressor and those who resist aggression" on the same footing. Owing to opposition of the South Vietnamese government to N.L.F. participation in the talks, the Paris peace talks remained deadlocked for quite some time. While the negotiations as well as fighting were going on simultaneously, Ho Chi-Minh died of a heart attack on 4 September 1969. On 17 September 1970, the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) proposed an 8-point plan at Paris peace talks—involving suspension of attacks against U.S.A. and South Vietnam and discussion on freeing of U.S. prisoners of war in case U.S. agreed to withdraw all its troops by 30 June 1971. On 8 October 1970, Nixon placed a 5-point proposal before the conference suggesting a complete cease-fire, an International Conference on Indo-China, a negotiated time-table for complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, a political settlement which met the aspiration of all South Vietnamese and immediate and unconditional release of U.S. prisoners of war. Along with peace negotiations in Paris, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam continued unabated. On 3 October 1971, in an election which was alleged to be a rigged one, Nguyen Von Thieu, described as "incapable henchman" of the U.S.A., was re-elected as President of South Vietnam.

In the meantime President Nixon was trying to bring China into a close diplomatic embrace with the U.S. and Henry Kissinger, his special envoy, had been sent secretly through Islamabad to visit the Chinese leaders at Peiking. This was partly aimed at widening the gulf between China and the Soviet Union and partly to create uncertainty and confusion among the North Vietnamese regarding the continued flow of Soviet arms which had been reaching them through Chinese territory. China had by this time stopped talking of the Soviet Union as a Communist country and taken a position against what it described as its policies of "social imperialism". This merely led to an increased effort on the part of the North Vietnamese and N.L.F. forces to bring pressure on the U.S. position on South Vietnam.

On 25 June 1972, the U.S., while continuing its military offensive on Vietnam, presented fresh peace proposals to the Paris Conference: suggesting total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other foreign forces allied to the South Vietnamese government within six months of an agreement; release of all military men captured by either side simultaneously with the withdrawal of foreign forces; holding of free and democratic elections in South Vietnam under the supervision of an independent body, comprised of all political forces in South Vietnam within six months of an agreement and under international supervision. The U.S. expressed its preparedness not to side with any candidate in the election and to abide by its outcome. A decision regarding the reunification of Vietnam was to be taken on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam without constraint and annexation from either side and without foreign interference. Both sides were also to respect the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and those of 1962 on Laos. There was to be no foreign intervention in Indo-Chinese states and the Indo-Chinese people were to be left to settle their affairs by themselves. Their respective military forces were to remain within their respective national boundaries and the military aspects of the agreement were to be internationally supervised. North Vietnam refused to accept the U.S. proposals unless Thieu was removed from the presidency of South Vietnam.

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Following the stopping of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam in early January, 1973, the final moves for a peace settlement at Paris could be initiated on 24 January 1973, and with the signing of an Agreement for Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam three days later, the Vietnam war came to an end. The Agreement had 23 Articles, the main features of which were :

(i) the U.S. and all other countries were to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognised by the 1954 Geneva Agreement ;

(ii) the U.S.A. was to cease all its military operations against North Vietnam, withdraw all its forces and advisors from South Vietnam and dismantle its military bases there ;

(iii) the question of the return of the prisoners of war was to be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties "in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity" ;

(iv) the existence in South Vietnam of two separate zones controlled by two administrations—the People's Republican Government of South Vietnam and the Saigon administration—was to be recognized. The political question of South Vietnam was to be decided by the people of South Vietnam themselves by means of free and general elections under international supervision.

The two South Vietnamese parties immediately after the cease-fire were to "hold consultations" "in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect and mutual non-elimination", and set up an International Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments—thus involving the existence of three separate elements in South Vietnam—the Saigon region, the PRG of South Vietnam and those who did not support either of the two. The two South Vietnamese parties were also to sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within ninety days after the cease-fire came into effect. The NCNRC was to work to ensure strict adherence to the Paris Agreement, to reach national reconciliation, concord and safeguard democratic freedoms, to organize free and democratic general elections and determine the procedure and conditions of holding them; the re-unification of Vietnam being re-

cognized as an important part of the Paris Agreement, Article 15 of the Agreement laid down that this "shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference." The time for re-unification was to be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam.

The Paris Agreement also resolved that the parties taking part in the Paris Peace Conference would act according to the 1954 Geneva Agreement and the 1962 Agreement regarding Laos; the domestic problems of Cambodia and Laos were to be resolved by them without any foreign intervention; the exchange of Prisoners of War would be completed within 60 days of the cessation of hostilities—with the exchange of POWs and the withdrawal of the U.S. and other foreign armies taking place simultaneously; the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam would take place within a definite time after the agreement had been signed, and cease-fire and the control over cease-fire would be entrusted to an International Commission which would carry out its work with the joint military commission consisting of people from both parties in South Vietnam.

In the concluding articles of the Paris Agreement, the U.S. government expressed its desire to see the agreement as the beginning of an era of reconciliation with DRV and all the peoples of Indo-China and to contribute to the healing of wounds of war and to post-war reconstruction. A four-sided joint military commission and a two-party joint military commission made up of representatives of the two South Vietnamese sides were set up along with the International Commission for Supervision and Control composed of representatives of Hungary, Poland, Indonesia and Canada. The Paris Agreement thus brought to an end a war which had lasted incessantly for 12 long years.

REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM

The war having ended, the process of re-unification of Vietnam was taken up in hand by the triumphant Communist parties of North and South Vietnam. A united conference of the DRV and what was described as the Republic of South Vietnam was held in Saigon (now

named as Ho Chi Minh City) in November, 1975 and resolved to re-unite the two parts of Vietnam on 25 April 1976. On 2 July 1976, the National Assembly proclaimed the formation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. A treaty of friendship and co-operation between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as it was named, and the Soviet Union was signed on 4 November 1978, the two governments declaring the strengthening of peace in Asia and throughout the world and establishing just and equitable relations between nations as the basic principles of their foreign policies.

While the Vietnamese war came to a formal end in 1973 suspicions and fears continued on both the sides. Between early 1973 and mid-1974, the U.S. was alleged to have extended military assistance to the Thieu government at Saigon to the tune of 2.98 billion dollars, which was supposed to be inducing it to discontinue the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Cease-fire continued to be violated from time to time. The International Commission for Supervision and Control also was not able to function smoothly. Canada withdrew from it, and was replaced by Iran. While the Soviet Union hailed the "truly historic victory" of the Vietnamese people and regarded it as "a major contribution to the common cause of the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples for liberation, China continued to create difficulties for the North Vietnamese government, supported as it was by the Soviet Union and was alleged to have occupied new positions well inside Vietnamese territories. With Teng Hsiao Ping accusing Vietnam of acting at the behest of the Soviet Union for "hegemonistic" objectives, the Chinese government continued to be critical of what it regarded as Vietnamese involvement in Kampuchea. Encouraged by the Chinese, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime operating in Kampuchea attacked the Vietnamese territory, which by the end of 1977 had developed into a full-scale military involvement between the two countries.

Cambodia alleged that Vietnam was bent on forcibly occupying Cambodia and installing a puppet government there. While counter-acting the charge of having any intention to resort to military action, Vietnam did not deny that it would be interested in the Indo-Chinese states maintaining the "special relations" developed among them during the wars against France and the United States "in their nation-building and defence efforts, in the interest of their respective

independence and prosperity." Cambodia rejected the very concept of "special relationship", condemning it as a cover for regional hegemony.

As the Sino-Soviet differences took a more acute form in Southeast Asia, China started direct military interference in Vietnam's domestic affairs and started despatching substantial amount of ammunitions, including long-range artillery, into Cambodia. In January, 1979, the Pro-Peking Pol Pot—Ieng Sary regime was overthrown. On 17 February 1979 China openly started what it described as a punitive expedition against Vietnam for its alleged violations of the Chinese border and intention to "subjugate" Laos and Campuchea. While justifying her action, China accused Vietnam of persistently following anti-China policy and carrying out armed provocations against her borders. The Soviet Union immediately came over to the support of Vietnam. "The aggressive action taken by Chinese leaders" was described by *Pravda* on 18 February 1979 as "highly dangerous for the cause of peace throughout the world." It described China's action as "a brazen action against Vietnam in none other than an attempt to weaken the eastern flank of world socialism." On 1 March 1979, declaring that China was "getting near" to achieving its aim of teaching the Vietnamese that armed provocation did no good. Chinese Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Li Hsien-nien, stated, "Once our goal is achieved, we will certainly withdraw our troops." However, both China and the Soviet Union seemed to have realized that they could not carry on their conflict with each other without creating an adverse public opinion in the entire region. On 5 March 1979, China suddenly announced its ending of the 17-day old invasion of Vietnam and withdrawal of all Chinese frontier troops to Chinese territory, thus drawing a curtain, at least for the time being, on the 1000-year old legacy of conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia.

LAOS

The small Buddhist kingdom of Laos was, as we have seen, given the status of a neutral independent state by agreements signed at the Geneva Conference on 20 July 1954. Laos, however, failed to gain

much from the liquidation of French colonial imperialism in South-East Asia, which soon became an arena of the conflicts of the East-West Cold War.

A number of factors conspired to make Laos an unhappy victim of this ideology-cum-power struggle between East and West, or, concretely, between Communist China and the U.S.A. (The U.S.S.R., which in the early days of this struggle called the communist tune, had, with the development of her ideological conflict with China, almost withdrawn her support of Chinese policies in South-East Asia). In the first place, as we have already seen, nationalism came to the countries of this region in alliance with Communism, and the most determined fighters against foreign rule being communists, the latter naturally claimed a dominant share in the governments set up after independence. So far as Laos was concerned, the nominal head of the state was the King, who during the years of political eclipse under French and Japanese domination, offered little, if any, opposition to the foreigners, while the freedom-fighters were from all sections of the population, and were called nationalists and/or communists. This accounted for the fact that the political factions of Laos were led by persons whose ideology was difficult to ascertain; for example, the "communist" Pathet Lao was headed by the "Red Prince" Souphannovong, who was the half-brother of Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Premier and the leader of the neutralist faction. This had an interesting result: Pathet Lao claiming that it was a dissident national group, its fight with the government became "civil war" and Red Chinese or North Vietnamese support of the Pathet Lao forces could not technically be called "aggression".

The most important cause of Laos's miseries was her unfortunate geographical position—perched as she is between the Chinese province of Yunnan in the north, North Vietnam in the north-east and east Cambodia and South Vietnam in the south and Burma and Thailand in the west. According to American strategists, she was the vital buffer that separated Red China and her alleged protegee, North Vietnam, from pro-American Thailand and South Vietnam and neutralist Cambodia and Burma. Her fall—brought about either by Chinese conquest, or internally, by the triumph of the Pathet

Lao in the civil war, would, according to the Americans, at once let loose the overpowering communist flood over the whole of South-East Asia. As the U.S.A. viewed it, Laos was then, as she has been for centuries, a cross-road for invaders of South-East Asia. In persistent violation of the Geneva accords, said she, North Vietnam kept her armies stationed in Laos; they patrolled access routes into South Vietnam, provided highly trained cadres for the Pathet Lao military units and sometimes committed battalions in support of operations against the Laotian right-wing and neutralist forces; through Laos also they sent cadres and supplies to the Vietcong guerillas in South Vietnam. Above all, according to the U.S.A., Red China, which cast an enormous shadow over the land to the south of her, had been, in the interests of her ideology and her multiplying millions, evincing an increasing appetite for expansion into regions actually or potentially rich in food and other produce—Malaya, Indonesia, and even beyond. Allegedly, she was busily engaged in constructing a network of roads that aimed at Thailand through north-western Laos. Red China, in reply to the American accusations, pointed her accusing finger to Taiwan, and the mighty Seventh Fleet, which the U.S.A. had kept stationed in Far Eastern waters.

The civil war among the contending factions of the rightist, neutralist, and leftist varieties showed no signs of coming to an end, for each side had powerful protagonists outside the country, as we have seen. The U.S.A. was spending something like \$52 million annually in the aid of the rightists; and, when the Pathet Lao forces gained some significant victory, she made a display of her military strength, e.g. landing troops in Thailand. For once, however, there was some expectation of peace coming to Laos: in 1961 Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy met in Geneva and agreed that Laos should be independent and neutral; and in 1962, as the result of a fourteen nations conference held at the same place under co-chairmanship of the U.K. and the U.S.S.R., a coalition cabinet composed of the representatives of the three fighting groups and headed by the neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma was set up in Laos. The truce in the civil

war thus established, however, did not last long, and each time the fighting was resumed the Pathet Lao made some important advance. In the first week of April, 1964, the Premier arranged for a talk with his rivals at Plainse des Jarres ; the talks failed ; and when he returned to the capital, Vientiane, he was placed under house arrest by some disloyal officers. He was released, but civil war was resumed.

CAMBODIA

Once the seat of the mighty Khmer empire which ruled most of Indo-China, Cambodia became a French protectorate in 1864, and from 1949 to 1954 was an Associate State of the French Union. In 1953, King Norodom Sihanouk retired temporarily to political asylum in Thailand with the result that the French were compelled to give him a measure of independence. This independence was guaranteed in 1954 at Geneva, which neutralized the country as also Laos, though both countries obtained the right to make treaties and enlist foreign aid (other than French) in their own defence. In March, 1955 the king abdicated in favour of his parents, King Norodom Suramarit and Queen Kossamak, entered politics, and founded the Sangkum (Socialist People's Community) Party, whose programme included support for a parliamentary monarchy, strong central government and provincial assemblies to administer local affairs. In the General Election of August, 1955 the Sangkum won all the seats in the assembly, defeating the chief opposition party, the Democratic Party, led by Sihanouk's cousin, Prince Phorissa, and the anti-French republican Son Ngoc Thanah. In the General Election of 1958, the Sangkum won all the 61 seats in the assembly. As a neutralist State, Cambodia received aid from both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—the former being satisfied that its neutralist government was at least non-communistic and checked the spread of Communism, the latter and Communist China getting Cambodia's votes in the U.N. Cambodia, however, found this sort of tight-rope walking in politics increasingly difficult to continue as nearby China gradually replaced distant Russia in the leadership of the Communist cause in South-East Asia. Prince Norodom

Sihanouk had his quarrel with the Americans too, and in November, 1963, on the plea that the latter were helping the Cambodian guerillas, ordered home the entire Cambodian embassy in Washington. He also announced that he would refuse to receive any further aid from the U.S.A. (it was something like \$35 million annually). Evidently he was shifting from neutrality to a more friendly relationship with Communist China.

LAOS AND CAMBODIA DURING THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

As the U.S. armies began their full-scale attack on North Vietnam, the U.S. forces, under the plea of chasing the communists, started violating the territories of Cambodia and Laos. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Chief of State in Cambodia, warned the U.S.A. against interference in Cambodia's internal affairs and asked her to desist from pursuing the alleged Vietcong soldiers into the Cambodian territory. The Prince warned the U.S.A. on 27 December 1967 that if its troops continued to cross into Cambodian territory, his country would have to seek aid from China, North Korea and Cuba. On 16 February 1968, Cambodia, as a signal of her independence in foreign policy, put an end to the Swedish mediation in Cambodian-Thailand dispute. Since the U.S. interference in Cambodia continued, Prince Sihanouk, in November, 1968, sought guarantee from the U.S.A. for the security of its borders. Not prepared to alienate Cambodia, the U.S., in a statement issued on 16 April 1969, expressed its recognition and respect for the sovereignty, independence and neutrality of Cambodia.

On 18 March 1970, however, the National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom of Cambodia unanimously voted against Prince Norodom Sihanouk and declared him deposed for "creating a political crisis in the country". (This rightist element in Cambodia had accused the Prince of having a soft corner for North Vietnam). After the fall of Prince Sihanouk's government in Cambodia, monarchy was declared as abolished and General Lon Nol emerged as the strong man. This was followed by anti-Vietnamese propaganda in Cambodia and clashes between

the "blue Cambodians" and the "red Vietnamese" became common. Lon Nol gave up the facade of constitutional rule on 19 October 1971 and became a dictator ruling the country by decrees. On 20 October 1971, he declared a state of emergency, saying that he would "no longer" play the game of "democracy and freedom". He appointed a government with himself as President and pursued a policy of total opposition to Vietnam's struggle for freedom and was, in fact, in saddle with U.S. support.

The government of Prince Souvanna Phouma in Laos, though claiming to be neutral, was also under tremendous U.S. pressure to follow an anti-Vietnamese, anti-Soviet foreign policy. In July, 1979, his government alleged that North Vietnam was engaged in violating its territory and called for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops. There were accusations and counter-accusations from both the Laotian government and the Pathet Lao side blaming each other for violating the Geneva accord. On 7 February 1971, about 5000 South Vietnamese troops, supported by U.S. helicopters and fighter bombers, poured over the borders into Cambodia and Laos and launched an attack on what they described as "communist sanctuaries." The South Vietnamese and the U.S. justified the attack, saying that the South Vietnamese Liberation forces (Vietcongs) were using what they called "Ho Chi-Minh Trail" passing through the dense jungles of Laos and that their intention was to destroy that "trail". The Laotian government, while accusing the North Vietnamese for using the "trail", protested to the Americans against the South Vietnamese attack. The Pathet Lao reported to the Soviet Union and Great Britain, co-chairmen of the Geneva accord, about the serious implications of the U.S. provocative action. The Soviet Union warned the U.S.A. that this move would adversely affect the Soviet-American relations. In August, 1971 Pathet Lao put forward its terms for a peaceful settlement of the Laotian problem :—(i) immediate cease-fire and (ii) starting of negotiations between Laotian parties to the dispute for a peaceful settlement in the Plainese des Jarres and Vientine alternatively. The

Pathet Lao continued to secure victories against the Laotian government forces. No negotiated settlement was in sight.

After being deposed, Prince Norodom Sihanouk established a government-in-exile in Peking with himself as the head. On 6 December 1971 the Prince declared that his forces fighting against the "illegal Lon Nol government" were in a position to capture Phnom Penh at any time. The anti-U.S. and pro-Communist forces in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos now started negotiations to put up a joint front. The Prince visited North Vietnam for the purpose and discussed the issue with N.L.F. of South Vietnam and the Pathet Lao. In the meantime, resentment was growing within Cambodia against the repressive policies of General Lon Nol's government. On 13 November 1973, his palace was attacked with rockets, though he escaped unhurt. With growing anti-Vietnamese propaganda, allegedly with the support of China, relations between Cambodia and Vietnam worsened and a situation was created in which a section of the ruling party revolted against the government in Cambodia headed by Pol Pot and with the support of Vietnam, set up a Liberation Front with a 14-member Central Committee to fight against the hated Pol Pot regime.

Meanwhile, border war continued between the two countries. A Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation, known as the National Liberation Front, was set up in Cambodia on 3 December 1978 and called upon the entire people to rise for the struggle to overthrow the "Pol Pot—Iyeng Sary clique" in the country. Pol Pot had to admit on 13 December 1978 that his forces were losing ground and the Vietnamese forces (by which he meant the Kampuchean Liberation Front) were advancing towards the capital. The Pol Pot regime fell on 11 January 1979 and was totally liquidated. The Kampuchean Peoples' Revolutionary Council (KPRC), consisting of Heng Samrin as its Chairman and Hum Sen as Foreign Minister, was constituted to run the country. The fall of the Pol Pot regime was not liked by the Chinese, who accused Vietnam for interference in Kampuchea's internal affairs and installing its henchmen as Kampuchea's rulers—a charge

which was denied by Vietnam. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries hailed the overthrow of Pol Pot and immediately extended their recognition to the new regime in Kampuchea.

The issue was raised in the United Nations by China. The Soviet Union vetoed a resolution condemning the establishment of the new government in Cambodia. Following the U.S. leadership, the ASEAN countries also, on 13 January 1979, called for an immediate withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and declared that the Kampucheans should determine their own future "free from interference or influence from outside." The ASEAN adopted an anti-Vietnam attitude in spite of the fact that earlier they had denounced the Pol Pot regime for its policy of genocide in the country, and continued to support the defeated Pol Pot regime which was functioning from its hideouts near Thai. India and a number of other countries recognized the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who had criticized the U.N. intervention in Cambodia when he was in power, now supported the Pol Pot regime and criticized Vietnam for helping Hun Sen to overthrow the Pol Pot regime. The Prince had headed the Pol Pot representatives at the United Nations when China had accused the Vietnamese for interference in Cambodia. On 19 March 1979 he retracted from that position and announced that he would no longer plead for the Pol Pot regime at the United Nations. The Prince later formed a National Front in order to secure the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, even though he did not support the Hun Sen government. The ASEAN response to the situation in Kampuchea was reflected in their proposal for the establishment of a demilitarization zone inside Kampuchea under U.N. supervision, a proposal which was rejected by Kampuchea and Vietnam on the plea that such a proposal would help the security of Thailand, which was providing sanctuary for the Pol Pot remnant and not of Kampuchea. If a demilitarization zone had to be established, it suggested, it should be on both sides of the Thailand-Kampuchean border. The Kampuchean problem, however, continued to remain

unresolved. This was due to the ASEAN countries' insistence on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea while they were not prepared to guarantee that their own territories would not be used by Pol Pot forces, aided and abetted by China and the U.S.A. While India recognized the new regime, inviting much criticism from many non-aligned countries, partly those among the ASEAN and proposed a political settlement, the U.N. has continued to recognize the credentials of the Pol Pot regime as the real government in Kampuchea.

THAILAND

Thailand, or 'the land of the free'—the name by which Siam now officially calls herself—is alone of the nations of South-East Asia that has remained independent through modern history. Although a Japanese occupation during the Second World War marred this enviable record, foreign rule ended with the defeat of Japan, and Thai sovereignty was re-established. Though two great factors—historic independence and food surplus (Thailand is a large exporter of rice)—give Thailand a distinction, she has not proved a leader in South-East Asia, nor has she been able to deal efficiently with her own economic and political problems. In the past, Thai statesmen showed great dexterity in playing off the two greatest imperialist powers in South-East Asia against each other—first Britain and France, then Britain and Japan. When, however, the Japanese invaders came in 1941, the Premier (and virtual dictator) Field-Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram (Pibul is pronounced Pee-boon), talked much about fighting for freedom, but, as the wits said, the battle was over before breakfast and he co-operated with the Japanese and declared war on Great Britain and the U.S.A. His rival, the civilian leader of a *coup d'etat* in 1932, which had replaced absolute monarchy with a constitutional one, Pridi Phanomyong—led an underground resistance movement and more than a year before the Japanese surrender actually established his government in the country. The Free Thais' war record, Thailand's conciliatory attitude, and, above all, the world's great need for the rice that Thailand alone could supply induced the

Allies to treat her leniently and not as an Axis satellite. Thailand immediately gave back to Malaya and Burma the border provinces ceded by her in 1945 as the ally of Japan, and reluctantly, the Indo-Chinese territory similarly acquired from Vichy France. In January, 1946, Thailand signed a treaty of friendship with China, by which diplomatic relations were established between the two countries for the first time in their existence. Then, after repealing her internal ban on Communism, Thailand asked the Soviet Government for the restoration of diplomatic relations which had been broken off after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Having thus paid in full the price for reinstatement to international good standing, Thailand in December, 1946 achieved her longed-for goal of admission to U.N.

In June, 1946 the young king of Thailand, Ananda Mahidol, was found shot to death in his bedroom in the palace. It was never decided whether it was due to accident, or suicide, or murder, but rumours implicated Pridi personally. In November, 1947, civilian officers co-operated with the army to bring out a *coup d'état* which overthrew Pridi, and in 1948, the army reinstated Pibul Songgram to power as Premier. (In September, 1957 a second bloodless *coup* outside Pibul and power was assumed by a military junta led by Marshal Surit Thanarat, which had overthrown Pibul.) The establishment of the communist government in China, and their activities in Indo-China and Malaya together with the pressure of the communist movement in Thailand herself, which was strong among the Chinese inhabitants of the country, who constituted a sixth of the country's 20 million people, induced Pibul to abandon Thailand's traditional policy of neutrality and align himself and his country with the western democracies in the Cold War. Thailand sent a contingent to the U.N. forces in Korea—a gesture which stimulated American interest in the country, and after a visit from American economic and military missions, Pibul signed agreements with Washington providing for the supply of arms, ammunition and military equipment. Marshal Songgram enthusiastically responded to the western request to attend the Manila Conference which in September, 1954, discussed ways and means for combating communist threat in South-East Asia and joined the SEATO, which was established soon afterwards for this

very purpose, Songgram's successors in office have continued to follow his foreign policy.

THAILAND DURING THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

Like Indonesia and the other ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia, Thailand also moved closer to the U.S. during the Indo-Chinese war. It gave the U.S. permission to construct six air bases to prosecute the Indo-Chinese war, and till October, 1973, it had a military government dependent largely on U.S. support. With insurgency breaking out on its northern, north-eastern and southern borders and about 400 villages in provinces close to the Laotian border dominated by Pathet Lao and Vietnam, this appeared to Thailand to be the only way to keep "the North Vietnamese wolf at bay." With the change of relations between U.S. and China and Nixon's declared commitment to a policy of withdrawal of U.S. armies from Southeast Asia, Thailand showed a new concern for economic and social development which now appeared to its government to be a better strategy for winning back the disaffected population of the north and north-east than that of suppressing it by military means. Thailand also expressed its desire to have friendly relations with China provided it withdrew its support from the communist insurgents in the northern border area.

In March, 1975, Thailand's military government was replaced by a popularly elected civilian government. Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj now tried to phase out U.S. bases and personnel as a gesture of the country's good intentions towards North Vietnam. Following diplomatic recognition by China and improvement of relations between China and the Philippines in 1975, Thailand moved towards normalization of relations with China. It revoked the trade ban with the C.P.R. Thailand, however, found it more difficult to normalize relations with Vietnam as the latter continued to insist on its withdrawal of all American bases and personnel before undertaking any serious negotiations with it, in return for which Thailand has been insisting on a promise from Vietnam to cease supporting the guerillas in the north-eastern part of the country and take back some 40,000 Vietnamese refugees residing in that region.

MALAYA (MALAYASIA)

Before the Second World War, Malaya could be summed up, as one geographer said, in three words—rubber, tin, and Singapore. It produced 38 to 58 per cent of the world's supply of rubber in varying years, almost a third of the global output of tin, while Singapore was a naval base on which Britain depended to secure her colonial power in South-East Asia. Today none of these factors is quite as important as it seemed in the pre-war era. The world managed to function without Malaya's tin and rubber, and the Japanese proved that the invincibility of Singapore was a myth.

When the British returned after the Japanese withdrawal, much had happened to make their old position as colonial rulers in Malaya untenable. During the war, they themselves had given arms to the communist guerillas fighting against the invaders, and the guerillas, who were mostly Chinese, were now the most determined enemies of the continuance of British rule in Malaya. As the jungles and terrain of Malaya were great helps to guerilla fighting, the British found it a well nigh impossible job to suppress the guerillas. Again, on account of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose's Azad Hind movement, the Indians of Malaya had been roused, and they considered themselves as the standard-bearers of freedom from colonial rule. Above all, a strong nationalist movement was growing up among the Malays and in 1946, the United Malaya National Organization, the first really nationalist association in the country, was formed.

As they were at the time quitting their other possessions—India, Burma, etc.—the British decided to withdraw from Malaya also. But, strangely enough, without consulting Malayan opinion, they announced a Malayan Union, which was opposed by the Malays, since, under the new constitution, the acquisition of citizenship rights had been made so easy that non-Malays could easily become citizens and threaten the predominant position in the government that the Malays considered was rightfully theirs. (Malaya consists of three ethnic groups, each having its own religions and language the Malays making up 50 per cent, the Chinese 37 per cent, and Indians and others 13 per cent.) In Singapore, the Chinese are about 80 per cent of the population, and as the proposed Union was to

include this territory also, the position of the Malays in the Union was rendered more precarious.

However, in 1948, the Labour Government, headed by Mr. Attlee, had the good sense to cancel the Union, and announce instead the formation of the Federation of Malaya, which was to consist of all the territories of the Union minus Singapore which became a separate Crown Colony. The rights of citizenship were made more rigid. Thus the British had recognized that for any future relationship with Malaya, they had to depend upon the Malays and not the Chinese, who were, moreover, mostly communists. However, a great leader turned up among the Malays, Tengku (Prince) Abdul Rahmant who established communal harmony by forming a coalition—the Alliance—consisting of the dominant Malay and all the Chinese political parties. On 31 August 1957 Malaya became a member of the Commonwealth and had a new constitution of democratic type. Tengku Abdul Rahman became the first Prime Minister and such was his stature that the question was asked, as a similar question was asked in India with reference to Nehru, "After the Tengku, what?"

In giving Malaya dominion status, the British had taken a "calculated risk", since the country has an important strategic position in South-East Asia, and the Chinese population, which is increasingly becoming communist and may turn out to be willing tools of Red China in carrying out its expansionist aims, constitutes an ever-present danger to the Malays. The solution was considered to lie in the formation of a wider federation—Malayasia, in which the Chinese population may be reduced to the position of a still smaller minority than it was in the Federation. On 14 September 1963, this was actually accomplished, and a new state was born—Malayasia. The new state was formed by the linking together of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo (or Sabah) into a single member of the British Commonwealth.

For a number of reasons, President Sukarno of Indonesia, who at one time was in favour of the formation of a still larger Malaysian Federation—Maphilindo—to be composed of Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, backed out of the idea of the formation of Malayasia and indeed opposed it tooth and nail. He was of opinion that it was

designed to "save imperialism", and that North Borneo and Sarawak, because of their large Chinese populations, would become ripe for communist penetration. He also thought that, since Malayasia under the agreement it had signed with Britain, would be protected by the latter country, it would continue Britain's power in the area. His critics felt that he resented it rather because this would pit him against Britain's might if he tried to extend his influence in South-East Asia. It was also alleged that he opposed Malayasia on account of his own pro-communist sympathies and the pressure of the communist elements in his government. In any case, Sukarno, by insisting that the U.N. should conduct a plebiscite or referendum in North Borneo and Sarawak with a view to ascertaining the real wishes of the peoples of the two territories as to whether they wanted Malayasia, succeeded in delaying the inauguration of the Federation, scheduled to take place on 31 August. Malayasia was proclaimed on 14 September 1963, only after U. That had an enquiry conducted in the two states, and affirmed that the peoples of both the states were in favour of the merger. (Singapore later on seceded and formed itself into a separate state.)

THE MALAYASIA-INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION

Almost as soon as Malayasia was born, President Sukarno started a "Crush Malayasia" campaign by landing guerillas on the isolated Borneo states (Sarawak and Sabah). On 17 August 1964, a date which coincided with the 19th declaration of Indonesian independence, he stepped up his operations further by landing a small force at Pontian, on the Malaya peninsula itself. On 3 September, 30 armed regular paratroopers equipped with all supplies parachuted at Labis, 85 miles from Kuala Lumpur. At the same time, Malay-Chinese racial riots flared up at Singapore, which were interpreted by Malayasia as an attempt by the under ground communist party to stage a come-back under the Indonesian umbrella.

Tengku Abdul Rahman, the Malayasian premier, promptly appealed to the U.N. for action against what he described as "blatant and inexcusable aggression" by Indonesia. Sukarno reacted to this by threatening a "more offensive action" against Malayasia, but he categorically disavowed any plan for a direct confrontation with

the British. The latter, though committed to defend Malayasia, likewise refrained from doing anything which might have led to a clash with Sukarno, on the plea that the clash between the two nations of South-East Asia was an "Asian affair". However, after riots broke out at Singapore, they airlifted a 500-man anti-aircraft regiment to the place from Germany and despatched 4 warships from their Mediterranean fleet to the same destination.

The U.S.S.R., anxious to contain Britain's lingering influence in Indonesia, and also to prevent Communist China from consolidating her influence in the state, hastened to give her moral support to Sukarno's policy. On 17 September 1964, she recorded her 102nd veto in the Security Council to kill a resolution which deplored Indonesia's attack on Malayasia.

BURMA

Burma became an independent nation completely outside the British Commonwealth by a treaty signed in London on 17 October 1947, effective 4 January 1948. She was the third country in modern history to free herself completely from the British empire, of which she had been a very subordinate, if not a subdued, possession. She had been preceded only by the United States of America and Eire. Burma is a phenomenon in Asia—an underpopulated country which exports food. She can feed and clothe and house herself, and she exports rice to earn the greater part of her foreign exchange.

"Independence in our time" was the slogan of Burma's national leaders, and these leaders—headed by the martyred Bogyoke Aung San and U Nu, till lately prime minister—were the student rebels in the 1920's. They initiated the Thakin movement in the 1930's; supported Japan against the Western Allies in the Second World War, believing that Japan really would grant Asians their independence; turned against Japan when they became convinced that Japanese occupation meant the exchange of one master for another; and achieved complete independence in 1947. Since 1941, Burma has been hampered by civil strife by communist groups and the Karens, who form 6 per cent of the population.

With India and Indonesia, Burma is most active in the Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N. Less assertive than the Indians, the

Burmese, nevertheless, have acted on the assumption that the wisest course for them is to follow a "correct policy" with respect to Moscow and Peiping. Burma, perhaps more than India (before the Chinese invasion) and Indonesia, has no illusions about the Communists. She sees her role as one among a group of small liberal nations which have everything to gain by remaining free and independent and everything to lose by being swallowed up as satellites or pieces of empire by any one group. At present, however, Burma is under a dictatorship under General Ne Win who seized power by a military *coup d'etat* and placed U Nu, the premier, and other ministers and leaders under detention.

ASEAN

On 8 August 1967, the foreign ministers of five neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—in a meeting held at Bangkok issued a declaration since then known as "ASEAN declaration", thereby establishing "an association for regional cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia". The major aims and purposes, as described in the Bangkok meeting were : (i) to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations ; (ii) to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among the countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; (iii) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields ; (iv) to collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communication facilities ; and the raising of the living standards of their peoples ; and (v) to maintain close and beneficial co-operation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all

avenues for even closer co-operation among themselves. Described as "the collective will to attain stability and peace in the region as a pre-requisite for the well-being and prosperity of the ASEAN people", the Ministerial Council expected the ASEAN to grow into "a pillar of hope for millions of people".

ASEAN is not an alliance in the traditional sense and it has never been the intention of any of its members that it should become one. It is not a conventional instrument for collective defence and the combined military capability of the five members is not necessarily appropriate for the combined regional projection of military power even if the political will for such projection were to exist. Despite ASEAN efforts at economic co-operation and closer relations with the West than with the Soviet Union, its members continue to compete with each other for both external markets and outside investments, mutual suspicions between Indonesia and Singapore, Singapore and Malayasia, and Malayasia and the Philippines still continue to linger—based as they are on territorial claims and/or ethnic frictions—and there are sharp foreign policy differences on such regional issues as exploitation of the sea bed and rights of international ocean passage through the Straits of Malacca. All the same, ASEAN is undoubtedly an increasingly significant vehicle for international co-operation among the nations of the region. Co-operation among the member states has been increasing. What is more important is that, taken together, the ASEAN countries are a dominating factor in the world supply of important commodities like tin, rubber, vegetable oils, tropical hardwoods, abaca fibre, and an important factor in the production of other commodities like rice, pineapples, maize, sugar, and petroleum.

The functional expansion of the ASEAN during the years has been quite impressive. Starting with exclusively consultative activities in 1967, it has developed a number of plans—for the exploration of production sharing, a regional payments union, an ASEAN shipping service, joint tourism and joint negotiations on market agreements with the EEC and for various collaborative activities in the region. There now exists an ASEAN office in each member country's foreign ministry. Yet it is far from being a regional organization in the true sense of the term. As it stands

today, the dependence of the countries of Southeast Asia, individually as well as collectively, on the Western powers and on Japan is increasing, though there is a movement in all these countries towards closer identity for regional co-operation and for non-alignment as a vehicle for foreign policy. Despite high hopes for the future of the ASEAN expressed by member-states, it is too early to say whether it will remain "merely an economic-cultural grouping", what it is today, dependent, both nationally and region-wise, on the Western powers or evolve itself into an autonomous regional organization.

CHAPTER XXVII

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

THE POLICY OF NON-INVOLVEMENT

The foreign policy of India, like that of every other country in the world, rests on national interest, such as the defence of the country, the economic needs of the people, and certain cultural and emotional factors, which are rooted in history. India is sheltered by the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea in the east, south and west, and by the lofty Himalayas in the north. She is faced by the most difficult kind of economic and political problems at home. She had certain cultural and trade contacts with other parts of Asia, which were cut off during British rule, and which she now naturally wants to reopen. As Mr. Nehru once remarked, India feels more intimately with regard to them than to things happening in Europe or America, even if the latter are more important. In short, as says Mr. Walter Lippman, India's foreign policy, is "the natural expression of the vital interests of a new State".

Non-alignment or non-involvement—words generally used to describe India's foreign policy—though often ascribed to Nehru personally, would seem to be the natural corollary of the factors mentioned above. In somewhat similar circumstances, the nascent American Republic had also adopted the policy of non-entanglement, enjoined upon the nation by George Washington. Adverse critics point out that India has other reasons also for wanting to stand out of the major conflicts of the present day world. The Cold War being still remote from her, they urge, her sense of urgency in the ideological conflict is less acute. Indian economic development, too, depends heavily on external aid, and, therefore, needs world peace. The biggest share of this has come from the U.S.A. but the U.S.S.R. also has given her valuable economic aid,

besides support in the U.N. on the Kashmir issue, and she has not sided with Peking in the India-China conflict. In any case, these critics hold, India's military weakness, specially as compared with Communist China, has prevented her from definitely allying herself with the West, and compelled her to seek to live on amicable terms with the Communist world.

India's case, however, is that her policy of non-alignment is grounded on positive reasons, and is not just neutralism or a negative, middle-of-the-road reluctance to distinguish between right and wrong, an eagerness to benefit from both sides. In the first place, it is based on the belief that grouping into two blocs precipitates the conflict which it is sought to avoid and that India's way is the better one of narrowing and thus not widening the area of conflict. It is not passive neutralism, or a refusal to resist evil, Nehru passionately declared on a number of occasions. As Nehru told the Congress of the United States in 1949 : "Where freedom is menaced, or justice is threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral... Our policy is not neutralist but one of active endeavour to preserve and, if possible, establish peace on firm foundations."

India's policy is rather a positive or dynamic neutralism in which a country acts independently and judges each issue on merit. She feels that India can contribute to world peace by trying to bring opposite sides together—by holding an area of peace uncommitted to either side, whose influence can be exerted in either direction to bring about greater understanding between the opposed blocs. "By keeping aloof from the controversies of the cold war," says Mr. K. M. Panikkar, "she has been able to build up a position of independence and, in association with other States similarly placed, has been able to exercise considerable influence in the cause of international goodwill. This is in keeping with the policy of non-violence for which Gandhiji stood in his life time and which, broadly speaking, is still the basis of India's thinking."

As actually practised, India's policy has, according to some critics, been to remain "neutral on the side of democracy", and, according to others, the other way. So far as Nehru was concerned,

he more than once stated his distaste for Communism in the plainest terms. Of communist ideology he declared that it is "outmoded... Marxism is out of date". As regards the communist form of government he once declared forcefully : "I do not like monolithic states." After returning from China, he declared that India had achieved more by democratic means than the Chinese Communists had done by dictatorship. If, in spite of all this, he did not denounce Communist Russia's expansionism, it was because he felt that hot words only beget hotter words and bring the world closer to war. He often indicated to Mr. Chester Bowles his mistrust of the western military build-up for defence, such as NATO, and said it might frighten Russia into launching a war which she might not otherwise contemplate. (Chester Bowles, *Ambassador's Report*, pp. 236-37). Mr. Nehru was strongly against American-sponsored regional alliances such as SEATO and CENTO on the ground that they sow the seeds of a new form of colonialism, apart from the fact that they lead to countermoves "on the other side of the ideological fence", with consequent increase of tension in both camps.

The history of the conduct of India's foreign policy up-to-date falls under three periods. In the first, covered by the years 1946-54, the non-alignment policy was tilted westwards. This was the period of the condemnation of North Korean aggression, of the protest against China's assertion of suzerainty over Tibet in 1950, of Nehru's trip to the United States and of the failure to make any protest against the colonial wars being waged in Indo-China and Malaya, and of a passionate defence of the Commonwealth. At the same time, however, during all these years, certain other aspects of India's foreign policy were being developed, viz. the quick recognition of People's China, the sharp disillusionment with the West over Kashmir, the appeal to Stalin in Korea and the repeated requests to the U.S.A. not to cross the 38th parallel, and the anger over Tunisia and Indonesia, and the noting of the pro-colonialist character of NATO.

In the second period, covered by the years 1954-59, India's disagreement with certain aspects of western policy became acute and was firmly expressed. First came a sharp denunciation of U.S.

military aid to Pakistan. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1954, Mr. Nehru condemned it as a "wrong step, a step which adds to the tensions and fears of the world. It adds to the feeling of insecurity in Asia". Even stronger was his condemnation of SEATO in his speech on 29 September 1954. The signing of the Pancha Sheel Agreement with China on Tibet was a logical outcome of the attitude towards the West and was inspired by love of peace and disapproval of colonialism. This was followed by visits from China and to that country. Then came Bandung in April, 1955, where Mr. Nehru firmly expressed India's devotion to non-alignment and Afro-Asian solidarity. These five years saw the hey-day of India's international prestige—the Indo-China settlement, the initiative together with Asian powers to defend Egypt, the refusal to play the western game on Hungary, the energetic intervention in the disarmament negotiations etc.

With the Chinese occupation of Tibet and the grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama in April 1959 and the strange Chinese reaction to it, followed up with the eruption of the border crisis in August that year, the third phase of India's foreign policy commenced and continues till today. No doubt China's intransigence and actual aggressions in Ladakh and NEFA have posed serious challenges to India's policy of non-alignment which, however, has been continued, though certain dents have appeared and shifts taken place. Mr. Nehru's policy statements with regard to Congo, Cuba and Algeria have been criticized by orthodox exponents of non-alignment, as lacking in "fullthroatedness" though there has been no real departure from the basic principles.

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

As early as 1925 the Indian National Congress had established the four cardinal points that determine India's path in world affairs today. These are : (1) opposition to imperialism and colonial rule, (2) support of subject peoples and oppressed races in their struggle for freedom and equality, (3) promotion of peace and abhorrence of war, and (4) avoidance of foreign entanglements. The relationship India desires with other countries was spelled out in 1954 in a statement of the Five Principles (*Pancha Sheel*), as follows : (1) Mutual

respect for each other's integrity and sovereignty, (2) non-aggression; (3) non-interference with each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefits; and (5) peaceful co-existence. So far, agreements to these principles have been signed by India with Communist China, Yugoslavia, and Russia. The agreement with Russia was signed between Nehru and Bulganin during the former's visit to Moscow in 1955. Moscow was persuaded to accept the additional phrase, "for any reason, either of economic, political or ideological character" to the third clause of the Five Principles.

INDIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH

When India became a sovereign republic in 1950, she retained her membership of the Commonwealth, recognizing the British monarch as titular head of that body, a sort of symbol of the common bond between independent member states. But the Queen is not the sovereign in India as she is in the dominions. There is some opposition in India, mainly from the communists, the socialists, and the Hindu Mahasabha, to this policy, but the All-India Congress Committee, meeting in May, 1950, endorsed it. Nehru was the chief defender of the Commonwealth link. He said it had obvious advantages. For one thing the continuous exchange of information and consultations among commonwealth capitals is of value in determining the day-to-day course of foreign affairs. India's adherence to the sterling bloc, with its currency backed by reserves in Britain, is another reason. India asked Canada and others to assist her case in Washington against military aid to Pakistan. Inside the Commonwealth, India has serious differences with Pakistan over Kashmir, with the Union of South Africa, whose policy of apartheid she is fighting along with Pakistan, with Ceylon over citizenship rights of migrants from India and their descendants, and with Britain occasionally with regard to her policies, such as entry into ECM and her ambivalent attitude towards the Congo and Portuguese colonialism.

INDIA AND THE U.S.A.

India's relations with the U.S.A. have been subject to strong vicissitudes. To many Americans, including the late American Secretary of State Mr. Dulles, India's policy of non-involvement was

hardly distinguishable from neutralism, and was a handicap to America's policy of building up defence organization in Asia. Mr. Nehru's visit to the United States in October, 1949 hardly improved matters. On the one hand, many Americans were displeased with his "moralizings" about what the American Government should do and should not do, and on the other, Mr. Nehru, as says Mr. Breecher, developed "a thinly disguised contempt for American materialism". However, the clouds of misunderstanding were largely removed in course of time, and it was realized on both sides that, though their methods were different, the goals were the same. As an American writer has unhesitatingly stated: "The heat of debate tends to obscure not only the abstract points of agreement but also India's concrete services to the American cause, as for example, her continued supply to the United States of the bulk of her strategic export materials like manganese and mica." (Robert Trumbull, *As I See India*, p. 231.)

The first serious rift in Indo-American relations occurred during the Korean War. India acknowledged that the initial attack was North Korean aggression, but would contribute only a medical unit, not combat troops, to the U.N. force. She warned (accurately) that crossing the 38th parallel by General Douglas MacArthur's forces would draw the Chinese Communists into the war. Meanwhile, she was pleading vigorously for Red China's inclusion in U.N. and opposed American support of the French in Indo-China. The nadir in the relations was reached in 1954, when America agreed to give military aid to Pakistan, and India opposed the formation of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. India slightly warmed up to the U.S.A. in 1956 when the latter disapproved of the Anglo-French-Israeli venture in Suez, though reports that the invaders had used American arms chilled her a lot India's vacillating attitude towards Soviet repressions in Hungary, and specially Mr. Menon's pro-Soviet vote in U.N. aroused the ire of Americans. In 1958, the despatch of American forces to Lebanon irked India sorely, and, in 1961 India strongly criticized American sponsored invasion of Cuba. Americans were conversely aroused by the Indian invasion of Goa. But these were relative pin pricks in an era of cordiality. Since the death of Mr. Dulles in May, 1959, the American Government has paid more

attention to India's views and India has learned to be cautious in criticizing a nation which has, in spite of all that happened, contributed slightly more than \$4 billion in loans and grants to her economy. President Eisenhower received a hearty welcome from the Indian Government and people when he visited New Delhi in December, 1959. The relations considerably improved under the Kennedy administration and their sympathetic reaction to the Chinese aggression in 1962.

INDIA AND THE U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union was the first country with which independent India decided to establish diplomatic relations. Negotiations for the purpose were indeed started even some four months before India actually became independent. In the last twenty years close and friendly relations with the Soviet Union have been among the most stable bases of India's foreign policy. It is not a fact that Indo-Soviet relations have never been put to any kind of strain—the Korean war days were difficult (see above, Chapter 24), and at the present moment some Indian leaders have accused the successors of Khrushchev of wavering on the latter's unequivocal stand in support of India's policy with regard to Kashmir (see above, Chapter 21, Russian Foreign Policy After Khrushchev). On the other hand, the Soviet Union has always given unstinted support to India in the Security Council discussions relating to Kashmir, and often pulled her out of difficult situations created there by hostile moves of Pakistan's Western friends. Thus, in 1957, the Soviet delegate at the Security Council vetoed a resolution sponsored by the West contemplating *inter alia* the introduction of a United Nations force into Kashmir to oversee a proposed demilitarization of the area. When, a little later, in the course of the same year, the West proposed demilitarization as a step towards the holding of the plebiscite, the Soviet delegate nipped the move in the bud by threatening that he would veto any such resolution, if passed. The Soviet Union also vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning India's action in Goa in 1961 (see below, India's Action in Goa).

On the critical issue of China's aggression on India's border, the Soviet Union, understandably enough, at the early stages, attempted

to hold a neutral posture, Khrushchev frequently expressing his hope that Russia's Chinese *brother* and Indian *friend* would be able to settle it by mutual discussions. When, however, China launched a sudden and massive attack on India's border in Ladakh and NEFA, *Pravda* gave up its neutral attitude (as expressed in its editorial of 9 September, 1959) and expressed itself fully in support of India's contentions in the matter. This was so even though Russia's own self-interest lay in standing neutral, with the possibility of thus diverting China's attention from the still unsettled Sino-Russian border, and the competition for influence in Mongolia. (If the *People's Daily*, vide its editorial of 25 October 1962, quoted by K. Satchidananda in his *Indian Foreign Policy*, is to be believed, Khrushchev had, in return for China's support on the Cuban missile issue, on 13-14 October 1962 offered to China Russia's complete sympathy and support in respect of the Sino-Indian border quarrel through the Chinese Ambassador, Liu Hsiae.) However, as in the unequal fight with China India seemed to go down, Khrushchev quickly decided to stand by India. In his ideological fight with the Chinese leaders, he needed the support of Asian and African communist parties, particularly the Communist Party of India. Above all, "Russia's basic and long-standing interest in Central Asia—specially in strategic and mineral-rich Sinkiang"—required that China must not have an overwhelming victory in the strategic Himalayan regions. Russian aid to India in this war against India was considerable, and was of a form specially intended for use in the Himalayan areas. Most of the transport planes and helicopters which India used to supply to advanced positions in the Ladakh area were sold by Russia to her on favourable terms. Russia also gave India a form of technical assistance by supplying Russian instructors to train Air Force pilots in the use of these planes. She also announced (as we have seen, Chapter 27, above) that she stood by her commitment to sell a few MIG fighters to India. She indeed offered to sell India a more advanced type of these jet-fighters than the one she had supplied to China. (Margaret W. Forster, Leo E. Rose, A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battleground—Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh*.)

It is no use laying undue stress on the fact that Russian attitude to India is based on national self-interest, or that Indian attitude to

Russia is based on political motives (altruism seldom plays an appreciable role in international relations). Rather, it is worthwhile acknowledging that Russian and Indian interests run parallel to each other and that Indo-Russian friendship is grounded on common interests. Speaking of Indo-Russian relations, one may go a little further, and hold that they are based on the principles of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems and on respect for each other's sovereignty and integrity. Indians and Russians take a basically similar stand on many international problems, such as general disarmament, banning of nuclear tests, and struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism, and against national oppression and racial discrimination. Above all, the two nations have an equal dedication to peace and are equally averse to the use of violence as a method of solving international problems. Apart from common interests and co-operation in the political field, the two peoples have a deep fondness for each other's works of art, poetry, theatre, and cinema.

Russians claim that while Indo-Soviet co-operation covers all spheres, that most striking proof of Russian friendliness to and co-operation with Indians is to be found in the economic field. In this sphere again, they point out, Soviet assistance has been rendered to the greatest extent in the development of those industries which are of the most decisive importance in the building up of a nation's economy. It is indeed significant that Soviet economic assistance began as far back as February 2, 1955 with the signing of an agreement between the two countries for establishing a steel plant at Bhilai, steel being the foundation of a nation's industry and the touchstone of its wealth. Bhilai is at present in the midst of a large-scale expansion, but even Bhilai became a "young brother" of a new steel giant which was constructed with Soviet assistance at Bokaro. More than forty major industrial projects have already been built with Soviet assistance, which include, besides the two just mentioned, the Thermal Power Station at Neyveli, the Heavy Machine-Building Plant at Ranchi, the Oil Refinery at Barauni, the Oilfields at Ankleshwar, the Coal-Mining Machinery Plant at Durgapur, and the Heavy Electrical Equipment at Hardwar. It may be mentioned that Soviet assistance has been specially useful in the expansion of India's oil industry, in which the country's capacity was vastly, and

as it now appears, deliberately, underrated by the foreign owners of the few existing such industries.

The last but by no means the least of the factors that contributed to the establishment of friendly relations between the two nations was cultural exchange, which began with the visit of the poet Rabindra Nath Tagore in the thirties of the present century. The poet took with him a collection of his paintings which enabled even the common people of Russia to comprehend the culture of India. The publication, soon afterwards, of his *Russiar Chithi* (*Letters from Russia*), in its original Bengali and English translation, similarly, disabused Indian minds of the wrong impressions that had been deliberately instilled into them by the hostile propaganda of their foreign rulers, and made Indians understand the true nature of the Bolshevik Revolution and its achievements as also the friendly feelings of the Russian people towards Indians. There then began a vast exchange of delegations : delegation of poets, artists, writers, dancers and film workers. Indian classics which had received attention even in the Tsarist times were translated into the numerous languages of the U.S.S.R., not in thousands, but in tens of thousands. The centenary of the birth of Rabindra Nath Tagore was celebrated with great eclat throughout the Soviet Union. Even the 1500th anniversary of Kalidasa was observed and his great play, *Shakuntala*, was turned into a Russian ballet, the great Indian epic, the *Ramayana*, too, was condensed into a play and shown at the Children's Theatre in Moscow. Produced in 1961, it continues to be shown in Moscow even today.

INDIA AND CHINA

An Era of Goodwill

Till at least 1959, when Chinese claims to 51,000 square miles of Indian territory were first made public, the relations between India and the Chinese Communists were friendly, and even cordial. India's attitude was ascribed by hostile critics to her partiality to the communist world and described as one of appeasement of a frightening powerful neighbour. Neither of these hypotheses is correct : India simply wants to work harmoniously with a great and free Asian State with which she has always lived in peace. India had the same attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek's

Nationalist China, and, immediately after the Second World War, Mr. Nehru had invited General Chiang Kai-shek and his wife to visit India, and they did so. The delegates of Nationalist China attended the Asian Conference held in Delhi in 1964. Mr. Nehru indeed had a life-long vision of India and China joining themselves together in cultural partnership in the world of today, as they had been in the hoary past when they were both great nations. In 1940, while urging a worldwide federation he proposed an "Eastern Federation of China and India and other Eastern countries".

Mr. Nehru was a strong critic of Communism, and his government sternly repressed the communist rising which occurred in India in 1948. Yet Mr. Nehru, like Britain, recognized the communist government almost as soon as it had established itself in China, and he considered it ridiculous that the real rulers of the country should be supposed to be those who owned no more than an island off the Chinese coast. All the same the Chinese Communists had a blow aimed at him and his government. In reply to a message from the Indian Communist Party conveying its apologies for having earlier described him as a "deviationist"—this was done under the guidance of Moscow which similarly admitted its mistake—Mao Tse-tung cabled an assurance of full support of the Chinese people for the Indian Communists in their "struggle", and expressed the hope that "India, too, would be liberated by the Communist party from the oppression of Anglo-American imperialism and its Indian lackeys".

Mr. Nehru tactfully took no notice of the strange episode and his government continued to press for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, even though it endangered amicable relations with the U.S.A. India's arguments, which have been borne out by subsequent developments, are mainly that the effectiveness of the world body is impaired by the exclusion of a nation that contains nearly a quarter of the globe's population. In particular, according to this point of view, disarmament, one of the most important U.N. objectives, would be unreal, with Red China, armed to the teeth, left out of it. India's attitude to Red China continued to be friendly and reasonable

all through the crisis of the Korean War, in spite of U.S. disapproval and of rebuffs from Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists themselves. India's representative in the Security Council, Sri, B. N. Rau, voted in favour of the initial resolution which condemned the North Korean aggression and demanded a cease-fire at the 38th parallel. India also supported the second resolution, which called on U.N. members for collective assistance, and as a token of her support and in the Gandhian tradition, sent an ambulance corps, which served bravely throughout the fighting under U.N. She did not send troops; neither did Pakistan, or any other Middle Eastern or Asian nation except Turkey, Thailand and the Philippines.

When the United Nations forces, after General MacArthur's landing at Ichon, were approaching the 38th parallel, Nehru urged the American Government that they called a halt there. He took the view that the purpose of the U.N. action was to repel aggression and to defend the non-communist world from aggression, and that this had been accomplished. Then, on the eve of the U.N. forces crossing the parallel, the Indian ambassador in Peiping was awakened in the middle of the night by the Chinese Government. He was told that if they did so, the Chinese Government would feel that its security was threatened and take "defensive" action. Nehru passed on this clear warning to the American Government, who disregarded it, President Truman having formed the strange opinion that the Indians were merely working as "the stooges" of the Chinese Reds. Again, when the resolution to brand Peiping as aggressor was before the U.N., India opposed it, chiefly, and rightly, on the ground that it was calculated to increase tension, extend the sphere of Cold War to Asia, and thus worsen the international situation. Nehru, evidently, had chosen for himself the role of mediator between East and West, earning thereby the displeasure of both.

Meanwhile, by supporting an Afro-Asian resolution proposing a cease-fire, India had been fiercely attacked by the Soviet delegate, Malik, as attempting 'to save the American troops' who were facing near-encirclement. However, India persisted in her efforts to bring about an armistice, which was signed—after two years had passed—on 27 July 1953. In recognition of her

services to the cause of peace, she was chosen as Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and was generally praised for skillful and impartial handling of the delicate issue of disputed prisoners of war.

Worsening Sino-Indian Relations—Chinese "Liberation" of Tibet
Two developments which occurred soon afterwards shook India's faith in Mao Tse-tung's government. The first was the Chinese invasion of Tibet, where India had inherited from the British certain old-established rights, including an agent in Lhasa, trade agencies in Gyantse and Yatung, post and telegraph offices on the trade route to Gyantse and a small military escort for their protection. India valued these arrangements, which were for the mutual benefit of India and Tibet, and, frankly, she had no wish to see her semi-independent neighbour overrun by forces which would bring communism to the frontiers of both India and Nepal, and even pose a threat to her very integrity. What disturbed Mr. Nehru's mind most was the fact that the invasion of Tibet by China took place at a time when a Tibetan delegation was in New Delhi awaiting permission to proceed to Peiping for discussions.

Nehru protested vigorously to Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in two notes, but was told, in effect, that the Tibet affair was China's domestic concern, that Nehru should mind his own business, and that he was only an imperialist stooge. "The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan peoples and defend the frontiers of China", was a telling rebuke to Nehru personally as also an ominous threat to India. India, however, was in no position to send an army over the Himalayas to Tibet's rescue, even if she had a wish to do so. The U.S.A. had previously declined to accord official status to a Tibetan delegation, on the ground that Tibet had no sovereign status. The United Nations similarly ignored a Tibetan protest over the Red Chinese invasion.

The second shock happened in connection with the Korean peace negotiations. In 1952, the Government of India, after months of careful sounding of all the interested parties, brought before the U.N. Political Committee a seventeen-point draft resolution for a truce in Korea. Russia's flat rejection of the

plan disappointed India, but her disappointment turned to surprise and chagrin when the Chinese also uncompromisingly turned down the resolution. However, India took comfort in the thought that Russia was the villain of the piece, and the deduction was verified when, after Marshal Stalin's death, China agreed to truce plans very similar to those she had turned down at the end of 1952.

Meanwhile, China's "liberation" of Tibet was proceeding slowly but surely. At Peking's request the sixteen-year-old Indian Mission in Lhasa became a consulate-general and all direct relations with Tibet ceased. The Tibetan army, such as it was, could do little against the invaders, and the Tibetan authorities had no option but to negotiate an agreement. The young Dalai Lama with his retinue fled from Lhasa to Yatung on the Indian border but by the end of 1950 he was persuaded to return to his capital. In 1954, he and the Panchen Lama, the second most powerful Lama of Tibet, whom the Chinese were playing up against the former, were invited to visit Peking. They accepted the invitation, and, on their arrival at Peking, were used more or less as public exhibits of Chinese overlordship over Tibet. The autonomy, guaranteed to Tibet under the agreement, was violated by the Chinese, but the U.N., the custodian of the integrity of the nations of the world and of human rights, looked on. On 20 April 1954, an agreement was signed between Delhi and Peiping at the latter capital, which was prefaced by a declaration of five principles, the famous *Pancha Sheel*, and under which all privileges formerly enjoyed by the Government of India in what was now called the "Tibet region of China" were abandoned. The Indian military escort had to be withdrawn, all Indian Government rest-houses, buildings, post, telegraph and telephone services had to be handed over to the Chinese, and in return for trade facilities in Tibet Delhi had to grant to the Chinese Government similar trade facilities in India. In June, 1954, Mr. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier, while on his way back to China from the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, paid a three-day visit to Delhi. The two Prime Ministers had a ten-hour consultation with each other, after which a communique announcing "a clearer understanding of each other's point of view" was issued

and a wave of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai sentiment swept India.

Chinese Aggression on India and Unofficial War

The Tibetans were far from reconciled to their "liberation", and in 1959, after extensive rebellions against the Chinese had been brutally crushed by the latter, the Dalai Lama fled from the country, and took refuge in India, while Tibet lost whatever autonomy it still enjoyed. This further exacerbated Indian ire against the Chinese, who had meanwhile put up claims on some 51,000 square miles of Indian territory in NEFA and Ladakh by publishing maps in which these were shown as included in China, amounting to what was called by the late Dr. Meghnad Saha as a "cartographic invasion" of India. Earlier, when India was befriending them by supporting their case for being seated in U.N., the Chinese Reds had sought to evade the issue by stating that the maps had been prepared by their predecessors, the Kuomintang Government, and that they had no time to look into them. Later, they replied to Indian protests both by the pen and the sword. It is difficult to say when exactly they began their aggression on Indian territory, for the Indian Government, wishing to avoid public excitement in India, had blacked out all such news. In August, 1959, at long last, they publicised the news that the Chinese forces had occupied Longju, an Indian frontier outpost in NEFA and killed three policemen. They also admitted that the Chinese had already occupied nearly half of the territory they claimed in Ladakh as their own and territory elsewhere—in all 12,000 square miles of territory, and had also constructed a road through Ladakh, linking it to Western Tibet. In spite of exchange of notes, Chinese aggression went on slowly but surely till 8 September 1962, when Chinese forces suddenly broke through the frontier and intruded into Indian territory in a corner of the Eastern Sector.

On 20 October 1962, the Chinese launched massive attacks in both the eastern and western sectors and the Indian troops, who were ill-armed and faced formidable difficulties of climate and terrain, were compelled to fall back, their casualties being numbered in thousands. Mr. Nehru appealed to the West for supply of arms and the response was quick. The Russians

indicated where their sympathies lay in this fight between their Indian "friends" and Chinese "brethren" by announcing that they would live up to their commitment to sell a dozen MIG jet fighters to India. On 24 October, the Chinese suddenly made what they called a "peace proposal"; they asked that both sides should withdraw 20 kilometers (12 miles) beyond the "line of actual control", defining it as the positions occupied by both sides as on 7 November 1959, as a preliminary first step to the re-opening of peaceful negotiations. On scrutiny, the proposal was found to be a "trick", for the Chinese had falsely included in what they called the area under their occupation as on 7 November 1959 many positions which they had not occupied before that date and had been secured by aggression later on and which gave them command over vital passes. Mr. Nehru, in rejecting the Chinese proposal, requested—as a pre-condition for the reopening of negotiations—that they might restore the position obtaining prior to 8 September 1962 before their latest aggression.

The Chinese aggression went on till they had occupied all or nearly all the areas claimed by them as belonging to themselves. It included some 2,000 sq. miles of disputed territory in the north-east and an addition of some 2,000 sq. miles to the 12,000 sq. miles of territory in Ladakh, which they had acquired piecemeal since 1957. Then, again suddenly, on 21 November 1962, they announced a unilateral cease-fire. According to this, beginning from 1 December 1962, Chinese troops were to retire in all the sectors to certain distances behind the "line of actual control"—the area thus designated being defined arbitrarily by themselves. In his reply, Mr. Nehru exposed the factual errors of the Chinese demarcation of what they called their "line of actual control", and reiterated his stand that "at least the latest aggression must be undone before there can be talks for a peaceful solution of the border question".

The Colombo Proposals

The Chinese aggressions in India evoked widespread sympathy for India in the "free" and "non-committed" worlds; but Pakistan's reactions were and continue to be otherwise. India's neighbour refused to recognize in the situation any threat, direct or indirect,

to her own safety, and indeed either blamed it on India or declared the Chinese threat to India as unreal and as an Indian device for getting military aid from the West. She fell foul of her western friends for arming India for what she continued to interpret as increasing Indian military strength against herself. The world, however, has not been befooled as to the danger of Chinese expansionism. On 10 December 1962, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, called a Conference at Colombo of six non-aligned Afro-Asian countries—Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the U.A.R.—to discuss the conflict between India and China. They unanimously made certain proposals which they considered would be a good starting point. The Prime Minister of Ceylon was requested by the Conference to visit Peking and Delhi and personally discuss the proposals with the two governments.

Mrs. Bandaranaike, accordingly, visited Peking from 31 December 1962 to 8 January 1963, and received the assurance of the Chinese Government that they had given a "positive response" to the proposals. Mrs. Bandaranaike, accompanied by Mr. Aly Sabry, President of the Executive Council of the U.A.R. and Mr. Kofi Asante Ofori-Atta, Minister of Justice of Ghana, next visited New Delhi. The Indian Government asked for some clarifications, and these were jointly given to them by all the three representatives of the Colombo Conference, who also communicated them to the Chinese Government. The Colombo proposals were discussed in the Indian Parliament, and being in general conformity with the Indian stand, were accepted *in toto* by the Indian Government. The Chinese Government, however, rejected the proposals, thereby virtually flouting the Colombo Conference. The Indian position, thereupon, was, and continues to be since, that, if China really wants a peaceful settlement of the border dispute with India, she has simply to accept the Colombo proposals and their clarifications. China has still now refused to do this, and, whether she wants to resume her aggression, and, if she wants to do so, when it is to begin, are open questions.

COMMENT ON CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS INDIA

Peking's objects and objectives in picking up this serious quarrel

with India are a matter for considerable speculation. With regard to them, the Chinese themselves have given no clue; in fact they say the fighting has resulted from Indian "aggression". But it is clear that several factors have impelled them to resort to relatively large-scale force. Whether, after they have conquered all the territory they have claimed on the border, as they have done or nearly done at this writing, they will stop, or continue their advance into the heart of India, is not clear, and there are some who still think that the "liberation" of India is not included in their plan, at least at present. There is a volume of weighty opinion in favour of the view that the Chinese want, not all-out war, but to goad India into diverting resources from economic development into defence, such as has been done in the Kashmir dispute. Those who hold this view believe that the Chinese would be pleased if India gave up non-alignment and sided with the West against them. Peking is said to believe that such a decision would be extremely unpopular with the Indian masses and might pave the way for a revolution. In any case, this would prevent India from becoming a flourishing democracy, or from building an economy that could outshine China's in Asia—setting, thereby, an example for other undeveloped countries. A related objective would be diverting the attention of the Chinese people from the serious economic difficulties at home. Others point out that Nationalist China has not repudiated Communist Chinese claims, which are based on the former's maps, and has, on the contrary, corroborated them after the beginning of hostilities in September. This lends credence to the view that Peking's irredentist claims merely reflect traditional Chinese expansionism. It has been held that they may be wanting to establish commanding positions in the Himalayas so that they may strike south later in the populous Southern-Asia crescent. Even if the objectives may not be so far-reaching, and they may be, as some think, limited in scope and confined to the securing of only a few military advantages, their gains from their recent aggressions, at least in the Western sector, are highly significant. By extending their areas of military occupation in Ladakh, they have not only consolidated their hold over their earlier territorial acquisitions there, but have

ensured the safety of the Aksai Chin road, which they had surreptitiously built there, and which provides them a route from their own province of Sinkiang to Tibet. It also gives them control of other routes, and particularly the Karakoram Pass which puts the Chinese communists at the door of the Pakistani-held sector of Ladakh.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The Kashmir issue

Ever since the partition of India, the relations between the two states so created, India and Pakistan, have been strained, and, shortly after it the two had a fourteen-month undeclared war until 1 January 1949. Pakistan has always considered India as her Public Enemy No. 1, and has never missed an opportunity of exploiting India's difficulties to seek to have some advantage for herself. Even when China invaded India with overwhelming forces on 8 September 1962, endangering there by the integrity of also Pakistan, the latter, relentlessly pursuing her enmity to India, has sought to embarrass her in various ways, notably by protesting vigorously against such arms supplies as the U.S.A. and the U.K. have given to India, and even hobnobbing with China over a non-aggression pact.

Pakistan's chief dispute with India is over Kashmir, an Indian State, which has a predominant Muslim population, but, in 1947, was ruled over by a Hindu Maharaja, who, supported by his Muslim Prime Minister, Sheikh Abdullah, acceded to India, when Pakistani tribesmen invaded the state in October, 1947. At the Maharaja's request Indian airborne troops arrived on the scene, just in time to save the capital, Srinagar, from the tribesmen, who were only five miles away in the course of their march, every stage of which was marked by plunder, arson and rape, and which should have succeeded in reaching its objective but for a quarrel among themselves over their loot at Baramula, which they had sacked and subjected to every form of bestial cruelty and oppression of the inhabitants. The tribal invasion, if not instigated by Pakistan, which provided the blood-thirsty tribal lashkars (war parties) with truck transport,

was led by Pakistani army officers, alleged to be on leave. Soon India had to wage a full scale frontier war with Pakistan herself who, after denying her complicity in the criminal happenings as long as she could do so, admitted her sympathy with and participation in the invasion.

So far as law and fact are concerned, Kashmir's accession to India was now complete, but, while accepting it, the Indian Government had informed the Maharaja that "as soon as law and order had been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people". The pledge (if this announcement of their policy might be described as one such) was not given to Pakistan or to the U.N. nor was it necessarily for a plebiscite, but it was nevertheless, "a serious political mistake"—Mr. Nehru agreeing to it at the suggestion of Lord Mountbatten. Further, on the advice of Mahatma Gandhi, the Indian Government took another step, which many Indians think was mistaken, viz. to refer the affair to the Security Council of the U.N. (1 January 1948), with a charge of aggression against Pakistan. The outcome was quite different from what India had expected: the Security Council—influenced (as Indians think) by power politics and disregarding legalities or moralities—took little note of her accusations. They fastened on Mr. Nehru's "pledge" and, interpreting it as an offer that a plebiscite should be held when order was restored, set up a commission which was to proceed to the Indian sub-continent charged with the task of setting up a cease-fire line and facilitating the necessary measures for a plebiscite.

The Commission managed to stop the fighting, but at the time the cease-fire agreement became effective (1 January 1949), Indians were about to take the last narrow sliver of territory held by Pakistan at the western end of the state and their victory was in sight. Both governments nevertheless accepted the idea of a plebiscite and the recommendations of the Commission. Yet neither the Commission, nor its successors, Sir Owen Dixon of Australia and Dr. Frank P. Graham of the United States, succeeded in implementing either of these. The chief problem was a controversial interpretation by the governments of India and Pakistan as to two important points in the Commission's

resolution. The two points concerned the scope of demilitarization of Kashmir and the time of induction to office of the plebiscite administrator.

In August, 1953 the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met in New Delhi to open bilateral negotiations on Kashmir. They agreed to appoint a plebiscite administrator by the end of April, 1954 upon settlement of "preliminary issues"—mainly the issue of demilitarization, without which no free plebiscite was considered possible. But a year passed, and the plebiscite administrator was not chosen, nor was the problem of demilitarization settled. Moreover, India now declared that the acceptance by Pakistan, on 8 September 1954, of U.S. military aid affected the agreements previously reached. She indicated that even if she had been willing to reduce her military forces in Kashmir to 21,000 soldiers—a number which Pakistan had considered to be too high—she must "retain full liberty to keep such forces and military equipment in the Kashmir State as we may consider necessary in view of this threat to us". Both Pakistan and the U.S.A. contended that U.S. military aid was intended for defensive purposes; but Indians held that, whatever the purpose, Pakistan valued it not for defence against communist countries, like China or Russia, but to impress India with her military strength, even if she did not meditate an actual attack on India. In any case, Indians argued, Americans could not prevent Pakistan from using American weapons against India. Subsequent happenings, e.g. use of American weapons by the French in Algeria, and by the British and the French in Suez, have borne out India's contentions. With this failure to settle the demilitarization issue, direct negotiations between the two countries ceased, and Mr. Muhammad Ali declared that the issue must revert to the Security Council. The efforts of Pakistan's western friends to take up this issue in subsequent years were frustrated by the Soviet Union's vetoes.

The bone of Indo-Pakistani contention is the Vale of Kashmir, the "Switzerland of India", with its scenic beauties and its attraction for tourists, a basin about 85 miles long and 25 miles wide—less than 2.5 per cent of the State—which is, by law and fact, an integral part of India and is coveted by Pakistan. Its

economic potential is probably good, but it would be costly to develop and it is far from self-sufficient. India has done a good job here, as also in the rest of Kashmir—constructing schools, teaching villagers improved methods of agriculture, digging irrigation canals, constructing a power house and a year-round tunnel, carrying out land reform and making rice cheap. For Pakistan its acquisition is primarily a question of prestige, and she is confident that if a plebiscite were held, she will win it. The issue has been simultaneously a source of frustration and of political escapism for Pakistanis. They are naturally bitter about their failure to get it and their anger on the score is turned not only against India but against their western friends who, they think, are lukewarm in their support of their case against India. But this failure has in one way been of considerable help to the Pakistani Government, who find it convenient to blame India, the West, the East—just about everybody but themselves—for their country's economic, political, and diplomatic troubles. Disgruntled and disgraced politicians rain fire and brimstone on Mr. Nehru through their speeches, as a way by which to stage come-backs to political power. Recently (end of December 1962), Khwaja Nazimuddin, an ex-premier of Pakistan, advocated war as the only possible means of solving the Kashmir issue.

The Kashmir problem became more complicated by the sudden arrest and detention of Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmir Premier, and his substitution by Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad as Premier (9 August 1953). For some time past Abdullah had been advocating an independent Kashmir, and there were persistent rumours of U.S. interest in it as a base from which to threaten Russia and dominate all South Asia. It was alleged that former Democratic Presidential candidate, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, during a recent visit to Kashmir, had conveyed an offer to Sheikh Abdullah from the U.S. Government of fifty million dollars in economic aid if Kashmir became independent. In any case, at the instance of the new Premier of Kashmir, the Constituent Assembly declared the state's accession to India as "final and irrevocable". Mr. Nehru declared that India would still stand by her "international commitments" by which he presum-

ably meant the result of a plebiscite, although in a letter to the Kashmir Premier he expressed the view that one could not go completely by a plebiscite. Many Indians think that the adoption of a constitution in Kashmir and general elections have been a reaffirmation by the people of the state of the accession of Kashmir to India effected by the option of the Maharaja in 1947, and that conditions have changed to such an extent that a plebiscite would be impossible.

As a Kashmiri Brahmin by origin, Mr. Nehru might have possibly been sentimentally attached to Kashmir, but to ascribe his determination to have Kashmir as an integral part of India to the accident of ancestry, as is done so often, is absurd. Mr. Nehru held the partition of India was not made on a religious basis, and he preferred to describe it as the "secession" of certain territories, now forming Pakistan, as the result of "local political self-determination". However that may be, Mr. Nehru was a strong opponent of Mr. Jinnah's "two-nation theory", which he wanted to disprove, and, in his opinion, stood disproved, by the willing accession of a state, some 77 per cent of whose population is Muslim, not to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan but to the secular Indian State. On the very reasoning is based his opposition to any unsettling of the present status of Kashmir, which further, by implication would affect the 40 million Muslim citizens of India and also react on the 10 million Hindus who were still left in East Bengal. A reversal of Kashmir's accession to India on the ground of religion might let loose the fury of religious fanaticism, which drenched India and Pakistan in blood soon after partition. Mr. Nehru's opponents say that this reasoning is tantamount to religious blackmail and admission that the Indian Muslims are hostages. But Muslim nationals of India are equal citizens, which the Hindus in Pakistan are not, and India's treatment of the former has been praised by impartial foreigners, including heads of Muslim states, like King Saud of Saudi Arabia and President Shukri Al-Kuwally of Syria, among others. Yet more important is the fact that Pakistan has failed in all her efforts to unite the Muslim world against India's occupation of Kashmir.

Mr. Gunnar Jarring, Sweden's permanent delegate to the United Nations and former president of the Security Council, in his report of 30 April 1957 on the Kashmir question, expressed his awareness

of "the grave problems that might arise in connection with and as a result of a plebiscite". He called to the Council's attention that "the implementation of international agreements of an *ad hoc* character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change". He added : "I could not fail to take note of the concern expressed in connection with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia".

The statement was interpreted not only by Indians but by many impartial foreigners as suggesting that given the state of the world, in general, and the unabated tensions between India and Pakistan, in particular, the best that could be done was to maintain the *status quo*. Another argument which favoured India (and was substantiated a few years later when the Chinese invaded Ladakh) was that Kashmir was India's vital base of operations for conducting defensive operations against an enemy threatening her from the northwest. In any case, for a few years, and specially after a military dictatorship under Field-Marshal Ayub Khan was established in Pakistan (1958), the dispute seemed to be placed in cold storage. In the beginning of his rule, indeed, Ayub Khan seemed to be bent on having friendly relations with India. A few minor border disputes were settled and discussions were begun which led to a solution of the vexed Indus Waters dispute (see below). Ayub and Nehru had a friendly chat with each other during a brief "fuel-halt" at Palam airport, while the former was on his way to Dacca, and shortly afterwards, when in early 1959 India's relations with China were believed to have deteriorated on account of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, Ayub Khan made an offer of joint defence to India. India could not accept the offer, because India was a non-aligned country, whereas Pakistan was aligned to America and a member of SEATO and CENTO, and acceptance of a joint defence agreement by her might pledge her to defend Pakistan not only against China but against Russia and thus virtually to give up her policy of non-alignment.

In September, 1960, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed and Nehru visited Peshawar in the course of which he discussed with

Ayub many questions which were at issue between the two countries, and the two leaders issued a joint communique in which their hopes for co-operative relations were expressed. Shortly afterwards, however, Ayub visited "Azad" Kashmir, and made a speech declaring that the Kashmir question could not be allowed to remain unsolved any longer. In December, 1961 India occupied Goa, thus rousing the hostility of the NATO partners of Portugal in the Security Council, and Pakistan immediately sought to exploit the situation by bringing India once more in the dock there. On this occasion, however, India's representative, Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, made a defiant speech, clearly stating India's position in the matter. "This is the 104th meeting on the subject, I believe, You can hold two hundred meetings. We will come here every time that you ask us, but on no condition shall we trade our sovereignty, on no condition shall we sell our heritage, on no condition shall we open the door for the disruption and disintegration of India which would be a calamity not only for the Indian people but for the whole of that part of the world."

At this time China was daily pecking and nibbling at India's borders and had already forcibly occupied large chunks of territory in Ladakh and elsewhere in the northwest, and her image as an enemy (rather than a 'bhai' or brother) was becoming clearer and clearer. An enemy's enemy may be a friend, as history has often shown, and Pakistan needed a real friend badly at this time, since, as she thought, the U.S.A. and her entourage had proved to be false friends, who could not or wilfully did not help her to grab Kashmir. Thus began a strange development—a rapprochement between Pakistan and China, the former an ally of the U.S.A., a member of SEATO and CENTO, and continuing to receive immense quantities and varieties of weapons of war worth billions of dollars from the U.S.A. to fight Communist enemies and the latter the arch enemy of the U.S.A. Pakistan's first move was to settle the boundaries of parts of Kashmir which China had occupied. On 3 May 1962 Pakistan and China issued a joint communique in which they agreed to negotiate "to allocate and align their common border". On 2 March 1963 an agreement was signed between the two countries by which Pakistan "ceded" to China thousands of square miles of territory which China had occupied and which legally belonged to

India, though under Pakistani occupation. India sent notes of protest to both countries, to be rejected by both.

The border agreement was followed by the opening of an air link between China and Pakistan. A trade agreement of great significance was also signed, China offering a huge credit to Pakistan for her development programmes. The two countries at the same time began to take up similar attitudes as regards their controversies with India. On 24 July 1963, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan declared that India had committed acts of aggression five times—thrice against Pakistan, once against Portugal, and once against China. He also hinted at the existence of a military understanding between China and Pakistan. Pakistanis reporting on Indo-Chinese problems began to rely on materials supplied by the New China Agency, and thus support the Chinese version of every point of controversy between India and China. During his visit to Pakistan in early 1964, Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier, fully and unreservedly endorsed Pakistan's viewpoint with regard to Kashmir. The net result of these hobnobbing between China and Pakistan was to produce in Pakistan (and in the mind of her Foreign Minister, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the chief architect of what in effect was an alliance between Pakistan and China) the definite conviction that India, confronted by the double threat, would agree to settle the Kashmir issue with Pakistan to her entire satisfaction. India, however refused to be intimidated, and Pakistan, driven to fury, embarked upon acts of aggression on India's borders in Kashmir and Kutch, which led to a war between the two countries in 1965.

Minor Issues

Several lesser disputes between India and Pakistan have been settled amicably, some only after prolonged negotiations. The biggest concerned the use of the waters of the Indus river and its tributaries, which, having their sources in India flow through both countries. India planned to dam these for her own badly needed irrigation projects, and Pakistan feared that these operations might deprive her rich "wheat bowl" of the water it requires. In addition, India controls the headworks of some of the canals flowing into Pakistan. Indian and Pakistani engineers conferred in Washington under the aegis of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to make out a scheme of water develop-

ment for the benefit of both countries. The dispute was amicably settled with the signing of an agreement in Karachi in September, 1960 with the assistance of the World Bank only after a consortium of countries had agreed to put up most of the money for the works involved.

INDO-PAKISTAN CLASHES OF ARMS, 1965

The Kutch Fighting

1965 was a particularly bad year for Indo-Pakistani relations, strained as they were nearly always since the creation of two states in 1947, for the two nations came to actual fight with each other twice in the course of one year. The first clash occurred in the first half of the year and concerned same disputed areas in the Rann (desert) of Kutch, an uninhabited wasteland lying between the old princely state of Kutch (included in India) and the old province of Sind (included in Pakistan). India claims that the dispute as to the Kutch-Sind border had been settled in 1914 by giving the whole of the Rann to Kutch, whereas Pakistan claims that about 3,500 square miles of the Rann were formerly under the administration of Sind. There was a clash between the two countries concerning the rival claims in 1956, and it was decided that the border line should be demarcated. For various reasons this could not be done, but the area acquired a fresh importance as Pakistan included a section of the Rann in the coastline to be surveyed for off-shore drilling by an American oil company.

On 25 January Gujarat border police discovered that Pakistani border forces were using a new track within Indian territory. India lodged a protest, in disregard of which Pakistan established permanent post in a ruined fort of Kanjra Kot about 1000 yards within Indian territory. Indians established posts at Sadar and Vigorkot in the vicinity of their existing posts at Chhad Bet. In the midst of a brisk exchange of notes, firing broke out, 9 April, and after an action that lasted 14 hours, Pakistani forces retired from Sadar, which they had occupied earlier. On 23 April, more than 25,000 Pakistani infantry, supported by 42-ton Patton tanks (supplied by the U.S.A. to Pakistan for fighting Communist enemies) and heavy artillery attacked on a 65-mile long front stretching from Ding in the west to Chhad Bet in east. Pakistani forces occupied Biar Bet, but Indians

succeeded in halting their further advance. From 30 April a *de facto* cease-fire existed.

On 27 April Mr. Harold Wilson, the British Premier wrote letters to Messrs Shastri and Ayub Khan offering to help in any way he could. In formal discussions were held between the two leaders during the Commonwealth Conference in London (17-25 June), though there was no direct meeting between them. On 30 June a cease-fire agreement was signed between the two countries, the two persons who signed the document on behalf of their two countries being first cousins, viz. Mr. Azim Hussain, Secretary, Indian External Affairs Ministry and Arshad Hussain, the Pakistani High Commissioner in Delhi. The agreement provided, *inter alia*, for ministerial discussions on the demarcation of the border, and if these were unsuccessful, for the reference of the question to an impartial tribunal. In view, however of a deterioration in the relations between the two countries (on account of the rapidly mounting tension over Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir, soon to lead to a war), India cancelled a projected meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in Delhi on 5 August, and proposed that the matter be at once referred to a tribunal, on the ground that there was little likelihood of an agreement being reached. Pakistan agreed to this readily, since, while the negotiations were going on, she was preparing for a showdown in Kashmir.

Indo-Pakistani War, 1965

The second clash we have spoken of above was in the nature of a full-scale war between the two countries arising out of the despatch by Pakistan of thousands of infiltrators to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism in Kashmir in the hope of rousing the predominantly Muslim population of that state to revolt against their government. India charged that the infiltrators were members of the regular Pakistani army who were led, trained, and organized by Pakistan. The Pakistani contention that the unrest in Kashmir was a rebellion of the Muslims of Kashmir against Indian rule was belied by the spontaneous co-operation offered by the Kashmiri Muslims in the villages in apprehending the infiltrators and handing them over to the authorities, and the absolute calm that prevailed at Srinagar and other towns. It is possible that Pakistan was emboldened at

what she believed were her successes in the Kutch fighting and she may have counted on her new friend, China, to commence military operation on India's borders compelling the latter to fight on two fronts.

In order to prevent further infiltrations into her territory, India adopted a new hardline toward Pakistan, and sent her forces across the cease-fire line for occupying two posts in the so-called Azad Kashmir territory. The Pakistani army launched an offensive in Jammu on 1 September, supported by American Patton tanks and Sabre jet-bombers, and threatening to cut communications between India and Kashmir, whereupon the Indian army invaded Western Pakistan in three sectors, advancing up to the outskirts of Lahore. Fighting continued until 23 September, when a cease-fire came into force at the "demand" of the Security Council. While the fighting was in progress, China, which had announced its full support for Pakistan, delivered an ultimatum to India on 16 September threatening India with dire consequences unless she dismantled her fortifications on the Sikkim-Tibet border within three days. On 22 September the ultimatum was withdrawn, India having denied the existence of any such fortifications complained of by China and declaring her resolve to defend her territory.

Relations between India and Pakistan remained tense after the cease-fire, as each side continued to occupy considerable areas of the other's territory, and repeated clashes took place between the armies. Attempts by the U.N. Secretary General to negotiate their withdrawal produced no effect, as Pakistan insisted that military disengagement must be accompanied by an attempt to secure a political settlement on Kashmir, the condition being rejected by India. Peace came to the subcontinent after Mr. Shastri and Field-marshal Ayub Khan had, at the invitation of the Soviet Premier, Mr. Kosygin, met on Soviet territory at Tashkent, had talks with each other in which Mr. Kosygin participated, and on 10 January 1966 signed an eight-hundred word declaration laying down lines of amicable settlement of all disputes between the two countries. The historic Tashkent Declaration which was followed within a few hours of its signature by the sudden death, due to a heart attack, of Mr.

Shastri, was soon afterwards in the process of implementation by both countries.

The Tashkent Declaration

In the Tashkent Declaration Mr. Shastri and President Ayub Khan expressed their firm resolve to restore normal relations between their countries and to settle their disputes through peaceful means according to their obligations under the U.N. Charter. To that end they agreed :

Not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means:

To withdraw by 25 February all armed personnel to the 5 August 1965 line;

To continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries;

To base relations between the two countries on "non-interference in the internal affairs of each other";

To restore normal functioning of diplomatic missions with the High Commissioners returning to their posts and with the observance of the Vienna Convention of 1661;

To discourage any propaganda directed against each other and encourage propaganda that would promote friendly relations;

To consider measures towards restoration of economic and trade relations, communications as well as cultural exchanges, and measures towards implementation of existing agreements;

To create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people and to continue discussion of questions relating to the problems of refugees and eviction/illegal immigration ; and

To discuss the retention of the property and assets taken over by either side during the recent conflict.

THE EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH

The partition of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as a separate nation in 1971 had been implied in the very nature of Pakistan as it had come into existence in 1947. Separated by more than one thousand miles of Indian territory, the two parts of the country had differed in almost everything—in language, culture,

costoms and manners, ways of living and outlook on life, Ayub's policy of centralisation of powers in the hands of the army and the civil services, both dominated, by and large, by West Pakistani elements, further alienated the people of East Pakistan. It was the growing realisation that East Pakistan was being exploited economically as well as politically by West Pakistan which created a strong demand for autonomy in that part of the country.

The Awami League, the major political party in East Pakistan, evolved a six points programme in February, 1966 and made it the basis for their struggle for autonomy. Leaving defence and foreign affairs in the hands of Central government, the Awami League demanded the transference of all other powers—control over currency, foreign trade and foreign exchange earnings, taxation and revenue collections—to the government of East Pakistan which was, in addition to all these powers, also to possess the powers of raising a separate militia. These appeared, in the eyes of the central government of Pakistan, as the demand for virtual independence. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Awami League, was subsequently involved in a case, known as the Agartala Conspiracy Case, and put into prison. The transference of economic power to East Pakistan would have hit the army most and was strongly resisted by the military generals. In the meantime, Ayub had lost his hold even in West Pakistan. Fearing that the demand for autonomy by East Pakistan would be irresistible, unless suppressed in time, he handed over power to General Yahya Khan in 1969. Yahya Khan arranged for national elections in December, 1970 in which the Awami League was able to capture almost all the seats in East Pakistan and become the majority party in the country as a whole. Finding that Yahya Khan was not prepared to honour the verdict of the electorate, Mujib gave his final call for independence on 25 March 1971.

Instead of coming to a settlement with what was now described as Bangladesh, Yahya Khan tried to crush the movement militarily, with the result that millions of refugees sought shelter in India, putting a tremendous strain on her economy and social life. India made serious efforts to internationalize the problem and sought the help of the major powers in resolving it. India's failure to do so was primarily due to the United States, at this time becoming interested in establishing good relations with China, with a view to off-setting

the growing danger from the Soviet Union : it did not matter if in the bargain China was allowed to establish a dominant position in South and Southeast Asia. Communist China which had opposed the United States tooth and nail ever since it had come to powers, responded favourably. In July, 1971, Henry Kissinger, the U. S. Secretary of State made it clear to India that if there was a war between India and Pakistan over the Bangladesh issue and China intervened on the side of Pakistan, India should not expect the U.S. to come to her aid.

It was in this background of the U.S. stubbornness in not caring for the strain which India was undergoing, or even trying to understand India's position on the issue, that India and the Soviet Union which was directly threatened by the growing amity between the U.S. and China, entered into a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation. China, it seems, was satisfied for some time by India's assurance that the treaty was not directed against her. But, following Kissinger's visit, China seemed completely to fall in line with the U.S. policies in the sub-continent. Once an understanding had been reached between U.S. and China, military supplies from both began to pour into Pakistan. While the U.S. could take the plea that the ship-loads of American arms sent to Karachi had been in accordance with licenses issued to her before the outbreak of the trouble in Bangladesh, no such pretext was needed in the case of China. Arms and ammunitions sent for Pakistani divisions started flowing in June, 1971 and on 10 September a war plant built with Chinese help and credit was presented to the Commander of the East Pakistani Military division. Following the visit in November, 1970 of a Pakistani military division, which included Bhutto, the arch-enemy of East Bengal's demands for autonomy, some 400 fighters and bombers, tanks and anti-air-craft installations were supplied to Pakistan by Peking.

It was clearly the support extended by U.S. and China to Pakistan which made her adopt an intransigent attitude and defy the growing world public opinion against her. If the U.S. and/or China had decided to bring pressure upon Yahya Khan to settle his internal problems in a way that did not impinge upon India, the matter could have been resolved. But neither of them exercised any influence in this direction. While the major trends in global politics led to the

break-down of India's efforts to internationalize the issue and obtain its settlement through international pressure on Pakistan, it was exactly these which helped Bangladesh in attaining its full independence. If U.S. and China had not moved closer to each other, clearly against the Soviet Union, and if the U.S. had made it very clear that in case war between India and Pakistan broke out over the Bangladesh issue and China intervened on behalf of Pakistan she would not come over to the support of India, the Indo-Soviet treaty would not have materialized at the time, or not followed in its radical implications. Till late in October, 1971, the Soviet Union appeared hopeful of Yahya Khan being pressed by force of circumstances to come to a political settlement in Bangladesh. But when it realized that, supported by the U.S. and China, Yahya Khan's attitude was becoming more and more intransigent, it moved completely on the side of India.

Certain of defeat of Yahya Khan's forces at the hands of the Indian armies supported by the Bangladesh nationalists, the United States now tried to mobilize first the Security Council and then the General Assembly of the United Nations in trying to bring pressure on India, which it now openly accused of aggression. Finding that the Chinese delegate to the United Nations was supporting the United States in all its steps, the Soviet Union took recourse to vetoing all its proposals. The United States not only tried to bring pressure on India through her support to Pakistan and mobilization of the United Nations, it also tried to threaten it into subjugation by mobilizing an advance unit of its powerful atom-propelled Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean. On 17 December, within a fortnight of the Pakistan Air Force, striking all the Indian air-fields of Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar and with a U.S. fleet at the distance of 30 hours from Chittagong, Mr. Mullik, the civilian governor of East Pakistan resigned, and Generals Niazi and Farman Ali, in charge of Pakistan's Eastern Command, capitulated. Following the surrender of Pakistani armies in East Bengal, India unilaterally declared cease-fire in the West. While China continued to blame the Indian "reactionaries" and "expansionists" for their "wild ambitions" to annex Pakistan and bring about a greater Indian empire. Nixon claimed, falsely, that the cease-fire had been declared by India under Soviet Pressure manipulated by the U.S. government.

It may be interesting at this place to make an assessment of the emergence of Bangladesh on international relations and policies. It was clear that the American and the Chinese policies had received a severe rebuff in South Asia—while the U.S. had lost at least for the time being all its goodwill in India and Bangladesh, and that even in Pakistan its policy of vacillation and inaction coming in the wake of bluff and bombast was likely to prove disillusioning. Since it was widely believed that Yahya Khan had not sent adequate force to East Bengal and also not mobilized all his forces on the Western Front in the hope that U.S. and China would ultimately intervene, China also lost its credibility. On the other hand, Russia had increased her influence in the sub-continent in proportion to the loss of influence by U.S. and China and was likely to play a growingly influential role in the region.

India, like the Soviet Union, emerged stronger out of the crisis. Her superiority had not only been proved in the military field but also in social and economic matters. The fact that a developing country with scanty resources was able to look after nearly ten million refugees for more than nine months and also contain successfully the social and economic strain which their presence in the contiguity of local population was causing, could be regarded as a triumph of bureaucratic efficiency. The morale of her leaders rose considerably. The proclaimed ideals of the Indian political system—secularism, democracy, modernization, national unity—had all been vindicated. It was not so much the weakening of Pakistan as the fact of a new nation—the second largest country in South Asia, fifth largest in Asia and the eighth largest in the world—standing by her side which had raised the international stature of India. India's unilateral cense-fire on her Western frontiers had clearly proved how false Pakistan's continuous propaganda that India was bent upon destroying her had been. This was incidentally also likely to create more confidence among the smaller neighbours of India.

Pakistan, on the other hand, had faced the greatest disaster in its history. It had not only lost large chunks and majority of its population—without the slightest hope of getting them back—but suffered a military defeat which was bound to explode the myth of its fighting forces, supposed to consist of the hardest and bravest-

soldiers, being invincible. Neither religious zeal nor the sophisticated weapons of war had saved Pakistan from coming to grief. It was not only Pakistan's unity or the myth of its military invincibility which had been exploded, but the entire approach of global alliances now lay shattered. Pakistan had depended on the United States between 1954 and 1965 and, while the United States' ardent desire to help Pakistan had cooled down for a temporary period after 1965, China had started supporting her even more enthusiastically from 1965 onwards. While neither Pakistan was expected to give up its dependence upon the United States and China, nor the latter expected to give up their support to Pakistan, it was left completely to Pakistan to decide whether she would make use of the opportunity in reversing its domestic policies and international alignments.

INDIA'S POLICY AFTER 1971

India's policy after 1971 was clear and firm. She showed her willingness to rebuild the bridges with China and the United States, destroyed by the latter and not by India. India had many reasons to establish cordiality in relations with Pakistan. The Agreement, signed with Bhutto in 1972 at Simla may be regarded as a landmark in the direction of India's policy of establishing bilateral relations with the countries in the region. Strengthening of relations with Afghanistan and Sri Lanka as also building up bridges of understanding with Iran, then emerging as a major regional power and bound by close ties with Pakistan, was a part of the same process of erecting a structure of peace in South Asia. India signed a treaty of friendship with Bangladesh also in 1972, though relations with that country deteriorated later, particularly after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman in 1976. (The signing of an agreement on Farakka Barrage in 1977 appeared to be an effort on the part of both countries to revert to the earlier position.) All this was in complete conformity with India's declared policy of non-alignment and good relations with *all* countries. But as long as Pakistan did not fully reciprocate India's efforts and continued to remain alienated from her and dependent on U.S. and China, she was likely to find

it difficult to resume normal relations with the latter. India's policy was one of amiability with all—with the super-powers as well as with the neighbouring countries—after the gruelling experiences she had gone through in 1971-1972—the influx of nearly ten million refugees, Pakistan's sudden bombing of her major air-ports, the war in Bangladesh, the unexpectedly hostile attitude of the Nixon-Kissinger combine in U.S., culminating in the appearance of the Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean, the tortuous ways of peace-making that Bhutto adopted—but also in terms of her national interest.

India's hope that the United States would recognize the failure of its efforts and readjust itself to the realities of the situation in South Asia did not prove to be wrong as the U.S. now recognized India's role as "South Asia's most powerful country". While India's position of non-alignment had been completely vindicated at the conceptual/theoretical level, certain "superstition" had been proved to be wrong. The "balance of power" which the United States had tried to play by building up Pakistan economically and militarily, with the sole object of checkmating the growth of India, and bringing China within her close-embrace with a view to thwarting the ambitions of the Soviet Union in South and Southeast Asia, had proved a failure. It had also been proved that the United States, a giant in international affairs, had failed to browbeat India into a position of submission to her wishes and even to prevent a small country like Bangladesh from asserting its sovereignty as a nation. The tragedy of the situation however lay in the fact that the events in the sub-continent had completely exposed the inability of the United Nations—"its in built incapacity" as Swarn Singh pointed out in the General Assembly—to resolve major international issue unless there was unanimity between the two super-powers.

INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Between 1968 and 1971 we find China adopting a dual policy towards India—throwing out suggestions regarding the possibility of improvement of relations on one side and giving reassurances to Pakistan and support to Mizos and Nagas in their insurgency in India's north-eastern frontier and thereby showing an anti-India stance, on the

other. India, on her side, has shown its preparedness to establish normal relations with China. The Bangladesh crisis brought the second line of China's policy to the forefront. It was only by April, 1976 that China seemed to revert to a policy of friendly relations. Ambassadors were exchanged between the two countries and there was also an exchange of non-diplomatic delegations and visits by individuals. This was also indicative of a relaxed attitude that the new government of China seemed to be taking towards world affairs. China's policy of building a new image for herself in the developing world also was likely to be helpful in the progress of amiability of relationship between the two countries. Yet, important problems like the border dispute, affecting some 45 thousand square kilometers of territory, remained unresolved, to which further complications were added by China's opening up of the Karakoram Highway, the position it takes on Kashmir, nonrecognition of Sikkim's accession to India and its support for the Naga and Mizo hostiles. As long as China continues to give, in collaboration with the U.S.A., an all-round support to Pakistan and refuse to build up an understanding with the Soviet Union, it would be difficult for India to respond favourably to her indications regarding the establishment of normal relations between the two countries.

DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA'S POLICY

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who assumed power in Pakistan in December, 1971, was faced with the almost insurmountable task of resurrecting the country virtually from the ashes. He started well. The Simla Agreement of 1972 was the first step in that direction. Bhutto tried to improve the economic conditions of the country by measures like the nationalization of some industries and introduction of land reforms. At the political level, he allowed the opposition parties to form governments in Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P. A new constitution, the result of a consensus among all political parties, was enacted in 1973. Bhutto also tried to control the military forces: the dismissal of some top officials like Admiral A.R. Khan and the appointment of General Zia-ul-Haq was indicative of this effort. Having secured the release of the prisoners of war, recognized Bangladesh and placed the national economy back on the rails, he tried to establish a new relationship with India, more in conformity

with the developments in the sub-continent. Bhutto, at the same time, tried to keep the army satisfied by not reducing the military establishment, even though the country's defence requirements after 1971 were considerably less.

Nothing, however, could stop the rapid deterioration of the economic situation, which was the inevitable outcome of the enormous expenditure Pakistan had to undergo during the war. Rising inflation and unemployment led to discontent both outside and within the Pakistan Peoples' Party. Progressive policies earlier adopted by Bhutto now had to be reversed. The National Awami government in Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. were dismissed, and when this led to insurgency and dissidence a policy of repression was adopted. Within his own party also, Bhutto threw out progressive members like J.A. Rahim and Mairaj Mohammad Khan and put them into jail. Bhutto also showed his tilt towards Islamic fundamentalism by declaring the Qadianis a minority and placing a new emphasis on Nizam-i-Mustafs. By January, 1975 when elections were announced in Pakistan—in anticipation of elections in India—Bhutto had already lost his massive support in areas outside Punjab and Sind. Following the growing disclosure of blatant rigging by Bhutto's party during the elections, General Zia-ul-Haq staged a *coup* and placed supreme power in his own hands. Bhutto was subsequently put into prison and later executed in defiance of world opinion and growing popularity at home. The military-bureaucratic establishment had once again come into power in Pakistan.

If the withdrawal from Vietnam and the change in attitude towards India during the Bangladesh crisis were taken as indicative of the U.S. policy of withdrawal from the sub-continent, it was proved wrong by subsequent events. The fall of the Shah regime in Iran and the leftist *coup* in Afghanistan and their possible reactions on Pakistan brought back the U.S. interest in Pakistan in full force, with the result that in spite of his growing unpopularity at home, Zia-ul-Haq has successfully postponed elections, which he had been promising from time to time, and has strengthened the power of the armed forces. A situation such as this was not likely to work in the direction of greater understanding between India and Pakistan, in spite of the former's continuous efforts during 1977-1980 to improve her relations with her neighbouring countries. As time has moved on, both the United States and China have started to take greater

interest in the rearming of Pakistan, a subject towards which India has responded by increasing her military forces. Towards the end of 1981, the prospects of normal relations between the two countries being completely restored again seemed to be receding into the background.

The leftist coup in Afghanistan to which we have referred above took place in April, 1978, and had been followed by large numbers of Afghans who were supporters of the old feudalistic regime taking refuge in Pakistan. Armed by the latter country, they infiltrated into Afghanistan. Under the circumstances, the Afghan government thought it necessary to seek Russia's military aid—as provided in their treaty with the Soviet Union. As the latter quickly responded to this appeal by sending troops in aid of the Afghan government a hue and cry was raised about intervention and military occupation of an independent country by Russia. According to a statement made by President Sadat sometime before his murder on 6 October 1981, he had been for the past two years selling Soviet arms supplied to him by Moscow, at high profit, to the United States which was transporting them in its own planes to the Afghan rebels. (*The Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 29 October 1981). President Sadat's "discloures" may or may not have been correct. But the fact cannot be denied that, though the Russians have repeatedly declared that they would not stay in Afghanistan a day longer than needed for the safety of Afghanistan, the presence of Russian troops in that country has given a strong enough excuse to the U.S.A. for arming Pakistan with sophisticated weapons, including F-16 bombers and a massive military and economic aid. This has posed India an unparalleled threat to her security, it being clear that these weapons, particularly the F-16 bombers, while unsuited for use by Pakistan against the Afghan rebels, could only be meant to be used against India, specially by destroying by means of a peremptory attack, her nuclear installations in Maharashtra and Rajputana (as Israel had recently destroyed the nuclear installations of Iraq by using this very kind of weapons). India has accepted the reassurances of Russia that her troops are meant only for the defence of Afghanistan and would be withdrawn as soon as they are no longer necessary for the purpose. Still, danger looms for her as the Cold War has now descended on her very doors and on account of what it has been begun to be called a

U.S. China-Pakistan axis which threatens to disturb the peace of the whole of this part of the Asian continent.

INDIA-PAKISTAN-CHINA : MUTUAL-RELATIONSHIPS

It is a well-known fact that neighbourly countries are often at odds with each others (such as over border questions) but the mutual relationships of India, China, and Pakistan have more serious causes which determine their relationships with each other. We have dealt at length above on the causes of friction (leading once to war) between India and China. Whatever they are, they do not stand in the way of both countries having a working relationship with each other. But Pakistan's relationship with India is of a different kind altogether. Born out of hatred of India, it is carrying on its enmity since its very birth, and it may be no exaggeration to say that Indians have little respite, and have some proof or other of it quite often.

It is a commonplace that in politics your neighbouring country may be your enemy but that your neighbour's neighbour is usually your friend. On this basis Pakistan and China may well be expected to be friends. China has shown this friendship for Pakistan in many ways—specially in supplying its friend with war materials. There was a display of Chinese arms supplied to Pakistan at Islamabad quite recently and soon after the President of China had left that country after a visit. They included two squadrons of high-class T-54 and T-59 tanks, etc. Besides 85 and 100 m.m. radii field-guns, 100 m.m. radii anti-aircraft guns etc. China has also strengthened Pakistan's navy by equipping it with two romeo type submarines, and other high-class submarines which are designed to chase away enemy submarines. China has given this arms aid to Pakistan with the full knowledge and approval of America which 'as we have seen' has also given and is giving Pakistan terrible bombers which may annihilate India's nuclear installations in Maharashtra, Rajputana, etc.

Why is China giving these military aids and other weakness too many to mention here? In answer to this questions, China raises her accusing finger at the policy which she alleges Russia is following towards Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam etc. She declares she is opposed to extension of Russian overlordship in these regions, and,

in particular, to the deep friendship which India and Russia have with each other. That there is some basis for this reasoning is proved by the fact that Chinese aid to Pakistan which dates from the fifties of this century has gone on increasing as Indo-Soviet friendship has become more and more pronounced. In other words, according to both China and Pakistan, their friendship with each other is a counterpoise to Indian friendship for Russia. China also argues that Russian presence (according to her, occupation) in Afghanistan is a menace not only to Pakistan but to herself. That is a chief reason, says she, why she wants Pakistan to be a strong buffer between herself and Russia in these regions. She indeed is vying with America in wooing Pakistan. By building a military road across the Karakoram ranges China has joined Lhasa the capital of Tibet, to herself. On the other hand, Zia-ul-Haq, has joined Pak-occupied Indian territory in Kashmir, viz. Gilgit, with a road.

There are other and weighty reasons for China's attempts to win the friendship of Pakistan. It is through Pakistan's assistance only that China may secure a footing in the Islamic world. The chief ally of Pakistan on the questions such as Kashmir in the United Nations is America. By allying herself with Pakistan China may extend her friendly relationships in that body as also elsewhere. It is believed that America's reapproachment with China had Pakistani hands behind it. It is through Pakistani support also that China has been able recently to secure a foothold in the Arab world. That also may serve many other purposes: it may undermine India's strengthening her friendly ties—persistently sought after since Nehru with this world.

Besides supply of war materials, the friendship of Pakistan with China, has taken other forms. Support of each other's position in the United Nations, etc. is one such. Interviews of military experts and their visits to one another. These have been greatly accelerated after Russian intervention in Afghanistan. In 1983 such visits occurred more than thirty times.

INDIA AND THE HIMALAYAN STATES : NEPAL, BHUTAN AND SIKKIM

The conquest of Tibet by Communist China prompted India to adopt certain counter-moves designed to stabilize her relations with her immediate neighbours in the north, viz. Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.

She strengthened her neglected relations with the small and strategically placed states of Sikkim and Bhutan, resulting in a virtual protectorate over them and the establishment of Indian troops within their territories to guard the Tibetan passes. While her relations with these two tiny states have been cordial, and their administration orderly, Nepal has caused her a lot of worry on both the counts. The Indian Government virtually supported the 1950 revolution in Nepal, which freed King. Tribhuvan Bir Vikram Shah, from the control of his Prime Minister, Mohan Shamsheer, whose ancestors had, since the day of powerful Prime Minister, Jang Bahadur Rana (1847), been actual and hereditary rulers of the state in the name of *roi faineant* Kings. In 1957, India helped the Nepalese to suppress a communist-led revolt, and not only supplied substantial economic aid and the technical assistance but provided a military mission, whose job was to give Nepal a small but modern fighting force. On the death of Tribhuvan in April, 1955, his son Mahendra became King, and, the latter, after experimenting with various ministries, virtually effected a *coup d'etat* in December 1960 by dissolving the ministry headed by Mr. P. Koirala, the leader of the Nepali Congress had won a thumping victory in the general elections held a few months before. The arrest and detention of Mr. Koirala and other members of his Cabinet on the plea that a *Panchayat* democracy under the king's personal direction was the best possible government for a politically backward and poorly developed state like his own met with disapproval of the Indian Government. The relations of the two states deteriorated—with Nepal's charges against India of fomenting domestic troubles in Nepal and India's concern over the safety of the frontier specially in view of the threat from China. While the ministers continue to be confined, and the Nepalese internal situation has shown little signs of stabilization, the relations of India with Nepal have, at this writing, somewhat improved.

INDIA'S ACTION IN GOA

Portugal's ouster from her colonial possession of Goa, a tiny enclave on Indian soil, (December, 1961) raised a hue and cry in England and the U.S.A., whose governments, professedly expecting a peaceful settlement of the issue, had done nothing, to say the least, to

persuade Portugal peacefully to depart from India, in spite of repeated requests from India during fifteen long years for their good officers in bringing about the consummation. The Indian Government, subjected to increasing domestic pressure, and exasperated at the persistent and stubborn refusal of Portugal to leave Goa, which she threatened to burn to ashes if India used force to acquire it, had at long last to overcome their strong reluctance to use force. The actual operations were just a matter of a few days or even a few hours, and the inhabitants of Goa showed what feeling they had for their late colonial masters by giving the Indian troops as they crossed the border into Panjim a tumultuous welcome.

Mr. Adlai Stevenson, the American Ambassador at the U.N. denounced India's action in violent language, while supporting a Western resolution condemning it at the Security Council. If the use of force could be condoned for anti-colonialism, said he, it could be condoned for other reasons also; and he accused the U.A.R., Liberia and Ceylon who refused to vote for the resolution, of having a "double standard" on colonial issues. India's Ambassador, Mr. C.S. Jha, asserted that the expulsion of Portugal from India was not an act of aggression, but of "getting rid of the last vestiges of colonialism from India". He further declared that this was "a matter of faith for us, whatever anyone else may think, Charter or no Charter, Council or no Council". Two days later, Mr. V. C. Krishna Menon carried the argument a step further, and declared: "We consider colonialism is permanent aggression. We did not commit aggression. Colonialism collapses."

The U.S.S.R. vetoed the Security Council Resolution, and the Western Powers did not, in view of the attitude displayed by the non-aligned nations represented on the Council who, they feared, expressed well enough general Afro-Asian opinion on the subject, carry the matter to the General Assembly, which they could have done under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, and the issue was, accordingly, shelved.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE MIDDLE EAST

IMPORTANCE OF THE AREA—STRATEGY AND OIL

THE Middle East is an inexact geographical expression. It is generally taken to mean the countries lying between European Turkey and Pakistan, i.e., Turkey, Egypt, the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, and Iran. It has been of great importance in world affairs over many centuries, and of recent years a vital sector of the Cold War.

Apart from its political importance to the rest of the world, the Middle East is an area of tremendous strategic, geographic, economic and religious significance. It is a land-bridge between three continents. The Suez Canal is the shortest waterway between Western Europe and Asia. International air-liners fly across Arab countries and the staging stops for the Europe-to-Asia flights—Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Baghdad—are on the shortest routes between the Mediterranean and India. In the age of power bloc rivalries, the Middle East provides to the "free world" a strategic base for defence against "international communism", with the Caucasus and the Elburz mountain chains acting as barriers against land invasion. In the new age of air power, the Middle East's air-fields, specially those in Turkey and Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, leased by the United States, provide a base, in case of war, for attack against the not-so-soft underbelly of central Soviet Russia. They also provide essential support for Turkey, the right-flank anchor of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Conversely, communist bases in Syria and/or in Egypt would make the eastern Mediterranean an extremely perilous place for the United States Sixth Fleet, and would out-flank Turkey—and NATO. (It may be observed, however, that the latest developments in missiles and thermonuclear weapons have revolutionized strategy. One hydrogen bomb, for instance, may put the Suez Canal completely out

of action and another such Basra. It is not air-bases but missile-launching sites which are of value in a thermonuclear showdown between the two super-powers of the modern world, and the efficacy of the latter depends more on the secrecy that can be maintained over their location. In other than such kind of nuclear war, however, the current notions of the importance of the Middle East air-bases would hold good.) Correspondingly, the U.S.S.R. looks on the Middle East as "the one major gap in her protective satellite fringe"; since the failure to convert Turkey and Iran into satellites she has done her best to drive the U.K. out and prevent the U.S. from coming in.

In recent years there has been a new dimension in the balance of power between the two super-powers in respect of their rivalry in the Middle East. The Eisenhower-Dulles policy of "massive retaliation" by a string of bases around the Soviet Union necessitating the securing of strategic bases in the Middle East, was found to be obsolete almost as soon as it was promulgated, since the growth of Soviet nuclear capability posed the unacceptable risk that such "retaliation" ran the inevitable risk of all-out nuclear war. This danger has been superseded at the present day by the activities of the two powers, specially the U.S.A., in the waters adjoining and beyond the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and, above all the Indian Ocean. Though Washington is silent on the matter, it is an open secret that U.S. strategic missile submarines are on patrol beneath the waters of the Arabian Sea, which is the north-west corner of the Indian Ocean. From these waters, most of the Soviet industrial hinterland, as well as Moscow, are within the missile range of the U.S. Polaris and Poseidon submarines. Presumably, it was this fact that accounted for the accumulation of vast Soviet political and military interest along the coastland from Aden to the Horn of Africa, in the Indian Ocean, starting in 1968. The U.S.A. has built up a strong naval base on the British-owned atoll of Diego Garcia, which is a part of the Chagos archipelago and is not far to the south of the Maldive islands. The rivalries of the two super-powers in the Indian Ocean pose a serious threat to the safety of the littoral states who, headed by India, have been, since 1970, strongly protesting against the American naval presence in Diego Garcia—without success.

The other factor—besides strategy—which gives the Middle East its importance in world affairs is its “block gold”—oil. Oil is the Middle East’s greatest economic asset, though nearly the whole of the vast revenue that oil yields goes to fill the pockets of the ruling class who spends but little on the welfare of the masses. This oil is, however, of supreme importance for the West, both for war and for peace. The Middle East produces ordinarily from two-thirds to three-quarters of the “free world’s” oil resources. In spite of the discovery of new oil-fields, e.g., in the Sahara, of sources of natural gas in South France and Italy and of the progress made in manufacture of nuclear power, the West would have to depend for still a long time for its industries or daily necessities or war purposes on Middle East oil. As the Suez crisis showed, oil could be supplied from the U.S. to the West in emergencies, but this in any case can be only a short-time and never a long-term proposition.

The U.S. has, indeed, vast sources of oil, and is not dependent on the Middle East for her needs, but, since her own sources of oil are the safest and only sure source of oil for her in time of war, she wants to utilize other sources in times of peace. About 30 years ago, Lawrence Dinny (in his book, *We fight for Oil*), pointed out that the U.S.A.’s present sources—at the then rate of consumption—would last for 75 years. The rate of consumption has now increased enormously, and other available sources may not last for more than 50 years more. As observes Sir Olaf Caroe: “It may be wise to hold that the resources of the western hemisphere—U.S., Caribbean, Canadian together—will not avail much longer to sustain a net export of oil, so that in the not distant future, Western Europe entirely, Asia, Africa and Australia largely, and before long America to an extent, may come to depend on the output of the Persian Gulf.” (*Wells of Power*, pp. 98-99). Naturally enough, access to Middle East oil is and will remain one of the most important factors in shaping Washington’s policy in the area.

On the other hand, if the U.S.S.R.—who herself does not need Middle East oil—should succeed in denying it to the West, she would have won a major victory in the Cold War. If she could secure control of the Gulf fields, she should have some positive gains too. Russian oil is safely produced, but has to be transported vast

distances to refuel and service Russian planes and ships, a major concern of Russian logistics. If Russian planes could be serviced and refuelled at airfields within this area, they could disrupt shipping in Middle East waters and close any base where this shipping might refuel.

The Persian Gulf States and their Oil Resources. There are three great oil-producing areas in the world today, viz., the U.S.A., Venezuela and the Middle East. About the position of the U.S.A. in this respect, we have said something above. Venezuelan oil is mostly consumed in Europe. There are vast resources of oil in some other areas of the globe and it is possible that marketable oil in vast quantities may be found out in the near future. But so far as matters stand at present, Middle East oil is essential. More than three-fifths of the world's crude oil reserves come from the states that rim the Persian Gulf. About 57% of Western Europe's oil come from them; the comparable figure for Japan is 90%. In 1970, the U.S.A.'s import from the Gulf began to rise and now accounts for one-seventh of all oil consumption. By now, it and its allies may be looking to this area alone to slake their growing energy thirst.

The oil-producing states in the Persian gulf region are eight in number. They are (1) Iran, the superstate of the area, (2) and (3) Saudi Arabia and Iraq which are fairly large states, (4 to 7), five mini-states, viz., Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Dabar and Qatar and (8) the United Arab Emirate. The last-named comprises, from the Straits of Hormuz westwards, Ras al Khaimah, Umm al Qawain, Ajman, Sharjan, Dabai, Abu Dhabi, which used to be ruled by their Shaikhs who were known as the Qawasim, in English usage the Jowsmi. The United Arab Emirate owes its formation to the decision of Labour Government in Britain, announced in 1968 and implemented in 1971 to withdraw from the Persian Gulf. About the same time, Britain pulled out of the Protectorate of Aden. The city of Aden, which, under its rule, had grown into the largest bunkering port in the world and also became the site of a major refinery, had now an influx of population from northern Yemen, now the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Many of these immigrants were carriers of Arab radicalism, and after the British retirement, they speedily seized power in the city, proclaiming themselves to be the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) or South Yemen.

ARAB NATIONALISM

The third great factor that has given its importance to the Middle East is the emergence of a strong national movement among the Arabs. The story of Arab awakening goes back to Napoleon's conquest of Egypt, which gave as much impetus to Arab nationalism as the Corsican's conquests of Spain, Italy and Germany gave to nationalism in these countries. On his downfall, his mantle fell on Muhammed Ali, who, in the opinion of Palmerston, sought to build up the edifice of an Arab kingdom, comprising all the countries that spoke Arabic.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, leadership of the national movement passed to Syria and Lebanon, where the Christian Arabs, educated in the American University of Beirut, founded in 1866, took the leading part. An Arabic Renaissance began with the compilation of an Arabic dictionary in 1867, and an Arabic encyclopaedia in 1870. The political movement was further stimulated by the Young Turk Revolt, 1908, and by the First and Second World Wars.

In the First World War the British incited the Arabs to revolt against their Turkish masters, promising them self-determination at the end of the war and at the same time by the Balfour Declaration of 1917 committed themselves to the establishment of a Jewish "national home" in Palestine. The Arabs found little comfort in the parallel declaration that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities" for a Jewish "national home" in Palestine was clearly inconsistent with Arab independence, while both were inconsistent with the interest of British imperialism. Palestine was of importance to Great Britain as an air and military base, as containing the terminus of an oil pipe line from Mosul, and as a strategic base for controlling the Mediterranean, specially against possible challenge by Italy. The chief tool of Col. T. E. Lawrence, the British agent, was the Sheriff Hussein of the Hejaz, along with his three sons, Ali, Abdulla and Feisal. The post-war settlement, however, dashed the hopes of the Arabs to pieces. The Allies gave over Mesopotamia (Iraq), Palestine and Transjordan to Britain, and Syria and Lebanon to France—each power to hold the territories assigned to it as mandate. In the

period between the two World Wars, the Arab cause made little progress though Saudi Arabia, Yemen and a few Sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf, as also Iraq (Mesopotamia) had become independent. The rest of the Arab world—the “fertile crescent” extending from Iraq to Morocco, continued to be under occupation by European powers. The British stooges, Hussein and Ali, had however been driven out of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud, and Feisal, whom Lawrence had placed upon the throne of Iraq, had also been compelled to make terms with him. Abdulla, who, on Feisal’s premature death in 1932, had become the prominent Hashemite ruler, along with Nuri as-Said of Iraq, another British protege, planned to found a Greater Syria, uniting Syria Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan. The plan, however, was disfavoured by the British, and was opposed by Ibn Saud, and by Syria and Lebanon.

The Second World War revolutionized the situation. Italy lost Libya, which became an independent kingdom in 1951. Syria and Lebanon ceased to be mandates and became independent republics (1944). In 1946 Britain recognized the independence of Transjordan, which became the “Hashemite kingdom of Jordan”. In March 1945, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen as also Egypt, representing in all 36 million Arab people, formed a league of Arab States. Meanwhile, the Second World War was drawing to a close and the Allies had declared at Yalta that only those states that had declared war on the Axis powers would be entitled to take part in the Peace Conference. The Arab League States, thereupon, entered the war, and expected to present a united front at the impending San Francisco Conference. But as the aims of the League generally coincided with British politics, e.g., the elimination of French influence from the Middle East, the League was accused of being a British tool. With reference to the accusation that the “League spoke Arabic with a British accent”, Azzam Pasha, the Secretary-General of the League replied: “This suit is made of British cloth but I am wearing it.”

PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-JEW CONFLICT

At one time there were three storm-centres of Arab nationalism,—Palestine, where the enemy was the Jew; Egypt, where the enemy

was Britain ; and North West Africa, where the enemy was France, which controlled Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. In her mandated territory of Palestine, Britain encountered opposition both from the Jews and the Arabs—the former pressing for unrestricted immigration of the persecuted Jews of Europe into the territory, and the Arabs who were dead against it on the ground that it led to the buying up of their none-too-plentiful arable soils by the immigrating Jews, which threatened the existence of thousands of Arabs. In 1929 there was a violent anti-Jewish outbreak in Palestine which was quelled by British troops rushed into the mandated territory by the government of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. In the following year, there were further troubles over the Arab claim to the possession of the Wailing Wall, which adjoined a sacred mosque of the Arabs, and was a place of worship for the Jews. In the following years, there was a change in British policy, which now sought to make friends with the Arabs and was caused by British alarm at Mussolini's claim that the Mediterranean was "our sea". Pending the report of a Commission, which they appointed to study Palestinian economic conditions, the British Government indefinitely postponed Jewish immigration. But on account of the sharp protests of the World's Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency in Palestine, they were compelled in 1932 to permit free entry of Jewish farmers, merchants, and businessmen who could show that they possessed a capital of £2,500. In 1936, the triple conflict of Arabs, Jews and British imperial interests once more became violent. In 1937, they put forward a plan for the partition of Palestine, which was rejected by both the Arabs and the Jews. In 1939, they sponsored yet another plan—Palestine was to be set up as an independent state after a ten-year period, during which Jewish immigration should be limited at first by numbers and then by Arab consent. This was also rejected by both the sides.

THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL

The issue was kept in cold storage during the Second World War, but towards the close of the conflict, tensions in Palestine reached the breaking point. Britain, whose League mandate has been continued as a trust under the U.N., vainly tried to secure U.S. assistance in finding out a solution. But the Truman administration, largely due to domestic reasons, viz., the need for the pro-Zionist vote in the key

state of New York, where the major political parties balanced each other, in the forthcoming Congress elections, was strongly pro-Jewish, and called for the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine. At this time also, on account of the opening of the Nazi Concentration Camps and the consequent revelations of Nazi atrocities towards the Jews, there was a world-wide sympathy for that harassed race. In 1947 the British referred the Palestine problem to the U.N. In November, the General Assembly put forward a plan for the partition of Palestine. It did so because both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. advocated the idea—this being the first time since the establishment of the U.N. when the two powers found themselves in agreement over a controversial matter. The plan was opposed by the Arabs, and in the following month fighting began between the Jews and the forces of the League. This continued into the summer of 1948.

Britain surrendered her mandate to the United Nations, and withdrew her forces in May. The first and most obvious reason for the British retreat was that it cost them heavily to keep 80,000 troops in the territory, and, having come out of the Second World War in a gravely weakened financial position, they had been compelled to grant independence to Burma, India and Pakistan, and promise Dominion Status to Ceylon. Secondly, the importance of the Mediterranean-Red Sea route had lessened by the reduction of Britain's commitments in India. Moreover, there was a new doctrine of imperial strategy, which seemed to have found acceptance in British governing circles, and which placed principal reliance on a network of air bases in Kenya and Tanganyika rather than on the island fortresses of the days before the development of air power. The British were, moreover, anxious to conciliate the Arab States and expected that this step would lead to improved relations with them. As for the vital pipeline bringing oil from Iraq to Haifa, the British apparently were relying on the United States, which was at the time having a growing interest in the oil of the Arab States, and for the reason was expected not to permit either the Jews or the Arabs to interfere with it.

In the very month the British withdrew from Palestine the United Nations appointed Count Bernadotte of Sweden as a mediator, but in September, he was assassinated by Zionist terrorist. During the

fighting—the British troops having left Palestine—the Jews had proclaimed that part of Palestine which had been assigned by the U.N. to the Jewish State to be the State of Israel, with Dr. Chaim Weizman as President and a democratic constitution. The new state was immediately attacked by the combined armies of the Arab States of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, with token troops from Saudi Arabia. Surprisingly enough the Israelis won, and by the time the U.N. arranged a final truce (1948) they held more than half of Palestine. Though the U.N. tried to internationalize Jerusalem, the Israelis occupied the new city and later made it their capital. The old city and the parts of Palestine still under Arab control were annexed by the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. In May, 1949, Israel was admitted to be a member of the United Nations. In the course of the year separate armistices were signed with the Arab States, but there has been as yet no general peace, and the Arab League, which established its headquarters at Damascus, has subjected Israel to an economic boycott. Border clashes continued into 1956, when the Israelis invaded Sinai, the border territory of Egypt. Altogether the United Nations has played a sorry part in its handling of the whole question of Arab-Jew conflict. The Arab States, who have many mutual quarrels, are united in one objective—to push Israel into the sea.

WHAT FUTURE FOR ISRAEL

That aim is never likely to be realized, and Israel is a fact, which the sooner the Arabs recognize the better it is for them. The real question is, remaining, as it is since birth, in a state of siege, and thus cut off from normal relations with all its neighbours, when and how Israel can become a viable state. Of its population of nearly 2 million, 200,000 are Palestinian Arab, who did not leave in 1948, and are looked upon by the Israeli Government as a potential fifth column and subjected to special restrictions. The Israelis themselves are by no means a homogenous people; they are split between those who have come from Western lands and the "orientals", who come from such relative primitive areas as the mountains of Morocco and the highlands of Yemen; religiously, they are split between Orthodox and secular. Yet, national feeling is growing stronger everyday; it is rooted in the memories of their common suffering and pride in having founded a state of their own after 2000 years. The government.

accommodate the Orthodox on matters like the strict observance of the Sabbath, and the "orientals" are getting westernized. Hebrew as a common language is a unifying force, and another such factor is the requirement that youths of both sexes perform national service.

The economic problem of Israel is formidable enough. The "ingathering of the exiles" being the governing principle of its life—it has already admitted more than 1 million immigrants since 1948—the best energies of the nation are spent in solving the problem of feeding its rapidly increasing population. More and more land is everyday being brought under the plough, and pipe-lines have been laid to bring water from the wet north to the dry Negev in the south. The cultivation of wheat and cotton has been vastly improved, but, until an inexpensive method of making fresh water from the sea is found out, further development in agriculture is hardly possible. Israel has been equally careful about its industrial development, its great asset in this field being its population which is highly skilled in Western technology. It is, however, short of natural resources—oil, raw materials—and machinery, while its exports are relatively few, such as citrus fruits and industrial diamonds. Israel has limited resources of foreign currency, some of which—notably "reparation payments", which West Germany has been providing in goods and services since 1955, and, running over a 12-year period, will total \$800 million—are a temporary boon. Other valuable contributions to Israel's economy are remittances from Jewish communities abroad, specially in the United States, Britain, Canada, and South Africa, and grants and loans from the United States Government for development, which have totalled over \$700 million.

Israel, however, cannot indefinitely count on these resources, and its future must be considered as uncertain, until the Arabs discontinue their boycott, and cheap supplies of Middle East oil, among other necessities, become available. Moreover, Egypt prevents Israel shipping from using the Suez Canal on the ground that technically the two countries are still belligerents. The efforts made by the late Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the U.N. to induce Nasser to allow cargoes of Israeli origin to pass through the canal under an ingenious arrangement under which title to the cargoes was transferred to a third party, failed completely.

Israel is a welfare state, and has a democratic constitution with a multi-party system and a cabinet responsible to the elected legislature, the Knesset. The largest party is the Mapai, led by one of the most highly respected leaders of the Zionist movement, David Ben Gurion. Other parties represent such diverse doctrines as left-wing socialism (Mapam), free enterprise (the General Zionists), Orthodoxy (National Religious party), ultra-orthodoxy (Agudat Israel), and immediate expansion at the expense of Jordan (Herut). Ben Gurion, who has been many times appointed premier after the foundation of the state, is largely the maker of Israel's phenomenal progress, but his proneness to partisan controversy and boastful statements about Israel's achievements in war against the Arabs, created too many enemies for him at home and abroad, and his name is anathema to all Arabs.

CAUSES OF THE SUCCESS OF THE JEWS IN FOUNDING ISRAEL

The success of the Jews in founding a state of their own in Palestine, after they had been driven out of it nearly two thousand years back and remained 'dispersed' ever since, is a marvel of history. It was the successful culmination of the efforts of the World Zionist Organization, founded at the close of the last century by world Jewry with the twin purpose of resettling the Jews in Palestine and erecting a national state there. Many factors contributed to the Zionist success. Pious Jews claim that it was the fulfilment of God's promise to Abraham that His Chosen People shall own Palestine—an answer to Jewish prayers that they may be permitted to return to their own land. It was the intensity and continuity through many long centuries of Jewish yearning to return to the Holy Land which produced that Zionist movement, say they. Some have stressed the driving force of anti-Semitism, which was always present in Christian lands, and raised its ugly head in many countries of Europe, specially Russia and Germany, about the middle of the nineteenth century, inflicting untold sufferings on the Jews residing in those countries.

The Zionist movement received a tremendous accession of strength from the British Government's committal to the idea of a Jewish National Home in Palestine as reflected in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. This amazing document, which declared that

"His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine," has been considered by many people as the most important and decisive cause of the Jewish success in establishing their national home in Palestine. It has been interpreted variously. According to some, it was issued in gratitude to, or in fulfilling a promise made by Premier Lloyd George to, Dr. Chaim Weizmann of Manchester University, a leading Zionist who became later the first President of Israel, for contributing to the Allied war effort by his discoveries in the field of explosives (It is said that when at a critical phase of the war England faced a disaster on account of the acute shortage of acetone, an essential explosive ingredient, Premier Lloyd George requested Dr. Weizmann to save the situation, and Weizmann did it by producing the substance synthetically. When Mr. Lloyd George offered him a reward, Weizmann refused to accept anything, except the British government's solemn promise to establish a Jewish home in Palestine.) The story may have a basis of fact, but it cannot be denied that the Balfour Declaration was consistent with historic British policy and plainly dictated by British imperial interests. As far back as the middle of the nineteenth century, the idea was current in British political circles (it was elaborated in Hollingworth's tract, *The Jews in Palestine*, published in 1852) that the establishment of a Jewish state under British protection in Palestine was the best method by which the overland route to India might be safeguarded. Lord Palmerston was sympathetic to the idea as were, later, Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury—the last-named going so far as to propose that negotiations be opened with the Porte on the subject. The British government may have hoped to secure some immediate strategical advantages by issuing the Declaration, and also to nullify French claims to parts of Palestine with a view to bringing the whole country under British control.

In the chain of events leading to the establishment of Israel after the Second World War, a special importance attaches to the United Nations' resolution of 29 November, 1947, calling for the partition of Palestine, a resolution in which the United States played

a decisive role. It has to be stressed that one event, however important strategically, was not sufficient to produce Israel, which was the result of a combination of many factors in the context of a movement which made most of them.

A RESUME OF ISRAEL-ARAB RELATIONS, 1948-1959

Israel's foreign relations have been guided by three objectives : (1) to ensure the integrity of the state by achieving genuine peace with the Arab states ; (2) to promote massive immigration of Jews from all parts of the world ; (3) to bring about rapid economic development. Israel's pursuit of these objectives is closely affected by her relations with her neighbours and the big powers, and her position in these two spheres is, in turn, affected by the relations among themselves of her neighbours and of the big powers and their interactions. Looking at Israel-Arab relations from this perspective, three different periods can be discerned : 1949-53, 1953-1956, and 1957-1959.

The First Period—After Israel had concluded an armistice with the Arab states in the war of 1948, she seemed to be confident that a lasting peace would be soon established, specially because both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. supported her at the moment in securing this objective. During what we have called the first period these hopes evaporated, and the basic factors which have determined Israel's relations with the Arab states and the big powers become painfully clear. In 1949, as soon as the armistice agreements were signed, Israel's foreign policy was primarily directed at seeking peace with the Arab states through the offices of the Conciliation Commission appointed by the U.N. But, though the two sides reached some understanding by signing separately a protocol (Lausanne Protocol), which committed them to accept the U.N. General Assembly's resolution of 20 November 1947 as a basis for discussing boundaries, the negotiations eventually came to a standstill. Israel then tried to negotiate secretly with Jordan and actually arrived at a draft treaty, but King Abdullah could not put up a government which would approve it, and even this effort cost him his life in 1951. The Arabs indeed had no genuine desire to establish pacific relations with Israel, and had even some good reasons to oppose the consummation. The

Palestine question was useful for promoting Arab unity, and public opinion all over the Arab world was opposed to the establishment of a Jewish national state in Palestine. Meanwhile, the attitude of Soviet Russia toward Israel, after a brief period of support to it, which had been dictated by its design to get the British out of Palestine and after this objective had been achieved, was reversing itself, as the former, traditionally anti-Zionist, had begun to look upon the latter as a tool of American imperialism in the Middle East. (A reflection of this in Russian domestic affairs was the discovery of the so-called "doctors" plot, see above, Chapter 21.) In 1950, Israel asked for economic aid from the United States to counter-balance the shipment of arms that the British were making to some Arab countries. American policy soon crystallized itself in the attempt to freeze the Israeli-Arab conflict and to bring all the parties together into a regional defence organization. The efforts of the U.S.A., eager as she was to fill the vacuum caused by the decline of British power in the Middle East, to go ahead with this policy even after it was clear that the Arabs were not willing to come under one organizational roof with Israel, and to have a regional organization even without Israel, produced tension in Israeli-American relations.

The Second Period—In the first four years of her existence, Israel had not succeeded in gaining the primary objective of her foreign policy, viz., a secure peace with her Arab neighbours. But she had achieved some notable successes—she had obtained international recognition, secured United States economic aid, and received masses of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Muslim countries. But from 1953 onward numerous changes in the area and in the great powers' relations as they affected the area caused a steady deterioration of Israel's position, out of which it sought to rescue itself by striking a daring blow at Egypt in 1956. The chief worry of Israel was the policy which was being pushed forward vigorously by the Eisenhower administration to form a regional administration in the Middle East. (The policy had begun under the Truman administration, but on account of the great regard which Israel had for the administration, relations were cordial enough.) Israel viewed with alarm the conclusion of a Turko-Pakistani agreement early in 1954 which was immediately followed up by the grant of military and economic aid to Iraq and the formation of the Baghdad Pact (later

known as CENTO), which Iraq, along with Great Britain, joined. Israel's plea for arms and a defence treaty with the United States was ignored, while the United States, herself keeping out of the Baghdad Pact, wooed the Egyptians who were opposed to it. The conclusion, under American pressure of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement (1954) providing for the evacuation of the Suez base, alarmed Israel since it removed a buffer between herself and Egypt. When Egypt arranged an arms deal with the Soviet Union (1955), there began what seemed to Israeli eyes "a stampede among the Western powers to appease Nasser in order to prevent his slipping further under Soviet influence." The American reaction to the arms deal was to offer to finance the Aswan High Dam; the British Prime Minister, Eden suggested publicly that Israel should make some territorial concessions as a price for peace with the Arabs; and even France, which was embroiled with Egypt over the Algerian question, sent the Foreign Minister, Pineau to Cairo in March, 1956 to induce Nasser to refrain from dumping his obsolete weapons in Algeria.

In 1956, Israel found herself in a desperate position: friendless and without arms she was exposed to the danger of encirclement by the Egyptians. The wheel of fortune, however, soon turned in her favour: the Americans, for a complexity of reasons (seen above, Chapter 22) refused to help build the Aswan High Dam; Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, thus infuriating Great Britain. Rather than wait to be crushed when the enemy chose his time, it seemed more opportune for Israel to take advantage of the situation—the U.S.A. was busy with a presidential election and Russia was preoccupied with Hungary—in order to strike a "pre-emptive blow" in what appeared to be an act of collusion with England and France. On 29 October 1956 Israel invaded Sinai; the British and French adventure followed. A series of momentous results followed, which we have described at length elsewhere (Chapter 22), and need not be recounted here. Israel finally gave in, after the U.S.A. assumed a moral commitment to support her right of "innocent passage" through the Gulf of Aqaba and to see to it that the Gaza strip was not used as a base for renewed raids.

The Third Period—The U.S.A. now assumed the sole responsibility for defending the Western position in the Middle East which she

proclaimed to the world by enunciating the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine. The attempt to isolate Nasser and rally friendly governments to the Western cause produced a series of crises. In April, 1957, the young king of Jordan dismissed a government which wanted to turn the country into an Egyptian protectorate and with the support of the U.S.A., which ordered the Sixth Fleet to proceed to the Eastern Mediterranean, stood his ground. The United States policy, however, sustained a defeat when early in 1958 the Syria-Egypt merger took place. In May 1958, there was a crisis in Lebanon and the pro-Western Chamoun government was threatened, and in the following July a revolution broke out in Iraq and the pro-Western government there was overthrown, (see below). The U.S.A. landed marines in Lebanon and Britain paratroops in Jordan with the nominal object of protecting the governments in these countries but also with the object of giving support to Iraqi forces which might seek to redress the situation. Nothing happened, and under an arrangement with the U.N., Britain and the U.S.A. withdrew their forces. However, a balance was emerging, the key to which was Iraq, whose rulers established close relations with the Soviet and broke relations with Nasser. Nasser then began to seek to improve his relations with the West, and the U.S.A. reacted favourably.

The emerging balance of power was not substantially altered in spite of subsequent changes. Thus the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic in September, 1961 and a subsequent coup in March, 1963, which brought Baathist party leaders to power was certainly resented by Nasser but they did not meet with military opposition from him. In Iraq, the new ruler, General Abdul Karim Kassim, was overthrown and killed by a Baathist group in February, 1963, and the regime it installed was in turn overthrown in the following November by a pro-Nasser government which proceeded to make terms with him. An ominous development was a proclamation by Iraq, Syria and Egypt of a tentative agreement to unite, since it put pressure on Jordan and raised the spectre of an inter-Arab war. The proposed unity, however, did not materialize and, in any case, the balance of power, such as it was, was left untouched. Above all, the U.S.A. realised that it had failed to entice any bloc of Arab countries into the Western camp, and reconciled herself to their neutrality,

while adopting a policy of friendly relations and economic help to prevent them from becoming too dependent on the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union appeared to be content with denying the West control over the area and continued its policy of friendship and aid. The role of Israel during these turbulent years was passive, but it nevertheless contributed to the development of the balance because her very presence acted as a check on Nasser.

THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION : NASSERISM

The ignominious failure of the united Arab nations in their war against Israel gave a rude shock to the Arab world, which sought some new road to unity. While some Arab leader took refuge in the theory that Israel's success was part of a Machiavellian conspiracy master-minded by Britain and the U.S.A., others adopted a more revolutionary view. The most prominent among the latter were the young Egyptian army men banded together as the Free Officers.

To the Free Officers, Egypt seemed ripe for revolution after 1948. In 1922, Britain had recognized Egyptian independence, and in 1923, King Fuad of the Muhammad Ali dynasty had issued a constitution establishing a limited monarchy on the Belgian model. Yet Britain had retained special rights, notably to station troops in the Suez Canal Zone and to share with Egypt administration of its southern neighbour, the Sudan. The Wafd, Egypt's nationalist party, pressed for the abolition of these privileges, but obtained only partial satisfaction before the Second World War.

The Wafd was sapped by corruption and failed to solve the country's economic problems, or to raise its international status, and far less to give a lead to the Arab world, cast in gloom because of its recent frustration. The Egyptian monarchy was discredited at the failure of the Israeli war, and the gross young King Farouk had lost prestige as he was implicated in a scandal over the defective supplies to Egyptian troops. The air of crisis deepened at the close of 1951 as Egyptian police clashed with British occupation troops along the Suez Canal and as the Muslim Brotherhood, a fanatically anti-western organization, spread a campaign of hate and terror.

On 23 July 1952, the Free Officers easily overthrew the old regime, forced Farouk into exile, and set up a military administration. At

first their chief appeared to be General Muhammed Naguib, a hero of the Israeli war, but in 1954, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, the real leader, forced him into retirement. The revolutionary government soon settled old scores with Britain. In 1953, both states arranged to let the Sudan determine its own future (it chose independence), and in 1954 Britain agreed to withdraw her troops from the Suez Canal Zone in two years. In 1955 Nasser alarmed the West by negotiating a deal with the Soviet bloc for the acquisition of large amounts of communist arms.

Nasser defied the the West still more directly in July, 1956, when he proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal a month after the last British troops had moved out of the canal zone area. The international crisis he precipitated reached a peak in October-November, 1956. Israel invaded the Sinai peninsula, the Egyptian territory lying between the Israeli frontier and the canal, and French and British forces landed in the canal zone. The war was promptly stopped by the U.N., firmly backed by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and powerfully supported by world opinion. The invaders withdrew as the U.N. sent a small international force to patrol the canal and the Sinai peninsula. The canal remained nationalized, and the Egyptians confounded the westerners who had believed them incapable of managing such a complex operation by operating it successfully in spite of the withdrawal of French and British pilots. (See above, Chapter 22.)

In spite of the defeat of his armies, Nasser came out of the Suez crisis triumphant. His repeated defiance of the West made Nasser the hero of nationalism throughout the Arab world. Egypt and the other Arab countries found a common goal in Pan-Arabism. Nearly every party in every Arab State (except perhaps some Christian groups in Lebanon) cited unification as among its chief aims. From the extreme nationalist Muslim Brotherhood on the right through the left-oriented Socialist Resurrection, or Baath party, unity was a primary goal. Politicians like Nuri as-Said or rulers like Feisal of Iraq or Hussein of Jordan resented his claim to lead the Arab world. But the streets in all the Arab capitals belonged to Nasser, who could at any moment give a call to the youth of Arabia, and specially the student community to his aid, whereupon the latter in their thousands would throng the streets, shouting for the blood of the detested politicians, and would sometimes also have it.

After the Suez crisis Nasser's first conquest seemed likely to be the shaky kingdom of Jordan (the former Transjordan), where he had a devoted following among the Palestinian Arabs, who made up two-thirds of the population. Early in 1956, the Palestinians had forced the young King, Hussein, to dismiss General Sir John Glubb, British commander of Jordan's Arab Legion. In 1957, a Nasserite coup was thwarted at the eleventh hour by the courage of King Hussein, the loyalty of the Arab legion, and Washington's decision to support Jordan. Nasser never ceased to be a popular figure among the Palestinian majority, but their hopes for the downfall of King Hussein were dampened by the realization that such an event might bring both economic chaos and Israeli armed intervention, and that Nasser with his hands full in Syria was not eager to assume responsibility for these eventualities. In 1961, much to the disillusionment of some of his more impatient followers, Nasser exchanged conciliatory messages with Hussein and was clearly willing to keep the situation in Jordan on ice.

The Pan-Arab focus next shifted to Syria, where the frustration of defeat by Israel was compounded by the chronic instability of the republican regime installed there after the Second World War (in 1949 alone there had been three *coups d'état*). Both Nasser and moderate Syrian nationalists feared this instability. Early in 1958, therefore, they hastily arranged the merger of Syria and Egypt into a single state, the United Arab Republic (UAR). This produced among Nasser's opponents the feeling that he had "grabbed" or "swallowed" Syria as the first step towards a general Egyptian imperialist expansion. As a matter of fact, it was the Syrians who had pressed their demand on Nasser, and he responded to these demands with reluctance. On 28 September 1961, however, Syria broke away from the union, and Nasser acquiesced in the act. Nasser had apparently antagonized the leaders of the Arab Socialist Renaissance (Baath) party—the very men who had prominently figured in the movement that had led to the union—by placing an increasing number of Egyptian officials in positions of control, and the wealthier classes by initiating well-conceived but badly administered land reform, and by nationalizing banks and industries.

The first step towards Arab unification upset the delicate balance in Syria's half-Christian, half-Muslim neighbour, the Republic of Lebanon, where nationalists were already settled by the pro-western attitude of the Lebanese Government. Prolonged civil strife paralysed the country throughout the summer of 1958 until a more neutral government was installed and the political balance readjusted. The United States Marines who had landed in Lebanon in July, 1958 to forestall the possible impact of the *coup* in Iraq were withdrawn after political stability had been restored in the country. That the settlement left Lebanon in the hands of a neutral government more or less acceptable to Nasser seemed to be primarily due to the good sense of the American Government, and though Nasser still had his Lebanese admirers, a clear limit had been placed on what they could expect of him.

IRAQ

Iraq, which comprises the areas between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers is the legendary cradle of the human race, regarded by some Biblical scholars as the original Garden of Eden. It was here that the ancient cities of Nineveh and Babylon flourished. Ur, perhaps the most ancient city of the world as yet discovered, was built more than 6000 years ago.

Iraq, then known as Mesopotamia, was taken from Turkey in the First World War, and handed over as League of Nations mandate to Britain. In 1932, the mandate ended and Iraq was recognized as a sovereign state and member of the League of Nations. It is now a member of U.N. and the Arab bloc.

Emir Feisal, then king of the Hejaz, was chosen ruler by referendum, 1921. On his death, September 1933, he was succeeded by his son, Ghazi Ibn Feisal. King Feisal was killed in a motor accident, 4 April 1939, and was succeeded by his son (born 2 May 1935), King Feisal II. Emir Abdul Illah, his maternal uncle, acted as regent till the king reached his 18th birthday, 2 May 1953. Iraq became a constitutional monarchy hereditary in the family of King Feisal and had a Chamber of Deputies of 142 members, and a Senate, which

may not exceed one-fourth the number of Deputies, appointed by the King. The Premier was the pro-British Nuri as-Said.

Britain having vacated her position in Middle East politics after the Second World War, the U.S.A. entered into the breach, and sought to build up a defence organization in the region against communist infiltration and aggression comparable to NATO. Iraq, being Egypt's chief rival for leadership of the Arab world, and on account of her closeness to Russia more alive to the Cold War, accepted military aid from the U.S.A. in January, 1954, Pakistan having already done so earlier in the same month. A year later (on 26 February 1955), Iraq signed a mutual defence pact with Turkey, which was a member of NATO, though the move was strongly opposed by Egypt. The Baghdad Pact, as it came to be called, was later joined by Britain, Pakistan and Iran, the U.S.A. remaining behind the scenes and the chief supporter of the whole movement. (See below, New Issues in the Middle East.)

The solidarity of the Arab world was thus destroyed, and both Egypt's leadership and her policy of non-alignment were threatened. She sought to reassert her influence and to bring together a bloc in opposition to the western-controlled Baghdad group. She had a strong supporter in Saudi Arabia, whose claim to the Buraimi Oasis was disputed by the British supported ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat. Syria, too, sided with Egypt and signed a defence pact with her in October, 1955. A similar pact was signed between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the same month. Yemen, another Middle East country involved in a dispute with Britain (concerning the Aden protectorate) signed a defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in April, 1956. Under pressure from Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt, and being assured that the subsidy she received from Britain would be replaced, Jordan repulsed the efforts to get her included in the Baghdad Pact. In March 1956, she dismissed General Glubb, Commander of her Arab Legion, and early in May reached a military agreement with Egypt. In 1957, however, a Nasserite coup was foiled in Jordan, Nasserism secured a triumph by the merger of Syria with Egypt in the following year, but in 1961, Syria broke away from the union, as we have seen.

THE REPUBLIC

On 14 July 1958, units of the Iraqi army led by British-trained General Abdul Karim el Kassim, abruptly ended the old regime, assassinating King Feisal II and Nuri as-Said. Although both Nasserites and communists hoped to exploit the situation, Kassim apparently outmanoeuvred both the groups and emerged as the rival of Nasser, not his partner. A republic was proclaimed and Kassim installed himself as virtual dictator with a mainly military cabinet. The new government was promptly recognized by most foreign states. On 24 March 1959, Kassim announced Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, which became transformed as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

The Kassim regime of 1958-1963 was unfortunate in almost every respect. Scores of senior officers and high officials were removed on suspicion of being monarchist or conservative, and many more were tried before a televised "special court" for alleged past offences. All democratic institutions were abolished and all control was exercised by the revolutionary council. A military revolt at Mosul in 1959 was bloodily suppressed. The Communists were blamed for a violent street fight at Kirkuk in the same year, although General Kassim later reversed this judgement and leaned heavily on Communist support. Kassim himself was wounded by an assassin in October, 1959 and after that incident rarely emerged from his headquarters in the ministry of defence.

Iraqi relations with Egypt and Syria, at first cordial, deteriorated into campaigns of mutual abuse. Kassim's sudden claim in 1961 to Kuwait and its oil was frustrated by the latter's success in obtaining prompt British aid. Serious troubles in Kurdistan, caused by a militant separatist movement, called for major military operations in 1962-1963, against the Kurdish leader, Mustafa al-Barzani. The government failed to suppress him.

Another military coup in February, 1963, which put Kassim to death and installed Col. Abdul Salam Arif in his place, produced a less repressive regime. The new president, who published a temporary constitution in 1964, envisaged the restoration of an elected parliament, sought better relations with Syria and Egypt, and signed

agreements with them on a unified policy and coordinated armed forces—all in practice inoperative—as was the Egypt-Syria-Iraq federation planned in 1963, but unrealized. Iraqi politics, which were not calmed by the formation of a single party regime, the Iraqi Arab Socialist Union, were beset by personal rivalries, by interference from the Syrian Baathists, and by the unending war in Kurdistan. President Arif was killed in a helicopter accident in April, 1966 and he was succeeded by his brother, Gen. Abdul Rahman Arif. The latter after 28 months, was expelled by the Baathists in yet another coup on 17 July 1968, and was replaced by Gen. Hassan al-Bakr as president, prime minister and president of the Revolutionary Command Council.

Differences with Iran led to border fighting in 1974-1975 prior to a peace settlement in March. The Iraqi Communist party was recognized in July, 1973 and with the Baath party formed a National Front. Intermittent trouble continued with the Kurds, who rejected an offer of autonomy in March, 1974 when the government insisted on retaining control of the Kirkuk oil reserves, but who subsequently were given an autonomous area. Generally the authoritarian Bakr regime continued its "Arab socialism" course, joining with other Arab governments in opposition to Egyptian-Israeli peace moves (see below), while increased oil production and revenues permitted ambitious social and educational programmes.

RESURGENT NASSERISM

After his failures in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, Nasser made a determined attempt to recover his prestige by adopting an even more militant and radical posture. In a passionate speech on 16 October 1961, he declared that his mistake had been to compromise with "reactionaries". Henceforth, said he, the U.A.R. (he pointedly chose to maintain the title) must maintain its own momentum of revolutionary change and pursue its own independent course in the Arab world at whatever cost. The Cairo radio and press stepped up their attack on the monarchs of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, and the new Syrian regime.

In September 1962, Nasserism achieved its first of three quick-following successes. The aged Imam of Yemen died and within a

few days his son and successor was declared to be deposed by a group of young army officers and the "Yemeni Arab Republic" proclaimed. The new rulers at once requested and got Egyptian armed support, while the young Imam carried on a guerilla battle with the assistance of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The republicans were seated at the United Nations, and, under pressure from the U.N. Secretariat and the U.S.A., Saudi Arabia accepted the *fait accompli*. The second and third successes scored by Nasser's supporters were the *coup d'état* of 8 February and 18 March, 1963, in Iraq and Syria respectively, which brought to power Pan-Arab nationalist regimes of predominantly Baathist membership. Baath party had broken with Nasser in Syria in 1959, but now they had been apparently reconciled with each other. On 17 April the leaders of the three states signed a lengthy document providing for union, this time on a federal basis. Soon, however quarrels developed between Nasser and the two Baath governments, presumably on the extent of the authority to be vested in the president of the Union (who could be only Nasser) and the position of the Baath party in the new state. The scheme for union fizzled out.

NASSER AND PAN-AFRICANISM

While assuming the leadership of the Arab national movement, Egypt never foreswore the fact that she is an African country, and Nasser was determined to make her the permanent centre of Pan-African activity. (Thus the statement of the Khedive Tewfik, 1879-92, that Egypt is not an African but a European country was, in so many words, reversed.) There were a number of reasons for this. One of them was economic; Egypt was anxious to find an outlet for the products of her new industries, and Africa was a ready and natural market for them. Another reason was to drive out from the field Israel, who, as the result of the Arab boycott, had sought a market in Africa, and had built up her influence in many African countries, where she operated a kind of "point four" programme, and helped finance and operate new industries and commercial ventures. Like Egypt, Israel also attracted African university students, whom Nasser wanted to draw away to Cairo. He also wanted to reduce Israelite influence in Ghana which, under Nkrumah, was perhaps the most

militant centre of Pan-Africanism. The choice of Cairo as the venue of the second summit conference of the non-aligned countries of the world, which opened on 5 October 1964, and was attended by 57 chiefs of state and Heads of Government, testified to and consolidated Nasser's position in the Afro-Asian and non-aligned counsels.

CONTINUING ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1956-1967

Arab-Israeli conflict again erupted in war, the third such since 1948, in June, 1967. Though it lasted but six days—a truce being imposed by U.N.—it produced 10,000 to 15,000 deaths and 300,000 new refugees. The conflict between the two nations has been one of the most intractable political problems of modern times, and has defied solution because of the incompatibility of even the minimum claims of the two sides. It is not a solely Middle East parblem. In the context of the East-West Cold War—with the Soviet Union and the United States becoming more deeply involved, politically, militarily and economically in the Persian Gulf area—it is a world problem threatening world peace.

The essential issue, since the creation of the Israeli state in 1948, has remained the same,—who is entitled to live in the land called Palestine and exercise self-determination in it. At one time in an overwhelming majority in Palestine, or even in that part of it which became the Israel state in 1948, the Arabs, numbering some 500,000 to 800,000, men, women, children, had fled to neighbouring territories, their numbers swelling at the end of each unsuccessful war. A small portion of these refugees was gradually incorporated into these territories, but the majority of them, unable or unwilling to assimilate, were lodged in camps—particularly in Jordan, Syria and the Gaza strip—and, with their descendants, created a festering sore. The reverse flow—that of Jewish emigrants from neighbouring Arab countries, where Jewish communities practically ceased to exist, was absorbed by the new state of Israel. The Arabs who chose to remain in Israel were allowed by the latter to enjoy citizenship rights, including sending representatives to the Knesset (parliament). But they felt themselves to be second-class citizens and were under

pressure from Jewish Israelis for their land jobs and looked to their Arab brethren for resistance, or even active opposition to the Jewish state.

It was the plight of the refugees, however, which had become, since the 1948 war, the central part of the Palestinian drama—the continuing enmity between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Their spokesmen, organized in various groups under the aegis of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), demanded the right of return to their Palestinian homeland and the abolition of the Jewish state. While the Arabs were unwilling to make the slightest concessions—their cry of pushing Israel to the sea becoming even louder after their defeats in two successive wars—the victorious Israelis, fortified by U.S.A. support, stood adamant in their resolution to resist the Arabs, if necessary by more wars. The American involvement became deeper in the Middle East with the growing involvement of the Soviet Union on the Arab side, through military, economic and diplomatic help to Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Israel, with its western ties, inevitably came to be identified with the Western bloc. The U.S.A. was left to cultivate the weakest of the Arab states—Jordan and Lebanon—and the most reactionary and unpopular—Saudi Arabia. Under the circumstances, the armed truce between Israel and the Arabs remained undisturbed but unstable.

The Arabs, smarting under their defeat in the two previous wars with the Israelites, were looking forward to the day when they would be strong enough again to attack the enemy. There were, no doubt, some thinking leaders among them, who possibly included Nasser himself, who believed that time would find a peaceful solution of the problem and, in any case, did not want to initiate an aggressive war. Nasser, however, found himself placed in a difficult position in the Arab world. His pre-eminent position as its leader still remained unquestioned but there were hot-heads among the Arabs, specially the Baathist leaders of the Syrian government who, having seized power by a *coup* and wanting to consolidate their hold in it, were openly supporting the infiltration of Palestinian saboteurs into Israel from Syrian territory. Nasser had other difficulties: his finances were in disarray; the Yemeni war was expensive, frustrating and

unpopular, he had quarrelled with the United States which cut off wheat shipments to the UAR—in a way repeating the position of 1955 when Dulles had cancelled the Aswan Dam loan.

In Isreal, there were both hawks and doves, the former represented, among others, by David Ben-Gurion who had controlled Israeli policy since independence, and General Moshe Dayan who had commanded the army during the Sinai campaign in 1956, and the latter by Levi Eshkol who had succeeded Ben-Gurion as premier in 1963. The supporters for immediate war were convinced that a lasting peace with the Arabs was unattainable except by vigorous demonstrations of Israeli military superiority and loudly demanded prompt retribution for the recent Arab incursions. They contended that if peace with the Arabs could at all be established it could be at the price of receiving back the refugees who would ever remain a fifth column and make Israel a polyglot state whereas the *raison d'être* of the establishment of Israel was the ingathering of the "exiles". On 1 June 1967, Eshkol whose differences with Ben-Gurion and the hawks was, after all, largely temperamental rather than any conscious conviction, admitted Dayan into his cabinet as defence minister. This meant that a resumption of hostilities had been decided upon.

THE WAR OF 1967

The war of June, 1967 was what professionals call an "accidental" war. Neither side had wished or expected that the war would happen; yet a series of misjudgments on the Egyptian side led to a crisis from which it was not possible for them to extricate themselves. As we have seen, Nasser was in a difficult position: he could not forgo the position he had built up for himself as the leader of the Arab world, yet in his own camp there were hot-heads whom he had to yield to, if he had to retain this position. The Syrians were wild but Nasser expected to restrain them since every Arab knew that it was not possible to go to war without Egyptian military backing. In 1966, the Soviet Union, equally anxious for peace, advised him to make an alliance with Syria, hoping that this would restrain Damascus. In November, 1966, Nasser concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with Syria, but the Baathist government could not be

restrained. They sent commandos into Israel through Jordan in a deliberate effort to implicate that country. Israel retaliated with a massive raid by land forces against the Jordanian village of el-Sam in November, 1967 and air action against Syrian border positions both before and after that date. As these actions failed to stem the tide of terrorist attacks, Israel warned Syria that it would take effective measures, believing that Nasser who was busy in Yemen would not intervene.

On 13 May 1967, the Russians warned Nasser that large Israeli forces were being concentrated on the Syrian border. In order to dissuade Israel from carrying out its plan of invading Syria with a view to overthrowing the Syrian government, Nasser, on the following day, ordered a mobilization of his armed forces and began marching troops into Sinai and deploying them along Israel's borders in warning to Israel to keep its hands off Syria. To make his warning credible he asked for the removal of the UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) which had been stationed on his side of the border and at the entry of the Gulf of Aqaba (the Strait of Tiran). The U.N. Secretary-General, U. Thant, convinced that this request was fully within the UAR's sovereign rights, immediately complied. U. Thant flew to Cairo for urgent consultations with Nasser, but even before he arrived the UAR government declared the closure of the Strait of Tiran to all shipping to and from Israel. Faced with a *fait accompli*, all that U. Thant was able to accomplish was to win Nasser's secret and rather vague promise not to indulge in any further provocative actions for the time being and to consider a formula whereby Israeli bound cargoes, as distinguished from ships carrying the Israeli flag, would quickly be allowed to pass.

Ten days of diplomatic discussions followed in the Middle Eastern and world capitals and at the U.N. The United States (now busy with the Vietnam war and divided at home) and Britain cast about for a peaceful means of persuading Nasser to open the Strait; the Soviets expressed their support for the UAR; but all three, and France also, cautioned both sides against resorting to war. Nasser declared that the UAR would not strike first, but that should Israel do so, he would take the opportunity to destroy it. Israel declared that it considered the closure of the strait a belligerent act in itself

and that if no one else acted to lift the blockade, it would. On 30 May, King Hussain of Jordan suddenly appeared in Cairo, buried his quarrel with Nasser, and signed a defence pact. Two days later, as we have seen, Eshkol took Dayan into his cabinet as minister of defence, which clearly indicated that Israel had decided to go to war. On 5 June 1967, in three hours of air attack, Israel destroyed half of the Egyptian air force before it could leave the ground; in the afternoon it had destroyed half of the air forces of Jordan and Syria also. Israeli ground forces then invaded Egypt, Jordan and Syria successively, and by the end of the week reached the Suez Canal, the Jordan river and the town of EL Quneitra in southeastern Syria.

It had been one of the most successful blitzkrieg campaigns in history. When the belligerents agreed to a cease-fire, Israel was left in the control of the Gaza Strip, the Suez Canal, the whole of Jordan's territory west of the Jordan, including the old city of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights in Syria. In the Six Day War, from 10,000 to 15,000 Arab soldiers lay dead; Israeli dead totalled 679. The war again proved the tragic failure of the U.N. to do anything to prevent war, to limit the theatre of operations, or to mediate a workable peace. The General Assembly, which was in continuing emergency session, passed a resolution on 4 July (repeated on 14 July) demanding that Israel retract in unilateral take-over of the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, without results. The Security Council which had passed a resolution on 14 June, which Israel had ignored, managed to pass another on 22 November, declaring the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and requesting the Secretary-General to send a representative to the Middle East. Mr. Thant immediately appointed Mr. Gunnar Jarring as the representative and the latter spent several months shuttling between the capitals of Israel, Jordan and Egypt, equally without results.

The question is often asked how 2.3 million Israelis could give such smashing blows to nearly 40 million Arabs. The answer is simple: in war it is not the population that brings about victory; if this were really so India could easily defeat the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. In war it is not population that counts, but the forces that a country could train, equip and mobilize. In this kind of reckoning Arab preponderance over Israel was much more modest. The Arab

armies, moreover, were poorly led both at the national command level and in the field; their strategic planning had been inadequate, and their morale collapsed under stress. However, Nasser took all the blame of the defeat on himself and emphatically announced his resignation—only to be kept in office by hundreds of thousands of his countrymen who filled the streets in support of him. A more pertinent question to ask is, why the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., with their overwhelming strength and influence, did not prevent the war from breaking out, or after the Security Council had passed a resolution in November, did not join hands in bringing about a settlement within its framework. As the foregoing narrative would make it plain the war began because the Soviet Union exercised no effective restraint on Syrian and Egyptian conduct, and the U.S.A. did not raise its little finger to stop Israel and Jordan from pursuing their respective reckless conduct. As regards the failure of the two superpowers to bring about a speedy settlement of the terms of peace, the reasons are that each of them had its axes to grind in the Middle East and cancelled each other, as they had been doing in the U.N. almost always since the foundation of that international body. They continued to view the Middle East as a power vacuum to be filled by them, and all their activities were dictated merely by these interests. According to many competent critics, only a Soviet-American agreement can settle the Middle East conflict.

THE WAR OF 1973-1974

Nasser did not long survive his disgrace and was succeeded in the presidency by Anwar el-Sadat, the Vice-President who declared that he would follow all his policies. He had secured a niche in Egypt's history by wrenching it out of its former political and economic subservience to foreigners and restoring a sense of dignity that had been lost over centuries of foreign rule. But some of his more difficult aims had not been achieved: Arab unity had not been attained and the Middle East continued to remain the playground of superpower rivalry.

Though the 1967 war left the Arab states in disarray and too weak militarily to mount another attack, the Arabs continued to harass Israel. Palestinian terrorists struck across the border, raiding and retreating. Israel retaliated with air strikes against neighbouring

Arab states and with ground skirmishes along its new borders. In 1972, there was an increase in Palestinian guerilla activities, culminating in the indiscriminate slaughter of 28 people at the Lod air port near Tel Aviv and the killing of 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team at Munich on 5 September. Though in the meanwhile, the U.N. was pursuing the will-o-the-wisp of peace in the Middle East, and in 1970, a plan sponsored by the U.S. Secretary of State, William Rogers, seemed to be a feasible one in the direction, Arab impatience again erupted in war.

On 6 October 1973, Egyptian forces launched a major offensive across the Suez Canal, and at the same time Syria struck across the north. The Israelis were caught off guard. After retreating on both fronts, they opened a successful counter-offensive, first against Egypt and then against Syria on 11 November. However, Syria with the support of the U.S.S.R., continued hostilities through the first part of 1974, though Syrian troops were driven from the Golan Heights and pushed back towards Damascus. A cease-fire was not reached on the Syrian-Israeli front until 31 May 1974. Although this fourth war between Israel and the Arabs proved Israel's continued military superiority, the Egyptian forces performed better than previously, and Egypt emerged with definite political gains.

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY

U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, played the major role in arranging the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement along the Suez Canal. In 1974, after a seven-year breach, the United States and Egypt resumed formal diplomatic relations, and U.S. President Richard M. Nixon visited Egypt, promising nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Later, largely through the efforts of Secretary of State Kissinger, Egypt and Israel signed an agreement in 1975, leading to a withdrawal of Israeli forces from a part of the Western Sinai.

In April, 1974, Sadat ended Egypt's reliance on the U.S.S.R. for arms, and in March, 1976, the 1971 treaty of friendship with the U.S.S.R. was cancelled. Meanwhile, relations with Libya deteriorated after 1973, when Sadat rejected President al-Quaddafi's offer to unite the two nations. In November, 1977, attention was again focussed on Egypt's relations with Israel. President Sadat visited Israel at the invitation of Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel and addressed the Knesset, calling for Israel's withdrawal from Arab lands occupied

in the 1967 war. In December, Begin paid a return visit to Egypt. Intermittent negotiations aimed at an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty continued. After meeting with U.S. President Carter at Camp David, Sadat and Begin signed a preliminary peace agreement on 19 September 1979, and the formal peace treaty on 26 March 1979. Major provisions of the treaty called for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, negotiations on self-rule for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and ultimately normal diplomatic negotiations between the two countries.

Arab Reaction to the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty—There was strong resentment in the Arab world against what it regarded as Egypt's defection. A Conference in Baghdad in November, 1978, attended by all members of the Arab League except Egypt, with many represented by heads of state, adopted a resolution branding Sadat's endorsement of the Camp David framework for an agreement as a breach of Arab solidarity. This and other resolutions were intended to discourage Sadat from concluding a separate peace treaty with Israel and to re-affirm that the Arab interest could be safeguarded only in a comprehensive settlement. The strongest voice against the policies of Egypt was that of Iraq, further angered by the fact that its friend, the Soviet Union, had been bypassed in the sixteen months of U.S. mediation of the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation. Saudi Arabia and the mini-states with Jordan, in tow, adopted a softer line in the matter.

Immediately after the ceremony at Washington, the Arab League, at the level of foreign, economic and financial ministers reconvened on 27-31 March 1979 and adopted some punitive measures against Sadat's Egypt. They included the severance of political and diplomatic relations with Egypt; the suspension of its membership in the League, the temporary transfer of the League headquarters from Cairo to Tunis; the promotion of the suspension of Egypt's membership in the third-world Non-aligned Conference, the Islamic Conference Organization and the Organization of African Unity; the stoppage of aid and the sale of oil to Egypt; and the application of an economic boycott against Egyptian firms, institutions and individuals entering into dealings "directly or indirectly" with "the Zionist enemy." Still, the resolutions distinguished between punishing those Egyptians who co-operated with Sadat's power politics and

safeguarding the Arab interest in the welfare of the Egyptian people. Through this loophole, there continued to flow each month an estimated \$ 1500 million in private remittances from Egyptian workers in the Arabian oil states.

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION (PLO)

It is the name of an umbrella organization for several Palestinian Arab guerilla groups that seek to liberate all or part of Palestine from Israeli control. In 1964, the leaders of the Arab states sanctioned the foundation of the PLO. In 1969, after al-Fatah, the largest Palestinian guerilla group, had gained control of the PLO, al-Fatah's leader, Yasir Arafat, was named chairman of the PLO executive committee. The PLO's chief territorial base of operation was in Jordan but in 1970, war broke out between the Syrian-supported PLO and the Jordanian army, and by the following July the PLO's military bases in Jordan were destroyed. Arafat was able to maintain bases in Lebanon where it grew into a state within a state.

After the PLO's defeat in Jordan, the Palestinian guerillas increasingly engaged in international terrorism. When this policy culminated in the murder by Palestinian guerillas of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic games at Munich, al-Fatah denounced plane-hijacking and all acts of terrorism outside Israel. The PLO suffered a serious setback as a result of the 1973-1974 war, in which it took no part. Israel's defeat of Egypt and Syria led to a split in PLO leadership. The more moderate groups within the organization indicated that they would accept a Palestinian state limited to the West Bank of the Jordan river and the Gaza strip, both of which Israel had occupied after the 1967 war. The extremists, later called the "rejectionists" refused to abandon the original goal of the elimination of Israel and its replacement by a non-sectarian, democratic state in which, Muslims, Christians and Jews would be on a basis of equality.

The PLO gained international recognition on 14 October 1974 when the U.N. General Assembly invited it to participate in a debate in November. On 28-30 October, the Arab heads of state agreed at a meeting held in Rabat that the PLO was the "sole, legitimate" representative of the Palestinian people. Arafat addressed the General Assembly on 13 November 1974. The Assembly adopted a resolution

that the Palestinians had the right to self-determination, national independence, and sovereignty "inside Palestine." Israel refused to have any dealings with the PLO. In succeeding years, the PLO was threatened by internal divisions, by terrorist attacks, by an Iraqi-supported organization outside the organization, by the Syrian invasion and occupation of Lebanon in 1976, by the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978, etc. Egypt's defection undermined even the moderates' hopes of establishment of a "sub-state" on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and fearing that an Israeli-Egyptian peace might lead to the return of the West Bank to Jordanian rule, the moderates drew closer to the rejectionists in insisting that there be no negotiated settlement with Israel.

DECLINE OF THE P.L.O.

It would perhaps be no exaggeration to say that at least till recently Yasir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization (better known by the shortend form P.L.O.) were synonymous terms. In 1957 Arafat had formed his organization, al-Fatah, with the determination to liberate Palestine from Jewish control. Round it had grown up seven smaller bodies among which may be mentioned the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), and the Syrian-trained P.S.L.P. General Command. Arafat had knit them into one organisation, the P.L.O. and their leaders were his bosom friends. They all were uncompromising opponents of Israel.

After Nasser, no other leader had won so much prestige and popularity in the Arab world as Arafat had done. He had indeed become the very symbol of Arab unity. He moved about freely from Morocco to Egypt, from Lebanon to South Yemen. He had, as we have seen, won almost international recognition for the P.L.O. When, a few years ago, he had paid a visit to India, he had been given a reception that was due only to the head of an independent state. Now the P.L.O. is in shambles, he himself is without a following worth the name and has possibly no other safe place of refuge than Tunis, the capital of Tunisia. (A few years ago, Habib Bourguiba, the President of Tunisia, had been expelled from the Arab League for having proposed that the Arabs should accept Israel as a fact.)

The decline in Arafat's fortunes is not due to any military reverse sustained by the P.L.O. in wa with their common enemy, the Jews,

but, strange to say, in the revolt of his bosom friends in the Organization. It began when, in year before last, he had been compelled, as the result of Israel's attack on Lebanon, to leave Beirut and proceed towards North Lebanon. Arafat's lieutenants complain that for long a change had come in his way of thinking and that he was anxious to come to a solution of the Palestine problem by diplomatic discussions and compromise with the enemy. The apple of discord had been thrown into the P.L.O. in September, 1982 by President Regan of the U.S.A. who had mooted a peace proposal which was accepted by Arafat as a basis for negotiations but was fiercely opposed by the executive body of the P.L.O. and was ultimately rejected outright. They took special objection to the fact that Arafat had had some discussions with King Hussain of Jordan behind their back. This was the first reverse sustained by Arafat. The climax of opposition came when about two dozen leaders of Arafat's own organisation, namely al-Fata, turned against him and joined hands with other rebels against Arafat's leadership, who received powerful support from Syria which had expelled Arafat from the state in June, 1982.

The consensus among Arafat's opponents is that his real object is to establish his own position in the international field rather than to advance Arab national interest. Besides, say they, he is dictatorial in conducting the affairs of the Palestine National Council, that he has no faith in democratic methods and the principle of joint leadership, that his principal lieutenants are corrupt, etc. They want to dislodge him from his position of primacy and direct the P.L.O. to the fulfilment of its real aim, viz., to wage a relentless struggle against Israel.

The net result is a fierce and sanguinary conflict among the units of the P.L.O., which has been practically reduced to shambles. Arafat is (at the present writing) losing ground, his one sure friend being President Borguiba of Tunisia. We heard of him last as one of the participants at the funeral rites of Indira Gandhi, but that did not make much news. The only gainer of this fratricidal war among the Arabs is, of course, Israel. In their attempt to remove Arafat from the leadership of the P.L.O. (Arafat still claims to be its Chairman), the rebels have reduced the P.L.O. itself to impotence.

THE CYPRUS QUESTION

The post-war controversy with regard to the status of Cyprus is not merely a Middle Eastern issue, and it is rather difficult to place it. Great Britain acquired the island from Turkey in 1878 and turned it into a Crown colony following the Second World War. Cyprus was an important bastion of British naval power in the Mediterranean. The British made the island a healthy and prosperous place but paid little heed to the popular demand for constitutional government under the British Government. Instead, the movement for Enosis, or union with Greece, which was led by the Orthodox Church, flourished and grew. The head of the Orthodox Church—the Archbishop—had traditionally unusual powers, being independent of patriarchal authority, and they were augmented by the fact that in Cyprus, as in the Levant, nationality was a matter of religion. It was not, therefore, surprising that the Archbishop Makarios, as both the political and religious leader of the Cypriotes, should powerfully influence both the Greek Government and Orthodox opinion in Greece.

While Great Britain refused to deal with the nationalists of Cyprus and stepped up her repressive measures in the island, arresting and deporting Archbishop Makarios on 9 March 1956, and opposing—on the familiar ground of domestic jurisdiction—the taking up of the matter in the General Assembly of the U.N., an unseemly wrangle went on between Turkey and Greece, both members of NATO, as to the disposal of the island. Ankara claimed that since Turkey controlled Cyprus at the time of its cession to Great Britain in 1878, the island, if relinquished by the British, should revert to Turkey, not to Greece. On behalf of the Turkish minority which represented 18 per cent of the population and some 40 per cent of the island's economic interests, she opposed the demand of the Cypriotes for self-government and Enosis or union of the island with Greece, which the Greek Government supported.

In terms of Middle Eastern policy Cyprus, meanwhile, had lost much of its importance in British eyes. The island, however, retained its importance as an advanced western base within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance for the containment of the U.S.S.R. As had happened so often in the nineteenth century, Russia exploited.

the situation to underline her solidarity as an orthodox country with the aspirations of the orthodox churches in Cyprus, Greece, and the Middle East. Both Turkey and Greece, as also the pro-western, American-educated Archbishop Makarios, were alive to the danger, and an amicable settlement became possible. Greece gave up her stand in favour of Enosis, and Great Britain her offer of self-government for the island under the British Crown, and an agreement was worked out by the foreign ministers of the two countries, meeting in Zurich, and ratified in London (February, 1959). At the end of February, 1960 Cyprus was to become an independent republic, with a Greek Cypriote as President to be assisted by a Turkish Vice-President with veto powers. The agreement also provided for an elected house of representatives, a ratio of 70%, Greek to 30% Turkish members and for the allocation of posts in the civil service on the same lines. Britain was to retain her sovereign rights over her military bases. Greece and Turkey were to maintain an armed contingent on the island. Any of the three powers could intervene, if need be, to re-establish the *status quo*. Makarios, who signed the agreements only after considerable hesitation, was elected president. Fazil Kutchuk became Vice-President, and the republic came into existence on 16 August 1960.

The agreement, however, broke down almost as soon as the island became independent on due date. Archbishop Makarios found the veto power onerous, and proposed to abolish it through a series of constitutional changes. Communal troubles broke out in December, 1963, and after Turkish and Greek troops on the island clashed, both Turkey and Greece threatened to intervene in force. Civil strife was, however, damped down by the British whose forces on the island managed to keep the warring communities apart. Nevertheless, both the Turkish and Greek Cypriotes adopted a more intransigent attitude than previously, and insisted on the abrogation of the constitution. The former began to clamour for partition and the latter to oppose the idea, holding that democracy meant majority rule.

Turkey and Greece once again threatened to intervene, while the western countries were appalled at the prospect of a war between two NATO allies, which further might bring on Russian intervention in

some form. However, on 4 March 1964, the Security Council intervened, and passed a resolution establishing a U.N. police force for Cyprus for three months. (This was the third time that it had done so, the first occasion being provided by the Suez crisis and the second by the disturbances in Congo.) Within a short time, a U.N. police force arrived in the island, and a U.N. mediator (Mr. Sakari S. Tuioja) addressed himself to the task of finding a constitutional settlement acceptable to all parties. Disturbances, however, continued.

In July, 1964, a conference was held at Geneva between the representatives of Greece and Turkey at which Mr. Dean Acheson, acting as the special envoy of the U.S. President, attended—helping unofficially the official mediator, Mr. Sakari S. Tuioja, in reaching an agreement. The two NATO allies of the U.S.A. accepted a compromise settlement, Turkey agreeing to Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece), Greece ceding some islands to Turkey as compensation, and Turkey retaining a base on Cyprus presumably under NATO auspices. It was the last-mentioned term which galled the Greek Cypriotes, and President Makarios, to whom Enosis was personally disagreeable, since it would reduce his status as an independent President to that of a provincial governor, turned to President Nasser. The latter won him over to the idea of a demilitarized Cyprus, and after returning to the island after a three-day visit to the U.A.R., President Makarios declared: "We don't want Greek bases, Turkish bases, British bases, NATO bases," any bases.

As President Makarios did not want Enosis, but an independent Cyprus with the support of Athens, but primarily through General Grivas who led the movement from 1964 to 1967 and again from 1971 till his death in January, 1974, the underground activities of the EOKA (later known as EOKA'B), were a major cause of turmoil. The Turkish Cypriots, with strong support from Ankara, were also responsible for numerous incidents of violence, including a near-invasion by Turkey in 1964. There were attempts on Makarios's life in 1973 and 1974 but, in contrast, he was elected president with an overwhelming majority of votes for a second five-year term in 1969 and, uncontested, in 1973.

THE 1974 CRISIS

The death of General Grivas, the strong champion of enosis and as such an opponent of Makarios who considered enosis as unrealistic, seemed to secure Makarios's position. But the issue could not be laid aside. On 15 July 1974, the Greek Cypriot national guard, led by Nikos Sampson, a Cypriot newspaper editor and former guerilla leader, launched a coup and declared himself as president. Makarios, first reported to be dead, barely escaped with his life and fled abroad to appeal his case. Five days later, Turkey landed troops at Kyrenia on the northern coast of the island, thrusting inland to Nicosia. Three days later Sampson resigned and was succeeded by Glafkos Clerides, the president of the House of representatives. The foreign ministers of Greece, Turkey and Britain—the guarantors of an independent Cyprus, convened in Geneva. On 30 July, they signed an agreement to consolidate the cease-fire accepted by the combatants on 22 July.

But the fighting continued. The peace conference resumed on 8 August to consider the island's political future, with representatives of both Cypriot communities. Within a week the Conference collapsed, as Greece rejected the excessive Turkish demand that about 35% of Cyprus be placed under Turkish Cyprus administration. A UN Security Council resolution (for the fourth time) called for a cease-fire. In a renewed offensive, Turkey gained control of nearly 40% of Cyprus.

Makarios returned in triumph to Cyprus on 7 December 1974 and assumed the presidency. In mid-January, 1975, Clerides and the Turkish-Cypriote-leader, Vice President Denktash, began a series of talks on the Cyprus problem. On 13 February 1975, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish-held area of Cyprus a separate state. A constitution was drawn up by a constituent assembly and approved by Turkish Cypriots in a referendum on 8 June 1975.

While the United Nations maintained a peace-keeping force on the island, talks among the interested parties continued intermittently in Vienna. On 30 June 1976, Denktash was elected president of "The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus". Meanwhile, Makarios began to show the strain of the long struggle to reclaim Greek terri-

tory. He died in Nikosia on 8 August 1977 of a heart attack. On 8 August 1977, Spyros Kyprianou, president of the House of Representatives was elected to serve the remainder of his term. In the following January he was elected to a full five-year term as president.

IRAN—AND OIL

Iran, "the homeland of the Aryans", stands unique among the nations of the world for its historical and cultural continuity. The story begins about 550 B.C., when the emperors Cyrus and Darius established the first world empire, stretching from Egypt across Asia Minor to the banks of the Indus. Centuries later another Persian empire inflicted humiliating defeats on the legions of Rome, but in the seventh century was conquered by the Muslim Arabs. The Persians countered this political conquest with a cultural conquest of their own, for their poets and writers enriched mediaeval Arab civilization. (The word, Persia, which is used synonymously with Iran to denote the whole country, was originally the name of one of its provinces, Pars—which was taken into the Greek language as Persepolis—or Fars, which has given its name to the language, Farsi or Persian, Indo-European in origin, but written in Arabic script.) They are very proud of their national past and their "civilizing mission". Iran's national heroes are not emperors or warriors but mediaeval poets of whom Omar Khayyam is best known to us.

By contrast, there were few highlights after the Arab conquest. In the sixteenth century the Safavid dynasty restored a strong state, which reached its peak under Shah Abbas I (r. 1587-1629). After Abbas, a prolonged decline set in, which reached its nadir at the close of the eighteenth century under the Qajar dynasty who exploited the masses for their personal benefit, and were at the same time unable to check the rising tide of European imperialism.

Russia created the first imperialist threat in 1828, when she annexed Iranian lands in the Caucasus. Later in the century she acquired valuable economic concessions as also the right to train a unit in the Persian army, significantly called the Cossack Brigade. In the interests of her possession of India, Britain began to vie with

Russia in extracting concessions in Persia, the most valuable of which was the right to exploit the oilfields of Iran. Oil was discovered in Iran in 1908 and the Anglo-Iranian (then Anglo-Perisan) Oil Company was formed in 1909. Meanwhile, under threat of intrusion into the Persian Gulf region by Germany, which menaced the interests of both Russia and Britain, the British concluded an agreement, whereby they divided their spheres of influence in Persia. Persia's sovereignty was on the verge of extinction.

In opposition to the imperialistic designs of the two powerful western nations, a revolutionary movement—in which students, merchants, mullahs took the most active part—grew in strength. In 1905 and 1906 the revolutionaries shut down the Teheran bazaar, the centre of the capital's economic life, and staged a kind of "sit-down" strike in front of the British legation. The reigning Shah agreed to grant a constitution, modelled on the Belgian constitution, which provided for a representative assembly called the Majlis, and somewhat tempered royal autocracy. Both the Shah and Russia did all they could to thwart the national movement. Then came the First World War, which gave Britain and Russia the pretext to occupy the zones they had marked out for themselves with their forces. After the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, they withdrew their forces from Iran, but this did not remove the threat to Persia's independence, because Britain planned to establish a protectorate over the country.

Iran was saved from this fate by a timely *coup d'etat*, effected (1921) by the 43-year-old Col. Riza Khan of the Cossack Brigade, who marched on Teheran at the head of his regiment and forced the formation of a new administration in which he was the driving force. Successively becoming commander-in-chief of the armed forces, minister of war, and prime minister, he had the last ruler of the Qajar dynasty deposed and himself installed as Shah (1926), the first of a new dynasty called the Pahlavi, the name of an early Persian language. Playing, like Atatürk, the vigorous role of a modernizer, Riza Shah drove his people hard and had roads, and railways built, industries established, modern law codes enacted, a national bank created, women freed from the veil and a school system spread over

the land. Unfortunately, he grew more and more autocratic, and terrorized his subjects more than he inspired them. When the Second World War broke out Britain and Russia occupied Iran with their forces on the pretext of meeting in advance a German threat across the Caucasus, and forced his abdication. His son, Mohammed Riza Pahlavi, was installed on the throne.

At the close of the Second World War foreign domination once more threatened Iran, as the Russians showed themselves to be little disposed to withdraw their occupation forces from the country, and made a clandestine attempt to set up a separatist Azerbaijan republic in north-western Iran bordering Soviet territory. The Persians, however, allied themselves with the Western Powers, and by the end of 1949 were once more masters in their own house : under pressure from the U.N. and also from the U.S.A. the Russians withdrew their forces and the Azerbaijan republic collapsed. The Soviet Union, however, left an important instrument for the political penetration of Iran. This was the Tudeh (Masses) Party, a communist-front organization, which made common cause with Iranian nationalism in the next crisis—the oil dispute with Britain.

THE OIL CONTROVERSY

Before withdrawing their forces from Persia, the Russians had extorted a promise from the Persian Government to the effect that they would be given an oil concession, which they had asked for in 1944. The Persian Government, however, could not implement the agreement, as it was rejected by the Majlis; 22 October, 1947. This was followed by a period of tension between the two countries, but the Persians tided over the crisis with U.S. support. The episode, however, heightened xenophobia and national feeling in Persia, which were next turned against all foreign concessions in the country, and, particularly against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in which the British Government was the major shareholder. The Company had a dispute with the Persian Government, which demanded an enhancement of the royalties they paid to them and also offended popular sentiment by refusing to employ the children of the soil in the higher ranks of their service.

A crisis arose in 1944, when "a certain Dr. Moussadeq" (as an English writer puts it) persuaded the Majlis to appoint a special committee with himself as chairman to study the Persian oil industry, and the committee reported in favour of nationalization. Son of a Qajar princess and a Finance Minister, Dr. Moussadeq—the name also spelt as Mossadegh and Mussadiq and meaning "one who has been tested and found worthy" being given to him by then Shah—had a stormy and chequered public career. Serving as governor of a province and then as Finance Minister, he had gone into exile, during which he won a Swiss doctorate of law. On 28 April 1951, Dr. Moussadeq, who had been elected to the Majlis, introduced therein a bill providing *inter alia* for taking possession of the installations of "the late Company", Anglo-Iranian. On 29 April, he risked the dreadful task of becoming Prime Minister for the sole purpose of effecting oil nationalization. On 30 April, the bill was passed, and on 1 May received royal assent. Towards the end of May the Company was served with the notice to quit, and the use of force being out of the question, particularly in view of the attitude of the American Government who were opposed to it—the latter were afraid that the fall of Moussadeq would produce chaos leading to the seizure of power by the Tudeh Party—the Company left the country and Abadan, the great refinery was abandoned. The British Government referred the matter to the Security Council and to the International Court: the former body deferred a debate till the latter had pronounced on it; the Court held it had no competence in the matter (22 July 1952). The U.S. Government, who continued to give aid to Iran, made a belated effort to help the parties reach a new agreement. But the Persian Government rejected the Anglo-American proposals, and on 22 October, Persia broke off diplomatic relations with Britain.

Contrary to western expectations, Iranians were able to keep the complicated oil machinery in partial operation. The Moussadeq regime, however, was brought to the verge of bankruptcy by its inability to find markets for Iran's oil because the big western companies refused to transport and market the oil, and the coalition that had originally supported Dr. Moussadeq, ranging all the way from the Tudeh to clerical conservatives, disintegrated on other issues once oil nationalization was an established fact. The first half

of 1953 saw mounting opposition to Dr. Moussadeq within Iran. On 13 August 1953, the Shah, apprehensive about his own position, which was threatened by certain measures adopted by Dr. Moussadeq, issued a decree dismissing him and naming Fazlollah Zahedi as his successor, and then flew to Baghdad and Rome with Queen Soraya. Moussadeq was overthrown in a military coup (19 August), and the Shah returned to his country three days later. Mossadeq, a lachrymose, frail-bodied, sick, old man, with ulcers all over his body, was arrested, and tried for treason. It was indicative of his wide popular appeal that he was given the comparatively light sentence of a three-year prison term, and compulsory retirement from politics.

In 1954 the dispute between Iran and Britain was ended by a compromise settlement which the United States helped to arrange. Although Iranian oil remained nationalized, the Iranian Government agreed to employ the services of foreign companies, including British Petroleum (the successor to Anglo-Iranian), in exploiting and exporting the oil. With oil revenues again flowing, and with massive American aid, the country gradually returned to more stable conditions. In November 1955, Iran acceded to the Baghdad Pact (renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO for short, in 1959, when Iraq withdrew from it), and in 1957 subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East. In 1959, Iran and the United States concluded a bilateral military agreement officially described as an extension of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which obligates the U.S.A. to go to the aid of countries that become the victims of direct or indirect communist aggression.

"WHITE REVOLUTION" IN IRAN

The tremendous ovation which the Shah received on his return to his capital on 22 August 1953 induced him to think that he had received a personal mandate to direct the destiny of the nation, and he took quick steps to move from the role of a monarch who reigns to that of one who rules. In 1956, the second 7-year plan was put into operation and fared well, with oil revenues again flowing in and additional grants from the United States and elsewhere. In 1957-1958,

the Shah created two political parties—the Milliyun (Nationalist) party led by the premier, and the Mardom (People's) party—the latter intended to form his majesty's "loyal opposition." The 1960 elections were so rigged that they were cancelled and new ones proclaimed for 1961. In September, 1962, the third 7-year plan was put into operation. The land-distribution programme (sale of crown lands to landless farmers at moderate prices payable over 25 years), that had been begun in 1950, was accelerated, and new civil rights were promised for women. In the spring of 1963, conservative reaction to the projected reforms precipitated violence. After the riots had been successfully quelled, new elections—with the National Front refused participation—were held in 1963, all the government's candidates winning easily. In January, 1965, the Shah, after he had appointed a number of premiers in quick succession, installed Amir Abbas Hoveida in that office. He carried the Shah's reform programme and remained in office till almost the end of his rule in 1969.

"INSTANT INDUSTRIALIZATION"

With all opposition crushed and, through the all-too-familiar apparatus of his secret police, known as the SAVAK—setting up a police state, the Shah now felt himself to be able to realize his dream of industrializing and westernizing his country. As early as 1963—a decade before the doubling and redoubling of oil prices by the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) which brought him fabulous wealth—the Shah began a long-term "white revolution" to modernize his still non-industrial kingdom and educate his largely illiterate people. In 1973, with funds vastly and unexpectedly enhanced, he adapted his fifth development plan (ending in March, 1978) to a strategy of "instant modernization". He cultivated visions of transforming Iran into the world's fifth industrial power before the end of the century through a programme of massive commodity and high technology (capital-intensive, not labour intensive) development.

Had the pace of economic development been measured, not forced, Iranians might have filled most of the multiplying semi-skilled jobs, but the Shah threw caution to the winds, and pushed on with

his programme, in ways which a Muhammad-bin-Tughluq, called by early historians in India (unjustly) the Mad Sultan, might have shrunk from. "Instant modernization" led to instant confusion. The sudden massive capital and commodity imports clogged the few harbours and internal transportation system which could not handle such a load. The Shah had to recruit workers from so far away as Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Philippines and South Korea. The measure relieved the strain on the distributive system but the infiltration of thousands of foreigners increased social tension, and yet accelerated the movement of Iran's own population from villages to the towns which churned up the society.

The largest influx of villagers into the cities was in the capital city (Tehran), the population of which, estimated to be 1,50,000 in 1956 (the year of the first census) trebled within 20 years, rising to an estimated 5 million by 1978. The populations of the provincial towns increased at the same or nearly same rates as that of Tehran. The populations of Mashad and Isfahan, trebling in 20 years, rose to 670,000 each and that of Ahwaz, the capital of the country's principal oil-producing province, had the same experience. The populations of Shiraz and Tabriz more than doubled. The new townsmen found employment but no proper housing. The government could neither build houses nor immediately furnish community services, such as water, electricity, paved streets and schools. As slums spread out, the conditions of over-crowding worsened. The semi-urbanized immigrants remained practising Muslims, receiving both spiritual and material solace from the *ulama*, who warmly responded to their appeals, to which the government mostly turned their deaf ear.

MILITARY MODERNIZATION

Meanwhile, after 1972, the Shah had embarked on a policy of modernizing his military establishment and equipment with, as in the case of plan of industrialization, emphasis on high technology. The armed forces which had 126,000 officers and men at the time of his reinstatement in August, 1953, swelled to 285,000 in 1972; the navy more than trebled to 28,000; and the air force grew to 100,000 by 1977. The Shah abandoned the usual practice of slow

promotion, which now came to be associated with favouritism. This produced discontent in the establishment and accounted for the fact that almost as soon as the revolution began the air force defected and not long afterwards there was a total disintegration of the ground forces. The expansion of the armed forces went hand in hand with increasing investment in military hardware. While the expenditure on armaments stood at 1.2 billion between 1945 and 1972, the commitments for the purchase of arms over the next dozen years were over \$ 18 billion worth of weapons. And the Shah would have nothing but the most sophisticated systems in the inventories of the U.S.A. and its West European allies. The latter included F-24 Tomcat fighters with Phoenix air-to-air missiles that gave the fighter-jets 100-mile reach, P-35 Orion antisubmarine patrol planes, Chieftain tanks, Spruance-class destroyers, the AWACS (air-borne warning and control system), a plane which even major allies of the U.S.A. found too expensive. (The Shah was able to do this because President Nixon and his security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, had, in May 1972, taken the decision to sell him virtually any conventional military weapon that he wanted.)

BREWING REVOLUTION

Whom the gods strike they first blind. While the Shah went on with his schemes for making Iran the fifth industrial power in the world—at the same time spending his days in state visits, revelries, celebrations in commemoration of the glorious days of “his” dynasty, etc., etc.—he was blind to growing discontent, the symptoms of which were all but manifest everywhere in the state. Or, if he saw them, he was confident that his SAVAK could ferret out all the malcontents and crush them out of existence. Still the anti-Shah movement grew. In a rapidly expanding society, with a majority of population twenty years old or younger, the universities grew into centres of activism as they came to symbolize the hopes of the future in overcoming the burdens of wide-spread illiteracy. The University of Teheran, in particular, developed into the headquarters of almost every movement against the Shah—religious and secular, Communist and free-enterpriser, pro-Soviet and pro-China, Trotskiyite and Maoist, urban guerilla and civil libertarian. Because of the outspoken condemnation of the police state by students and faculty, the government again

third government of the year which was composed of six other military officers and technicians. Martial law, first imposed on the major cities on 8 September 1978, continued in effect till the end of the imperial regime. As the insurgents gathered strength in defiance of the heavily armed security forces, the Shah's successive measures of compromise, including the appointment of a highly respected opposition leader, Shahpur Bakhtiar as premier heading a new civilian government and the arrest of persons accused of profiteering failed totally to stem the tide of revolution.

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Meanwhile Khomeini who had declared Bakhtiar's appointment as illegal, from his exile in France announced the formation of a "Revolutionary Council" to govern Iran temporarily. On 16 January 1979, the Shah fled from Iran with his family. Khomeini returned from France in triumph on 1 February and four days later named a provisional government with Mahdi Bazargan, an engineer, former professor and respected libertarian, to oversee the affairs of state and bring the country back to normalcy. The position of the government thus established vis-a-vis the Revolutionary Council—widely known as the Komiteh—was not clearly defined, so that misunderstanding, tension and potential conflict were generated. Bazargan called for a popular referendum on the Islamic Republic proposed by Khomeini, appointment of a constituent assembly, and eventual elections for a new parliament and transfer of power from the revolutionary government to a permanent government. On 1 April, concluding a two-day national referendum, Khomeini proclaimed the new Islamic republic. Measures were taken to halt the Westernization and secularization of the country. Those executed in the months that followed included Hoveida who had been premier for thirteen years and was held to be primarily responsible for the carrying into effect of the Shah's offensive policies. Iran severed its tie with Egypt on 30 April, and the government gave its support to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Khomeini, of course, held the supreme power in the state but, according to some critics, he did not display the same skill as administrator and statesman as he had shown in directing the course

of events that had led to the revolution. His problem was not personal. Underlying it was the fact that the Islamic fundamentalist role in the revolution was not exclusive. Many of the groups—the secular politicians of the National Front, communists among the urban guerillas of Tehran and many among the strike organizers in the oil industry, intellectuals, students and women touched by the libertarian principles of the West—all these groups, each for its own reasons had joined in bitter opposition to the Shah's police state. To bring it down, they had accepted the lead of the *ulama*, whose dominant voice was Khomeini. But once the Shah went away, the divergent purposes of the groups composing the revolution became manifest and they did not show the same eagerness, to say the least, to accept the unquestioned leadership of Khomeini and the fundamentalists.

Iran was a land of ethnic minorities—the Kurds, the Baluchis, the Arabs, etc., and if they had joined the revolt against the Shah, it was largely because they expected to get at least local autonomy. Deeply disappointed, the Kurds rose in revolt, demanding autonomy. In August, the Khomeini forces invaded their homeland, drove them into hiding in the mountains and executed many of their leaders. At this writing the Revolution is running its course and it is not possible to predict what developments it may bring. But it undoubtedly was a watershed in Iranian history and is bound to have its repercussions not only in the Middle East but in the world.

IRAQ-IRAN WAR

Iraq and Iran are both Muslim countries and both also belong to the non-aligned group of nations. Yet, like the proverbial serpent and the mongoose, their enmity is proverbial. The Iraqis are Arabs, while the Iranis belong to the Indo-Aryan group of nations. The Iraqis are mainly Sunnis while the Iranis are Shiyas. Saddam Hussain, the President of Iraq believes in the communist ideology of the Baath party, while Iran professes the extremist ideology of the Shariat. In the opinion of Khomeini, Hussain is a heretic and Iraq is a land without religion.

Even these points of difference are, however, not essential ones. The present conflict began in 1975. In that year Iraq had been compelled to sign a humiliating agreement with the then mighty Shah of Iran. According to this, Iran had secured partial control over Iraq's only exit to the seas, viz., the Shat-el-Arab. In return, the Iraqis obtained from the Shah the promise that he would refrain from aiding the rebels of Kurdistan. It may be mentioned that in 1971, the Shah had obtained possession of three small but strategically significant islands belonging to the United Arab Emirate.

In 1980, after the fall of the Shah, Hussain had his day and in September of the year Iraqi forces entered into Iran and war began. Hussain declared that his aims were, firstly to restore Iraqi sovereignty in Shat-el-Arab, secondly to secure 120 square Kilometer of disputed territory at Husain, a border city of Iran, and finally to bring back to the Arabs the three disputed islands of the United Arab Emirate.

Hussain had expected an easy victory in a brief war, but the Iranians have belied his hopes by carrying on a fierce and protracted struggle. Though the fear has been expressed in some quarters (The Sunday Times, for example) that this war may accelerate into a Third World War, the super-powers have held aloof. Soviet Russia has shown no inclination to get mixed up in this war, while America has confined itself to the warning that if oil supply through the Persian gulf is impeded, it will not tolerate it. Meanwhile it has sent its naval forces towards that direction. Besides Syria, a few other states have supported Iraq, but none has shown an inclination actually to take sides. At the recent non-aligned Conference at Delhi, the representatives of both Iraq and Iran were present, but there was no headway in any discussion that might have taken place among any in that highly successful gathering.

NEW ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Strategy and oil, as we have seen above, have been for many years the principal reasons why the Great Powers have been interested in the Middle East. Strategical problems have altered greatly, as we have also seen; but oil remains the lodestar for all nations, great and small, and will remain one of the most important factors in

shaping the foreign policies of the Great Powers and determining their mutual relations.

To Britain the oil of the Middle East is well nigh indispensable, and will continue to be so far at least another 20 years, till new sources of power, viz. atomic energy, can be harnessed to man's peaceful uses, or the new discoveries of oilfields, in the Sahara, etc. can be so utilized as to produce an appreciable impact on the world's oil requirements. Britain's economic earning from her oil holdings in the area is also necessary to her prosperity. Middle East oil is also necessary for the foreseeable future to the welfare and defence of Western Europe. For the U.S.A., who is not so dependent on Middle East sources for her oil needs in war and peace, or her economic prosperity, it is still vital in so far as it is vital to her NATO allies, and also as a source which may stand her in good stead in the not very distant future when her own sources will be running out. The U.S.S.R., who has her own rich sources of oil, would welcome additions to them, and she has positively to gain, if she can deprive the West of Middle East oil, or even can make the latter's access to it insecure.

The discovery of nuclear weapons and manufacture of long-range missiles carrying nuclear warheads have altered the strategy of warfare in the post-war world. But, in all except a nuclear showdown between the two atomic giants, the old strategical factors hold good, and the Middle East remains on that account also, as of old, a centre of stress and strain among Great Powers. Certain changes in the military strength and political importance of some powers who till lately had strong interests in the Middle East, e.g. Britain and France and had established a balance of power on which so long depended the unsteady peace that existed in the area, have not only altered the Middle Eastern political scene but created a power vacuum, which has led to some new developments. For example, French military power has practically vanished from the Middle East and British power, though not to be quite written off, has fast declined and may be said to have been dealt a fatal blow as the result of the last Anglo-French venture in the Suez. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have rushed to the scene.

Apart from oil which is a predominant interest for America, for her own requirements and, much more, for her allies, the compelling reason for American interest in the Middle East after the Second World War was the Cold War—more particularly the determination of the United States to “contain” communist penetration of the area. The threat of this became evident at the end of the Second World War with the attempted Soviet push into Iran and with the pressure that was put by Moscow on Turkey for territorial concessions along the Russo-Turkish frontier and for special rights over the straits. In 1947 President Truman obtained Congressional approval of the Truman Doctrine, which made it possible for America to provide Turkey and Greece with the aid that Britain could no longer afford to supply. The scope of the Truman Doctrine was soon extended to include Iran.

In 1953, soon after the Eisenhower administration came into office, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, decided to include the “Northern Tier” of Middle Eastern States close to Russia in the chain of alliances “containing” the communist bloc. He sought to link NATO, of which Turkey was already a member, with SEATO by sponsoring the Baghdad Pact, initiated by Turkey and Iraq early in 1955. In the course of the year, Britain, Pakistan and Iran also joined it. In 1957, the U.S.A. joined the military committee of the Pact. The Baghdad Pact had widespread repercussions, not at all favourable to American policy.

It deeply offended India, who felt that it would embolden Pakistan, who was already a military ally of and was heavily armed by the U.S.A., to seek a solution of the Kashmir problem by war, and, consequently, forced her to divert money from her sorely-needed development plans to buy arms. This was likely to have the gravest consequences for all Asia, and also for the entire “free world,” as it gravely imperilled India’s rivalry with China to see whether her free methods were better than China’s communist ones. It put Iran in fear of Soviet retaliation, which she felt might come, if not immediately, at some future time. It also alarmed Israel, for it involved the heavy arming of Iraq by the U.S.A., which refused matching arms to herself. Above all it intensified the anti-western policies of some

Arab states, e.g., Egypt, who resented it as a move to create differences among the Arab States, and made them more inclined than before to accept overtures from the communist bloc. Together with the refusal of Dulles to supply dollars for the construction of the Aswan High Dam and arms to strengthen Egyptian forces against Israel, it led to Nasser's arms deal with the Soviet bloc. Efforts to secure Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact touched off the riots of December, 1955, which led to the dismissal of General Glubb and endangered the position of King Hussein. Denounced by Nasser as a traitor to the Arab national cause, the Iraqi premier, Nuri as-Said, had to face an angry mob during a *coup d'etat*, and soon afterwards, he and his king, Faisal II, were murdered. The power in Iraq passed into the hands of the revolutionary, anti-western General Kassim, who formally denounced the Baghdad Pact in 1959. Though the remaining members of the Pact retained their membership, calling it thenceforward as CENTO, American popularity continued to decline in the Arab States. The Suez crisis gave a further blow to western prestige, and the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine, early in 1957, extending all aid, including American troops, to Middle Eastern States threatened by communist aggression, further infuriated Arab nationalists. The Pact, however, clarified the issues in the Middle East for the U.S.A. and her European allies. It proclaimed the dismantling of the British imperial structure in the Middle East, and the shouldering by the U.S.A. of the responsibilities which Britain till then considered to be her own.

The Middle Eastern policy of the U.S.A. secured for the West in the Cold war certain striking successes. It played a major role in sustaining Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Jordan. It failed, however, to win over the revolutionary Arab countries. Both Nasser's Egypt and Kassim's Iraq successfully forged close economic and military links with communist bloc. Nasser, and more precariously Kassim, and his successors were able to walk a kind of political tightrope—accepting communist help and yet maintaining neutralism. That they have repressed local communists and have not gone over to the communist bloc may be considered as limited successes for the U.S.A. Nor has U.S. policy succeeded in strengthening ties between the U.S.A. and her own western allies. The latter resent the poor support given by the U.S.A. to their colonial policies in the region and, on the other

hand, the Arabs mix up the U.S.A., with these policies. The joining of hands, by the U.S.A. with the Soviet in checkmating England and France in their Suez venture loosened the western alliances, without having any appreciable impact on Arab leaders, who indeed credit the Soviet with deliverance that it brought to Egypt. Above all, American sympathy and support for Israel, the common enemy of all Arab States, has been a standing handicap to the growth of Arab good feeling towards the United States. Arab leaders assert that Jewish leaders and Jewish voters shape American policy, and, accordingly, view every American move for reconciliation with suspicion.

Western losses have been Russia's gains in the Middle East. In the past Russian policy had pursued a negative programme aimed at destroying western influence. The Russians had allied themselves with whatever forces were struggling against the West: Syrian and Lebanese nationalism in 1945, Zionism in 1947-49, and Egypt and Syria in 1955-56. The Suez defeat of Britain and France in 1956 allowed the Soviet to break through the barrier which for centuries had held back the expansion of Russian influence in the Middle East. Now Russia has, like the West before her, positive stakes to defend in countries like Egypt and Iraq and her position in the area has simultaneously become more formidable and more complex. At present, the U.S.S.R. frankly supports the Arabs against Israel. This, plus arms aid, limited economic help, military and technical assistance, cultural missions, effective propaganda, etc. has helped immensely in spreading communist influence in the Middle East. The short-time aims of Arab nationalism coincide with the short-term aims of the U.S.S.R.

The shift in U.S.S.R. policy began with the successors of Stalin. They withdrew their territorial claims against Turkey. A common hatred of the Baghdad Pact, 1955, brought U.S.S.R. closer to Egypt and Syria. The arms deals of late September 1955 between the two Arab lands and the Soviet bloc terminated the western near-monopoly in the supply of modern weapons to the Middle Eastern countries. What is more important, by this act, the U.S.S.R. became aligned to the most dynamic leaders in the Arab lands, the leaders of Egypt and Syria. The latter became now much more vocal than ever before in

their advocacy of "positive neutralism". They seemed determined to exploit East-West differences for their own ends. They became also the most vociferous to perform more daring acts of defiance of the West—culminating in the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in July, 1956. Under Nasser's leadership, Arab nationalists made a concerted attack on "the imperialist rascals" everywhere—in Algeria, on the French, on the Baghdad Pact, and on the British, in the Persian Gulf zone, and on the southern littoral of the Arabian Peninsula. They made unceasing propaganda against western oil concessions, on American bilateral military trade agreement with Iraq and other Baghdad Pact countries, on American arrangements for bases with Morocco, Libya and Saudi Arabia.

The fact that the Middle East is a powderkeg is not, however, due simply to the intrusion of Cold War politics into policies of the Arab States ; to ascribe all the ills from which these lands suffer to the interests which the western nations have in their oil or in the strategical factors based on their geography which they must reckon with is, indeed, an over-simplification of a vast problem. The Middle East is not only a battle-ground of East and West, of Communism and anti-Communism, it is one between the emotional favour of nationalism and the hard reality of political disunity and separativeness, between the rising forces of liberalism and freedom and the old order of feudalism, parochialism, and obscurantism. In recent times, Arab nationalism, symbolised in the personality of Abdel Gamal Nasser, and with the political unity of the Arab world as its prime objective, appeared as a vast and strong tide which seemed destined to sweep all obstacles before it, even though it receded and lay still from time to time. It is already one of the most powerful factors in the politics of the Middle East and a new dimension in world politics. It is a truism, but one worth restating that the Arabs (and the Africans) are now subjects, not objects, in world affairs.

There is, however, a lot of pessimistic thinking on the subject of the Arab national movement, and the difficulties it has to encounter are without doubt gigantic. Besides the factors of turmoil detailed above, (1) East versus West, (2) West versus West, (3) Arab versus Arab, and (4) Israel, there are natural and economic forces that

stand in the way of progress. Nature herself seems to frown on the idea of Arab unity, since most of the Arab land is desert, compelling the people to be concentrated in widely separated watered areas like the Nile Valley or the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and is poor in resources (aside from oil), which seriously limits the possibilities of industrial development, while the adjacent seas are dominated by foreign navies. Even the present international trade pattern is not developing in a direction which would be conducive to unity. It now trades more beyond its borders than among its component units. In the face of all difficulties, however, the Arab tide has been moving high, and the writing on the wall is clear.

WORLD ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

The World Islamic Conference first met in 1870, the objects of the sponsors being (1) to compose as far as possible the disputes that existed among the Islamic countries, (2) to enhance cooperation among them and, above all, (3) to infuse into the Muslims who belonged to diverse races and nationalities and professed widely varying ways of life and numbered about eighty crores a sense of unity. A session of this august body was recently held in Casablanca in Morocco. The Conference was planned to last four days, but ended in three days. Besides King Hussain, other important heads of states, such as Col. Gaddafi, Saddam Hussain, and Muhammad Buhari, the new military administrator of Nigeria, did not attend the meeting.

In a ten-thousand-word declaration issued at the termination of the Conference, it denounced the role which was being played in the politics of the Middle East by America and Israel, Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the rejection by Iran of the peace proposal mooted at the meeting. Indeed, not only did old enemies like Iran and Iraq speak in the same language, friends of long standing failed to do so. For instance, in his inaugural address, King Fuhad rejected outright the proposal which King Hussain of Jordan had made for the establishment of a Palestinian homeland for the Arabs. Yasir Arafat, though present at the Conference, did not open his lips at all. As a matter of fact, after the genocide at Jordan in 1970, none in the Conference had the least desire to think of such an idea.

The only achievement of the Conference was their lifting the ban on Egypt (see above—*Arab Reaction to the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty*) and to ask Egypt to participate in the Conference. Egypt warmly welcomed the decision and declared that it was a step in the direction of restoration of peace in West Asia. The sorry failure of the Conference to restore peace between Iraq and Iran, however, weighed heavily on the minds of the leaders of the Conference which, on account of this, did not continue after the third day. Summing up the results of the Conference, it may be said that though impassioned speeches were delivered in it and there was much idle talk on important matters like economic co-operation and trade among the Islamic states, the Conference emitted more smoke than fire.

CHAPTER XXIX

LATIN AMERICA IN TRANSITION

EVOLUTION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN STATES

THE term Latin America covers the twenty continental, isthmian and insular republics that occupy the huge region stretching between the United States-Mexican border and the Gulf of Mexico in the north and Drake Passage and the outer fringes of the Antarctic in the south. Owing their independence to the same cause and methods as those which gave the North American colonies of Great Britain their freedom, viz., revolutionary nationalism and successful revolt against the mother country, these ex-colonies of Spain and Portugal have pursued a very different political course. While the exigencies of their war of independence against Great Britain compelled the colonists to form themselves into the United States of America, the spirit of national separativeness which induced the Latin American colonists to break away from the mother country served after each had won its independence to keep it away from the others. Today the twenty nations together cover an immense area (something like 8,000,000 square miles), are inhabited by approximately 192 million people who, since the Second World War, are multiplying at an unprecedented rate, and have vast and valuable natural resources. Still, they find themselves unable to free themselves from their dependence on the Colossus of the North for their defence, economic assistance, private investment capital, "know-how" and finished goods.

One reason for this disparity between the U.S.A. and Latin America is the difference of cultural heritage with which each started on its new career, though it far from explains it fully. The Latin Americans, like the inhabitants of the U.S.A., were essentially European, though their cultural ties were with a different part of Europe. But in one respect they were less European than the United States; that was in blood. While the vast majority of the inhabitants of the U.S.A. (and Canada) come from European stocks, the Latin

Americans have mostly either Red Indian or Negro blood in their veins. The Latins, for whatever reason, have not the same intensity of race or colour prejudice as the Anglo-Saxons: there never was in Latin America that wholesale extermination of Indians which characterized "Anglo-Saxon" colonization of North America. The broad result was that on the West Indies and along the coasts of the Caribbean, Negro blood predominated, while in Mexico, Central America and a large part of South America, most of the "common people" were Indians or cross-breeds. The latter have been called by various names—mulattos, mestizos and sambos. A mulatto is the offspring of a white and a black; a mestizo is a cross between a white and a native American Indian; a sambo is a cross between a native Indian and an imported African, or is a descendant of one. There are also half-castes, quadroons and octroons. A quadroon is one who had a black grand-parent and an octroon is the descendant of a quadroon and octroon whose parents have not remarried black. Some of the octroon girls are considered to be among the most beautiful women in the world. (M. Follick, *The Twelve Republics*).

Through the trials and tribulations of the years of national struggle, the Portuguese-speaking people of South America managed to hold together and finally to emerge as the federal State of Brazil. But the Spanish-speaking colonies began their career as eight distinct nations—Mexico, Central America, Colombo, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile—and within a century, they numbered eighteen. In 1828 Uruguay revolted against Argentina, and became independent in 1830. From Colombia seceded Venezuela in 1829, Ecuador in 1830, and Panama, much later, in 1903. In the 1840's Central America broke up into the five separate republics of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, and Costa Rica, while San Domingo became a state distinct from Haiti. Cuba, after repeated revolts and interventions by the United States, gained general recognition as an independent republic in 1899. Each of these eighteen Spanish republics, thus established, as also the Portuguese republic of Brazil, and the French Negro republic of Haiti, had its distinct nationality, and jealously cherished it.

By far the largest (area 3,288,050 square miles, which is actually a little larger than that of the United States without Alaska—3,022,387 square miles) and in many ways the most important State of Latin

America is Brazil. She is the world's largest coffee-growing country, furnishes nearly three-fourths of mankind's coffee requirements, and exports also large amounts of timber and minerals. Of the Spanish-American States, the largest, as also in many ways, the most important were Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Argentina became a great meat-growing country and her metropolis, Buenos Aires, came to be known as one of the most beautiful and cultured centres of the world. In military and naval strength, Argentina ranked with her neighbours, Brazil and Chile, forming with them the so-called group of A-B-C-powers. By war with Bolivia and Peru in 1879-83. Chile acquired the northern province of Tacna and Arica, with their rich nitrate deposits. Mexico, which contains the largest population among the States of Latin America, was an agricultural land, in which a handful of land owners, who were of Spanish descent, exploited a servile peasantry, who were largely Indian in blood and formed the bulk of the population. She succeeded in the 1850's and 1860's in frustrating Napoleon III's design of putting Emperor Maximilian on the throne. But the hero of the Mexican national resistance, Benito Juarez, who was a full-blooded Indian, showed little inclination, after the victory against the foreigner had been won, to allay the miseries of his fellow-Indians. He even turned out to be a tyrant, and his successor, Porfirio Diaz, who had a long rule which lasted from 1877 to 1911, followed in his foot-steps.

YANKEE IMPERIALISM AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY

Americans do not generally deny that all through their history there have been some groups of ambitious men who have advocated an imperialist expansion of America's territory, and that in the methods by which this was accomplished, particularly in the case of the Mexican War, there was much that was morally indefensible. It is also true that the pursuit of imperialistic policies has met within America an opposition that has been rarely encountered in many other countries. The charge of imperialism has been levelled against the American Government specially in the context of their relations with the Caribbean area, the delay in granting independence to the Philippines, the method pursued in the annexation of Hawaii, and their policies, generally covered by the so-called Monroe Doctrine, in regard to the countries of Latin America.

Conflicting claims are made as to the purposes for which United States control of neighbouring countries has been established. On the one hand, the purposes of the United States were declared to be to maintain state governments and make economic development possible, largely for the sake of the Latin American peoples themselves, unwelcome as such measures were to the latter, and to provide protection for the lives and property of foreigners which European Governments would otherwise take steps to provide. By others, the purpose of the control was believed to be the economic advantage of small groups of citizens of the United States, which informed students of the Caribbean situation have dubbed "dollar diplomacy". Protection of the Panama Canal was put forward as one of the major grounds on which the U.S.A. has insisted on the policies she has followed in the Caribbean area.

Some of the principal ways in which U.S. imperialist activities and dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean area were carried on are given below : (1) When Cuba, over which a protectorate was secured as a result of the Spanish-American war, was granted political independence, a considerable degree of control was kept under the provisions of the Platt Amendment. This "amendment" was incorporated in the Cuban constitution and in a permanent treaty with the United States. This granted to the U.S.A. the right to intervene to preserve Cuban independence, and to maintain a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. In addition, Cuba was prohibited from incurring any debts which her current resources could not meet and also compelled to cede to the U.S.A. land for coaling and naval stations. (2) In Haiti, San Domingo and Nicaragua, United States control was secured through actual military occupation by marines, whose officers went so far as to bring about the dissolution of a national assembly which refused to grant certain investment privileges desired by foreign citizens. (3) In other cases threats of force, such as the mere presence of warships in nearby waters, were enough to secure the carrying out of policies favoured by the United States. (4) In still others, notably in the case of Mexico refusal of recognition of governments whose policies were not in accord with those of the United States served the same purpose. (5) Several countries were subjected to the indirect control of the United States under the terms of loans made in the U.S.A. If a country i

which the government was subject to frequent change desired to negotiate a loan, it was necessary for it to grant the interests making the loan direct control of some part of its financial assets. For one of the less well-established Latin American countries, therefore, to negotiate a loan in a European country was likely to lead to a situation which under the Monroe Doctrine the U.S. Government would not tolerate. The U.S. Government consequently encouraged loans by American banks, and political and financial interests were led into close co-operation in maintaining security and encouraging policies in conformity with those of the United States. Several Latin American countries employed citizens of the United States as financial advisers. Direct governmental involvement in bonds, financial and otherwise, contracted between a Latin American Government and private interests was carried to such an extent that in a dispute between Salvador and a banking firm, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States was to be under certain circumstances referred to as arbitrator.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Latin American Governments contended that the American Government distorted the Monroe Doctrine to suit its own interests. The following were some of the typical ways in which this was alleged to be done : (1) In cases of internal political strife or revolution in Latin American countries the American Government assumed the right (as when they intervened in Nicaragua for the first time in 1912) to declare which was the constitutional party to be supported by the military and naval power of the United States. (2) When the conclusion was reached that a Latin American country was not able to maintain an independent and competent government to keep order and discharge its international obligations, the U.S.A. assumed the right (as in the case of her intervention in Haiti in 1915) to take political and economic control of such country. (3) The United States assumed the right to intervene in the political government and economic administration of a debtor nation (as for example, San Domingo in 1910) to enforce and secure the cancellation of public debts. (4) The United States Government assumed the right, as in the controversy with Nicaragua and Mexico, to intervene in the

internal affairs of the Latin American States when, in its opinion, political or economic ideas might endanger the private interests of American citizens.

The official position of the United States Government with regard to the Monroe Doctrine, of course, was that it was a policy of self-defence, not of aggression, that it did not infringe upon the sovereignty of other American States and did not establish a "protectorate" over them. In the centennial year of the Monroe Doctrine, 1923, Mr. Hughes, Secretary of State, defined the Monroe Doctrine in the following terms: "Properly understood, it is opposed (1) to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American States under any guise, and (2) to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this sphere by any non-American power." Mr. Hughes, however, firmly declared that, as it was "distinctively the policy of the United States, the United States reserves to itself its definition, interpretation and application". There, undoubtedly, was the rub, and neither Latin American Governments nor the outside world accepted such a benevolent interpretation of American policy under the cover of the Monroe Doctrine as Mr. Hughes offered.

PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT'S GOOD NEIGHBOUR POLICY

In spite of his fixed attitude to the Monroe Doctrine, Mr. Hughes tried to convince the Latin American countries that the United States had no ulterior motives in respect to their freedom and independence, and no intention of applying superior power to their disadvantage. His friendly approach led to goodwill measures that were initiated during the Hoover administration, and ultimately to the Good Neighbour Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Under his immediate successor, Frank B. Kellogg, however, there was a retreat from his more beneficent policy, and, at the insistence of President Coolidge, there was renewed intervention in the internal affairs of a number of Latin American States. The most glaring of such cases of intervention took place in Nicaragua, where the United States landed some five thousand troops in 1927 to maintain order and protect American interests. However, being widely accused of waging a "private war"

Coolidge was compelled to send Henry L. Stimson, as his personal representative, to try to bring about an amicable settlement. This Stimson succeeded in doing. In Mexico, too, where American business interests called for intervention the issues in dispute were resolved through the skillful diplomacy of Ambassador Dwight Morrow.

Soon after his election in 1928, President Hoover embarked upon a goodwill tour of Latin America. Both during this tour and on subsequent occasions, he repeatedly declared it to be American policy never to interfere in any other country's internal affairs, repudiated the idea of using force to sustain financial contracts, and stated that "we must clothe faith and idealism with action". A further assertion of these principles was contained in a memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, drawn up by Under-Secretary of State, J. Reuben Clark, in 1930 which finally freed this policy from the incubus of the Roosevelt Corollary and did much to relieve Latin American's fears of further interference by the United States. (In 1904 President Roosevelt had stated that the Monroe Doctrine may force "the U.S.A., however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power".)

The new policy was redefined and implemented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In his inaugural address he declared that he "would dedicate the nation to the policy of the good neighbour". The United States withdrew in 1932 the American marines that had been stationed in Haiti ever since the intervention of Wilsonian days, and early the next year recalled the last troops from Nicaragua. A more liberal recognition policy as applied to Central America was inaugurated with the recognition of a *de facto* government in El Salvador. The Platt Amendment to the United States and Cuban treaty of 1903 was abrogated, and that treaty itself virtually set aside except for the United States maintenance of a naval base at Guantanamo. In 1906, likewise, the United States relinquished the intervention rights accorded her by the treaty of 1903 with Panama. Friendly relations were maintained with Nicaragua and in 1938 an agreement settling compensation claims of United States citizens for land taken from them since 1927 was signed with Mexico. The effect of these conciliatory measures was reflected in a resolution passed at the Eighth Pan-American Conference at Lima in 1938.

declaring the solidarity of America. "Thus twenty-one nations, not the United States alone, became the interpreters of the Monroe Doctrine".

LATIN AMERICA IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The "Declaration of Lima" was not followed by the setting up of any machinery to implement it, such as a Pan-American League or court, much to the disappointment of those in Latin America who had hoped for a new era of fruitful co-operation with the Colossus of the North. When the Second World War broke out, however, the Foreign Ministers of the 21 American republics met together for the first time (September, 1939) at Panama, and after listening to Sumner Welles's assertion that they could not permit their security, etc., to be "jeopardized by belligerent activities in close proximity to the shores of the New World" declared the setting up of a "neutrality zone"—a fantastic and illegal proposition. They met again next year, and confirmed a "hands off" resolution which the American Congress had meanwhile passed warning Berlin and Rome about the implications of the Monroe Doctrine. In January, 1942, the Foreign Ministers, meeting at Rio de Janeiro, agreed jointly to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Axis Powers. All complied, except Argentina. On 4 June 1943, there was a *coup d'etat* in Argentina, and effective power was seized by Juan B. Peron. The new government was anti-U.S. and quasi-fascist, as was the dictatorship of Vargas in Brazil. But Rio co-operated with Washington, while Buenos Aires often did not.

On 21 February 1945, the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace opened in Mexico City. Argentina was not invited, though requested to sign the final agreement: the Act of Chapultepec of 3 March. This instrument reiterated the principles of non-recognition, consultation, solidarity against external aggression, etc. It also recommended the conclusion of a general treaty by which any threats or any acts of aggression against any American Republic should be met by collective sanctions. The developing friction in the relations between Argentina and the United States for a time blocked further action to give this policy permanent form. In the summer of 1947, however, twenty-one nations meeting at Rio de Janeiro signed a treaty that not only reaffirmed the position they had taken in the

Act of Chapultepec but definitely pledged themselves in the event of any attack to active co-operation in defence of their common safety. A year later, to carry out the purposes of the treaty, there was formally set up the Organization of the American States (O.A.S.).

LATIN AMERICA AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR—NEW TRENDS

The Rio Pact rang down the curtain on Yankee imperialism and Dollar Diplomacy, and policies like these which had so far prevented the growth of any real American solidarity. By abandoning these instruments of domination, the U.S.A. gained both in prestige and influence in the Latin American countries. In spite of the "verbal rituals", however, the power-relation did not alter. "The Pan-American State System remained as before, a constellation of small planets round a huge sun." (Schuman). "The United States was too strong, its power too overshadowing, its economic interests too pervasive, for the republics of Latin America ever to feel completely safe from possible exploitation or interference. There was always the shadow of imperialism." (Foster Rhea Dulles, *America's Rise to World Power, 1898-1954*).

Far more important than this lingering problem, however, was the impact of mighty political and economic forces which, in spite of its comparative isolation, Latin America had to face after the Second World War. Events of intense revolutionary activity crowded the 1950's—the social revolution in Bolivia in 1952, the ouster of dictatorships in Argentina, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela, and the continuing Cuban revolution of 1959. These episodes were but dramatic milestones in a larger historical process which was certain to go on for years until Latin America could achieve an equilibrium between the demands of its rapidly expanding populations and the availability of resources. With varying degrees of urgency in the individual republics, Latin America's basic problem was now posed in these terms. Political upheavals, rabid nationalism, economic crisis, and social pressures and explosions, unrelated to each other as they often seem, all form part of this process of revolutionary change from an old order to a new, and thus, to the emergence of a new society.

In the 1950's, four of Latin America's traditional dictatorships came to an end and democratic elections were held in the freshly liberated countries, viz., Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. For all practical purposes, Cuba became a political dictatorship under the one-man rule of Fidel Castro. Political liberties were being sacrificed for social revolution. Other dictatorships remained only in the Dominican Republic and in Paraguay, with nondescript regimes inclined towards dictatorship still ruling Haiti and Nicaragua. But with the approach and then the advent of the 1960's, Latin America appeared to be entering still another phase—that of powerful ferment which threatened to produce extremist social revolutionary movements. Warning signals of this ferment had already appeared during the 1950's—in Bolivia; in Guatemala, where a pro-communist regime had suddenly emerged; in British Guiana, where an equally pro-communist government under Cheddi B. Jagan won the victory at the polls in 1953 and again in 1957; and in Cuba, where the climax came with the victorious revolution of Fidel Castro. Even in the republics where democracy had acquired a certain tradition, unresolved social questions were clamouring for attention and action. Thus in Venezuela, the moderate government of President Romulo Betancourt was under powerful pressure from left-wing and nationalistic elements to follow the radical path of Fidel Castro, and to seize privately owned land and nationalize the vast oil industry.

In Argentina, President Arturo Frondizi summoned foreign capital to develop the country's petroleum and other resources. He battled *peronista* (the former President Peron's vague demagoguery-rich doctrine of *justicialismo* or social justice, which had frozen into dictatorship) and communist forces to restore balance and health to the Argentine economy. In Peru, a tremendous explosive potential developed as thousands of Indians and *Cholos* (people of mixed Indian and white blood) were driven by droughts and hunger from their Andean huts into the towns. In neighbouring Ecuador it was the urban proletariat on the relatively developed Pacific coast which was in a state of ferment that threatened the democratic stability that the country had sought since 1948. Even in Brazil, one of the most developed among the Latin American countries, social unrest and ultranationalistic influences grew in response to chronic economic crisis aggravated by inflation and the political struggles of the

approaching presidential campaign. Thus the central issue of Latin America on the threshold of the new decade was whether its social problems could be resolved within democratic systems and by democratic, gradual means, or, whether gripped by the people's mounting impatience, the various governments would turn for answers to extremism like that displayed by Castro's regime.

The years 1962 to 1966 witnessed a new wave of military coups, followed by unstable restorations of constitutional regime, which engulfed eight countries. Once again Argentina led the way. By attempting to incorporate the Peronist masses into the nation's political life, President Arturo Frondizi offended the military and was ousted. In July, 1963 the Peronists cast blank ballots, and Dr. Arturo Illia of the Popular Radicals was elected to the Presidency with only 25 per cent of the votes. He also was dislodged by the military as he announced his intention to hold free elections (June, 1966). Lt. General Juan Carlos Onganía was next set up as President by the military. He declared his resolve to stay in power for a decade to clean up the alleged "mess" and get the country moving again. All political parties were dissolved, and the President enjoyed dictatorial powers in Argentina. In mid-winter 1962, the Peruvian military seized power when electoral results seemed to be favouring American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA)—a social democratic party—candidate for the Presidency. In a seven-month period in 1963, erratic, reactionary Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes in Guatemala, compulsive alcoholic Carlos Julio Arosemena in Ecuador, progressive liberal Ramon Villeda Morales in Honduras and Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic were ousted by military coups. In April, 1964 the vocally leftist regime of João Goulart in Brazil was swept from power by the armed forces, supported by a majority of state governors. Bolivia's floundering national revolutionary regime, headed by Victor Paz Estenssoro, was toppled in power after more than 12 years in power.

While thus Latin American politics in the large continued to follow the old ruts, some sort of a return to constitutionalism occurred during 1965 and 1966 in a few countries where the military had seized powers. In Argentina and Peru democratically elected civilian regimes took office within little more than a year after the

coups. In the other six countries progress in the direction took longer time and was rather dubious. It was by mid-1966 only that the provisional regime in Honduras gave way to a "constitutional" successor, and the change was accomplished through indirect election and rigging to ensure that the leader of the *golpe* (coup) emerged the winner. The inaugurations on 1 July 1966 of civilian presidents Julio Mendez Montenegro in Guatemala and Joaquin Balaguer in the Dominican Republic were more than offset by the Argentine military's ouster of President Arturo Illia a few days earlier. Altogether, violence still remained a significant factor of political life in much of Latin America. In 1950-1960, it overthrew governments in 14 countries and in most cases unscheduled presidential changes took place two or three times. In two other countries, Nicaragua and Paraguay, dictators remained entrenched in power in the midst of frequent popular uprisings. In recent years leftist guerilla bands and terrorist organizations have cropped up in Venezuela, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Argentina, and sporadic risings have taken place. Exile invasions have repeatedly occurred in Paraguay and Haiti, where terror is a mainstay of the dictators. For the masses everywhere life continued to be on the old ruts of destitution and despair, and the widening gap between their present condition and the higher level of living which they saw the upper elite of society as enjoying and which they felt as possible for them produced a climate of frustration and alienation.

THE POPULATION EXPLOSION

A basic cause of Latin America's social problem is the tremendous growth of population in Latin America, stimulated by the advances in health and sanitation and such improvements in living standards as have occurred there since 1945. Latin America, which was once thought to be under-populated, has suddenly become over-populated. The present population is estimated to be 350 million, the annual rate of increase being 2.7 per cent. This, read with the fact that the rise of income per inhabitant in the country has been a bare 1 per cent, while the per capita income is substantially less than it was before the Second World War, gives the clue to the unrest which prevails at present in Latin America.

For the present, over-population is still confined to some traditionally colonized or civilized areas, along the coastal strips. The poverty-stricken inhabitants of these regions naturally seek to break out from this confinement, being hungry both for vital space and vital resources ; but the trouble is that resources are needed to find new resources. Brazil is trying to solve this problem by building a new capital, Brasilia, though at an enormous cost, at the heart of her immense territory. Brasilia has become already a lodestar which is drawing populations from the overpopulated South Atlantic coastline to the country's neglected interior. But few, if any, other Latin American countries can marshal today the resources for a giant breakthrough on the Brazilian model. Peru is constructing with help from international institutions some good roads through its jungles and mountains. Other efforts are under way elsewhere. Progress, however, lags far behind the needs, and so the story of Latin America continues to be that of a race between the growing population and available resources.

ECONOMIC HANDICAPS

Economically, Latin America remains divided into almost as many separate compartments as there are republics. Many of them produce the same commodities, vying with each other to place them on the world market, and depend on imports from outside. Several of the republics have, with the help of foreign capital, taken in hand heavy industry projects, but have so far neglected to avoid duplication of such projects, which they must do if benefits from each investment are to accrue to as many of the republics as possible. The trend towards duplication has been in evidence specially in the steel industry, the badge of achievement of a developing nation. In agriculture too there is a lot of duplication, and even of vying of several countries with each other in producing the same articles. Thus coffee is produced by 15 Latin American countries, and cane sugar by ten of them. Four of the countries are major cotton producers. Again, the economies of some of the countries are geared principally to one or two commodities—copper constitutes 67 per cent of Chile's exports ; coffee 77 per cent of Colombia's ; and petroleum 93 per cent of Venezuela's. These factors lead first to over production—in

1959, Brazil, the world's largest coffee-producer, had a record crop that was double of its sales ; they bring down prices in the world market, which specially affect the economies of the single-product countries, e.g., Cuba, the world's largest producer of cane-sugar, which accounts for about one-third of the national income and 75 per cent of total exports. The amount of sugar exported to the United States is in accordance with a quota established by the Washington Government, and, even before Castro's quarrel with the Washington Government, was in a precarious position, since, despite reaffirmation of Latin American solidarity, the other sugar-growing republics fought hard for higher percentages of the United States import quota. The price fluctuations affect the income of the republic, on which depends domestic development, for their exports fetch them the dollars and other foreign currencies needed for the importation of industrial and other equipment.

SOVIET ECONOMIC IMPACT

Much has been heard recently—specially since the Washington-Cuba breakdown of relations—of communist infiltration in South America, specially in the domain of economy. In a general way there is much in conditions in Latin America that foster the communist spirit—pitiful annual income for large families, illiteracy, under-nourishment, squalid housing, slums, and, above all, increasing contrasts of the haves and the haves-nots. But actual Soviet economic impact or infiltration has not amounted to much. Russia did sign a three-year agreement with Brazil late in 1959, providing for a two-year exchange of goods totalling only \$208 million. She bought much of Uruguay's wool, some Argentine meat, and, along with China, substantial quantities of Cuban sugar. In February, 1960 Mikoyan signed an agreement with Castro to buy 5 million tons of sugar over a 5 year period and to give Cuba \$1000 million in credits over a 12 year period. Russia agreed to pay the world price for sugar. Cuba's dependence on Moscow for the marketing of her products grew with the progress of her quarrel with Washington. In July, 1960, the latter drastically cut import quotas of Cuba's principal crop, sugar, and stopped purchasing it altogether in January, 1961, when it broke off diplomatic relations with Castro's Government.

In general, Latin America has to rely on outside aid of monumental proportions, which can only come from the U.S.A. to see its dreams of speedy development come true. At an economic conference in Buenos Aires in May, 1959 Castro had proposed that the U.S.A. should turn over \$32 billion for the development of the region. The U.S.A. immediately made it clear that no such resources existed, and that a Marshall Plan for Latin America was not possible. Private investments have, however, continued to mount up in many Latin American countries despite nationalistic trends and expropriation threats. Even the Soviet Union has given some assistance in building up a vast project in Argentina to develop its oil resources—the bulk of the funds coming from American and European groups.

U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

With the progress of the Cold War, American leaders became more and more engrossed in devising and carrying out such policies as that of "containment" of Soviet Russia, and failed to give due attention to their country's "back-yard". They could usually depend on the votes of the Latin American countries in the United Nations. When a pro-communist regime seized power in Guatemala, Mr. Dulles hurriedly visited Caracas, and urged a resolution against the Guatemala Government at the Inter-American Conference which was in session there, but did not have time enough to discuss the root causes of that strange development. The U.S.A. officially responded to the situation by increased lending to Latin American countries, but did not care to see what use the loans were put to, or how far they solved any of the region's basic problems. In the political sphere, the outstanding feature of the decade, 1950-59, was the series of revolutions, which eliminated five of the well-established dictatorial regimes in four years. But the U.S.A. failed to take heed of the developments, and caused considerable resentment in the countries concerned by showing unbelievable and avoidable courtesy towards several of the ousted dictators. Of course, the American Government was always credited in Latin America with the determination to keep up dictatorial governments with a view to securing the safety of American loans and vested interests in the various states.

THE NIXON VISIT : MAY, 1958

Washington was aware of the deterioration in U.S.-Latin American relations, and arranged for a fact-finding tour of eight countries by the Vice-President, Mr. Richard Nixon. Mr. Nixon left Washington on April 27, and was due to return on the 8th May, after visiting eight countries along the way. Mr. Nixon encountered sharp criticism of U.S. policy in Uruguay, Argentina and Paraguay. In isolated instances he ran into outright hostility. He had his worst experience of all at Lima, Peru's capital, where, against the advice of the police, he insisted on making his scheduled visit to San Marcos University. He could not get farther than the university's gates, which were blocked by two thousand student demonstrators, allegedly communist-led, who hurled eggs and stones at him and shouted "Nixon is a viper". Mr. Nixon shook his fist at them, and shouted : "Cowards, you are cowards, afraid of the truth." Later, when he sought to return to his hotel he was confronted with the San Marcos mob again. This time he was spat upon.

During his unedifying tour, Mr. Nixon heard a lot of what was said about the U.S.A. in Latin America, much of which however was hardly new. But it did dawn on him that if the U.S.A. failed to help Latin America, the latter was determined to turn to the Soviet Union for it. At Lima, a boy asked him whether the purpose of his visit was the U.S.A.'s fear of Soviet penetration of Latin America. At several capitals which he visited, Mr. Nixon heard at the highest level about the anxieties of Latin American Governments about collapsing prices directly caused by American reduction of imports of quotas of their key commodities during the recent recession and the negotiations they were conducting with the Soviet for more trade and for economic help. In Brazil (which he had not visited) the Government were openly inviting Moscow to make an offer to buy coffee, while the communist press wrote glowingly of how well and cheaply Brazil could use Soviet or Rumanian oil-drilling equipment. Everywhere, he saw evidences of resentment created by communist propaganda labelling Latin America's economic crisis as "Made in the U.S.A."

CUB UNDER CASTRO—THE MISSILE CRISIS

Cuba, the "Pearl of the Antilles", and the largest island of the West Indies, was a Spanish colony till it gained nominal independence after Spain was defeated by the U.S.A. in the Hispano American war of 1897-98. It remained a virtual protectorate and an economic colony of the U.S.A. and was ruled over by brutal dictators till 1 January 1959, when the last of them, Fulgencio Batista, a protege of the U.S.A., was driven out of the island after a protracted and heroic struggle led by Fidel Castro. After establishing himself in power Castro organized the administration and economy of the state on communistic lines and cultivated close relations with U.S.S.R., which valued them because, among other things, they offered an opening wedge for diplomatic relations with more Latin American states as also for trade. In 1960, Cuba signed the first of a series of aid and trade agreements with the Soviet Union, and 'in retaliation the U.S.A. quickly reduced her quota of purchase of sugar from the island on which its economy largely rested (Cuba having a one-product economy), and eliminated it altogether on 16 December 1960. The relations between the two countries became bitter after the failure of the U.S.A.-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles opposed to the Castro-regime in April, 1961.

After this Castro naturally turned to Moscow for military support and the latter responded by emplacing in Cuba intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM's), so that if the U.S.A. did not object to it, the island would be guaranteed against an invasion from the Colossus of the North for ever (except in the eventuality of a world war). The U.S.A. did object, and evidently Khrushchev had not anticipated the firm stand President Kennedy took on the issue. The Americans were of opinion that the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the island was not done to defend the country against expected attack, but was rather an effort to redress to some extent the military balance of power by putting the U.S.A. within the reach of medium and intermediate-range missiles and to humiliate the U.S.A. politically as a prelude to further Soviet pressure against West Berlin or elsewhere. In a statement distributed through Tass on 11 September 1961, the Soviet Government admitted that "a

certain amount of armaments" was being shipped from the U.S.S.R. to Cuba and that some military specialists were also being despatched there for properly handling them, but they firmly denied that the Soviet Union had the need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation, their rockets being so powerful that nuclear warheads could be carried to any military target if this was considered necessary for rendering assistance to any peace-loving state and not only to Cuba. In a personal interview with President Kennedy on 18 October, Mr. Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, confirmed these statements.

Each side appealed to the Security Council, and a wordy duel followed between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. While the debate in the Security Council was carried on between Adlai Stevenson and Valerian A. Zorin, the American and Soviet representatives respectively, on the usual acrimonious level of past Soviet-American exchanges in the U.N., the communications sent by President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev to each other were marked by dignity and a sincere attempt to appreciate each other's position and avoid a nuclear war between their two countries. Replying to the charge that the missiles had been emplaced in Cuba with a view to securing a military advantage, Mr. Khrushchev, in his letter to Mr. Kennedy dated 27 October, referred to the rockets stationed in Britain and in Italy and in Turkey, the last-named country lying next to Russia while Cuba was 90 miles across the shores of the United States, and proposed that the two governments withdrew analogous weapons pointed at each other. Replying to a letter received by him from Mr. Khrushchev on the previous day (whose text has never been made public) President Kennedy accepted Mr. Khrushchev's proposal to remove the offending weapons system from Cuba under appropriate U.N. supervision, and at the same time to withdraw his orders dated 23 October imposing a quarantine on Cuba, which the Russians had denounced as a licence for piracy, and had exposed the world to the risk of a nuclear war breaking out, should there be a clash at sea as the result of American warships attempting to intercept Russian ships allegedly carrying missiles to Cuba. (Actually one such moment had come when the U.S.A.-destroyer Vesole pulled alongside the Soviet freighter Polzunov, for

a check on cargo which included some missile-like objects. The Russian ship, however, veered away.) The President expressed his readiness to consider with his allies any useful proposals that Khrushchev liked to make concerning a *detente* affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

So the danger passed, chiefly due to the "good sense" of Khrushchev, though it unleashed against him the fury of his enemies, including the Chinese, who accused him of "capitulationism", and it contributed to his downfall. Castro was angry at this abandonment of Cuban interests by Moscow, but was soon reconciled to his Russian benefactors. The episode had its lessons for the U.S.A., which was not likely to repeat foolhardy invasions like the one launched at the Bay of Pigs. To the happy end, U. Thant, the Secretary-General of the U.N. substantially contributed by acting as mediator between the parties, and so the usefulness of the much-decried U.N. was also demonstrated.

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

American Governmental reaction to the worsening situation in Latin America was the launching, at the instance of President Kennedy, of the Alliance. For Progress, embracing 19 Latin American countries (Cuba abstaining). The President's proposal came only a month before the Bay of Pigs invasion and the shadow of the ill-fated affair lay over the organizing conference in August, 1961. In a Charter adopted by the signatories at their Conference at Punta del Este in Uruguay, they declared as follows : "It is the purpose of the Alliance. For Progress to enlist the full energies of the peoples and governments of the American Republics in a great co-operative effort to accelerate the economic and social development of the participating countries of Latin America, so that they may achieve the maximum levels of well-being, with equal opportunities for all in democratic societies adapted to their own needs and desires." A ten-year programme was adopted for achieving these goals ; a planned rate of economic growth of 2.5 per cent per capita each year in each country, a minimum of six years of schooling for all children by 1970, dramatic reduction in infant mortality and endemic diseases, agrarian reforms and industrialization.

President Kennedy pledged at least \$10 million U.S. public funds as part of an overall contribution from public and private sources of \$20 billion over the 10 years to the capital needs of the programme. The Latin Americans pledged \$80 billion over the same period to achieve the goals of the Alliance. According to Mr. Averell Harriman, by 1968 the U.S.A. advanced \$2.3 billion in fulfilling her pledge. It was claimed that the money had been spent in constructing school buildings, waterworks, low-cost houses and other less visible forms of social investment. Other portions had gone into roads, power plants, industries and further development projects. At a review of the work of the Alliance For Progress made by the delegates of the 19 countries constituting the Alliance at their meeting at Sao Paulo, Brazil, in the first week of December, 1963, strong criticisms were made of its working both by the U.S.A. and by Latin American delegates. The former held that the continuing political instability in the states, as evidenced by coups in Ecuador, in Honduras this year and in Peru last year, and the current proceedings in Argentina and Peru to nationalize the properties of American oil companies and the combination of inflation and profit-remittance limitations in Brazil and such other Latin American failures adversely affect investor attitudes towards the Latin American States. Latin Americans themselves ascribed the failure of the Alliance to achieve notable results to the growing inability of their countries to earn enough exchange through exports. The consensus was that the Alliance needed a political "New Look" and more folding money.

The answer devised by the meeting to make the Alliance more dynamic was to create an Inter-American Committee for the Alliance, to be headed by a prominent Latin American public figure. The Americans, however, refused to give it the control of the disbursement of Alliance funds as proposed by several Latin American delegates. They also refused to accede to the Latin American demand that the economic aid principles of the Alliance be inscribed into the Charter of the Organization of American States. However, in a message to a Special Inter-American Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Rio de Janeiro in November, 1965, President Johnson sought to pacify the Latin Americans by declaring that the United States was "prepared to extend mutual commitment beyond" 1971, as under the


Kennedy announcement. Subsequently, the U.S.A. also agreed to accept amendments to the OAS Charter pledging her to continue her long-term aid programme, and help Latin America to achieve economic integration and better access to world markets.


BALANCE SHEET OF THE ALLIANCE FROM KENNEDY TO CARTER

It cannot be denied that some substantial results resulted from the operation of the Alliance. Economically, Latin America as a whole has prospered since the early 1960's. The per capita income rose to more than \$1,000, clearly differentiating Latin America from much poorer Africa and Asia. Brazil's "economic miracle" has been most miraculous ; its overall foreign trade (imports plus exports) rose from \$2 billion in 1964 to \$24 billion in 1977, a level twice as great as India's ; Brazil now has the tenth largest GNP in the world and the largest among the "developing" countries. The economic development in a number of other countries, such as Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Bolivia, has also been remarkable. The approach to economic development, however, has been export-oriented, frankly capitalist and technocratically managed in most of the countries of Latin America, only a few (Peru, during the three years of Salvador Allende, Guyana and perhaps Jamaica following the Castro way. Castor's boast that he would make the Andes the "Sierra Maestra of South America", or the fear expressed by President Figueres of Costa Rica that Castro's take-over showed that it was "two minutes to midnight" in Latin America has proved to have been baseless.) Many Latin American countries have carried out programmes of agrarian reform ; twenty-five million Latin Americans have benefited from school lunch and other Food-for-Peace programmes. Thousands of class-rooms and housing units have been built. Even more significant has been the completion of basic development studies, the strengthening of development institutions and the growing accumulation of expertise and skills.

Viewed from another and equally valid perspective, the picture appears far less encouraging. In the first place, the American Big Brother's interest has been, as in the past, fitful and dictated by his own self-interest. As one of the motives of the American government

in launching the Alliance scheme had been to preempt further Communist gains, actual attention from top U.S. officials to their commitments lessened as that danger receded. The response of the Kennedy administration to the changing facts of hemispheric life, increasingly, was indifference. It soon became obvious that economic assistance would not reach the level of \$20 billion over the ten years projected for the Alliance. And much of the aid which was provided turned out to be a device for securing advantages for the United States. Washington accorded higher priority to keeping the hemisphere militarily secure—through military training, assistance (C.I.A. “spooks” ?) and even (in the Dominican case) military intervention—than to ways of supporting economic development. After the tragic assassination of the dynamic J.F. Kennedy and the entry into Whitehall of Lyndon B. Johnson, presidential interest in Latin America’s development gave place to neglect, punctuated by episodic bursts of rhetorical attention. This continued through the Republican administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, but a difference was noticed after Jimmy Carter occupied the Presidential chair. In his first twenty-five months in office, Mr. Carter visited Latin America three times. The President of Mexico paid a visit to Washington and he was followed soon by the president of Venezuela. In September, 1977, President Carter hosted the heads of Latin American and Caribbean states, holding meetings with each other. Problems relating to many Latin American countries have significantly engaged the energies of top Carter Administration officials. Problems relating to South America have been viewed by them in a broad global context, though attention has been focussed on issues which the U.S.A. itself deems to be urgent, such as human rights, energy, monetary policy and non-proliferation. The global economic issues that most deeply concern the majority of Latin American countries have received much lower priority. Thus, despite some real economic gains resulting from the Alliance for Progress—as mentioned above—it has had a negligible impact on the minds of most Latin Americans and the prevailing attitudes are characterized more by discouragement and disillusion than by optimism.





CHAPTER XXX

THE EMERGENCE OF AFRICA

AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS

AFRICA has crashed in on world politics. It was not very long ago that she was still spoken of as the Dark Continent, and school children read thrilling stories of the adventures of Livingstone and Stanley in the heart of dark and gloomy forests infested by pythons and ferocious beasts and no less fierce cannibalistic natives. Even at the close of the Second World War, which heralded the independence of many Asian nations—India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia etc.—Africa seemed still to be as far away as ever from any amelioration of her status as a conglomeration of colonial territories of some of the western nations. Rather, because of the shrinkage of empire elsewhere, of consequent acuteness of pressure on Europe's own economies and of the steadily rising strategic and economic importance of Africa, the African colonies became more precious than ever in the eyes of the colonial powers. The prospects, however, rapidly changed, and there commenced what has been termed an "independence explosion" in the vast continent.

At the end of the Second World War, Liberia and Ethiopia were the only independent countries in "black" Africa, besides Arab Egypt and white-owned South Africa. In 1957, Ghana received her independence; in 1958, Guinea; in 1960-61 no fewer than 18 new states including Madagascar (Malagasay Republic) were born on the continent of Africa. On 10 December 1963, Zanzibar, "island of spices", the smallest African country (area, 1,044 square miles, population, 320,000) attained her independence, and official celebrations began at Nairobi, capital of Kenya, for the independence of the former British colony (area, 224,960 square miles, population, 8,676,000) which took place two days later, on 12 December 1963. On 25 April 1964 Zanzibar united with Tanganyika (which had become fully independent on 9 December 1962) to form a new sovereign

state which became known as Tanzania. At midnight on 5 July 1964, the former British territory of Nyasaland, with an area of 36,000 sq. miles, attained her independence, after being under foreign colonial rule for 73 years. The new state assumed the name of Malawi, and was Africa's thirty-seventh independent country. On 24 October 1964, yet another British colonial possession, Northern Rhodesia, which was a part of the now defunct Central African Federation, became independent, assuming the name of Zambia. In 1965, the white settlers of South Rhodesia (called Rhodesia) issued their unilateral and unconstitutional declaration of independence (UDI), the territory beginning to be called Zimbabwe which, with the absolute majority won by the Zimbabwe African People's Union in the election of April, 1980, attained its independence. Further, in 1966, two of the three British dependencies which were enclaves within the territory of South Africa, viz. Basutoland and Bechuanaland, became independent, the former becoming the Kingdom of Lesotho (29 August) and the latter the Republic of Botswana (29 September). The remaining British dependency which was also a South African enclave, viz. Swaziland, became independent in 1968. The Portuguese colonial territories, Mozambique and Angola attained their independence in 1975 (see below).

Today, European colonial rule is well nigh liquidated over almost the entire continent, but brutal and soul-crushing racist colonialism still survives in the east and south and south-west of Africa as also some minor such rules in the Portuguese colonies of the western coast. They constitute serious problems not only for the parties concerned, but they have important repercussions on international politics and cause frequent tensions in U.N., which threaten at times to break it up and make international co-operation almost impossible. To the newly independent nations of Africa, too, their political freedom has brought colossal problems, and the outlook is anything but cheery. Africa is colonialism's last stronghold and the free world's last frontier ; her problems must be solved.

It cannot be forgotten that the struggle for power in Africa during the years preceding the First World War, typified by two serious military incidents—at Fashoda in 1898 and at Agadir in 1911—were among the many factors leading to that global war. Fashoda is in

the Sudan, Agadir in Morocco. In both countries a struggle—caused by imperialist interests—is in a way, though not visibly on the surface, still going on today. It has to be remembered too that the first international shooting event in the fascist assault on the world, which led inevitably to the Second World War, occurred on 5 December 1934, at the Ethiopian frontier-post of Walwal. But it took Marshal Erwin Rommel and the German Afrika Corps to bring Africa's strategic importance in the context of a world struggle home to the geo-political and military leaders of the world. The prodigious works that were begun all over Africa when Rommel threatened to seize the Nile, the Suez and the Red Sea and to cut off the West from the East except over or round South Africa have indicated to the Western Powers what may have to be done by them again should there be a Third World War.

During the Second World War, Africa became the military base of successful operations for the American forces in their assaults on the Nazi occupied territories in Europe. So convenient was it to have military bases in North Africa that the United States later acquired in Morocco and Libya bases with long runways that could be used by planes delivering nuclear war-heads on the U.S.S.R. Africa is heavily inked in on the maps of the military planners of the West. Even now a network of American war bases is being built across northern Africa and other military commitments are being undertaken on the continent. American aid funds are fuelling all kinds of strategic economic developments in ports, roads and railways, air links, mines and industries throughout Africa. Private American investment in Africa is steadily mounting, and American trade with Africa has mushroomed to an annual total of over \$1 billion.

Because of her actual and potential political conflicts and her vast store of strategic raw materials, Africa is a major arena in the world power struggle between East and West. The U.S.S.R.'s major asset in Africa so far is the West's own capacity for self-destructive behaviour. When the U.S.A. entered into the Second World War, she had no colonial interest or empire to defend. But when the Cold War started, the U.S.A.'s need of allies in the struggle made her attach a special value to her allies in Europe, who had colonial territories in Africa. Her anti-colonial tradition prompted her to help

African nationalism—a course which her membership of the U.N. also morally made binding on her, but, in general, she threw her weight on the side of her allies. As the Suez crisis clearly showed, the peoples of Africa, hankering for national liberation from white yoke, refused to undergo further sufferings and sacrifices in order to lighten for the white man his questionable “burden”. The pangs of Africa’s new birth have therefore been unduly long and severe.

While, at this writing, many of the African peoples, so long as under colonial rule, have attained a greater or less measure of political autonomy, a specially dangerous situation still exists in certain large areas of colonial rule, where the potential explosiveness of nationalism is multiplied by racism. This is specially true in the Union of South Africa and, to a somewhat less aggravated extent, in British East and Central Africa, where ruling white minorities base their power entirely upon the maintenance of white supremacy. Whitesupremacy nationalism is heading for a collision with the rising force of African self-assertion, and the clash may come sooner than most people think, specially if nationalism in Africa finds an increasing accession of strength in help from the communist countries.

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

Given the situation, as well as the fact that most Africans have fought for generations against western colonialism, it would seem natural to expect substantial communist influence in Africa. Surprisingly enough, there is still so little of it in the continent. In Egypt, communists were driven underground by Nasser, and many members of the party were jailed. The party was illegal in Morocco, and legal but small—about 500—in Tunisia. In Algeria there were many French communists—some in positions of administrative responsibility, particularly in press, radio, economic planning and education. In the Sudan United States sources placed active communists at 750, in an illegal party. In French Black Africa, a number of nationalists, most of them Paris educated, who were Marxists, were often accused by their enemies of being communists. It is believed there were no organized communist parties in all of Black Africa.

In the Union of South Africa, however, there was a vigorous although illegal communist party, perhaps 5,000 activists working through several legal fronts. Their organ, *New Age*, was suppressed by the government several times, but reappeared a number of times under other names. Encouraged by broadcasts from Moscow in English and in some native languages, these communist-led leftists are acting with diligence, dedication, idealism, and inter-racial comradeship against *apartheid* and economic discrimination. The leadership is mostly white, and, as in similar groups in Europe, often Jewish, but communist influence among the natives is growing.

AFRICA—THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

The vast continent of Africa—one-fifth of the land mass of the planet—is large enough to accommodate the surface dimensions of the major countries of the world—and its total population is estimated (no definite figures are available) at 220 million. The Africans are extremely poor, and the annual per capita income was placed by a recent U.N. survey at \$75, compared to \$50 in Asia, \$380 in Europe, and \$1,100 in North America. But even the figure of \$75 was deceptively high, for it represented the income of both Europeans and Africans. The reality was more correctly reflected by official figures, which showed, for example, that the per capita income of Africans in the Rhodesias and Kenya ranged between \$14 and \$28, as compared to \$560 to \$840 for non-Africans. In the Belgian Congo, Africans, comprising 97 per cent of the population, received in 1950 less than 25 per cent of the estimated national income of 32.5 billion Belgian francs.

With a population increase of about 1.7 per cent a year, per capita production has been increasing by more than 3 per cent a year. Distribution of the income from this production, however, has been very uneven. For example, the Union of South Africa, with 6 per cent of the continent's population, produces 22 per cent of its gross product—and the Union's 3 million Europeans get most of that. The total white population of Africa is about 6 million; about 98 per cent of all Africans are Hamites, Semites, Bantus, and other dark-skinned people. More than a third of the Africans are still animists.

or pagans ; about one-third are Muslims. Islam is increasing steadily, at the expense of paganism ; Christianity is barely holding it own. There are said to be as many as 21 million Christians in Africa south of the Sahara, a larger number than in all the rest of the "non-Christian" world. By far the greater portion of existing educational facilities for Africans in Africa has been created and is maintained by mission effort. Yet African Christians complain of the wide gulf between Christian profession and Christian behaviour among the whites and a standing joke among young African Christians is to offer to go as missionaries to convert Europe's savages to Christianity. A sign of the times among young men in Kenya is the dropping of baptismal Christian-given names.

Africa is plagued by all the diseases known to mankind, among the most widespread being malaria (almost certainly the greatest threat to health and life), sleeping sickness (found wherever its vector—the tsetse fly can breed, namely in thick "bush" and along shady watercourses), bilharziasis (from which, it is said, not less than one in three Africans suffer, and which is liable to be contacted wherever there is polluted water), worm infections (up to 100 percent incidence in many areas), leprosy, yaws and the deficiency diseases, such as pellagra and kwashiorkor. An average African is thus usually a sick man, and, whether this explains much of his behaviour, it certainly entitles him to sympathy. The majority of the Africans, again, are chronically under-nourished, poorly clothed and housed. They own virtually no property. An overwhelming number cannot read or write. Only four of at least 700 principal languages spoken in Africa (aside from Arabic)—Amharic, Tamachek, Bamun and Vai—had achieved their written script before the coming of the white man.

Yet the resources of the continent are vast. Africa produces a large part of the world's uranium, one-sixth of its lead, one-third of its chrome, almost three-quarters of its cobalt, nearly half of its antimony, 14 per cent of its tin, more than one-third of its manganese and phosphates, almost one-quarter of its copper, nearly two-thirds of its gold, 70 per cent of its palm oil, 75 per cent of its sisal, 99 per cent of its columbium, 100 per cent of its pyrethrum—and practically all its diamonds. As for iron ore, Africa possesses enough high

grade deposits to take care of the expected needs of the whole world for years to come.

To these we must add water, which, though not usually thought of as a mineral, is the most valuable of all minerals. For it is water that sustains the life of everything; it is water that provides one of the most economical means of communication and one of the most valuable sources of animal protein, namely, fish; and it is water that affords one of the cheapest sources of power. The Congo river alone has an estimated potential of approximately 150 million horse-power, or considerably more than that of all the rivers of North America.

More than a third of the land surface of tropical Africa is covered by forests, some of which—the so-called rain forests—are rich in highly prized hardwood timbers, such as mahogany, and in oil-yielding palms. Some—the so-called dry forests—yield industrial resins and gums. Bush (mixed wood and grassland) covers perhaps as much land again. Its economic value is smaller, but by no means negligible, for it is in the bush country that most of the estimated 60 million cattle, sheep, goats and camels of tropical Africa are pastured and most of the field crops (for example, maize, manioc, peanuts) are grown.

The western world, and specially America, is much dependent on these African products for its industries as also its needs of war. Were it not for the labour of Africans, America would have great difficulty in getting the alloys required for the manufacture of heat-resistant steels. Without Liberia, Republic Steel would suffer from a shortage of high grade iron ore, and Firestone would be unable to supply natural rubber to manufacturers needing it for countless uses. It would be most difficult for the American steel industry to get along without African manganese and cobalt if Africans should stop producing them. The sudden loss of these and other vital products of Africa would create for the United States as great a loss as that suffered by the bombing of a large number of factories. It would be a great victory for the communists if they could persuade Africans not to produce goods for American use. American air-bases in North Africa would be valueless if Moroccans and Libyans sabotaged them.

THE HISTORY OF AFRICA

If Egypt is left out, Africa has no ancient history which is recorded, or the heritage of a great culture like India or China. It is said cave paintings in South Africa indicate the existence of a hunting and fishing society in that area many thousands of years ago. The existence of Negroid people in upper Nile is also proved by Egyptian drawings which are as old as 5,000 years. The Arabs, the Chinese and also the ancient Persians landed in Madagascar and East Africa more than 1,000 years ago. We learn from the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, written by a Graeco-Egyptian sailor in the first century A.D., that Indians of the western coast had a brisk trade with many foreign countries including Africa.

For several thousand years a series of great Mediterranean cultures flourished along the then fertile coastal plains from Algeria right over to ancient Troy, in Asia Minor. Egyptians, Minoans, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, and our own countrymen traded along the coasts; but they were stopped by the Sahara. In the sub-Sahara continent itself, black-skinned men lived primitive tribal lives, leaving no written records and few lasting remains for future archaeologists to study. We know vaguely that several "empires" flourished briefly in West Africa—the Soussous, the Melle, and the Ghanaian empires, but it is vain to think of writing their histories.

It was the fierce followers of the Prophet Muhammad who, as they swept across North Africa, brought the region (seventh century A.D.) into one of the main streams of world history. They pushed some undefeated Berbers southward, where they clashed with sub-Sahara Negro tribes. Arabs, Jews and others also pushed southward in search of gold, slaves and trade. Sometimes massive invasion occurred, as when the Berbers took Timbuktu in the fifteenth century. But the conquerors never really penetrated the forest belt south of the desert. And during all these centuries, curiously enough, some white men crossed the Sahara, and, inter-marrying with the Negroes, left traces of their features in the straight-nosed, thin-featured Fulani in the West, the Masai and the Ethiopians.

In the fifteenth century the Portuguese came and as they pushed down along the coast, trading and slave-raiding, they shook up the

tribal society of the Hausa groups in Nigeria, and of other groups in the area of Lake Chad. And then came the Danes, the Dutchmen, the English and French sending terror into the natives, for their main business was to capture healthy young men, and ship them off to far-off lands, where to serve as human cattle on the farms and plantations of the Whites. The French pushed southward and the Dutch came northward from the Cape. The invaders found hostile tribes, some cannibalistic, warring with each other, and quite unmindful of the progress in human existence which was taking place in other parts of the world. It is surprising, however, that they still produced some art; and there are scholars who believe that neolithic culture came from Black Africa.

The slave trade acted as a blight on African life, since for centuries the most vigorous young men were taken off to other lands as slaves. Apologists for the inhuman business are however, to be found among the slave-raiding nations. It was more pleasant to be carried off as slaves than to be eaten up, they say. However, the Europeans came not for slaves alone, and, long before the slave trade was abolished, were pushing into Africa for other commodities: gold, ivory, pepper, oils and precious metals. By 1875 the vast continent, like the familiar melon, had been carved up among the Great Powers—Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Germany. The division was formalized in the Berlin Conference on African affairs (1884-85), although considerable pushing and pulling followed, in the course of which Turkey lost control of Egypt, Germany lost Tanganyika, Kamerun (divided into French and British Cameroons) and Togoland: France established her control over North Africa: Italy acquired territories in East Africa as well as Libya. During the period of western colonization only two states remained independent: Ethiopia, remote and impoverished and little Liberia, which, like Sierra Leone, had been settled by freed slaves and slaves rescued by the British both on the high seas and in Africa itself.

BASIC AREAS

In spite of her geographical unity, Africa lacks political, cultural and other kinds of unity. For many practical purpose, however, Africa can be treated as consisting of the four basic areas:

(1) *Black Africa*. Population about 140 million, includes all the continent except the Union of South Africa and the Rhodesias—languages, diverse ; races, mixed Negro, Bantu, Hamite ; administration, most of the area till recently under European colonial powers ; European minority, negligible.

(2) *The Union of South Africa and the Rhodesias*. Population about 21 million ; official languages, English and Afrikaans, but numerous tribal languages are spoken ; cultural ties with Britain and Holland ; European minority, a little over 3 million, the rest of the population being predominantly Bantu.

(3) *Egypt* (and a sphere of influence including parts of Libya and the Sudan). Population, approximately 34 million ; language, Arabic ; religion, Islam ; strong cultural and political ties with the Middle East ; European minority, negligible.

(4) *Maghreb*. Population about 25 million, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and part of Libya : language, Arabic ; religion, Islam ; strong cultural and economic ties of the first three with France : European minority, over 1.5 million.

THE UNIFYING FACTOR

With all the divisions, Africa is emerging as one political entity ; an African personality is unmistakably emerging. The nationalist pressure is as inevitable in Africa today, after the Second World War, as it has been in Asia since the end of the First World War. The challenge to European colonialism and its corollary of racism is the inescapable next fact of African life. Its greater portents are visible ; its accumulating pressures just lie below the surface. A whole new set of ideas, aspirations and expectations have been set in motion among the small but important segment of educated Africans by the eloquent promises of Allied propaganda, especially the Atlantic Charter. Basic in the whole picture is the African's attitude toward Europeans. His feeling is rooted in his whole experience, going back generations to the brutalities of the slave-trading era, the later years of European conquest and penetrations, the succeeding years of European consolidation at African expense. This pattern has varied widely in different places, but it has included the frequent pre-empting of the African's lands : the crowding of masses of Africans in some areas into hopelessly inadequate "reserves" ; the weakening or break-up

of his tribal life and its replacement, in many instances by the most degraded kind of industrial exploitation and urban existence, as in the Union of South Africa.

The African continent is by no means a coherent whole, but it has enough of a common nervous system so that shocks at any one point are communicated to others far away, especially where there are large masses of people highly sensitized to the emotional biases of nationalism. In the Muslim countries in North Africa, nationalist pressure against European colonial rule has a long history and is today quite strong and aggressive. Events and movements in these countries exert a radiating influence southward and contribute, however intangibly, to the growth of nationalist moods and activities elsewhere in Africa. Pressure against the French in Morocco and Tunisia was unfailingly reflected in French West and Equatorial Africa. Pressure against the British in Egypt had direct effects on the neighbouring countries, e.g. Sudan, where the issue of "joint" British and Egyptian rule had raised the prospect of Sudanese independence. The impact of growing release from White domination in Black Africa was increasingly felt in the Union of South Africa, Kenya and the Rhodesias, whose reactionary policies come under fire in U.N.

AFRICA AT THE CLOSE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

As has been said above, the Second World War did not bring immediate hope and succour to the people of Africa, who, on the contrary, suffered from their European colonial masters all the more as the former lost their colonial possessions elsewhere.

The only shifts of power resulting from the war occurred in the disposition of Italy's African colonies. These decisions were affected not so much by nationalistic considerations as by the strategic considerations of the new power struggle between East and West. Libya, an economically backward but strategically important country on the North African coast, was granted its independence, which was formally proclaimed on 24 December 1951. Against the protests of the native inhabitants, Somaliland was restored to Italian rule in the form of a ten-year trusteeship, terminating in 1960. Eritrea, it was agreed, would be federated with Ethiopia, which was given back its independence lost to Italy in 1936.

The other formal change resulting from the war was the replacement of the old League of Nations mandates by the U.N. trusteeship system. The essential colonial status of the territories was not changed. In Africa the new arrangement affected the British and French segments of the Cameroons and Togoland, British-administered Tanganyika, Belgian Ruanda-Urundi, and South-West Africa, mandated to the Union of South Africa. The last-named power, defying U.N., virtually annexed the territory and declined to submit a trust agreement. Colonial problems all but dominated the Sixth Assembly, producing divisions that cut across the lines of the larger East-West conflict. France "walked out" of a hearing involving Morocco's complaint against her rule. The Union of South Africa "walked out" in high dudgeon over the Assembly's persistence in pressing the issue of South-West Africa.

At the end of the Second World War, the disposition of the colonial possessions of the European powers in Africa were roughly as follows :

(1) *French Africa* : Total inhabitants, 49,850,000—consisting of (i) Algeria, a Department of France ; inhabitants, 9,000,000 ; (ii) and (iii) French Morocco, population—8,600,000, and Tunisia, population—3,500,000—Protectorates ; (iv-vii) French West Africa, population—16,400,000 consisting of 8 territories—Senegal, Mauritania, French Sudan, Niger, French Guinea, Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast, and Dahomey ; French Equatorial Africa, population—4,000,000 ; French Somaliland, population—50,000 and Madagascar, population—3,800,000—Colonies ; (viii-ix) Cameroons and Togoland, population—3,800,000—Trust Territories.

(2) *British Africa* : (i-xiv) Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Gold Coast, British Togoland, British Somaliland, Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Basutoland, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia—colonies ; (xv-xvi) Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, South-West Africa—status in dispute ; (xvii-xviii) British Togoland and British Cameroons—trust territories ; (xix) Union of South Africa—a member of the British Commonwealth.

(3) *Belgian Africa* : Belgian Congo, population—11,000,000, Ruanda Urundi (Trust Territory).

(4) *Spanish Africa*: Spanish Morocco, population—750,000, Rio De Oro and Ifni, population 21,000.

(5) *Portuguese Africa*. Portuguese Guinea, population—400,000, Angola, population—4,000,000, Mozambique, population—5,000,000.

POLITICAL PATTERNS

Different policies and methods of administration were used by the European powers in Africa. On account of their defeat in the First World War, the Turks and the Germans were driven out of the continent at the end of the war, but they left deep marks on their former colonies. Holland had been forced to leave Africa even earlier. Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy and Spain remained in control of Africa. The administration of these powers of their colonies differed from one another, and, broadly, four kinds of political behaviour and of patterns of colonial administration may be distinguished.

Spanish-Portuguese

In the administration of their colonies, the Spaniards and Portuguese have been very conservative. They have refused to accept any new ideas; they have been simply exploiters. However, they did not practise racialism.

Belgian Congo (now Zaire)

Belgian policy in the Congo shifted from the 'unrelieved hardness and brutality of an earlier day to a pervasive and efficient paternalism. The Belgians pointed with pride to their welfare services and their quota system in the recruitment of labour. They did not care to expand education, which was left almost entirely in the hands of the Catholic missions, and, if they paid some attention to it in the last days of their colonial rule in the Congo, it was merely to supply certain low-level skills for Belgian enterprise. The Congo Government was strictly a colonial administration without representative institutions of any kind.

However, as the British and the French began giving autonomy to their African colonies in West and Central Africa (starting with the grant of independence to Ghana) the Belgians announced that they would leave the Congo in June, 1960. This they did on the scheduled date, but within two months violence erupted in many parts

of the state. The fact was that the former Belgian rulers had never contemplated, and hence did not prepare for self-rule in the Congo. On the other hand, in sharp contrast, they had developed a very complex industrial economy in the highly mineral-rich country, in the operation of which the Congolese had participated up to the management level. These two opposing trends gave rise to the dangerous political and economic problems of the nation. Belgium had allowed open political activity since 1957, but the parties were oriented along tribal lines and were not united on vital issues, such as whether the new Congo should be organized in a loose federation of provinces, or as a centralized state.

The nation's first premier, Patrice Lumumba, a formal postal clerk, effective orator and writer, led the largest party, the Congolese National Movement (MNC), which, with allied parties, had a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. His opponent, Joseph Kasavubu, former teacher and government clerk, had been offered the premiership by the Belgian authorities, but, as he was unable to form a government, became, instead, the first chief of state or president. His party, the Association of the Lower Congo (Abako) was primarily a tribal party of the Bakongo people who live along the lower reaches of the Congo river. Kasavubu favoured separatist tendencies and hoped yet to set up a Bakongo regime, which could perhaps be federally associated with the rest of the Congo. More crucial to the unity of the state was the fact that the richest mining province, Katanga, in the south attempted to secede under the Confederation of the Associations of Katanga party (Conakat) and the provincial premier, Moïse Tshombe, a businessman.

More serious than the threat to the unity of the new state and civil war was the fact that the Congo became the arena of the Cold War. This happened because the Congo held an important place in international trade. About 9 per cent of the "free world's" copper and tin came from the Congo, 5 per cent of its zinc and three-fourth of its industrial diamonds. The area was also rich in uranium and cobalt. It was agreed that further investment from outside would be needed to maintain the country's economic growth. For this reason the new government's attitudes towards economic planning, private investment and foreign management were crucial questions for both East and West.

On 11 July, Katanga seceded and announced the formation of a new state allied to Belgium. On the very next day, Belgian troops from Katanga marched into Leopoldville, the capital of the state. If Belgium's intention was to stage a come-back to her former colony, it was ruled out because East and West were united—each for its own reason—to sustain the new republic. On 14 July, the Security Council adopted a resolution which called on Belgium to withdraw her troops from the Congo and authorizing the Secretary-General to send "such military assistance as may become necessary, until, through the efforts of the United Nations, the national security force may be able...to meet fully their tasks". Within two days, the first contingent of the U.N. force, drawn from the neutralist nations, including India, arrived in the Congo, and began restoring order.

The Soviet Union, which from the first reacted to the Congo force with suspicious scepticism, gradually became openly hostile. In October, 1960 Premier Khrushchev launched a campaign for the dismissal of the Secretary-General, and it was feared that the latter would follow the example of the first Secretary-General, Mr. Trygve Lie, who had resigned under Soviet attack in 1952. He was saved from the fate by his death, 18 September 1961, under suspicious circumstances, in a plane-crash at Ndola, Northern Rhodesia during one of efforts to bring peace and tranquility to the Congo. The U.S. Government did their level best to oppose Lumumba, whom they accused of attempting to convert the Congo into a Soviet satellite, since he had invited Soviet engineers and advisers for implementing his development plans. President Kasavubu, backed by the U.S.A., dismissed Premier Lumumba, and was in turn dismissed by the latter. The U.S.A. fearing that Lumumba might become "another Castro", fought an all-out battle to prevent his return to power, threatening to refuse to finance the Congo's recovery and even attempting "to buy up the Leopoldville "parliament" and thus "releasing" some of Lumumba's supporters from his "pressure". Mr. Lumumba's murder on 13 February 1961, which was hailed in the West with cries of approval, was followed by an attempt made by Vice Premier Gizenga to succeed him and set-up a national government in Stanleyville but actual power in Leopoldville fell into the hands of the military under Joseph Motubu. Parliament, reconvening under

U.N. protection on 2 August, named Cyrille Adoula to head a cabinet of national reconciliation. Katanga, however, persisted in its secession, and it was not until January, 1963 that, after two earlier U.N. operations had failed, the breakaway province was forcibly reunited with the rest of the country. Adoula was forced to resign in June, 1964 and was replaced by Moïse Tshombe, who returned from self-imposed exile. He recalled the white mercenary units that had formed the military backbone of the Katanga secession. These forces backed by a controversial U.S. and Belgian aid, recaptured all rebel-held towns, sealed off the borders and established at least nominal control of most of the insurgent areas by the end of 1964. Dozens of European civilians and countless thousands of Congolese lost their lives in the fighting. Tshombe's use of white troops, most of whom were South Africans and veterans of French colonial wars did not ingratiate him with the political leaders of independent Africa. In any case, he was unable to establish a nation-wide political base. In October, 1965, he was removed from office by President Kasubulu. On 25 November 1965, Mobutu unseated Kasubulu and proclaimed himself president for five years. Tshombe who had exiled himself once more now began to organize subversion from his Spanish retreat. He was sentenced to death in absentia for high treason on 13 March 1967.

Meanwhile, Mobutu had embarked on a bold policy aimed at capturing grass-roots support, the essence of which was the appropriation of radical nationalism. The names of many towns were Africanized—Leopoldville becoming Kinshasa, Elizabethville Lulumbashi and so on. A new constitution was adopted in June, 1967 which instituted a centralized presidential system and created a new political movement, the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR). In the elections of that year, Mobutu was elected president and his MPR which had been officially established as the single party captured all the parliamentary seats.

Following the renaming of the country in 1971 as Zaire, the remaining European geographical names were Africanized and Zairians with European were ordered to adopt African surnames. President Mobutu dropped the Christian name and became Mobutu Sese Seko. Zaire's intervention in Angola's civil war in 1975-76 to

assist the Nationalist Front for the Liberation of Angola resulted in defeat, but in February, 1976 an agreement designed to help normalize relations was signed with the new People's Republic of Angola. The province of Katanga, renamed Shaba, continued to be a major source of instability. Katangan exiles living in Angola invaded Shaba in 1977 and 1978 but they were repulsed. Complicating the situation was the apparent assistance given to the exiles by the Soviet Union and Cuba, resulting in considerable international concern.

French Africa—Contradictory Policies

The policies of France towards her African colonies have been the most diverse and contradictory. In principle, France has been dedicated to the assimilation of her colonies, or making Frenchmen of her Africans. As compared with Britain, France had three great advantages, which enabled her to follow this policy. First, she did not practise racial segregation. Second, she opened many opportunities for Africans to occupy key positions not only in Africa but in France herself. In Paris, an African cabinet minister and a number of deputies and senators enjoyed the same rights and responsibilities as their European colleagues. In French Africa, many cabinet positions were occupied by Africans, and large numbers of Africans served as members of regional parliaments. Third, the French spent money in substantial quantities for the development of their colonies.

This assimilation policy has been something less than successful in North Africa where the Muslim culture of the Arabs is too well integrated and too resistant. Morocco and Tunisia, which were "protectorates", were since 1945 given the status of "associated States" in the French Union. The French attempted to strengthen their hold over these two territories after the Second World War, but ere long were compelled to recognize them as independent states. The French were most unwilling to grant a similar status to Algeria, where the situation was complicated by the existence of over a million French settlers (colons) who insisted on complete integration of the colony, already a department of Metropolitan France, with the mother country. The latter and their rightist sympathizers in France frustrated all efforts of the French Government to effect a settlement with the Muslim inhabitants, who outnumbered them by

six to one and yet were denied a corresponding weight in electing representatives to the national legislature. Ultimately, the Algerian nationalists, under their leader Ferhat Abbas, broke out into open revolt, which the French Government, using the most brutal methods, was unable to quell. It was only after General de Gaulle had become the head of the Fifth French Republic that a way could be opened for bringing the struggle to an end and granting Algeria independence (1962). Meanwhile, all the territories of French West and Central Africa had been given either autonomy or independence.

British Africa

At the end of the Second World War, the British pattern in Africa was still more varied than the French and far more complicated. It embraced at once the most progressive and the most backward colonialist outlooks in African affairs.

The British pattern was a patchwork of conflicting interests and purposes, involving Britain and her policies and interests, the African peoples in the various colonies, the White and Asian minorities in certain of these areas, and the Union of South Africa, a member of the Commonwealth.

Britain's avowed policy was to transform her colonies at a suitably gradual pace into self-governing segments of the Commonwealth. This policy reflected, in part, a British awareness that the old methods of empire were obsolete, and that a reorientation was in the interests of the maintenance of Britain's world position. In practice, the application of this policy was hampered by inertia, specially in a permanent colonial service which was not particularly designed to serve as an agency of social change. The result, often, was a process in which the British yielded too slowly to the pressure of nationalist forces in their colonies and dependencies, as in India. Nevertheless, as compared to that of other colonial powers, British policy sometimes looked remarkably progressive.

In Africa the pattern was profoundly complicated by the fact that while some colonies remained homogeneously African, in others there were sizable minorities of White settlers intent upon maintaining their primacy in the midst of overwhelmingly large African majorities.

In the homogeneous colonies. the slow process of reform-pressure-reform culminated in the grant of virtual independence. But in the colonies with White minorities, it were the Whites who pressed for self-government for themselves so that they could, like the independent White rulers of the Union of South Africa, deny it to the Africans.

WEST AFRICA REFORMS

The major steps towards African self-government were taken in the west coast colonies—the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and the smaller units of Sierra Leone and Gambia. In the Gold Coast (Ghana) a new constitution was promulgated in 1946 which offered too little change to please the Africans. The nationalist movement grew swiftly with the slogan, "Self-Government now!" On 1 January 1951, a new constitution was proclaimed, and in the ensuing elections, the Convention People's Party, whose leader, Kwame Nkrumah, had been jailed for sedition at the end of 1949, won a sweeping victory. Nkrumah was released from prison to become the "leader of the government business" in the new regime. In 1957, Ghana achieved complete independence as a member of the British Commonwealth. Nigeria, which with a population of 24 million and an area of 339,168 square miles, was the largest colony in the British empire, was granted independence on 1 October 1960, with Alhaji the Hon. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as Premier. The enfranchised Black African States, quickly admitted into the United Nations, have formed part of the Afro-Asian group in that body and have adopted neutralist and anti-colonial attitudes. In certain cases, they have exercised a moderating influence on other members of the group. Ghana, for example, has established good relations with Israel, in sharp contrast with the Arab States, and Accra, the capital, is fast becoming an international centre, where not only the British but Americans, Russians, and Indians find equal welcome.

BRITISH EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

At the end of the Second World War, British East and Central Africa extended from the colony of Kenya and the protectorate of Uganda, down through the trust territory of Tanganyika, the adjoining protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, the High Commission territories of

Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, bordering the Union of South Africa, and Basutoland, which is enclosed within the Unions' boundaries. These areas have a total African population of about 22,000,000 and more than 200,000 white Europeans.

The white minorities are grouped in the richest and most important of these lands : 3,000 among 5,000,000 Africans in Kenya, 40,000 among 2,000,000 Africans in Southern Rhodesia. In East Africa there is a third element—some 100,000 Indians—brought over originally as indentured or contract labour and now an important segment of the trading and business community.

Of all these territories, Southern Rhodesia alone was in effect self-governing (in the sense, of course, that it had self-government for the Whites). Almost all the other areas, however, had local executive and legislative councils which conducted much of the colonies' business. The Africans' share in these councils was negligible.

The few scattered posts in the councils were given to a few nominees of the White rulers, and that too very grudgingly. The latter discouraged any political development among the Africans on modern lines. In Uganda, there was the Bataka, which developed out of a struggle for land reform, and was not exactly a political organization. In Kenya, there was the older Kikuyu Central Association, representing the principal Kenyan tribe and the newer political group, the Kenya Africa Union. In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Africans had fairly strong political organizations. Though politically weak, the great African majorities dominated the politics of east and central Africa, if only as a great overhanging shadow. Among the Europeans, there were just a few leaders who were sympathetic to the political aspirations of the Africans. The British Colonial Office, whose formal responsibility was to "protect" the interests of the native populations, pushed some reforms where they could do so. The dominant White view, however, was that White Europeans must preserve their supremacy.

CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION

The Whites were in favour of a federation of the three territories of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, expecting that the

creation of this new self-governing unit would enable them to have full control of "native policy" in their own areas. For the same reason, and for fear that it would deprive them of the "protection" of the British Colonial Office, the blacks were dead against the idea. Nevertheless, the Federation of British Central Africa was created and it came into effect on 1 August 1953. Under the constitution, the Africans were in a minority in the legislative and governmental bodies, and tensions greatly increased, leading to violent eruptions. The growing violence on both sides threatened to undermine the British conception of "creative abdication". In 1959, a 26-member Monckton Commission was appointed to recommend constitutional changes. The report favoured a looser association of the three territories, which should be permitted to secede after a trial period of five or seven years of the new system. Both the Africans and the Whites declared themselves against the proposals.

THE MAU AGITATION IN KENYA

Almost simultaneously with the declaration of the Central African Federation, a fierce terroristic movement began in Kenya. Mau Mau, a secret, blood-oath society, sprang up among the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest tribe, and it was responsible for many murders—the victims being found more among their own tribesmen accused of co-operating with the Whites than the Whites themselves. It is difficult to isolate the causes of the Mau Mau rebellion; while Europeans refused to place much weight on economic motives, and preferred to characterize it as an atavistic phenomenon, Africans listed a number of Kikuyu grievances both political and economic. Among the causes suggested may be mentioned—land hunger, detribalization without compensating opportunities, instances where the European community interceded with the Colonial Office to retard African political representation.

The authorities moved two contingents of troops into the lightly policed territory, the horrors perpetrated by whom rivalled the brutalities of the terrorists. Further, they conducted a lengthy trial of an educated African, Jomo Kenyatta (later the first premier of the emancipated colony), on the charge of being the "master mind" of Mau Mau. Kenyatta was the leader of a broadly based, legitimate

movement, the Kenya Africa Union, prescribed on 8 June 1963. He had once visited the Soviet Union. On 8 April, he was found guilty on participating in illicit Mau Mau activities, and along with five others was sentenced to seven years' hard labour.

RHODESIA IN REBELLION—THE BIRTH OF ZIMBABWE

After the breakup of the Central African Federation (see above), Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) achieved independence on the basis of full democratic rule. The problem of South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) remained, because after 40 years of self-rule the control lay in the hands of 230,000 Europeans while nearly 4 million Africans remained effectively without the vote. In effect, under the 1961 constitution, some 90,000 European electors were represented by fifty M.P.s, while perhaps 1,000,000 Africans qualified for the vote were represented by only 15 M.Ps.

The Question of Rhodesian UDI

In the Rhodesian general election, 7 May 1965, the governing party, the Rhodesian Front, won 50 out of 65 seats in the Legislative Assembly. Led by Mr. Ian Smith the party had for long been agitating for "independence" by unilateral action, but the British Government refused to consider it before the African Votes question had been settled. One of the first acts of Mr. Harold Wilson, after his party (the Laborites) came to power in Britain (16 October 1964), was to issue a stern warning that a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) would be firmly dealt with as treasonable. On 6 May 1965 the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution, sponsored by the Ivory Coast, Jordan and Malaysia, requesting Britain to "take all necessary action... to prevent such a declaration... and to promote the country's attainment of independence by a democratic system of government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population."

Many efforts were made by governments and organizations in various parts of the world to dissuade Mr. Smith from taking the fatal step that he contemplated. On 6 May 1965, the Indian Government withdrew its diplomatic representation in Salisbury. Talks were

held in London between Mr. Smith and the British Government from 4 to 5 October, but no agreement could be reached. In the course of a lengthy television statement on 12 October 1965, Mr. Wilson again warned as follows: "Under our laws, a Rhodesia which took its independence by unilateral action, would be acting illegally, in a state of rebellion, and we would have to act accordingly." On the same day, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee resolution calling on the British Government to use "all possible measures to prevent a UDI by the Rhodesian Government". The American Ambassador at the U.N., Mrs. Arthur Goldberg, said that his government would not recognize any regime in Rhodesia "purporting to emerge from an illegal UDI". On 24 October, in a last-minute attempt to prevent UDI, Mr. Wilson flew to Salisbury, and, in talks spread over four days, sought in vain an agreement with the Rhodesian Government. He also talked with the Rhodesian nationalist leaders and frankly warned them against believing that a solution could be found by "an assertion of military power" by Britain for "imposing majority rule tomorrow or any other time".

UDI and After—the Birth of Zimbabwe

On 11 November 1965 Mr. Smith carried out the threat he had been holding for over two years, and declared his country's "sovereign independence". Britain promptly responded by laying an embargo on Rhodesia's vital tobacco exports and imposing economic sanctions designed to cut off most of its trade. Mr. Smith held on, believing that these economic sanctions would hit the African inhabitants of Rhodesia harder than the Europeans and so would not be pushed on. His other "hostage" was neighbouring Zambia, whose copper depends on Rhodesian railways, coal and power. An international oil ban might crush Mr. Smith's government; but international economic sanctions are easier to advocate than to enforce, as has repeatedly been proved in connection with South Africa: Pakistan was the first to see profit in sabotaging them, with a jute and coal deal during the dispute over the Asiatic Land Tenure Act. The British Government seemed to pin their faith much more on the prospect of dissident white opinion rallying behind the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibb, whom Smith had dismissed, and who, a Rhodesian, remained loyal to

the Queen, and had dismissed him. In the early months of 1966 the rebel government's day were believed to be numbered, and in an economic study, the Johannesburg *Sunday Times*, gave them until March. The Commonwealth Relations Office, however, thought that sanctions would have produced economic *rigor mortis* by about next June.

These prognostications did not come true, and on the contrary the British Government was constrained to open fresh negotiations with the rebel government. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in London in September, 1966 firm action on the part of Britain in dealing with the rebels was recommended. On 4 December 1966 Mr. Wilson met Mr. Smith in H.M.S. *Tiger*, and offered him some terms for a settlement based on six principles, and a document was signed by the two leaders. The rebel government, however, refused to accept the document in its entirety, and each side laid the blame of the failure of negotiations on the other.

Meanwhile the Rhodesian question was being discussed in the United Nations General Assembly, the Special Committee on Colonization, and the Trusteeship Council. On 17 November the General Assembly passed a resolution by an over-whelming majority endorsing similar ones passed earlier in the Trusteeship Council, and reaffirming the right of the people of Zimbabwe (South Rhodesia) to independence, deploring the failure of the U.K. to put an end to the illegal racist regime and calling the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation. Following the failure of the *Tiger* talks, the Security Council met in December, 1966 at British request and considered a draft resolution proposed by Mr. Brown, the British Foreign Secretary, which called on all member states to prevent imports of asbestos, iron ore, chrome ore, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, hides and spices from Rhodesia. Earlier, the Security Council had refused to accept 5 amendments proposed by the Afro-Asian states seeking to prevent oil from reaching Rhodesia, and deploring Britain's refusal to use force against the rebels. The Smith regime did not seem to be much shaken by the measures taken by the United Nations.

Ian Smith could continue in his die-hard policy because of the strong support that, in its own interests, the racist government of

South Africa gave him. The latter did so, firstly because they recognized Rhodesia (as also the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola) to be buffer states that could hamper the tide of national liberation that was, after the end of the Second World War, rolling on southwards. Secondly, they had economic interests to protect in that country which, as of 1976, had reached something like \$ 800 million. While London and Washington continued with their "phoney" efforts to "settle" the Zimbabwe issue, Ian Smith carried on his policy of brutal repression of the nationalist leaders, throwing thousands into jails.

Specially after UDI, many nationalist leaders had fled across the Zambezi to mount guerilla resistance. Crippled, however, by internal rivalries, this proved ineffective until Mozambique's independence in 1975 (see below). By the time, Britain's efforts—always too little and too late—to bring about a negotiated settlement had proved to have completely failed. With a realignment of forces, Ian Smith came under unrelenting pressure from South Africa to release and negotiate with imprisoned black nationalist leaders. The latter in turn were under pressure from Zambia and Tasmania to engage in talks with Smith, in an attempt to avoid war. At the end of 1975, despite opposition within African nationalists, the veteran leader Joshua Nkomo and Ian Smith undertook to try to establish a basis for talks.

In the spring of 1976, after South Africa's invasion force had to withdraw from Angola, the pressures were intensified. Mozambique opened its frontiers to training and base camps for Rhodesia's guerilla fighters who intensified their war in Rhodesia (now called Zimbabwe). The U.S.A. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, met the South African Premier, Mr. Vorster, twice in Europe and suggested to him that he might have to sacrifice the Smith regime in the interests of his own. After meeting Kissinger in Pretoria on 19 September 1976, Smith told his electorate, though in somewhat ambiguous terms, that majority rule would have to come in two years' time. At the end of the following month, a Conference under the chairmanship of a British diplomat was held in Geneva to plan the transfer of power, but it had little results.

In order to get out of the impasse, Smith agreed to bring some black figures into the government, with Bishop Abel Muzorewa as the Prime Minister in 1979. The imperialist powers backed the Smith-Muzorewa forces expecting that they would serve as the most effective bulwark against the Zimbabwe revolution. During late 1979, an agreement was reached in London among the parties for a new constitution, a cease-fire and the holding of fresh elections. To prevent a nationalist victory in the elections which were to be held in April, 1980 and to decide the fate of the white rulers and their henchmen in Rhodesia, Pretoria gave thousands of dollars to Muzorewa's party and, in order to overawe the voters, stationed military forces in the territory. In spite of terrorism by Pretoria, the Blacks lined up at the polling stations and gave Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe National Union (ZANU) an absolute victory. ZANU now established the first independent government of Zimbabwe, which became a free country.

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

As has been said above, out of Africa's estimated total population of 220 million, only about 6 million, or about 3 per cent are Whites, and the rest are black-skinned. The Whites came to the continent first as slave-raiders or traders, and then as colonizers. They carved out territories for themselves, and finally, largely by mutual agreements among themselves, established themselves as the masters of the whole vast continent. Their relation with the blacks was uniformly that of rulers and subjects, but as we have seen, there were various patterns of the political relationships of the two races. The very worst of these was what obtained in the Union of South Africa, where the White settlers based their rule on the most unabashed assumption of racial superiority, and ruthlessly practised the policy of *apartheid* or racial separation. No policy or relationship in the world is immune to change and outside the Union of South Africa, the operation of African nationalist sentiment brought about a varying degree of change in all the White regimes. But the White masters of the Union, on the plea that the only alternative was their own enslavement to the blacks, not only persisted in their old policy of maintaining White supremacy but by sheer brute force sought more and more to

tighten the collar of slavery on the necks of the black subjects of the Union.

About a century and a half after Vasco do Gama had discovered the Cape of Good Hope, the Dutch planted a colony there. The Boer settlers (Boer is Dutch for farmer) grew food for ships trading with Holland's Far Eastern Empire. At the time the Cape was lightly populated by nomadic Bushmen, but as the settlers pushed northwards they clashed with Bantu tribes migrating south. In 1806, during the Napoleonic wars, Britain seized the Cape. When the latter freed the slaves (1833), the Boers moved north in the Great Trek of 1835-1837, and set up independent republics there. A three-way struggle between the Boers, Bantus and British ended with the victory of the British in the Boer War of 1899-1902. On 31 May 1910, Britain welded the area into the self-governing Union of South Africa. Three territories, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland, were set aside as native protectorates. On 31 May 1961, South Africa ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth and proclaimed itself to be the Republic of South Africa.

From the beginning, the Union's ruling Whites were divided into two major political factions. One, the present United Party, was pro-British and took the Union into two World Wars; it draws most of the English-speaking vote. The anti-British faction, the present Nationalist Party, favoured neutrality in the wars; it gets most of the Afrikaaner vote. The Nationalists displaced the United Party in power after winning the 1948 election. They won with increased majorities in 1953 and 1958. In the 163-seat House, the Nationalists in 1958 won 103 of the 156 seats elected by the White population. The United Party won 53 seats. The remaining 7 seats were held by four Whites elected by the Coloureds and three Whites elected by the Africans. (Out of 14,500,000 of the Union's total population, 3,000,000 are Whites, divided roughly into 60 per cent of Dutch origin—"Afrikaaners" and 40 per cent of English origin, 10,000,000 blacks, and 1,500,000 are Coloureds, or persons either of mixed blood or of Asian origin. 320,000 are of Indian origin.)

The Nationalists came to power in 1948 with two basic objectives; to ensure white supremacy, and to make the Afrikaaners dominating.

among the Whites. They made *apartheid* (apartness), or separation of the races, a government policy and set out vigorously to achieve it. They uprooted many of the Negroes from the cities and moved them to Bantu reservations or "*Bantustans*", including the British protectorates to which they laid claim. As a "show-case" for this policy they set up the Transkei, which was a piece of almost unbroken black territory roughly of the size of Switzerland, lying on the south-eastern coast and had a population of 104 million famished African inhabitants,—granting it, in 1963, a phoney independence with a sham legislative assembly and a sham ministry. They tightly controlled the movement of Bantus with a pass system, compelling each African to carry a bulky document that he had to show frequently, like a passport, in order to move about. The Nationalists also excluded Bantus from skilled jobs. They enforced rigid segregation in public places, and they enacted laws enabling the government to carry out *apartheid* and suppress resistance to it with a stern hand.

Indians, like other non-whites, were subject to the racial restrictions, for example, under the Group Areas Act, they were liable to be uprooted from cities like Durban, where they were heavily concentrated and where they earned their living mostly by skilled labour and trade, and transferred to areas of an inferior type where such labour was not in demand. How these laws were enforced is clear from the following news item, reported by *Reuter* from Pretoria, the Union capital, on 10 December 1963.

"Several Indian women were injured and others had their *saris* ripped today when South African police and police dogs broke up a demonstration of some 600 Indian women in front of Union Buildings, the seat of the Pretoria Government.

"The Indian women had come to deliver a petition to South African Premier, Mr. Verwoerd, in protest against the Government's Group Areas Act, which obliges numerous Indians to move from their present homes to specially reserved areas."

Under other laws, non-whites were forbidden to marry whites, hold public offices, attend the same school as whites, belong to a union as whites, buy or drink liquor, move out of their "reserved

areas" without permission, own property off the reservations, travel without identity cards, or mingle with whites in railroad, cars, buses or park benches. Commenting on a treason trial of 30 non-whites, which was going on in Pretoria at the time he visited the city (3 January 1960), and learning that the charge was one of seeking to overthrow the state, a *New York Times* correspondent wrote as follows: "It doesn't take much to be accused of subversion in the Union of South Africa, where the individual native has no vote, owns no land, lives where he is told to, travels with a pass and suffers under the most rigidly enforced social and economic segregation system in all the world."

It has to be remembered, however, that *apartheid* is by no means a new policy, and that, apart from a very small communist group and a few idealists, it finds favour with whites of all political persuasions. In the days of the leadership of Jan Christian Smuts, head of the United Party, South African racialism had already developed the pattern of extreme restrictions—the heavily limited representation, the burdensome "pass laws" controlling the simplest daily movements of the Africans, the exclusion of Africans from all labour but the most unskilled. Among the whites the Afrikaners are the most resolute champions of *apartheid*, partly because of the fact that, unlike other colonial settlers on the continent of Africa—the English, the French, the Belgians, etc.—they have no outside country like Britain for Kenyan and Rhodesian settlers, Belgium for those in the Congo, and France for the French in Algeria, to which they could look for support and even refuge in case of difficulties. They have a most stubborn feeling that they cannot and must not make any concessions beyond a certain point or they will lose their identity of race in a great tide of blackness. That is their racial personality.

Their other personality is born of their pride in their prosperity. These people live in a country which produces rich quantities of diamonds, gold, copper and uranium. The white population is tremendously proud of its cities, made modern with their efficient railroads and airlines, and graced by beautiful buildings. The Afrikaners are racially self-conscious and have a cultural antipathy towards Englishmen, which is quite keen because of their resentment

against much that took place in their historical relationship with the English. Finally, the number of white people in the Union of South Africa is greater than anywhere else in Africa and constitutes a very considerable power. By the sheer use of brute power, they can break up any demonstrations made by Africans, as they did at Sharpeville in March, 1960. There the police fired not on rioters, but upon men marching in peaceful protest under legally minded, politically westernized leaders. In that firing, they killed between 80 and 90 marchers.

South Africa—a Police State

In South Africa, traditionally, the rule of law has been observed but after the proclamation of the Republic, the judicial role has been increasingly narrowed down and the powers of executive and police officers expanded. The most far-reaching of the measures by which these have been done is the Public Safety Act of 1953, which was used to proclaim an emergency after Sharpeville (see above) and in the Transkei. By the Sabotage Act, passed in 1962, a large number of minor offences, if committed to further "any political aim", were made punishable by death. It also restricted individual activity by enabling the executive to detain any person in a 24-hour "house arrest". The most typical police state measure was, however, the so-called "90-day law", passed in May, 1963, which abrogated the right of habeas corpus. The act empowered any commissioned officer to arrest a person on grounds of political suspicion for repeated periods of 90 days without access to a lawyer or friends. A prisoner who had completed his term could also be indefinitely detained. So effectively did the law serve the government purpose that it was suspended in January, 1965. During 18 months of its operation, 1,095 persons (including 102 whites) had been arrested. Interrogation methods included, besides ordinary brutality, systematic torture, including electric shocks. As regards treatment of prisoners in jails, a report by the public health authorities on the conditions in the "Fort", a prison in Johannesburg, in 1959, ran as follows:—"They found that cells measuring about 12 feet by 30 feet held as many as 100 men; sanitary facilities consisted of open buckets which stood next to buckets of drinking water. Prisoners ate and slept in these cells although they were frequently too crowded to allow them to lie down. Prisoners often slept body to body in a squatting

position". These revelations led to a few minimal improvements in the sanitary conditions in the "Fort".

The Rise and Growth of Black Nationalism

The earliest expression of a sense of national identity among native Africans was found in the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1910. In the early days, the leaders were professional men and church leaders whose nationalism was respectful of tribal authority. The year 1936, when Cape African voters were removed from the common to a separate roll, witnessed African disillusion with white liberals, co-operation with whom, they had so far believed, would be fruitful.

The next 25 years witnessed increasing African militancy and increasing repression on the part of the white regime. Under A.B. Xuma, an American-educated physician, the ANC issued a statement of "African Claims" in 1945, based on the Atlantic Charter. In 1949, representing the new generation, the ANC Youth League gave a call for civil disobedience. In 1952, with growing Communist and Indian support, they commenced a "defiance" campaign of passive resistance to "unjust laws". The ANC's membership rose from about 15,000 to 100,000 and 8,500 volunteers went to jail. The government enacted punitive legislation that included whipping for advocacy of as well as participation in, any future disobedience and even demonstration of any kind. On June 25-26, 1955, a so-called Congress of the People met outside Johannesburg, and nearly 3,000 delegates endorsed a Freedom Charter, which demanded equal rights and opportunities for all. In December, 1967, Albert Luthuli, a liberal and president of the ANC since 1952, was among 156 persons arrested on the charge of high treason, based mainly on documents like the Freedom Charter. All of them, however, were acquitted, after a protracted trial, in March, 1961. From 1957 to March 1960, younger leaders urged greater militancy and in April, 1959 formally established the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). In 1960, after the Sharpeville massacre, the government, seeking a showdown, proclaimed an emergency, which was lifted only on 31 August 1960. Nothing daunted, the nationalist leaders of all shades of opinion, met in December, 1960 to plan an All-In African Conference which was actually held in Natal in March, 1961. Its highlight was the dramatic appearance of Nelson Mandela, the son of a chief, an attorney and a founder of the ANC.

Meanwhile, the policies and practices of the apartheid regime were coming under heavy fire also externally. Since India had complained at UN against the treatment of Indians in South Africa, in 1946 that body had become the forum for angry protests against their racist policies, and, specially at their defiance of UN resolutions in respect of South-West Africa. The gains of nationalism in Southeast Asia, specially in Vietnam, where half a million GIs and the world's most advanced technology could not stand up against a few thousand guerillas in black pyjamas, and, nearer home, the big gains of the liberation struggle in Mozambique and Angola, fired the imagination of the Blacks in South Africa. In June, 1976, there was an explosion on an unprecedented scale in South Africa, ostensibly over the enforced use of Africans in black schools. Although government retracted this policy, it was only after police had fired on thousands of demonstrating black school-children and disturbance had spread over most of the republic's territory and specially in the black townships. (At Sweto, the white police officer opened up with a machine gun, he later explained, because "it has a more demoralizing effect than a pistol shot".) Uprisings continued throughout the year with thousands dead. At this writing, the Africans are continuing their struggle and beginning to call their country that is to be free by the name Azania.

THE U.N. AND SOUTH AFRICA

In the very first General Assembly of the United Nations, India raised the question of the treatment of Indians in the Union, charging that it was a violation of the provisions of the Charter. South Africa claimed that the inclusion of the question in the agenda was barred by the principle of domestic jurisdiction. The Union Government at the time was still rather out of favour with the West on account of their pro-Hitlerite and anti-democratic attitude in the Second World War and their defiance of the United Nations over the question of South-West Africa. India, in any case found a lot of sympathizers in the General Assembly, which passed a resolution declaring that "the treatment of Indians in the Union should be in conformity with the international obligations under the agreements concluded between the Governments and the relative provisions of the Charter". In 1952, the *apartheid* charge, which is primarily directed against the treatment of the Negroes, was added. The General Assembly went on with

passing resolutions in almost every session, but South Africa managed to ignore all of them. As the General Assembly came to have more Asian and African nations represented in it, criticisms of South Africa's racial policy became more frequent. On 1 April 1960, the Security Council, voting 9 to 0, pronounced South Africa guilty of violating human rights, of flouting world opinion and of endangering world peace by its policies of racial discrimination.

In December, 1963, the Security Council, by a unanimous vote, condemned South Africa's practice of *apartheid*, and appealed to all states to stop supplying South African armament factories with materials and equipment. This was the most important success achieved by the opponents of South Africa's practice of *apartheid* since 1946, when India complained to the U.N. against the latter's treatment of Indians. This supplemented the resolution adopted the previous August, which had appealed to all states to embargo shipments of weapons and military vehicles. For the present, however, it seemed that the resolution would have little practical effect, since Britain and France, who are South Africa's principal suppliers of military equipment, promptly declared that they would continue to export weapons and materials needed for South Africa's defence against external aggression. This meant that the export of British jet bombers and French jet fighter would continue. The U.S.A., influenced as much by love of democracy as by fear of the effects a contrary policy was bound to have on her own Negroes, declared that she was going to impose a flat prohibition on exports covered by both resolutions. But such United States exports were never large, and the U.S.A. joined her British and French allies in insisting that the situation did not justify the imposing of sanctions, a course strongly advocated by the Afro-Asians.

At the same time as when (December, 1963), the resolution referred to above was passed, the Security Council, in response to Scandinavian suggestions, also provided for a group of experts to study peaceful means of transition from *apartheid*. Under Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden, the group recommended "free and democratic consultation" in a national convention representing all the people of South Africa and a technical study of sanctions that could be applied if the South African government did not co-operate by a stipulated date...

Though opposed to a deadline and coercion, the U.K. and the U.S.A., June, 1964, voted for the establishment of an expert committee to study the feasibility and implications of "measures" against South Africa. On 14 September 1981, the U.N. General Assembly had, in a resolution passed by 1170 votes with 25 abstentions "called upon all States in view of threat to international peace and security posed by South Africa to impose against that country sanctions in accordance with the provisions of the Charter". Though in the Security Council, which alone has the authority to impose sanctions of any kind, the resolution passed by the General Assembly (as stated above), was sure to be vetoed by some one of the permanent members, it is not without significance that such a resolution had been passed in the General Assembly without a dissentient vote.

The campaign to isolate South Africa and to induce it to abandon apartheid is gaining ground. Though all efforts of the African states, with mainly Asian and Communist support, have failed to win South Africa's exclusion from the U.N., South Africa has been forced to withdraw or has been expelled from all African regional organizations; from many international bodies, for example, the International Labour Organization and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization; and from the Olympic games. Diplomatic representation in Africa and Asia is totally lacking. Some countries have imposed total or partial embargoes, though these are mostly ineffective.

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA)

South-West Africa became a German colony in 1884. In 1915, during the First World War, South Africa troops under General Smuts invaded the territory on behalf of the Allied Powers and defeated the forces of Germany. As a reward for loyal service to the Allies, South Africa was given a "mandate" to rule the country by the newly formed League of Nations, 1920. In 1946, the U.N. refused to allow South Africa to annex the territory, and in the following year South Africa refused to place the territory under U.N. trusteeship. In 1959, in response to a request by the General Assembly, the International Court stated in a advisory opinion that South Africa was still bound by the mandate and that the UN had inherited the supervisory func-

tions over the administration of the territory. South Africa disregarded the opinion and continued to maintain that the mandate had lapsed. In 1960, Liberia and Ethiopia, as former members of the League, asked the Court to find that South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligations to the UN and that, by its policy of apartheid, had violated its obligations to the inhabitants of South-West Africa. South Africa challenged the Court's decision but was defeated by a vote of 8 to 7. It still did not concede the issue of jurisdiction, but continued to contest the case. In October, 1966, the UN terminated South Africa's mandate and subsequently renamed it Namibia. South Africa defied the UN and continued its jurisdiction over the territory. In 1970, the International Court finally gave its judgement against South Africa.

The reasons are plain : the loss of Namibia will not only hurt the self-pride of the white rulers of South Africa but deprive it of the huge profits which the exploitation of the territory brings to them. Namibia is a vast, sparsely populated country with a population of about 526,000 (in 1960)—the whites constituting one-seventh of the total and dominating the politics and economy of the land completely. Namibia has extensive deposits of copper, zinc, diamonds, uranium, tungsten, cadmium, iron, manganese, vanadium and other minerals. White-owned farms, on the inland plateau, where water is stored, raise not only cattle and sheep but also the valuable karakul, or Persian lamb. There is also a rapidly expanding fishing industry off the coast. Other foreign countries, specially British and American, are also involved in the exploitation of Namibia but the South Africans account for the largest share of investments (About half of Namibia's exports go to South Africa and 80% of its imports come from there.)

As we have said above, South Africa had found in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola and the white-minority-ruled Rhodesia valuable buffer states that could hamper the tide of national liberation that was sweeping southward. In 1961, it signed with the administration in Mozambique an agreement to purchase 80% of the power from the giant Cabora Bassa dam, the construction of which began in the same year with South African financing and participation. Also in 1969, a similar accord was signed with the Portuguese in Angola to begin plans for a R 220 million dam and hydro-electric

project on the Angola-Namibia border to supply power for the foreign-owned mines and industries of Namibia. To safeguard its economic interests and to confront the first stirrings of guerilla activity in these countries, South Africa began to despatch some of its troops to Angola. Mozambique and even Rhodesia, where it sent a police force in 1967. In the late 1960s, it adopted the practice of "hot pursuit", i.e., military attacks into nearby countries where Black guerillas received sanctuary, such as Zambia. It also staged some regular helicopter patrols over southern Angola where some of the Namibians had set up guerilla bases. In addition, it began to establish open—and covert—political and economic ties with some of the Black regimes which could be cajoled, or intimidated to respond to its overtures. Among the latter were the governments of Zambia, the Ivory Coast, Malawi, and Lesotho. The comparative failure of this so-called "outward policy" was compensated by the extension of more open recognition of and support of its imperialist policy by the Nixon administration (April, 1969) and some of the NATO Powers in Europe.

The South African government had another contender in the field—the South African People's Organization (SWAPO), which had wide-spread support among the Namibian Blacks and was recognized as such by the UN. SWAPO did not believe in the achievement of just a facade of independence for Namibia which at this time had been receiving the attention of many among the ruling class in South Africa and for which they had been thinking out plans. While, however, keeping up negotiations with SWAPO through the U.N., the latter attempted to overawe the former's supporters in Angola, particularly the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) by repeated and savage raids across the border. Under the circumstances, the Committee which had been set up in 1976, with the tacit approval of the government, by a group of white settlers and tribal chiefs to plan a constitution for Namibia for a semblance of independence for Namibia, found its task to be a harder one. After the liberation of Angola from Portuguese colonial yoke in 1975, the guerilla operations had been extended far into South Africa and South African raids in Namibia were more frequent. Though Namibians have not yet secured independence, the writing on the wall can be seen.

ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

The world-wide movement for the liberation of peoples from colonial yoke could not fail to influence the Portuguese territories also. With the Indian attack on Goa in 1961 world attention was drawn to Portuguese colonial policies. Salazar responded by making the territories overseas provinces of Portugal, and by granting limited local autonomy and increased participation in election to the Portuguese National Assembly to the whites and the handful of *assimilators*. The events gave a filip to the nationalist movements in the territories. There were, however, some political associations, among which the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in Angola, with a strong Marxist strain, emerged as the most important. Though opposed by another group, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), it retained its hold on the capital. In March, 1961, the Kongo people of Northern Angola revolted and, with the help of their newly independent kinsmen in Zaire and later the help of some other nationalist groups such as the FNLA (Angolan National Liberation Front), threatened the Portuguese hold in the north. Despite Portuguese military reprisals, a war of attrition continued over a dozen years.

In Mozambique, the nationalist organizations, though also plagued by division, were more successful. In 1962 a combination of three exiled organizations forming themselves into FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) began organizing a political and military underground movement. Within three years they claimed to have an army of 8,000 strong and to have established their own administration and marketing networks in three districts. Though Portugal's initial response to the outbreak of revolt was savage military repression and some 70,000 Portuguese troops in each territory, the uprisings produced a number of reforms. It was, however, a case of too little and too late, and ultimately the sheer cost of the wars led to the revolt of Portuguese army officers and the downfall of the regime in Europe. After a short transitional period, Mozambique became independent in June, 1975 under a Frelimo government headed by Samoran Machel.

In Angola, unlike Mozambique, the transitional period found the three main liberation movements, MPLA in the centre, FNLA in the

north and UNITA in the south—vying for control of any future government. The rivalries were greatly exacerbated by the involvement of the great powers, Portuguese settlers, Zaire and South Africa. When on 11 November 1975, the Governor-General withdrew from Luanda, the country was on the throes of a civil war which threatened to spread far wider as the Soviet Union flew in arms in support of the MPLA and the U.S.A. indirectly aided the FNLA-UNITA alliance through Zaire. (Pretoria did not trust the MPLA which was assisting the Namibian freedom fighters and preferred to support the pro-imperialist FNLA and UNITA which, moreover was backed by Mobutu of Zaire and Kaunda of Zambia.) South Africa now directly intervened in the civil war and sent its armies into Angola in two stages—the first such beginning in August, 1975 when its troops attacked the guerilla bases and the second one in October, 1975, when there was a large-scale invasion. [Though Washington continued to deny any role in the South African invasion of Angola, the African Defence Minister Pieter Botha (soon to become Prime Minister) asserted that it had not only urged them to intervene but had flown in supplies to South-African held bases in southern Angola.] However, the invading forces had soon an unexpected contender in the war: the revolutionary government of Cuba. Fidel Castro, in response to an appeal from MPLA for help, sent his army to Angola, which stemmed the tide of invasion. The invaders had to choose between escalation or withdrawal. Bowing to the strong anti-war sentiment in America, Washington withdrew its support of Pretoria in the business and the latter, complaining that they had been “left in the lurch” retreated into their own territory. Angola now became free, and the fact as also the lesson received by Africans of the outcome, viz., that white military power had to flee before ill-armed African and a few Latin American troops, had their repercussions on the victims of colonialism all over the world.

PAN-AFRICANISM

Early Pan-African Conferences

The development of Pan-African ideas and movements is traced to the endeavours made in the early years of the present century by a few American Negroes like Dr. W.E.B. du Bois (1868-1963) and

others to arouse the Negroes to a sense of a "lost" "home-land", a belief in the existence of a distinct "African personality" and common destiny and the ideal of "Africa for the Africans". They held international congresses, the first such in London in 1900, which was attended by du Bois, who soon became a dominant figure in the movement and convened four more congresses. The first of these was held in Paris at the same time as the Peace Conference (1919) and requested the League of Nations to establish a permanent bureau for "overseeing" a proposed code of laws for the "international protection of the natives of Africa". The second congress was held in London and Brussels in 1921, the third in London and Lisbon in 1923, and the last in New York in 1927. Other prominent figures in the movement included Marcus A. Garver (1885-1940), who set up the Universal Negro Improvement Association with the object of welding Negroes throughout the world into one united people, and proclaimed himself president of a "United States of Africa", and Dr. E.W. Blyden, who is chiefly remembered for stressing the African personality ideas. African students from British colonies in British universities came into contact with one another and became familiar with the ideas of non-violence preached by Mahatma Gandhi, Christian and Fabian socialism, Marxism, etc., which continue to influence African thought today. The last such international congress to be held on foreign soil met in Manchester in 1943, and was attended by Dr. Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, and some others who were to rise to prominence soon afterwards as freedom-fighters in their respective countries and became world figures later.

Conferences of Independent African States (IAS)

The Second World War, without bringing immediate freedom to the African colonies of European powers, greatly enfeebled the latter, and accelerated the Pan-African movement. Africans were deeply impressed by the successes of the freedom movement in Asia, and re-dedicated themselves to the task of securing the independence of their respective countries, in some of which, e.g. French-held Algeria, the struggle had entered into its bitterest phase because the colonial power, having lost its possessions elsewhere, was all the more determined to retain its colonial possessions of Africa. African leaders

met at frequent intervals to consider how the granting of independence could be speeded up, and to discuss common problems. In 1958, a year after Ghana had secured her independence, a conference of Independent African States (IAS) was held at Accra at the invitation of the Ghana Government. It was attended by eight states, viz., Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, the Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, and United Arab Republic. It was here that for the first time African Governments, acting in concert, called upon the administering powers to grant independence to their colonial possessions in Africa. The conference also drew up a common programme to be followed by African states for economic, technical, and scientific co-operation, and a common foreign policy, which was to be as had been laid down in the Bandung Conference of 1955, viz., non-alignment.

The second conference of Independent African States met at Addis Ababa in June, 1960, and was attended, besides the representatives of the eight states who had participated at the Accra Conference, by those of Cameroon, Nigeria and Somalia, who had since gained independence and those of territories on the threshold of independence, and even of the rebel "Algerian provisional government" (GPRA). The conference adopted resolutions denouncing colonialism and neocolonialism, and asking colonial powers to fix dates "in conformity with the will of the people" for the granting of independence to their African possessions. An unhappy development was the growing difference of opinion among African leaders over the ways in which African unity was to be attained. Two views emerged, one forcefully expressed by Dr. Nkrumah who urged the formation of a Union Government for Africa on the plea that "unity was Africa's only weapon for the defence of its freedom", and the other which proved to be that of the majority of the conference members and was expressed by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of Uganda, among others. The latter favoured a gradual approach to unity which, said they, if it was to last, had to start from the beginning, and had to be achieved by taking practical steps in economic, educational, scientific, and cultural co-operation among the various states.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU)

A concrete step in the realization of the ideal of African unity was taken by the adoption at a conference of 30 African states at Addis Ababa, 22-25 May 1963, of a Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The purposes of the OAU, as declared in the Charter were, *inter alia*, to promote unity and solidarity, to achieve a better life for the people of Africa, to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence, to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, and to promote international cooperation. The Charter affirmed such principles as "the sovereign equality of member states", "non-interference in the internal affairs of states", "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence", "peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration", "unreserved condemnation of political assassination...and of subversive activities", "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African countries which were still dependent", and "the policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs". It also set up the following institutions: (1) An Assembly of Heads of State and Government, to meet at least once a year; (2) a Council of Ministers, to consist of Foreign Ministers or other ministers as designated by the member states, which was to meet twice a year and to be responsible to the Assembly; (3) a General Secretariat (whose headquarters was later fixed to be at Addis Ababa); and (4) a Committee of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conciliation.

The Conference also passed a number of resolutions touching some concrete issues. In anticipation of a situation in Rhodesia which has since been created there by the declaration by the White Government of unilateral declaration of independence, it asked Great Britain not to transfer power to it and pledged moral and practical support to any "legitimate" measures adopted by nationalist leaders in that country to recover power. Diplomatic relations between African states and Portugal and South Africa were to be broken off and the two states to be boycotted through the cessation of trade and the closure of ports and airfields to them. Support to the United Nations was re-affirmed and a call made for removal of military bases

from Africa and for the recognition of Africa as a denuclearized zone. It was decided that a fund should be created to support the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. Racial discrimination of any sort was condemned and concern expressed about the racial situation in the United States, although satisfaction was expressed with the efforts of the United States Government to solve these questions.

The Union Africaine et Malagache

Before OAU had been created certain states belonging to particular regions had formed groups comprising limited numbers of states, which sought to pursue economic policies of their own and have a common attitude on matters of foreign policy. Twelve such states which were formerly administered by France and, after independence, continued to receive economic and technical assistance from the latter sent representatives to a conference at Brazzaville, 15-19 December 1960, which set up a study committee to consider proposals for an Afro-Malagasy organization for economic cooperation. In the following year they adopted the Charter of the *Union africaine et malagache* (UAM), which aimed at the co-ordination of foreign policy and establishing a unified military command. In the succeeding years this group, which differed from the others in that they were all French-speaking states, held conferences which passed resolutions on foreign policy as viewed from their own standpoint. In 1964, however, they decided upon a new orientation, and calling themselves henceforth as the *Union africaine et malagache de cooperation economique*, to concern themselves exclusively with economic, technical, cultural and social matters. Two other groups, which had also been formed in 1961, the "Casablanca" and "Monrovia" groups, were dissolved after the Addis Ababa conference which set up the OAU.

Obstacles to Pan-Africanism

The OAU which at present represents all the newly emancipated states and embraces the whole of the vast continent minus the Union of South Africa, and the few remaining foreign colonies, faces colossal problems, some inherited from the past, others which independence itself has created. The inhabitants of Africa (excluding from this designation the whites) are extremely poor, chronically under-nourished, and poorly clothed and housed.

They are afflicted by all the diseases known to mankind—the average African is a sick man. An overwhelming number cannot read or write. They have no common religion or language—the language of administration being usually a European one. Apart from the lingering problem, black versus white, Africa has developed a new problem, black versus black. Morocco is at odds with Algeria over a boundary question, and the latter with Tunis over oil and border rights. In November 1963, an extraordinary meeting of OAU Foreign Ministers was held at Addis Ababa to consider the Morocco-Algerian border dispute, which had resulted in heavy fighting between the two states a month earlier. The Foreign Ministers appointed an *ad hoc* arbitration committee to determine the responsibility for the start of hostilities and to decide the basic problems of the frontier and submit proposals for their settlement. An emergency meeting of OAU Foreign and Defence Ministers, held in Dar es Salaam in February, 1964, with a view to discussing the army mutinies which had occurred in East Africa earlier in January, referred it to a sub-committee for consideration. On 14 February the sub-committee considered a recent outbreak of heavy border fighting between Somali and Ethiopian forces. A cease-fire was arranged and the two states agreed to withdraw troops and to cease hostile propaganda against each other.

Independence, which has created among the emergent nations of Africa a desire for union with each other, has also put in operation some forces which are opposed to Pan-Africanism. In the various states, political leaders, once independence for their respective states has been secured, conceive it to be their next task to create among their peoples a sense of common purpose, a respect for political institutions and established authority and to mobilize them in pursuit of economic and social purposes—worthy aims which naturally get priority over forming unions with other states. Africans, however, are not daunted by the obstacles which confront them. They rather consider them as arguments of Pan-Africanism.

AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY

The Bandung Conference, 1955

It was but natural that after the long dark night of foreign subjection was over and as soon as a new life as free peoples dawned.

upon them, the new nations of Asia and Africa should fraternize with each other and want to find out some common principles and programmes for themselves. The cries of "Asia for the Asians" and "Africa for the Africans" had been raised by idealists long ago—even when the mightiest nations of Europe held sway over them, firmly convinced that they were commissioned by the Almighty to do so. Britain took the lead among the latter in relinquishing her colonial possessions in Asia and Africa one after another, and other imperialist nations, France, Holland, Belgium, etc. were compelled to follow suit. Within the past few years, as we have seen above, a veritable "independence explosion" took place in the continent of Africa.

Independence brought the emergent nations a host of problems, both as concerned their domestic affairs and as to the attitude they should take towards other nations in the world. One way of solving their problems was for the leaders of Asia and Africa to meet in conferences, where they could know each other and discuss common problems. Mr. Nehru, one of whose long-cherished ideas was an Asian or even a world federation, summoned in 1946 an Asian Conference, which met in Delhi (see above, Chap. 27). In 1955, twenty-five Asian and African nations joined in a conference, which met at Bandung in Indonesia. It was attended, among others by Messrs. Chou En-lai, Nehru, and Nasser, and is chiefly remembered for the great impetus that it gave to the principle of Afro-Asian solidarity and the adoption of the celebrated five principles of co-existence, known as *Pancha Sheel*. In the midst of the discussions at the conference, a cleavage became apparent between a pro-western, anti-communist group led by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and the majority who approved the policy of non-alignment followed by India and others. But the leaders parted with the best of feelings for one another and the common expectation that another such meeting should be summoned as soon as possible.

The Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N.

Afro-Asian solidarity was demonstrated in a more unmistakable manner by the formation of an Afro-Asian group in the United Nations. Beginning to swell in 1955, when as the result of a "package deal" between East and West, the newly independent Asian and

African members were admitted to U.N. membership *en masse*, the Afro-Asian group rose in 1961 to 46 (out of a total U.N. membership of 99), and become the largest single group in the General Assembly. The total membership of the Afro-Asian group then rose to 60 (Africans 35, Asians 25) in a total U.N. membership of 117. The number was just a little short of the all-important two-thirds, when (as they usually do) they vote with the Soviet bloc. The Western states plus Israel constituted about 40 per cent of the whole. This sharp alignment rarely, if ever, took place. But in any case the Afro-Asian bloc could at least stop any other group in the Assembly from having its way.

Its Growing Strength and Anticolonialism

The increased influence of Asia and Africa made itself felt as early as 1961, when the post of Secretary-General, previously held by Scandinavians, went to U Thant, a Burmese. Chakravarthi V. Narasimhan, an Indian, became Mr. Thant's executive assistant, replacing an American, and two Africans were made under-secretaries. In 1965, the President of the Assembly was a Ghanaian, Mr. Alex Quaison-Sackey, and more Afro-Asians are now Vice-Presidents of that body than before. At the same time the "gentleman's agreement" of 1946 (see above, Chap. 15), which omitted to provide elective seats on the Security Council for either Black Africa or Asia, took a severe battering when the seat allocated to the British Commonwealth went to the Ivory Coast. Also now, on account of the recent expansion of the Security Council, the Asians and Africans had five of ten elected seats in that body, with the remainder divided as follows: Eastern Europe, 1; Western Europe and other states (meaning Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 2; Latin America and the Caribbean, 2. (This superseded the "gentleman's agreement" of 1946). Also, the African and Asian members gained two judgeships on the International Court of Justice at the expense of the Latin Americans. There were, besides many more Asian and African nationals of the staff of the U.N. Secretariat.

Afro-Asian solidarity as demonstrated by the voting of the *bloc* in the U.N. General Assembly and in other bodies also has made an appreciable impact on the conduct of business in the U.N. It is due to this that the "domestic jurisdiction" provision of the

Charter, which was designed to cover the imperialist interests of the Great Powers, was all but nullified. It is, however, on issues of colonialism that the bloc demonstrated the greatest enthusiasm, cohesion and political pressure. A new chapter in the story of the handling of the decolonization issue by the U.N. began on 14 December 1960, when the Assembly adopted the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples'. With this declaration the Assembly put itself on record as affirming a soul-stirring principle: "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.....is an impediment to the promotion of world peace.....All peoples have the right of self-determination. . . Immediate steps should be taken in....territories which have not yet attained independence to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any considerations or reservations. . ."

A year later a committee of 17 was created (subsequently it was expanded to 24) to further the implementation of the declaration, with no requirements for balanced membership such as had been agreed to for the Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. In its expanded form the committee comprised 12 Afro-Asian nations, 3 Latin American, 5 Western, 3 East European (including the U.S.S.R.) and Yugoslavia. In 1963 the Assembly went a step further: realizing that the recommendations were not binding on the colonial powers, it asked the committee of 24 "to apprise the Security Council of any developments in any territory examined by it which may threaten international peace and security" This committee is one of the few subsidiary bodies thus authorized to bypass its parent body. Anti-colonialism is without question the ideology of the General Assembly, specially since it has come to be dominated by the Afro-Asian group. The racist policies of white-dominated South Africa have come in for severe condemnation by the General Assembly, which has called for ever-sterner measures against it, as we have seen above. Recently, it was against Rhodesia that the main fight was being carried on.

Obstacles to Afro-Asian Solidarity

Afro-Asian solidarity, though still strong with regard to opposition to all forms of colonialism and racialism, is understandably not quite

as monolithic as its most ardent champions wish it to be. Afro-Asia comprises vast regions, such as Black Africa, North Africa, the Arab lands etc., which claim special loyalties which have led to the formation of a number of unions such as the O.A.U., the *Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache*, the Arab League, the Colombo Powers, etc. about which we have spoken in their proper places above. Within these groups, also, wider ideals often give place to practical national interests which have prevented united action even in emergencies. Without doubt what has served most to corrode Asian or Afro-Asian solidarity in recent years has been Red China's expansionist policy, which reached its climax in the aggressive attack launched by her on India's northern borders in 1962 and has kept up a state of dangerous tension in the relations between the two great Asian powers ever since. The fact that the response to Mr. Nehru's appeal for sympathy and support addressed on the occasion to all friendly nations was more unequivocal and came quicker from the U.S.A. and the U.K. than from even the Arab nations, whose friendship India has sought to cultivate for many years, was a daunting experience for those who believe in the reality of Indo-Arab friendship, not to speak of those who cherish wider aspirations. Even among the nations who were invited to a Conference at Colombo by Mrs. Bandaranaike to discuss the situation who eventually presented some unanimous proposals acceptable to India, the lukewarmness of some was an eye-opener for others, (see above), Chap. 27. In the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, not unexpectedly, China assumed a threatening posture against India, but it was disheartening that Turkey, Iran and Indonesia actually supplied military hardware to one of the combatants, viz. their fellow-Islamic country, Pakistan. In the fight against Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (see above), Zambia and Malawi, dependent as they are on good relations with their white-run neighbour, failed to line up on the African side.

The Abortive Afro-Asian Conference at Algiers

What has most tragically indicated the present state of degeneration of Afro-Asian solidarity (outside the U.N. General Assembly and barring the issue of colonialism) has been the failure to hold the so-called second Bandung Conference at Algiers in 1965. The decision to hold such a conference was taken at a conference of 21 Afro-Asian

countries held at Jakarta in Indonesia from 10-16 April 1964. Subsequently it was decided that the meeting should be held at Algiers from 10 March 1965 and should be preceded by a Foreign Ministers' Conference, which should also decide upon India's suggestion that the U.S.S.R. and Malayasia be invited to participate. Before the meeting could be held a number of Afro-Asian meetings took place: (1) An African and Asian Islamic Conference held at Jakarta, 7-13 March 1965, which included representatives from India, Pakistan, and China, but excluded any from Persia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey; (2) A Meeting of Afro-Asian Legal Consultation Committee at Baghdad, 25 March 1965, which undertook, at the suggestion of India, to study the question of drafting the principles of "peaceful co-existence"—a term used in 4 international and 45 unilateral and multilateral declarations; (3) A Celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference (Malayasia not being invited) held at Jakarta from 17-19 April 1965; (4-6). The second, third, and fourth meetings of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Council, set up in Cairo in 1957, at Conkary (April, 1960), Moshi (Tanganyika), February, 7-11 1963, and Winneba (near Accra), 10-16 May, 1965, respectively.

Meanwhile the Algerian authorities had announced the postponement of their conference to 20 May 1965, and again to 29 June, Mr. Chou En-lai, who was opposed to Russian participation, and had met Mr. Ben Bella at Algiers on 30 March—1 April 1965 and President Nasser and Premier Ali Sabry at Cairo on 1 April 1965 presumably having had a hand in getting these postponements. Before the date on which the main conference was to be held, Mr. Ben Bella fell from power (15 January), and the new Head of State, General Boumedienne having at Chinese insistence, announced that the conference would be held on due date, the preliminary Foreign Ministers' meeting was actually held as previously arranged on 26 June. The main conference, however, was postponed till 5 November. After the Indo-Pakistani hostilities began, Mr. Chou En-lai changed his mind and declared himself opposed to the holding of the Conference of 5 November. At the meeting of the preparatory committee held on 25 October, India opposed the Chinese proposal for a postponement. Indonesia asked Algeria as the host country to ascertain which countries were willing to attend on 5 November. This was done, and 50 out of 65 countries invited to attend the

conference gave their opinion in favour of the Conference being held on 5 November. It was therefore announced that the meeting would be held on this date. Mr. Chou En-lai immediately issued a statement protesting against this decision and declaring that China would be compelled to absent herself, as it would lead to a split. Nevertheless, the preliminary Foreign Ministers' Conference, scheduled to meet on 28 October, met, though on account of the late arrival of some members, the meeting actually took place on 30 October. Now, at long last, the question had to be faced whether Soviet Russia was to be invited, as an Asian Country, to attend the meeting of Afro-Asian nations. Indians and Chinese, ranged against each other, canvassed for support of each other's stand. It was finally decided to postpone the Conference *sine die*.

It was a victory for Communist China, but the greatest exultation at the ending of the idea of holding a Second Bandung Conference was to be noticed in the West. There was a hearty endorsement there of what a disillusioned Arab leader is reported to have told a representative of an American journal: "There is no such thing any more as Afro-Asianism. It has been taken over by the big nations like China, who exploit it for their own, personal ends. I expect there will never be another Afro-Asian conference worthy of the name". Much of this is simply wishful Western thinking, but Afro-Asian solidarity has admittedly been put to severer strains on account of the Algiers fiasco.

AFTER FREEDOM—WHAT ?

At this writing, nearly the whole of the vast continent of Africa, barring South Africa are liberated from colonial rule. The newly emancipated nations of Africa are, however, beset with problems on the peaceful solution of which depends their progress. As we have seen above, apart from the problem of black versus white, the continent of the future (as Africa is being called at present) has developed an ugly problem, black versus black. Again in many of the new states, the problem of economic viability looms large. Further, all the new states have adopted the democratic form of government, but it is obvious that in most cases they lack the primary

conditions for the successful practice of democracy. To the charge that they are totally unfit for democracy, African leaders, however, say that to learn to fly the bird must be tossed from the nest ; one learns to swim in water, not on land ; before one walks, one must creep. Democracy, they point out, is a method of trial and experiment by error. At this writing, yet another danger seems to have appeared before the African states : it is the risk of being drawn into the many-sided controversies of the Cold War. There is a three-cornered struggle for influence in Africa—between the West and World Communism, and between the communist rivals, Russia and China. In December 1963, Mr. Chou En-lai visited Cairo, with the obvious purpose of promoting Peking's claim that it is the best champion of the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa. Chou En-lai confined his African tour to the United Arab Republic, Algeria, and Morocco, but his Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, attended the "Uhuru" (freedom) celebrations in Kenya, as a clear sign that Peking's ambitions ranged further south. The African States, however, seem to be resolved on maintaining a neutralist position in the U.N., and elsewhere. They have realized that African problems have African solutions, and that Africans alone have the primary responsibility for building up a new Africa.

CHAPTER XXXI

DISARMAMENT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

THE U.N. AND DISARMAMENT

THE members of the United Nations are dedicated to the cause of world peace and security, and the Preamble to the Charter commits them "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind". Under Article 2, members pledge themselves to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means", and under Article 1 they promise "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". So far there is little to differentiate the United Nations from its predecessor, the League of Nations, and the Charter also provides an enforcement system as did the Covenant, and seems even to improve upon it. Chapter VII of the Charter is the counterpart to Article 16 of the Covenant, and Articles 39, 41, and 42, which are the heart of United Nations' enforcement system, seem to go far beyond anything that the League contemplated (see above, Chap. 15).

Disarmament seems to have had as secure a niche in the Charter as it had in the Covenant, and claimed from the members of the new international body as much allegiance and devotion as it had had from those of the League. Article 11 of the Charter authorizes the General Assembly to consider, and make recommendations concerning "the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments"; Article 26 assigns to the Security Council, with the aid of the Military Staff Committee, the responsibility of developing plans for a system of armaments regulation; Article 47 reiterates the latter organ's advisory function on questions relating to "the regulation of armaments, and *possible disarmament* (italics

ours)". As regards the pursuit of the ideal of disarmament, member nations as opposed to each other as the U.S.A. and Soviet Russia and leaders as desperate as Khrushchev and de Gaulle contributed to the development of the standard assertion which found expression in a resolution unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1959, that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today".

With all their professions of loyalty to the doctrines of collective security and disarmament, however, the founders of the United Nations were quite cognizant of the problem of power, and were resolved to meet its requirements in the days to come. In the first Place, they placed the prime responsibility for maintaining peace and security broadly and squarely on the shoulders of those who possessed power—the five nations who became permanent members of the Security Council. Secondly, by giving them the so-called veto they made sure that the new creation should not be put to the risk of destruction by an attempt being made by it (as was done by the League) to coerce a great power. Thirdly, they sought to provide the United Nations with what the League had lacked—a ready-to-hand international force (this idea eventually failed of materialization). Fourthly, they placed far less emphasis on disarmament than had been done in the League Covenant—talking of *possible disarmament*, as we have seen, and, as one writer puts it, playing the theme in muted tone as contrasted with the clarion call for it made in the Covenant.

Why Disarmament ?

There were always two and opposing views on the question of disarmament. One is that armaments produce war and that they must be reduced in order that war may be eliminated, or at least made less inhumane. The other is that armaments do not make war and it is the danger of war that impels men to arms. "If man did not have bombs, he would fight with guns ; if he did not have guns, he would fight with rocks ; if he did not have rocks, he would fight with fists", it has been said. If survival is at stake, a man, or nation will indeed use any weapon he has, or can obtain, and an aggressor will use any weapon he thinks will achieve his end. He may be

deterred by fear of reprisal, but not by anything else. The opponents of disarmament found in the events of the interwar years what they thought were incontrovertible grounds in support of their view. In the first place, the League's failure in that regard showed that it was an unattainable goal: secondly, the Second World War itself had reamed with speed and vigour, that great calamity might never have confronted the world, they said. The moral that was drawn was; security lies in strength not weakness.

The moral was written into the Charter, as we have seen, and the question of disarmament might never have figured much in the deliberations of the United Nations had it not been for the shock that humanity received at the news of an unprecedented event—the dropping by the Americans of an atom bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 putting out at least a million lives and almost completely devastating the city. It was immediately realized that what the Americans had the monopoly of at the moment would sooner or later be in the possession of other nations (the Russians sooner than all others), and that in the context of the Cold War that had already started between East and West there was the sure prospect of the weapon being used against each other by the two sides with the consequent risk of colossal suffering for humanity, if not its entire extinction. Loud was the demand voiced on every quarter of the globe for the placing of a total ban on the manufacture and use of the horrid weapon by any nation and for international inspection and control of all factories producing fissile material for military and peaceful purposes. The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ernest Bevin, declared that the problems posed by the thermonuclear revolution called for the surrender of national sovereignty and the setting up of World Government.

The Atomic Energy Commission—American and Russian Plans

The Americans refused to share atomic secrets with other nations, not even with the British who by placing the results of their scientific research in nuclear fission at the disposal of American scientists and even despatching their own scientists to American laboratories during the war days had contributed to the success of the Americans in manufacturing the bomb. However, under the pressure of their

British and Russian allies, they agreed to the setting up of an Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, and on 24 January 1946 the body was actually set up, composed of one member each of the nations represented in the Security Council and Canada. In June, 1946, the Americans presented a plan for the control of atomic energy, which came to be known as the Baruch Plan (after the name of Bernard M. Baruch, the chief U.S. delegate at the AEC), for the consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission. The plan was rejected by Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet representative at the body, who, a few days later, presented a rival plan, which in turn was rejected by the Americans.

The two plans continued to be presented at successive sessions of the AEC by the proponent nations, and certain modifications were made of them on some such occasions. The Americans took their plan into the 1948 General Assembly, and after an all-out propaganda battle, received an overwhelming majority-vote in its favour (40-6). The Russians refused to accept the plan or to make any concessions, and nine months later succeeded in setting off their first atomic explosion. After the U.S.A. herself became liable to an atomic attack, the problem of nuclear disarmament became more complicated, and it has not been solved yet. They, however, do not regret that they did not succeed in getting their plan accepted by their opponents before the latter had their own bombs, for, in the light of later knowledge of the subject, the Baruch Plan appeared to be both unrealistic and dangerous to themselves. Before we take up these two plans it would be helpful if the problems of nuclear disarmament are set forth, so that the merits and defects of the plans may be easily found out.

Problems of Nuclear Disarmament

Disarmament in the nuclear age is feasible if three fundamental questions are all capable of being answered in the affirmative. These are : (1) Is the elimination of nuclear weapons in the interest of both sides, and equally so ? (2) Is a really effective and fool-proof control of atomic weapons a technical possibility ? If not, will an approximation do ? (3) If the setting up of a fool-proof system of atomic control requires surrender of national sovereignty, will it be so drastic as to be rejected by Russia and America ? As regards the first point, the U.S.A. has long based her defensive strategy on a policy of

"atomic deterrence", and hence is of opinion that it is not in her interest to destroy her atomic arm, specially so because as regards her conventional military strength she is inferior to the U.S.S.R. Secondly, it is now universally acknowledged that no cent per cent fool-proof control of the manufacture of nuclear weapons is possible. For one thing, in anticipation of the establishment some day of some atomic control scheme, those who have had bomb material, may have been engaged in secreting away some portion of it or some bombs even in extremely small quantities or numbers over the years. A highly skilful inspectorate may detect a good portion of past production but could not be sure it had found all. A complication is that the weight of nuclear fuel varies a certain amount with humidity. Further, to hide away a cache of weapon material is an easy enough job; radiation can be blanketed by ordinary water—thus bombs or bomb material can be hidden under lakes or ponds. As regards delivery, long-range commercial aircraft could be converted for the task quickly; bombs could be delivered by submarine or merchant ship or even in a traveller's brief case. The casings, which in themselves, are good shields, can be as small as four or five inches in length. Launching platforms for intermediate-range ballistic or intercontinental ballistic missiles (I.R.B.M.'s and I.C.B.M.'s) can be camouflaged so well that aerial reconnaissance planes would fail to detect the existence of at least many of them.

Baruch and Russian Plans Compared

The difficulties of detecting secret atomic weaponing being great, the American proposals for control were so designed that the entire atomic business from material to weapons might be covered. The Baruch Plan proposed to set up an International Atomic Development Authority which should manage and operate all plants producing raw materials in "dangerous quantities"; it would license and supervise all other plants. The Authority would itself own all atomic raw materials, from mine to factory, and all nuclear fuel produced in dangerous quantities. Violations of a treaty embodying these provisions would be punished without any veto to stand in the way. When the control programme had been put into "effective operation", the manufacture of bombs would stop, stockpiles would be converted to peaceful use, and all secrets would be shared with the

Authority. The Authority would decide when the moment of "effective operations" had arrived.

The Russian plan was fundamentally different. It started with the immediate outlawry of all atomic weapons, and the proposal to destroy all stocks of such weapons within three months. It contained no provision for the creation of any new international organization which was the pivotal point of the Baruch Plan. It left the enforcement of the outlawry of atomic weapons on the same moral plane as the Kellogg Pact had left the outlawry of war itself. Violation was to be treated as "a most serious crime against humanity", and each nation was to punish its own nationals for the offence. Mr. Gromyko offered to join in the study of "the measures, systems and organization of control and in the elaboration of a system of sanctions". But he rejected international control as envisaged in the Baruch Plan as affording to Americans chances for espionage and as derogatory to national sovereignty. He also rejected the proposal to do away with the veto power in the Security Council on the question of punishing violators as "incompatible with the interests of the U.N."

Russian Concessions

While the Americans continued to swear by the Baruch Plan in the years immediately following its introduction, the Russians attempted to close the gaps by proposing certain concessions. Remaining adamant in their opposition to the IDA idea, they showed their willingness to accept a form of international control. In 1947, Mr. Gromyko proposed to set up a 12-nation commission whose authority would extend to inspection but not to ownership or management. The inspection was to be fairly extensive, but it was to be periodic, with special inspection on suspicion of violation. Most important of all their reservations, the control scheme was to come into operation only after atomic bombs had been prohibited and destroyed. The Americans acknowledged the approximation to their own plan, but rejected it as still falling too short of providing for a really effective control organization.

In the General Assembly of 1951-52 the Russians announced a further concession: "prohibition and control would be put into effect

simultaneously". They explained the idea further as follows : first there would be a "decision in principle" on prohibition and control ; then the control organ be set up ; and finally, when the inspectors were "ready to underake immediate practical control", the obligation not to use atomic weapons and to begin dismantling them would take effect. Next year there was a further concession from the Russian side : as a first step, nations be permitted to keep their nuclear weapons but agree not to use them, a formula which had been first proposed in 1949 by Argentina and Philipppines. Any real discussions came to an end in early 1950 when the Soviets walked out of all U.N. organs over the Chinese representation issue. The Korean war followed. After the armistice they revived the idea of the "prohibition of use" of atomic weapons.

Both American and Russian Plans Unrealistic

In retrospect, these plans, the Baruch and the Russian ones with their modifications, were unrealistic—technically inadequate and politically unacceptable to either side. The Baruch Plan envisaged a degree of world government which neither the U.S.S.R. nor the U.S.A. could really agree to. It required both of them give an International Authority control over an important part of their domestic economy, that part which would be keyed to nuclear power. A day would come, under the plan, when all nuclear weapons would be destroyed and all atomic plants handed over to the Authority. The Authority no doubt would be American-dominated, but could Americans be expected to put their atomic plants under the control of any authority other than their national government ? When the time came for destroying the atom bombs, would not the Americans ask for postponements ? They were saved from being put to such tests by the Russian refusal to accept their plan. The Russians could not be blamed for refusing to do what the Americans themselves could not be expected to do, and for their refusal there was a further good reason—the Authority would be dominated by nations who belonged to a hostile world. There could be little possibility that they would carry on nuclear research ; sputniks would not have orbited the earth ; one could not imagine a Luna 9 safely landing on the moon and sending photos of the moon's surface taken at close range ; Russia could not have ever become a nuclear power. There

were many other cogent arguments to support their decision to reject the Baruch Plan. On the other hand, the Russian counter-plan was also unrealistic, if only because there was no proposal for an effective international control body in it. If the U.S.A. surrendered its nuclear weapons—the principal source of its military power—it would reduce itself to the level—or below the level—of the U.S.S.R.

Conventional Weapons

Meanwhile, a Commission for Conventional Armaments had been established in February, 1947. It did little work, for the Soviets, who had wanted a body dealing with both nuclear and conventional weapons and were defeated, did not co-operate. In 1949, however, the French introduced into it a plan for a census of armed forces and conventional weapons as a first step towards arms reduction. The Russians, crying "espionage", demanded reduction first, then verification, and of a much less thorough kind. If there was to be a census, they said, it must include the American stockpile of nuclear weapons. In January, 1950 there was a Soviet walk-out (over the Chinese seat issue) and work was virtually once again suspended. A year later, in accordance with a Western proposal, meant to conciliate the Russians, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Weapons were merged into one new body, the Disarmament Commission, which was to deal with both nuclear and conventional weapons. At the same time they put forward a plan based largely on the earlier French proposal for a census and verification and a reaffirmation of the Baruch Plan "until and unless a better or no less effective system can be devised". Though it received considerable neutralist support the Western plan was unrealistic—asking for inspectors being sent to every country in the world for a count of rifles, soldiers, policemen, etc.. for establishing criteria for armies (so many per square mile of territory, etc.), fixing levels ("adequate for defence" but not "adequate for aggression", etc.). The most-quoted commentary on the proposal was that of Mr. Vyshinsky, the Soviet Foreign Secretary, who said: "After reading the speech (of President Truman), I could not get to sleep all night—because I was choking with laughter". A deadlock once again set in, which did not begin to break until the Eisenhower "atoms-for-peace" plan in December, 1953, the British-French memorandum of June, 1954, and the Soviet

responses of September, 1954 and May, 1955. (President Eisenhower proposed the setting up of an atomic pool or "bank" for supplying atomic material to undeveloped nations for use of them for peaceful purposes. It was a peaceful "gesture", but the Russians did not co-operate.)

East and West Inching towards Each Other

As a matter of fact the once-yawning gap between East and West on disarmament had by now narrowed down to disagreement chiefly on two points: (1) the nature and degree of control and (2) the timing of the various steps in the disarmament process. The deadlock on the nature of control still seemed to be wholly unbreakable; it seemed however that on timing some compromise might be possible. In the 1948 General Assembly, Vyshinsky had made a significant concession; that the two conventions, or treaties—the one on prohibition, the other on control—could be "signed and brought into operation simultaneously". If he could be taken at his word, this meant that he conceded that the West might not have to destroy its bombs before control was ready to operate. In 1951-52 he confirmed that, that was what he really meant, and gave some further elaboration of the idea. The West, however, was still left unconvinced that there was not to be a "time lag" between actual prohibition and actual control. East and West might have gone on disagreeing with each other for yet a long time to come, but some events were happening in the world which made them pause and realize that they must come to some settlement with each other. West Germany was on the verge of becoming a full-fledged member of NATO, authorized to have nearly a million men in arms and an air force second only to that of the U.S.A., and the U.K., and out of the Korean war there emerged the figure of a giant, the People's Republic of China, with an air force reputed to be the fourth or the fifth largest in the world, the U.K. had conducted a successful nuclear test, and the lesson was to be learned by others. In the United Nations the sense of urgency was indicated by the setting up in 1953 of a sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission which was to consist of 'the Powers principally involved'.

Soviet Proposals, 10 May 1955—a turning-point

In its note of 10 May 1955 presented to the U.N. Disarmament Sub-committee in London, the Soviet Government made some pro-

posals regarding the timing of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the process of reducing armed forces which were hailed as marking a considerable advance towards positions acceptable to the West. They also frankly recognized that "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for circumventing this control and organizing the secret manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement of international control". The Americans welcomed this admission by the Soviet Government of the realization by them of the fact that a fool-proof inspection system was impossible to devise, and immediately set about finding out some acceptable substitute for it. American experts, in their search for some approximation to airtight control, came to the conclusion that an early warning system could be devised which would ward off the risk of a sudden atomic attack—of "frightful surprise", as President Eisenhower called it. The principal method of obtaining advance warning, they thought, would be to place the strategic air force of the potential enemy under careful surveillance. The men doing the watching could report at regular intervals; and major interruptions in their reports—caused, for example, by a total black-out of communications of the inspecting personnel—would immediately alert a potential victim. An early warning system would be like a brightly lighted plate-glass window which a burglar has to break with a resounding crash when he takes the first step toward committing a crime. Another method of obtaining advance warning would be to watch the potential enemy's communication system. Still other means would be scrutiny of national defence budgets—keeping watch of his steel and aluminium production, of the manufacture of electronics equipment and other similar tell-tale items.

President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" Proposal

President Eisenhower's dramatic proposal in a summit meeting with Premier Bulganin of the Soviet Union, Premier Faure of France and Premier Eden of Great Britain at Geneva, 21 July 1955, of an "open skies" scheme—the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to exchange with each other "blueprints" of their military establishments and verify them by aerial reconnaissance—was a step in the direction of preventing surprise attack. With the same end in view Premier Bulganin proposed the setting up by an international control agency "on the terri-

territories of all the respective states, along reciprocal lines, control posts in big ports, railway junctions, motor roads and aerodromes". The assumption on which this proposal was based is that a state preparing for major aggression would normally mobilize its infantry, parachute troops, and marines to follow up a nuclear attack and occupy the enemy territory. These operations could not but be detected by control posts if they were free to move out in the territory under surveillance. Premier Faure suggested a third method, viz. scrutinizing national defence budgets.

Premier Bulganin rejected the "open skies" proposal on the ground that it would be converted into espionage, but in November, 1956 he reverted to the idea in a new form. He said that the U.S.S.R. would accept limited aerial inspection in Europe in a zone 800 kilometers on each side of the demarcation line between opposing NATO and WARTO military forces. The U.S.A. replied that the NATO allies would consider a European zone only if the Soviet Union would agree to a zone covering parts of the United States and Russia. Alternatives advanced by the West, including a plan for an Arctic inspection zone, labelled on 13 June by Mr. Khrushchev, who had now become Premier, as "quite comical", were rejected by the Soviet Union in the U.N. Disarmament Sub-committee in August, 1957. On 4 October 1957, the space age began with the successful launching of Sputnik I into orbit around the earth. The Soviet announcement that the object had been launched by an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a projectile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and the successful launching of Sputnik III, a 3,000 pound object more than 1,000 miles into the air, confirmed the validity of the claim made in an earlier Soviet announcement (25 August 1957) that Russia had succeeded in perfecting an ICBM. The possibility of the use of outerspace weapons in future warfare horrified the world and made the task of arms control far more difficult and complicated than before. Strenuous efforts were made in the Sub-committee to arrive at a unified "package agreement" and adoption of some limited "first step" measures, but with no results. The Soviet Union declared that it would boycott all meetings of the Disarmament Commission (on the ground that it was unrepresentative) and did so till 3 November 1958, when, in accordance with an Indian resolution, its

membership was made to include all the members of the General Assembly.

The Question of Nuclear Tests Ban

Both East and West had expected that 1957 would not go by without their achieving some success—even a “limited first step” in their decade-long negotiation on disarmament. Such hopes were dashed to the ground on account of the breakdown of negotiations in the Disarmament Commission. The following year, however, witnessed a considerable advance in a limited area of the vast field of disarmament negotiations, viz., test ban cessation. Strictly speaking a ban on tests of nuclear weapons is not an actual disarmament measure. With the experience gained in previous tests nuclear nations could go on producing more nuclear arms, not perhaps “better” than what they possessed but deadlier ones. The outcry against tests was for their radio-active fall-out (see above, Chap. 20). Nuclear powers themselves did not consider the hazards to be too much—not at least when they were engaged in the act: when the U.S.A. carried on a test, its experts declared the risks to humanity to be ‘minimal’, and strongly denounced criticisms which came from the Russians; and *vice versa*. Nevertheless, they admitted that a cessation of these tests was a desirable disarmament goal, since it might help to create a better international climate and ease tensions, and facilitate mutually acceptable solutions of other international problems also. Cynics, however, pointed out a connection between the increase of willingness of the nuclear powers to accept a ban on nuclear tests and the growth of the “Nth country problem”—a desire to prevent other nations (China was said to be preparing for a nuclear test soon) getting the bomb. In February, 1960, France exploded a bomb in the Sahara.

In 1958 two conferences were held in Geneva—the first, a scientific and technical conference, which was to find out whether it was technically possible to detect nuclear explosions; the second, a political conference to implement the findings of the first. The first met on 1 June and with commendable speed produced a report on 21 August. It set out methods of detecting test explosions in the air, under water and under ground and put forward recommendations for the establishment and equipment of a control network which

would ensure that violations of a test ban would not go undetected. The control system, under their plan, would require 170 control posts all over the world. Before the Political Conference could meet, the U.S.A. had carried out a major series of blasts, the U.K. also had exploded nuclear weapons, and the U.S.S.R. said she had therefore the right to continue testing until she had tested as much as the two Western powers combined since 31 March, on which date she had unilaterally suspended her tests. However, the Political Conference consisting of the delegates of the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. met on 31 October 1958, and in well over 200 meetings extended over two and a half years succeeded in adopting a preamble, 17 articles and two annexes of a draft treaty. But the question of setting up an effective control system found the two sides sharply at variance with each other, and a deadlock ensued. When it reassembled, after a recess, on 21 March 1961, the Soviet Union advanced a "troika" plan under which a tripartite board consisting of representatives of the U.S.S.R., the allied democracies, and neutral nations (instead of a single administrator as proposed before) and having a veto, would administer the plan. The deadlock continued.

Meanwhile the outlook for successful steps toward disarmament had somewhat brightened with the assembling on 15 March 1960 of a Ten-Nation Committee on disarmament (appointed on 7 September 1959) at *Palais des Nations* at Geneva. In September, President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, after holding talks at Camp David, had issued a joint statement that "the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today"—a phrase subsequently expanded to cover "general and complete" disarmament and incorporated in a unanimously approved General Assembly resolution. At the Ten-Nation Committee, the Soviet Union presented a proposal which it had already put up before the General Assembly in September, 1959. The Western proposal, which was presented in a perfected form by President Kennedy to the U.N. General Assembly on 25 September 1961 (see below), was similar, but laid more stress on control. The Committee soon found itself bogged down in fruitless discussions and adjourned on 29 April 1960. Then, on 5 May, eleven days before a summit meeting which had been arranged to take place at Paris, Premier Khrushchev startled the

world by announcing that on 1 May the U.S.S.R. had shot down a U.S. espionage plane flying over Soviet territory. President Eisenhower denied and prevaricated, and then, confronted by facts, admitted the espionage which, he still argued, was for "legitimate national defence". As the world waited anxiously, the leaders of the four nuclear powers assembled in Paris. In vain, like an erring child the President pleaded that it would not be done again. (The offending U-2 plane, it may be noted, had started on its ill fated flight from Peshawar in Pakistan, a military ally of the U.S.A.) Khrushchev wanted full submission and retraction, and not getting it, wrecked the summit by leaving Paris in a huff. The talks, however, went on in the Ten-Nation Committee till 27 June when the Soviet delegation, led by Valerin Zorian, walked out.

Partial Versus Universal Disarmament

By this time the idea had gained ground that complete disarmament is better than partial disarmament, and that if agreement is ever to be reached on disarmament, it will be easier and sooner to come in the form of complete disarmament. Anything less, the advocates of general disarmament say, will result in deadlocked negotiations, because reduction to one level and in some particular branch of armaments is advantageous to one country and may be disadvantageous to others. They insist that the only arrangement which affects all participants equally, and leaves all equally impotent to commit aggression, is complete disarmament. It is also argued that inspection, which is the great stumbling block, will not impose greater burdens in implementing a scheme of general disarmament, for inspectors who are verifying the absence of certain weapons throughout a country could, without greatly added burdens, check on the absence of all weapons. According to the Russians, inspection is in itself a kind of disarmament in so far as it eliminates the military asset of secrecy. They say, therefore, that they will not accept inspection and control until there is complete and general disarmament.

Soviet Proposals

Two plans for effecting "general and complete disarmament" or, as the Russians say, "universal and complete disarmament"—accepted in principle by the General Assembly in 1959—are before the world.

today. Authoritative abridgements of them are given below. The Soviet proposal (as summarized in General Assembly Official Records : 14th Session) calls for a three-stage programme to be completed in four years. In the first stage : (a) the armed forces of the People's Republic of China, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. would be reduced to 17,00,000 men each ; (b) France and the United Kingdom would be limited to 650,000 men each ; (c) the levels of other states' forces would be established at a special session of the General Assembly or a world disarmament conference ; and (d) armaments and military equipment of the various nations would correspondingly be reduced. In the second stage, the disbandment of armed forces would be completed and military bases on foreign soil be eliminated. In the third stage, nuclear weapons, missiles, and air force "equipment" would be destroyed ; production, possession and storage of chemical and bacterial weapons would be done away with ; military administrative departments, military courses and training, and appropriation of funds for military purposes would be abolished. With regard to the implementation of these measures, the Soviet Union proposed the establishment of an international control organ whose activities would "correspond to the stage reached in the phased disarmament of states", that is, as each completed stage in disarmament justifies, not control in advance of actual disarmament. In an *aide memoire* issued on 21 July 1961, it stated that it sought "disarmament control", but not "armaments control". Broad inspection, it said, will be acceptable only in a completely unarmed world.

President Kennedy's Proposal

The Kennedy proposal also provided for three stages. *Stage I* calls for the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization (IDO), within the framework of the U.N., to insure compliance with all agreements. There would be specific reductions in force levels, by teletype a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests, a halt to the production of fissionable materials for weapons' use, supervision of transfer among nations of all fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, prohibition on international transfer of nuclear weapons and steps to eliminate weapons' stockpiles. In addition, there would be agreements to control and reduce nuclear weapons' delivery systems, agreement on peaceful uses of outer space, inspection and controls to

prevent surprise attack or accidental war, and reaffirmation of intent to seek peaceful solutions for international disputes. *Stage 2* calls for expansion of the powers of IDO, further reductions in forces and arms levels (including nuclear weapons stockpiles and delivery systems) "to agreed levels in equitable and balanced step" and the establishment of a U.N. Peace Force with progressively strengthened capacity "to deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the U.N.". *Stage III* calls for transfer of peace-keeping responsibility to the U.N., reduction of national forces to non-nuclear levels consistent with requirements for maintaining internal order, and prohibition of the manufacture of armaments for any other purposes—in short "peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world".

The Soviet proposal differs markedly from the American one in that it does not recognize any need for establishing any international peace-keeping machinery (such as IDO as proposed by Mr. Kennedy) to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of national forces and to inspect and enforce the disarmament arrangements.

Moscow-Washington "Hot line" Agreement and Partial Test Ban Treaty Signed, 1963

There were some discussions on these proposals for general and complete disarmament followed by the usual stalemate, but in 1963, rather unexpectedly, two successes were achieved. On 2 June 1963, an agreement was signed between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. for establishing a direct communication link by teletype between Moscow and Washington for use in emergency (such as had arisen recently over the Soviet missile bases in Cuba). As explained in Washington, the "hot line" was regarded as a step "to help reduce the risk of war occurring by accident or miscalculation". This agreement was the one positive result emerging out of the sixteen months long deliberations of the seventeen-nation conference sitting at Geneva. The other success was the signing of a test ban treaty at Moscow by England, America and Russia on 25 July, followed by ratification on 25 August 1963. As the three powers had failed to reach unanimity on the ability of their scientists, at the present state of knowledge, to detect all kinds of explosion (the western scientists being of the view that

minor underground tests could not be distinguished from earthquakes) and the Soviet Union being unwilling to agree to the minimum number of inspections proposed by the West, it was decided to limit the test ban agreement to test in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water only, and, for this purpose to hold talks in Moscow on 10 June. In a speech at East Berlin on 2 July 1963 Mr. Khrushchev angrily declared that the western powers were "stalling" the discussions, and that in reality there was "no need whatsoever for any inspections to check the discontinuance of tests including underground tests". However, as things stand at present, underground tests may continue. As could be foreseen, China, who had completed her preparations for a nuclear detonation, and France, who had not yet had a sufficient stockpile, refused to sign; but 105 other nations (excluding Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam, who supported China on ideological grounds), signed the agreement.

The signing of the partial test ban treaty by many non-aligned nations, including some like India who had nuclear capacity but would not manufacture nuclear weapons, raised the question how they were to be compensated for their act of self-denial. At the meeting of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, which began on 27 January 1967, they voiced their protest, specially when they found that the two leading nuclear powers were busying themselves in formulating plans for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Americans, indeed, were found ready with a draft of a treaty which would forbid the present nuclear powers from any action which would lead to an increase in the number of states or groups having such weapons. They were themselves prepared, they said, to prohibit transfer of nuclear weapons from their country to others not possessing them, and their draft treaty imposed corresponding obligations on non-nuclear nations in respect of receiving or manufacturing such weapons. The Russians immediately pointed out that current American proposals for nuclear sharing arrangements in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would certainly lead to proliferation. They accordingly made counterproposals, in the form of another draft treaty, which were designed to meet their own and the non-aligned nations' objections. The Russian draft treaty, as put up in the Disarmament Conference by the Russian representative, Mr. Semyon Tsarapkin, on behalf of the Soviet Premier, Mr. Kosygin, included a

guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used against signatories to the treaty who do not have weapons on their territory. It was expected that Americans would readily accept the Russian draft including the guarantee, but they have not yet done so, evidently considering it as not quite so innocuous as it looks (perhaps because the guarantee would not apply to NATO countries where nuclear weapons may be stored).

The prospects for further East-West agreements in disarmament receded as American bombing raids in North Vietnam led to a deep freeze in their relations. But there was an agreeable breakthrough on 27 January 1967, when the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain signed a treaty binding the three governments to ban nuclear weapons from outer space. The Soviet Union claims special credit for the treaty as the result of a proposal it first made in 1958. The treaty was assured of international support when the text was approved two weeks ago by the 18-member U.N. Outer Space Committee, which includes the United States, India and the Soviet Union. Earlier, the U.N. General Assembly had endorsed the treaty by a unanimous vote on 19 December, 1966. The treaty calls for freedom of exploration of outer space by all nations, without claims to national sovereignty, and binds signatory governments to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. The setting up of military bases on the moon and other celestial bodies is prohibited. Nations which set up installations on the moon and the planets must open them up to inspection by other nations provided they are given "reasonable time". The treaty prohibits the orbiting of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Astronauts who land by mistake on another nation's territory must be handed back.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

At present five nations possess nuclear weapons as also means of their delivery. They are, besides the two super powers, China, England, and France. West Germany, Japan and Canada are technologically capable of producing them today—India and Israel being close behind and Pakistan, notwithstanding protestations to the contrary being strongly suspected of clandestinely preparing one. In

the years behind, Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, Switzerland, East Germany. Poland and the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) possess the necessary technical and financial capacity to produce it. It takes only 5 to 10 kilograms of plutonium to make an atom bomb. By now civil reactors in some 40 countries are capable of producing some 25,000 to 70,000 kilograms of plutonium every year, and it would be easy for them to secret one per cent of their production every year, which would be sufficient to produce 50 to 70 bombs every year.

So far as nuclear warfare between themselves is said to be ruled out—the presumption is a controversial one on account of what is known as “the balance of terror (deterrence, for short),—in many parts of the world there are hatreds that run deep, for example, in South Africa which pursues the policy of apartheid (and is said to have already detonated an atomic device), and there are enough hot-heads among those who wield power—military dictators anxious about perpetuating themselves in power, ethnic, or tribal or religious enmities which can and have produced wars. (Since the Second World War, there have been 53 significant conflicts, all but two of which being in the developing regions of the world). If, in any of these countries, even crude kiloton weapons are used, the devastation would be terrible. Could the super-powers resist their own involvement in it? Again, what might happen if, say, West Germany decided to be an independent nuclear weapons power, and Soviet Russia attempted to prevent it? Further, some of the developing powers—notably India—having declared their firm resolve not to manufacture a nuclear weapon, there is the question, how to protect them against nuclear blackmail.

These questions vividly illustrate why the two super-powers came to share a sense of urgency over the need for reaching a world-wide agreement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. On 24 August 1967, they submitted identical drafts of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty to ENDC, calling on nuclear weapons powers not to transmit weapons technology or nuclear weapons to countries not yet possessing them, and binding the non-nuclear weapons countries not to receive or develop nuclear weapons or weapons technology. A difficult question at once arose about the implementation of the

proposed treaty, viz., how an inspection system acceptable to all the probable future signatories was to be devised. The super-powers, however, were agreeable to the idea that this was to be done through the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Another and more formidable difficulty was the feeling created in the minds of the non-nuclear nations that they were being permanently consigned to a second class status in the world. In the course of a few months of negotiating between the super-powers, however, some—but not all—the questions were solved, and on 18 January 1968, a complete draft of the treaty was submitted by them at Vienna—for adherence to it of all states who chose to do so.

To make a long story short, by 1968, 100, and by 1979, 111 countries have so far acceded to the treaty—having accepted the IAEA safeguards. India which had detonated a nuclear device in May, 1974, while reaffirming that it stood by its declared policy of not manufacturing a nuclear weapons, refused to sign the treaty. Its objections to joining the NPT system are: firstly, that this would place its indigenously established or autonomously controlled nuclear facilities under "safeguards"; secondly, such agreements are discriminatory and do not extend to the militarily nuclear facilities of nuclear weapons powers; and thirdly, perhaps she has apprehensions about Pakistan's clandestine efforts to establish a uranium enrichment facility, which has obvious military overtones. In a famous fable narrated by Sri Ramakrishna, the guru had asked its disciple, a serpent, never to bite; the cowherd boys took advantage of this to belabour it with impunity; the guru on his next visit to his disciple and finding it half-dead, said, "I had asked you not to bite. Why did you not raise your hood and hiss?"

DETENTE

In a previous chapter (Chapter XVII) we have described how a feeling grew in America that the policy of containment of Soviet Russia, generally associated with the name of Secretary of State, Dulles, was a failure and that a thaw grew in the Cold War between East and West. Neither Russia nor the United States, however, ceased from viewing each other with suspicion or refrain from pursuing its own policies. The bitter lessons learnt by the U.S.A. government from its unsuccessful war in Vietnam and, on the Soviet side,

the growing deterioration of relations with China and the changes in the power-balance in the Middle East due to the revolution in Iran could not but have some effects on both. At about the same time also military experts in both countries had come to the conclusion that a nuclear war could not bring victory—at whatever cost—to either participant and that it could lead to mutual destruction, if not the apocalypse. All these factors and considerations have led to a considerable lessening of tension between the two powers and a period of what is called a detente has set in. The new era has witnessed regular and frequent summit meetings which have been used to resolve diplomatic tensions and to promote the detente process itself. “In the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality,” stated Henry Kissinger, “the relaxation of tensions is the only possible course, and the only policy that can be pursued by any Administration charged with the responsibility for the lives of Americans.” “The struggle to assist the principles of peaceful co-existence, for lasting peace and detente and in the long-term, to prevent the risk of a new world war,” Leonid I. Brezenev has said, “has been and still remains elements in our relations with capitalist states”.

Out of such perceived necessity the two countries have proceeded to negotiate a limit to their strategic arsenals. We have already referred to the Moscow-Washington “Hot line” Agreement and Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963, and the treaty, between the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain binding them to ban nuclear weapons from outer space. Also of major importance was the beginning in late 1969 of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks a Helsinki (SALT I). These were followed by a series of agreements setting quantitative limits on missile launches and the establishment of certain principles of nuclear behaviour. These have included, *inter alia*, the following :—

- (i) improvement in communications between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. through modernization of the “hot line” (1971);
- (ii) an agreement signed in Moscow on 26 May 1972 limiting anti-ballistic (ABM) systems of both powers;
- (iii) an interim agreement freezing offensive strategic missiles at current levels for five years.

Further, at a 1974 summit meeting between Ford and Brezenev, both sides agreed to set limits on numbers of strategic missiles, multiple delivery

systems and heavy bombers. These agreements took form in a SALT II treaty, signed in Vienna on 19 June 1979, by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev. The treaty, due to expire in 1985, also limited improvements in current missiles.

The agreements between the two super-powers were aimed at establishing some sort of a parity in possession by them of nuclear weapons, not at reducing them—at least immediately. They marked no step in disarmament, or banning of any kind of weapons. Critics have pointed out that they represent nothing but “arms control upwards” allowing each side to keep up existing weapons levels in those areas where the opponent has an edge. In the critics’ views, moreover, the agreed ceilings are higher than national security actually needs. Seven years after the initial round of SALT, the number of U.S. strategic weapons has more than doubled from 4,300 to about 9,000, and the Soviet count has grown at as rapid a rate, from 1,350 to 3,500.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation at Helsinki, 1975—the Final Act—Due to the persistent efforts of the U.S.S.R., in pursuing the idea of a Security Conference which struck the West as unprecedented, a 35-nation Conference was held at Helsinki Finlandia House in the summer of 1975. At the Conference, both sides displayed a remarkable spirit of compromise and conciliation. The Soviets dropped their earlier offensive demands which included the disbanding of NATO and E.C.M. The Final Act was generously sprinkled with references to equal rights and economic co-operation, fundamental freedoms and non-intervention, sovereign equality and territorial integrity. There were specific clauses about reunification of families, marriage between citizens of different states, etc.

The document did contain one controversial point—the one that concerned the “inviolability” of “the present frontiers of Europe”. This involved the recognition by the West of the division of Germany and the legitimization of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, for which many tears had been shed by the Western leaders, including successive Presidents of America. Many Americans questioned the very policy of detente, or asserted that it should be at least a two-way street. Many Westerners contended themselves with the thought that the Final Act was, after all, a non-binding declaration of certain principles.

which reflected both the *existing* European realities and the *immediate future* interests of both sides. The *fact*, however, that such a Conference between East and West could be held at all and that a unanimous accord on vexed questions could be adopted by it, does seem to be significant.

LEADING DATES AND EVENTS

1945—15 November. Britain, the U.S.A., and Canada proposed the establishment of a U.N. Commission with the task of preventing the use of atomic weapons for destructive purposes.

1946—24 January. The U.N. Atomic Energy Commission set up with the members of the Security Council plus Canada as members.

—24 June. Baruch Plan put forward proposing an international authority, which would own all fissionable material in trust for the world, and own, operate, and manage all facilities for handling of dangerous amounts of such materials. When a control system was in full operation the manufacture and use of atomic weapons would be banned and existing stocks disposed of. Russia rejects the Plan.

1947—13 February. United Nations Commission for Conventional Weapons established.

1948—17 May. U.N. General Assembly endorses the Baruch Plan.

1949—23 September. First atomic explosion in the U.S.S.R.

1951—19 November. The West proposes the establishment of a U.N. Disarmament Commission and disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments.

1952—11 January. The U.N. "Disarmament Commission" set up with same members as the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission.

—1 November. The U.S. tests its first hydrogen bomb.

1953—21 August. The U.S.S.R. tests its first hydrogen bomb.

—28 December. President Eisenhower proposes peaceful use of atomic energy—'Atoms for Peace'.

1954—23 April Sub-Committee (representing the U.S., Britain, France, Canada, the Soviet Union) set up by the Disarmament Commission holds its first session in London.

—11 June. A comprehensive phased plan tabled in the Sub-Committee by Britain and France. This proposed a programme of balanced (conventional and nuclear) disarmament. The completion of each stage was to be verified by a control organ before the measures in the next stage were taken. When the second half of the agreed reductions of conventional weapons and armed forces had been carried out, the total prohibition and elimination of existing stock of nuclear materials were to be carried out.

1955—10 May. At another session of the Sub-Committee new Soviet proposals were put forward in which the Soviet Government seemed to recognize for the first time the principle of progressive development of a control system. (The provisions for control were still, however, regarded by the West as sketchy and inadequate. Later, some criticisms were made that the West missed a chance by not accepting these Soviet proposals at their face value.)

—19 May. The work of the Sub-Committee was suspended on 19 May for the impending General Elections in Britain and because of the forthcoming Geneva Summit Meeting.

—18-23 July. Geneva Summit Meeting held. Mr. Eisenhower proposed his "Open Skies" Plan, and Sir Anthony Eden a "Pilot Scheme" for joint inspection of the forces confronting one another in Europe.

1956—19 March. At a new session of the Disarmament Sub-Committee a revised form of Anglo-French Plan of 1954 was tabled. It did not propose elimination of nuclear weapons as past proposals had done, and hence was considered as going back to former proposals.

1957—29 August. At a further session of the Sub-Committee in London, a western plan for "partial" disarmament as a first step was proposed. It also proposed, as part of the "package", for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests. Rejected out of hand by the Soviet delegate.

—14 November. The above plan was endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly by 56 votes to 9 (the Soviet bloc) with 15 abstentions.

1958-60—There was little progress from the rejection of the western "partial" plan by the Soviet Union in 1957 and the meeting of the

Ten-Nation Sub-Committee which started in Geneva in March, 1960. There were some talks on prevention of surprise attacks, and they were futile.

On 17 September, 1959 a three-stage plan for comprehensive disarmament was outlined by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, and a day later Khrushchev expounded his plan for "general complete disarmament".

1960—May. British, American and Russian scientists met in Geneva and reached a large measure of agreement on coordinated research into detection of underground tests.

1961—27 November. The Soviet Government published the text of a four-point draft treaty to ban all tests in the atmosphere, outer space, under water.

—28 November. The Geneva Conference resumed its meetings. The West rejected the four-point treaty as unacceptable.

1962—March. The Disarmament Conference set up a Sub-committee on nuclear tests consisting of representatives of the U.S.A., Soviet Union and Britain.

—26 November. The 18-nation Disarmament Conference re-convened.

1963—During the recess of the Disarmament Conference, private talks were held in Washington and New York on the basis of Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy offering 2 or 3 on-site inspections annually and the establishment of unmanned seismic stations.

—12 February. 18-nation Commission reconvened in Geneva.

—15-25 July, Negotiations on a partial test ban treaty held between Britain, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Government. Agreement reached on 25 July, and their draft treaty initialled.

—5-5 August. The treaty signed in Moscow by the three governments, and declared open for signature by others.

1967—27 January. Disarmament Conference meets at Geneva. U.S.A. and Soviet Union put forward draft treaties for prevention of non-proliferation. Britain, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union sign a treaty banning nuclear weapons from outer space.

CHAPTER XXXII

WORLD POPULATION PROBLEMS

THE POPULATION EXPLOSION

"Population explosion" is a term commonly used to describe the phenomenal increase in world population that has occurred during recent years, and specially since the end of the Second World War. It is an admittedly unscientific expression, but certainly a telling one. Some writers have likened what they call the population bomb explosion to the two atomic bomb explosions which took place at the close of the war. They consider the population bomb explosion to be fraught with even more serious consequence than the two atomic bomb explosions since, while mankind is now aware that a full-scale atomic war may destroy humanity and hence an atomic bomb may never again be used in war, the population bomb has already exploded in some parts of the world and further explosions are inevitable unless excessive population growth can be checked.

Some facts and figures may be cited here to illustrate the growth of human population during the ages. Man, or very close kin to man, has lived on this planet for more than a million years. It is not known exactly when *homo sapiens* (the present version of man) first appeared, but he was much in evidence in various regions of the globe something like 25,000 to 30,000 years ago. According to reliable estimates, during the 600,000 years of the Old Stone Age, population increased at the rate of 2 per cent per 1,000 years. Today it is growing at the rate of 2 per cent per year. Thus, in the course of man's habitation on the earth, growth rates have increased a thousand fold. If this rate of growth is maintained, in about six and one-half centuries it would give each person only one square foot of land surface on the globe, including mountains, deserts and the arctic wastes. As Mr. Putnam puts it grotesquely: "If the world population continued to grow at present rates for only a few thousand years, there would be a galactic sphere of flesh expanding into space at

many times the velocity of light," (Palmer Cosslett Putnam, *Energy in the Future*).

Before the advent of agriculture, some 8,000 to 10,000 years ago, the human population could hardly have exceeded 20 million, according to Sir Arthur Keith, and may have been no more than 5 million. Agriculture greatly increased man's food supply, and the attendant domestication of animals provided more energy for transportation and for farm work, and insured a reliable source of meat. Human population rapidly increased, probably exceeding 100 million by 1000 B.C. and numbering between 200 million and 250 million in another thousand years. The average rate of growth during this period has been estimated at about 106 per cent annually. During the next 600 years there was little progress in many parts of the world. The concentration of population in cities and villages, with little sanitary control, facilitated the spread of diseases and epidemics. There were incessant wars among states. Nevertheless, the world population reached a total of about half a billion between 1600 and 1700 A.D., and about a billion by about 1850. By 1930, only 80 years later, 2 billion persons were alive. Thirty years later in 1960, the figure totalled 3 billion. (In spite of the most devastating war of history, German massacres, and widespread malnutrition, the population of Europe, excluding Russia, increased by 11,000,000 people between 1936 and 1946; see William Vogt, *Road to Survival*.) If present trends continue, the world population will reach 4 billion in 1977; 5 billion a decade later in 1987; and 6 billion (thus doubling itself) in 1995.

The rapid population growth in Europe and North America during the past few hundred years was made possible by the advances in agricultural techniques, the Industrial Revolution, the colonization of the Americas, etc. There was also a substantial decline in the death rate. For this several factors were responsible. Firstly, there was a vast increase of national wealth, leading to improvements in living standards of at least the upper classes, and progress in sanitary conditions. During the nineteenth century great strides were made in purifying food and water and improving personal cleanliness, which contributed materially to the elimination of parasitic, infectious and contagious diseases. Another and major contributory factor has been the advance of modern medicine—enhanced by the recent pro-

gress in chemotherapy and the insecticides. The rapid growth of population went on despite the onset of fertility declines, which became noticeable in France and the United States in the late eighteenth century and in Western Europe generally during the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century. The spectacular decrease in the death rate of the economically advanced Western countries was not shared by most of the population of the world. Of the people of non-European stock, only Japan had managed appreciably to increase longevity. However, there was a dramatic change in the situation after the Second World War. A variety of factors, including the advent of the U.N. and the Specialized Agencies with programmes emphasizing economic development and dissemination of chemotherapy and insecticides, have opened up to the mass of people throughout the world the attainment of the twentieth century death rates. The decline in death rates and increase in longevity have not, however, been accompanied by a decline in birth rates in the underdeveloped countries, and as they contain over two-thirds of the world's population the growth rate for the world as a whole is accelerating, and the population explosion is not only perpetuated but accelerated.

Four Stages of Demographic Transition

Demographers (experts on population problems) distinguish four stages of changes in the world population. The first stage, characteristic of all parts of the world before the seventeenth century, is that of high birth rates nearly balanced by high death rates, resulting in a slow growth of population. The second stage is one of high birth rates with declining or low death rates. Most of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are in this stage. The third stage is one of declining birth rates with declining or low death rates. In this stage are most of the countries of southern and eastern Europe, the U.S.S.R., Japan and Argentina. The fourth stage is one of low birth rates and low death rates with a slowly growing or even an essentially stationary, population. France was the first country to reach this stage, followed by England, Belgium, Austria, Germany and the Scandinavian countries. The United States was approaching this stage before the Second World War, but post-war birth rates have been high.

The countries which have reached the fourth stage are in a more favourable position than the others, but their present population is still too large, and their resources, even though great as those of highly developed industrial nations, have been recently depleted by the liquidation of colonial empires and trade losses. Most of the countries of the third stage of the cycle should be able to complete the transition. In most of the countries of eastern and southern Europe, including at present Italy, birth rates have recently declined. The birth rate of the U.S.S.R. is at present as low as that of the U.S.A. This is also true of Argentina. Japan has peculiar problems, and, in spite of a rapidly declining birth rate, is in a precarious position (see above, Chapter XXV), as her population is still growing at the rate of a million a year. In spite of their comparatively favourable position, the countries mentioned above found themselves in a desperate economic position at the end of the Second World War and most of them, with the exception of the U.S.S.R., could survive only on account of heavy American aid. Greece with only 25 per cent of her total land available for the growth of food, over-populated and unable to bring down the rate of population increase, was among the first nations to receive aid from Uncle Sam, who was too anxious to forestall Uncle Joe.

The countries in the second stage of transition vary greatly in their future prospects. Africa is not over-populated, but has made little economic progress. There has been a veritable population explosion in Latin America, specially since the Second World War, with accompaniment of economic misery for the masses and political instability (see above Chapter 29). Asia presents the greatest problem, and as it contains half of the world's population, the fate of humanity in like measure depends on a solution of its problems. Asia's arable land is already densely populated, and comparatively little new land is available for cultivation. Industrialization may be of great value in the developing economy of Asia but even in such countries as India where some appreciable industrial progress has been made, it is still—as a solution of stupendous problems—like the “ant biting the elephant”. In most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, population pressure has absorbed most of the advances made recently in agricultural production, and notwithstanding desperate measures adopted

by governments, such as India, to popularize birth control, it poses serious problems.

According to compilations of Dr. Shripati Chandrasekhar, Director of the Demographic Training and Research Centre of Bombay, India's current birth rate is estimated at 40 and death rate at 18 per thousand, resulting in a natural increase of 2.2 per cent a year (according to UN, 1.3 per cent). Life expectancy has increased from 32 years in the 1940's to 47.5 years at present. According to the 1961 census, the population was provisionally estimated at 438 million (UN estimate based on this census was 434.8 million). The rise of about 75 million between 1951 and 1961 (72 million according to UN) was nearly as large as that in the *two* preceding decades. The problem in India, according to Dr. Chandrasekhar, is not the rate of increase but the net addition to the existing population, in every decade. Because of the large size of India's population, even a modest rate of increase of 10 or 15 per cent may yield a net gain of 50 million, in itself larger than the population of any European country except Germany or Russia, or any Latin American country. And it is this large net addition that constitutes the problem, because it nullifies all efforts to improve the admittedly very low standard of living of the Indian people. "The increase in food production and national income achieved during the (first) plans, two five-year plans", says Dr. Chandrasekhar, "has hardly led to any appreciable improvement in the living standards of the people."

WORLD POPULATION PROBLEMS—THEIR IMPACT ON WORLD POLITICS

"Have" and "Have not" Nations

The significance of present and prospective rates of population growth lies in their impact on levels of living and world politics. Throughout history there have been important differences in standards of living both among and within nations. The fact has gained a new significance in recent times, and particularly since the Second World War. The "have not" nations, who represent some 71 per cent of the world population at the present day, now know that poverty and hunger are not inevitable, and they are striving to achieve higher standards of living. They know how the "have" nations have more

or less successfully grappled with the social and political conditions which are responsible for human misery and suffering, and they are anxious to follow the path chalked out by them so far, of course as it suits their own conditions. The first thing they sought to achieve was independence—for those among them who were suffering from colonial rule—and, as we have seen, to work together in the U.N. General Assembly and elsewhere to root out its traces wherever they remained. The passing by the General Assembly on 14 December 1960 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was a great achievement. These nations have made economic development a major national aspiration. This has also become an international goal as set forth in the Charter of the U.N. and as manifest in the foreign aid programmes, both governmental and private. It is probably correct to say that never in the history of the world has there been such a concerted, all out, world-wide effort, aided by all the scientific and technological knowledge that man has gained in the past centuries, to combat human misery.

Population Pressure and War

Their future is far from gloomy but the present condition of the "have-not" nations is fraught with peril. With all the efforts that they are making to better their lot such evidence as is available indicates that the disparities between the "have" and "have-not" nations are increasing rather than decreasing. Specially, as stated above, with their population still on the rise and outstripping the means of subsistence, a rise in living standards is hardly yet visible among the "have-not" nations. In any case, the way to improvement is bound to be a long and hard one, and the danger lurks in their—at least of those among them who are under totalitarian dictatorship—falling a prey to damagogues or leaders wedded to ideologies and being turned to the path of war. Today few, if any, people are willing to starve in peace.

Pope Urban II, in instituting the First Crusade, exhorted Christians of all nations to commit aggression on the infidels on grounds elaborated by him as follows: "Let none of your possessions detain you, to solicitude for your family affairs, since this land which you inhabit, shut in all sides by the sea and surrounded by mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; nor does it abound

in wealth ; and it furnishes scarcely food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder and devour one another and wage war and frequently you perish by mutual wounds. Let, therefore, hatred depart from among you ; let your quarrels and wars cease ; and let all dissensions and controversies slumber. Enter upon the road to the Holly Sepulchre ; wrest the land from the wicked race, and subject it to yourselves." The Holy Father was not the first and by no means the last, advocate of aggressive war as a solution of the population problem. In India, Peshwa Balaji Rao sought to justify the policy of Maratha expansion in Northern India on the ground that the latter abounded in food and riches, while his own land was barren and poor, and that, as Bhagirath brought Ganga from Kailas to earth to resurrect his people, he could divert the stream of plenty to a southerly course and bring prosperity to the South. The Conquistadors brought immense riches to Spain hoping thereby to solve the economic problems of their own land. The Dutch, Portuguese, British, French, and German colonial empires were formed and held by the sword in the belief that the resources of the conquered lands could be exploited for the furtherance of the commerce of the conquerors, and so to solve population and allied problems.

There was, however, a great outcry in England, when Mussolini used the population argument in support of his demand for colonies. Bismarck's Germany had argued on similar lines when she pressed for a "lebensraum" or for her "place in the sun", and Hitler in the *Mein Kampf* argued that Germany must fight Russia and wrest from her lands in eastern Europe so that they might be settled or resettled by German peasants. Both Hitler and Mussolini refused to adopt measures to dampen population growths in their lands, and indeed appealed for higher birth rates to provide larger armies so that they could invade and take the land of their neighbours. It may be mentioned that Germany adopted the policy at a time when the standard of living of her people was as high as in the advanced West European countries. Japan, with a large population which was rapidly growing and too small arable land, and prevented from sending her children as emigrants to countries like the U.S.A. and Australia, who could well afford to take them, embarked on a policy of conquest in China, as we have seen, with disastrous consequences.

Impact on Immigration Policies

At one time, the hungry and the poor in over-populated countries like China and Japan as well as the politically oppressed, or adventurous people of Europe were able to migrate to industrialized countries like the United States, which needed for its own development both unskilled labour and scientists and technicians. During 1820 to 1860 the U.S.A. admitted some two million immigrants, mostly from Europe. The Chinese began to come, followed by other Asians, from about 1840. In 1882, at the instigation of California, Congress passed the first anti-immigration measure, in contravention of a treaty negotiated two years earlier. In 1907, immigration was restricted by means of what is known as the "gentleman's agreement" between Japan and the U.S.A. In 1921, there was further legislation restricting immigration quantitatively and seeking to effect it qualitatively by a quota system, giving preferences to northern and west Europeans, with Orientals still barred except for small quotas granted to the Chinese, and some others. In 1922, a Supreme Court ruling debarred Hindus (Indians) from eligibility for naturalization. In 1924, an immigration act was passed aiming at the Japanese, who vigorously protested, and soon afterwards embarked on a policy of expansion in China, of Nazi Germany which drove thousands of Germans of Jewish origin, including the great Einstein, to seek refuge in other lands. The Anti-Semitic policies roused much unknown in America, but little was done to revise the policy of restricting immigration into America.

Migrations on a vaster scale affecting many countries began soon after the Second World War, and created serious problems. These migrants were penniless, homeless, refugees, uprooted from their native soil, and drifting aimlessly and unaware of what was to be their final asylum, or if there was to be one such at all. They were too many to mention here, but some of the worst sufferers, numbering millions, were the Germans, expelled from the Sudetanland, Poland, and the East European states; the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, who (after the creation of the two states of India and Pakistan), had to leave the lands they had been inhabiting for centuries, the Arabs who fled Palestine in 1948, etc. Millions died in the horrible process, millions

more disappeared, and millions who have been "rehabilitated" have still to wait to feel that the earth under their feet is firm enough.

International action, through agencies of the U.N., to solve the problem of these refugees, was pitifully slow to come, and when it came was too inadequate. The International Refugee Organization (I.R.O.) helped to remove a million refugees to overseas countries. The I.R.O. is now out of existence and has been replaced by an Intergovernmental Committee, (I.C.E.M.), which, by the end of 1956, assisted some 142,000 Hungarians who had fled their country after the abortive rising of that year to get permanent asylum in 35 countries. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees provided protection for 12 lakh refugees under its mandate. The U.N. created the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees in the Middle East countries surrounding Israel; more than one million refugees, half under the age of 18, registered with the Agency. The task of rehabilitating the refugees was made extremely difficult, because of the refusal of Australia to budge an inch from her "White Australia" policy, the discontinuance by France of her policy of importing Italian, Polish and other foreign workers to replenish her falling population, the refusal of the U.S.A. to liberalize her immigration policy, and, above all, the refusal of all the receiving countries to accept any but white entrants, and of these only those of their own choice.

Impact on World Alignments

The problem of the "uprooted" and the "homeless" man has had an adverse bearing on the economies of many countries overburdened as they are by their constant increasing populations. In the desperate plight in which they find themselves placed, they have had no option but to ask for foreign aid. Both the "free world" and the Communist nations are ready to help—in fact, the two are competing with each other to be able to do so as a way of winning their allegiance to themselves. The Communist nations are in an advantageous position in the matter: they can appeal to anti-imperialist sentiment, accuse the Western nations of having brought about their present misery by their exploitation of the undeveloped world in the past, and offer them loans and services on easier payment terms than the West. To the extent, then, that population growth is a factor impeding

economic development it is one that contributes, however indirectly, to social unrest, political instability and threats to peace that are exacerbated by the Cold War.

Impact on Sino-Soviet Rift

It is possible that besides the ideological conflict the disparity in their economic development is one of the causes of the growing rift between the U.S.S.R. and China. With a population approximating 700 million and growth rate of about 2 per cent per year, China is a "have-not" country. Its failure to control population growth may increase pressure for expansion that may threaten not only her neighbours to the south but her great neighbour to the north. The U.S.S.R. may find that she has more in common with the "have" than with the "have-not" nations, while China may try to form her own bloc by seeking allies primarily among the "have-not" nations. This means that even if the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. find a *modus vivendi*, world tensions will remain, calling for population control.

POPULATION AND FOOD

According to authoritative estimates, a third of the world's population may be said to enjoy adequate diets, and the remaining two-thirds do not have it. The number of people "underfed" is stated to be 44 per cent in Europe, 80 per cent in Latin America, 93 per cent in Africa and 98 per cent in Asia. Reliable estimates of the "underfed" are not available for the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., but according to one estimate in the 1930's, 20-30 per cent of the people in the United States were undernourished. Agriculture was a constant headache for Khrushchev, and his failure to improve its prospects was probably one of the causes of his downfall. From many other evidences, it seems that the U.S.S.R. has not ample food, and that the percentage of inadequately fed people there may be as large as was America's in the 1930s.

Many countries have not enough arable land to feed present populations adequately. England has 4 acre per capita, and though her farmers are sturdy and the yield is high, has to import 60 per cent of her food. In general one acre of land is sufficient to provide a good diet for one person, but many countries do not have this much of land per person, and have to import food, or go hungry.

Japan with 15 acre per person is able to provide its population an average of 2,150 calories per person by importing about a fifth of her food and by developing a fishery which furnishes about 70 pounds of fish per capita each year. China, with about half an acre per person, is perhaps able to provide adequate food to her present population, but not for many more. India has about 8 per acre of cultivated land per capita, perhaps sufficient to feed the present population, but, while increased yield and more acreage of cultivation are possible with the aid of science, she may still be unable to afford better living standards for her people, says Dr. Chandrasekhar, unless a substantial number of people, now dependent on agriculture are transferred to some other productive employment, such as industry. Java, with very fertile land, has difficulty in providing adequate food with about half an acre per person. At the other extreme are the U.S.A., Australia and Canada, with 2.9, 4.0, and 6.5 acres per capita respectively, and perhaps 50 per cent more which could be cultivated, if necessary; they have ample food and some to spare, and could provide adequate food to a much larger population, if necessary.

As we have seen above, with the help of modern medicines and public health services, the underdeveloped countries have been able to reduce the death rate, but the birth rate remains high, and there has been a population explosion. Food production is not keeping pace with production growth, and there is no appreciable improvement yet in the standard of living.

PROBABLE SOLUTIONS

Discussions regarding population increase and food supply have resulted in the enunciation of two extreme points of view. There are the neo-Malthusians who maintain that unless active steps are taken to encourage birth control in the highly populated and frequently food-deficit areas, all efforts at economic development will be frustrated by explosive increases in population. On the other hand, there are those who maintain that there are vast areas of the world not yet cultivated which can be brought into food production and also enormous water resources which can be made available for irrigation and the production of power. They maintain that there is no reason to assume:

that the world could not both raise nutritionable levels and at the same time feed an almost infinitely increasing population.

More than 150 years ago Malthus, English clergyman and economist, expressed the opinion that populations tend to grow faster than do the means of subsistence and must be controlled either by "positive checks" which result in high death rates or by "preventive checks" which result in low birth rates. Malthus did not approve of artificial birth control and had little faith in "prudential restraint" in married life. He believed that excessive population growth, and the resulting hunger and poverty, were inevitable. Soon after his dismal prophecies were uttered, the development of railways and of steamships opened up great new sources of food supplies. The development of railways provided the great potential wheat-producing areas of Russia with outlets at the Black Sea ports, and trade in wheat and other cereals developed from Odessa, Taganrog, and Novorossiysk. Other supply sources were gradually developed. The middle western United States and the prairie provinces of Canada yielded huge quantities of cereals and a variety of animal food products. Further supplies were provided by agricultural developments in Argentina and Uruguay, sheep and wheat production in Australia and sheep and dairying in New Zealand. Industrial Europe tided over the crisis and for a hundred years there were little anxieties about food.

Today there is a greater crisis, as has been explained in the above pages. Optimists, however, are of opinion that science will yet find means of increasing the world's food supply. Dr. Robert Salter of the United States Department of Agriculture estimated that some 300 million acres of new land could be brought into cultivation in the North Temperate Zone, and 1000 million acres in the tropics. This new land, and a 30 per cent increase in yields of land now cultivated will feed well at least for some time the increased population of the world. Others have pointed out that science may find out means of producing new synthetic foods. Solar activity may be harnessed for the production, through the action of some chemically prepared forms of chlorophyll, of new synthetic foods, such as sugars and fats, and both carbohydrates and proteins may be developed through the cultivation of algae (seaweeds) or of plankton in brackish and fresh water.

Critics point out that these are future possibilities which cannot be taken into account in assessing the present relationship between population trends and food production. The remedy lies, they say, in rapid control of the birth rate by artificial methods. The Communist position, as expressed in a statement by Vasily Nemchinov, a member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Science, is as follows : "Food shortages in many countries spring from defects in their social and economic systems. If the survivals of semifeudal relationships in agriculture are eliminated, and if agriculture is freed from the insupportable burden of land rent, the situation will change...Soviet people believe that, given a rational social system, the achievements of modern science and technology should make it possible to attain a genuine abundance of food in each country and throughout the world...The solution of the world's food problem lies not in reducing the growth of population, but in the radical reorganization of the economic and technical aspects of agricultural production."

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
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Prof. S.N. Dhar (b. 1897) took his M.A. Degree from the Calcutta University and has spent forty years of his life in teaching. He was the head of the History Department, Holkar College, Indore, for twenty-seven years where he was engaged in post-graduate teaching and guidance of research work and also in organizing historical archives. He was delegated to the Indian Historical Records Commission, Government of India, by the Indore Government and later by the Madhya Bharat Government.

Prof. Dhar was Secretary, Board of Secondary Education, Madhya Bharat, and Additional Controller of Examinations, Calcutta University, for few years. He has served the universities of Agra, Delhi, Jadavpur, Punjab etc. in various capacities. He is the author of *Europe Between Two World Wars, 1918-1939*, *Atomic Weapons in World Politics* and *A Comprehensive Biography of Swami Vivekananda*.

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